Laplante v. Milton Hosp.

The plaintiff, Father Philip LaPlante, appeals from a judgment entered in the Superior Court in favor of the defendant, Milton Hospital (hospital), in an action alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of G.L. c. 93A arising out of the hospital's alleged failure to honor a health care proxy. Concluding that LaPlante's claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, the judge allowed the hospital's motion to dismiss under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). We affirm.

Background. In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 12(b)(6), we take as true “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiff's favor.” Marram v. Kobrick Offshore Fund, Ltd., 442 Mass. 43, 45 (2004), quoting from Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 420 Mass. 404, 407 (1995). According to the facts alleged in the complaint, LaPlante is a retired Marist priest who was admitted to Milton Hospital in September of 2005 to treat a neurological condition known as normal pressure hydrocephalus. LaPlante contends that on September 5, 2005, he executed a health care proxy which designated his attorney-in-fact, Susan Gallagher, as the proxy. Miriam Clifton, a hospital employee, witnessed the execution of the proxy. About one week later, a neurological consultant employed by the hospital determined that LaPlante was healthy enough to be discharged. LaPlante informed the doctor that he wished to be discharged “home.” LaPlante was instead discharged to the Marist Fathers' facility on September 14, 2005. LaPlante contends that the hospital (and Clifton) failed to honor the proxy and obtain Gallagher's consent before discharging him to the facility, and that this failure amounted to extreme and outrageous conduct warranting a finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and also constituted an unfair or deceptive act under G.L. c. 93A. As the judge noted, the complaint was filed in April, 2012, well beyond the three-year statutes of limitations for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, G.L. c. 260, § 2A, and for medical malpractice, G.L. c. 260, § 4, and the four-year statute of limitations for c. 93A actions, G.L. c. 260, § 5A. This defect is apparent from the face of the complaint. LaPlante's attempts to argue that the discovery rule applied to toll the limitations period are unavailing as there is nothing inherently unknowable about the hospital's failure to honor the health care proxy, which occurred in 2005. See Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 243–244 (1991). Although the complaint alleges that Gallagher did not discover the hospital's actions until February, 2012, while reviewing medical records, that assertion is belied by the other factual assertions in the complaint detailing her attempts at the time to enforce the health care proxy, and her alleged coerced agreement to the discharge. Given our conclusion, it is not necessary to address the hospital's remaining arguments in support of its motion to dismiss. The judgment is affirmed.

So ordered.
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