JACK B. JACOBS
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County, Cr. I.D. Nos. 1101021521 and 1004011471.
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices.
ORDER
JACK B. JACOBS, Justice.
This 4th day of September 2012, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that:
1. Randy Wright, the defendant-below (“Wright”), appeals from his convictions of multiple weapons charges and Resisting Arrest, after a Superior Court jury trial during which he represented himself. On appeal, Wright argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel before trial, because the Superior Court's pre-waiver colloquy with him was legally inadequate. We disagree and affirm.
2. On January 31, 2011, while sitting in the driver's seat of a car parked on Ninth and Monroe Streets in Wilmington, Wright was approached by police officers. The officers searched Wright's car and found a handgun. Wright was later indicted on the following charges: Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited; Possession of a Firearm with a Removed, Obliterated or Altered Serial Number; Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited; and Resisting Arrest.
3. On August 16, 2011, the date scheduled for trial, Wright informed his court-appointed counsel and the Superior Court that he no longer wanted appointed counsel to represent him. Wright disagreed with counsel's decision not to call a juvenile fact witness who would testify favorably for Wright (by claiming ownership of the gun). Counsel refused to call the witness on ethical grounds.
4. After Wright brought his wishes to the Superior Court's attention, the court and Wright engaged in an extended colloquy about the ramifications of his decision. (At certain points, Wright also conferred with his court-appointed counsel.) The transcript reveals that during that colloquy, Wright inquired, and was informed about, the following issues relating to his counsel's withdrawal: (i) the logistics of Wright's calling witnesses generally, including witnesses who were not subpoenaed or present in court that day; (ii) whether Wright would be permitted to call the juvenile witness whose testimony Wright's counsel refused to present; (iii) whether Wright's decision to proceed pro se would affect the State's ability to introduce his past criminal record as evidence against him; and (iv) whether Wright would be afforded time to review the evidence that the State planned to present, as well as his case file generally. After Wright completed the Waiver of Counsel form, the Superior Court and Wright then engaged in a more formal colloquy. In that colloquy, the court informed Wright of “the danger and disadvantages of self-representation,” and confirmed that Wright understood all of them.
5. Wright's sole claim of error on appeal is that his waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing and voluntary and, therefore, violated the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Wright relies primarily on our decision in Smith v. State for the key premise of his claim. Specifically, Wright argues that the Superior Court's interrogation of the defendant—called for by the so-called “ Welty ” factors—was inadequate and caused his waiver to be not “knowing and voluntary,” thereby requiring reversal of his conviction. Our review of the validity of a criminal defendant's waiver of his constitutional right to counsel is de novo.
.996 A.2d 786 (Del.2010).
Briscoe v. State, 606 A.2d 103, 107 (Del.1992) (citing U.S. v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185 (3d Cir.1982)).
Smith, 996 A.2d at 790 (citation omitted).
6. Wright's case is plainly distinguishable from Smith, where: (i) the defendant's answers were “not responsive” to the critical Welty questions posed by that trial court, and (ii) the court “never made a [knowing and voluntary waiver] determination on the record.” Neither circumstance is present here. Moreover, in Smith, this Court recognized that a “knowing and intelligent waiver can occur without reviewing each of [the Welty ] factors in haec verba.” The concern in Smith was that “the trial judge did not ascertain enough information to establish a basis for a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.” Here, in contrast, the defendant confirmed that he understood the trial court's questioning, and also displayed a sophisticated knowledge of the judicial process. For example, Wright inquired about specific consequences of his counsel's withdrawal and sought time to review the case file and/or locate witnesses. The record demonstrates that Wright made an informed and voluntary choice—because of his disagreement with counsel's advice—to proceed pro se. His claim of a constitutional violation lacks merit.
Id. at 791–92.
Id. at 792.
Id.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
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