FRIEDMAN
Tuttle Yick LLP, New York (Jeffrey T. Yick of counsel), for appellant. Bryan Ha, White Plains, for respondent.
FRIEDMAN, J.P., RENWICK, MOSKOWITZ, RICHTER, FEINMAN, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Manuel J. Mendez, J.), entered on or about March 19, 2013, which, inter alia, granted defendant's motion to renew and reargue plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and, upon renewal/reargument, denied plaintiff's motion, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
The motion court properly reconsidered its decision because there are issues of fact whether plaintiff seeks to recover a “finder's/broker's fee” for services rendered in connection with the purchase of real property, although he did not have a broker's license when he rendered the services ( seeReal Property Law § 442–d). That defendant signed a promissory note and a letter agreement (setting forth essentially the same promise as in the promissory note) would not render plaintiff's action proper ( see Levinson v. Genesse Assoc., 172 A.D.2d 400, 568 N.Y.S.2d 780 [1st Dept.1991];Sorice v. Du Bois, 25 A.D.2d 521, 267 N.Y.S.2d 227 [1st Dept.1966];Futersak v. Perl, 84 A.D.3d 1309, 923 N.Y.S.2d 728 [2d Dept.2011],lv. denied18 N.Y.3d 943, 944 N.Y.S.2d 466, 967 N.E.2d 690 [2012] ). Nor does the general release signed by defendant entitle plaintiff to summary judgment. It is plaintiff who may not bring or maintain this action if the money sought or any portion thereof is for a finder's or broker's fee and he did not have a broker's or salesman's license ( seeReal Property Law 442–d).