PETER B. SKELOS
Wand Powers & Goody, LLP, Huntington, N.Y., for appellant. Kim Cardalena, Floral Park, N.Y., for respondent.
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, SANDRA L. SGROI, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.
In an action for divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Bruno, J.), dated May 31, 2012, which, after a hearing, granted the plaintiff's motion for an award of counsel fees.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
An award of reasonable counsel fees in a matrimonial action is a matter within the discretion of the trial court ( seeDomestic Relations Law § 237; DeCabrera v. Cabrera–Rosete, 70 N.Y.2d 879, 881, 524 N.Y.S.2d 176, 518 N.E.2d 1168;O'Shea v. O'Shea, 93 N.Y.2d 187, 190, 689 N.Y.S.2d 8, 711 N.E.2d 193). In determining a motion for such fees, the trial court must consider, inter alia, the relative financial circumstances of the parties ( see Guzzo v. Guzzo, 110 A.D.3d 765, 973 N.Y.S.2d 265;Sotnik v. Zavilyansky, 101 A.D.3d 1102, 956 N.Y.S.2d 514;Chaudry v. Chaudry, 95 A.D.3d 1058, 945 N.Y.S.2d 110;Siskind v. Siskind, 89 A.D.3d 832, 933 N.Y.S.2d 60;Raynor v. Raynor, 68 A.D.3d 835, 839, 890 N.Y.S.2d 601).
Here, the Supreme Court based its award of counsel fees on the disparity in the parties' income. Further, the defendant's testimony at the hearing regarding his employment and other financial matters was of questionable credibility. Under these and other circumstances, the award of counsel fees was a provident exercise of discretion ( see Guzzo v. Guzzo, 110 A.D.3d 765, 973 N.Y.S.2d 265;Sotnik v. Zavilyansky, 101 A.D.3d 1102, 956 N.Y.S.2d 514;Chaudry v. Chaudry, 95 A.D.3d 1058, 945 N.Y.S.2d 110;Siskind v. Siskind, 89 A.D.3d 832, 933 N.Y.S.2d 60;Raynor v. Raynor, 68 A.D.3d at 839, 890 N.Y.S.2d 601).