Certiorari Denied, Jan. 14, 2015, No. 35,032.
Affirmed.
Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee. Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender, Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.
{1} This case comes to us a second time following a “limited remand” previously ordered by this Court to obtain discovery and information regarding the calculation of Defendant Sidney Patrick Ortiz's earned meritorious deductions. Following an amended judgment and order, Defendant contends that the district court erred in determining that the Earned Meritorious Deductions Act (EMDA), NMSA 1978, Section 33–2–34 (1999, amended 2006), does not apply to a term of probation, even when the probation is served during a period of incarceration on another sentence. Defendant also challenges the imposition of parole, maintaining that New Mexico law does not require him to serve multiple periods of parole on consecutive counts. We affirm the rulings of the district court.
{13} Defendant additionally argues, pursuant to State v. Franklin, 1967–NMSC–151, ¶ 9, 78 N.M. 127, 428 P.2d 982, and State v. Boyer, 1985–NMCA–029, ¶¶ 17–24, 103 N.M. 655, 712 P.2d 1, that he should not be required to again serve parole after he already served one period of parole. He maintains that the parole statutes do not provide for multiple parole periods to be served on consecutive counts. We note at the outset that Defendant's argument is vague and appears to be incomplete. See Headley, 2005–NMCA–045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076 (declining to entertain a cursory argument that relied on several factual assertions that were made without citation to the record). However, because the argument is presented to us pursuant to Franklin and Boyer, we address it to the extent we are able.
{14} Our Legislature has provided that the period of parole that follows a sentence of imprisonment “shall be deemed to be part of the sentence of the convicted person.” NMSA 1978, § 31–18–15(C) (1999, amended 2007). Furthermore, our Supreme Court has already determined that “in the case of consecutive sentencing, the parole period of each offense commences immediately after the period of imprisonment for that offense, and such parole time will run concurrently with the running of any subsequent basic sentence then being served.” Brock v. Sullivan, 1987–NMSC–013, ¶ 13, 105 N.M. 412, 733 P.2d 860. Accordingly, we determine that Defendant must serve each period of parole to which he was separately sentenced by the district court.
{15} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court.
{16}
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