RALPH K. WINTER
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 16 day of January, two thousand fourteen. PRESENT:
RALPH K. WINTER,
CHESTER J. STRAUB,
PETER W. HALL,
Circuit Judges.
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:
George Heath, pro se, Brooklyn, NY.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:
Andrew W. Amend, Assistant Solicitor General
of Counsel, (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor
General, Michael S. Belohlavek, Senior
Counsel, on the brief), for Eric T.
Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of
New York, NY, representing the State
Defendants.
Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the
Eastern District of New York (Varuni Nelson,
Margaret M. Kolbe and Matthew Silverman,
Assistant United States Attorneys of Counsel,
on the brief), Brooklyn, NY, representing the
Federal Defendants.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Amon, C.J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant George Heath, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court's judgment dismissing his action against several state and federal judges, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
A district court has the inherent authority to "dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee." Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000). Although we have not resolved whether such dismissals are reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion, we need not reach that issue to affirm the district court's decision "because [it] easily passes muster under the more rigorous de novo review." Id. at 364 n.2. The district court properly dismissed Heath's claims as barred by absolute judicial immunity. Judges when "acting in a judicial capacity[,] are entitled to absolute immunity." Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999). Because all the actions taken by the judicial defendants and complained of by Heath were actions taken in their judicial capacity and in connection with Heath's federal and state court proceedings, Heath's claims are foreclosed by absolute immunity.
We have considered Heath's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk