PER CURIAM.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Wendy S. Loquasto, Special Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Matthew Pavese, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Opinion
PER CURIAM.
Zavon DeShawn Taylor appeals from his judgment and sentence for unarmed carjacking. Although the circuit court attempted to strike certain costs pursuant to Taylor's request in a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2), the circuit court did so after its jurisdiction under that rule expired. Therefore, we must declare the corrected judgment and sentence a ity and remand for re-entry of that order. See Calidonio v. State, 951 So.2d 87, 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (explaining that an order entered after the expiration of the time for ruling on a motion under Rule 3.800(b)(2) is a ity); Sessions v. State, 907 So.2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). We also reverse as to an error in the separate order of probation. The circuit court improperly imposed a condition requiring Taylor to “obtain” a GED or high school
diploma. See Rodriguez v. State, 768 So.2d 1234, 1236 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), overruled on other grounds as stated in Mier v. State, 58 So.3d 319, 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). We remand for the court to modify this condition to conform to the requirements of section 948.037(1), Florida Statutes (2012), which would require Taylor to make a “good faith effort” to achieve such skills or diploma. We affirm as to Taylor's remaining arguments. As the acts required by this opinion are ministerial in nature, Taylor need not be present for the court to undertake them.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.
WETHERELL, RAY, and KELSEY, JJ., concur.