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Attorney(S)

Dopf, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Martin B. Adams of counsel), for appellant Lutheran Medical Center. Vaslas Lepowsky Hauss & Danke, LLP, Staten Island, N.Y. (Ida A. Caputo of counsel), for appellant Maimonides Medical Center.

Judges

Ruth C. Balkin

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: Anthony Brown v. Lutheran Medical Center, et al. (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, N.Y., June 19, 2013)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Knipel, J.), dated February 6, 2012, which granted branches of the plaintiff's motion to strike certain affirmative defenses asserted by the defendants Lutheran Medical Center and Maimonides Medical Center.

Underlying events described in the opinion: in March 2007 the plaintiff's wife, Sharline Brown, allegedly sustained injuries from the defendants' medical malpractice. In July 2009 the plaintiff commenced a first action individually and as proposed guardian ad litem for Sharline to recover, inter alia, for medical malpractice. While that first action was pending Sharline died. More than a year after her death, and before any substitution of her estate as plaintiff, the Supreme Court dismissed the first action. The dismissal was denominated “with prejudice.” Subsequently, the plaintiff was appointed administrator of Sharline's estate and, within six months after dismissal of the first action, he commenced the present action as administrator and individually, adding a wrongful death cause of action in addition to those asserted in the first action.

After separate answers by the defendants, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the defendants' affirmative defenses of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the statute of limitations, and also moved to dismiss Maimonides Medical Center's affirmative defense of laches. The Supreme Court granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion, and the defendants separately appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the dismissal of the first action, though denominated "with prejudice," operated as a final judgment on the merits that would preclude the plaintiff from bringing the present action under doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel.
Whether the plaintiff was entitled to a six-month extension of the statute of limitations under CPLR 205(a) to commence the present action after being appointed administrator of the decedent's estate.
Whether the defendant Maimonides Medical Center established laches by demonstrating prejudice resulting from the delay in appointing a proper party to assert Sharline's claims.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

The dismissal of the first action, labeled "with prejudice," barred the plaintiff from prosecuting the same claims in the subsequent action under res judicata and/or collateral estoppel.
The plaintiff's present action was time-barred; the statute of limitations defense was asserted.
(Maimonides only) The doctrine of laches applied because of delay in having a proper party to pursue Sharline's claims and the defendant asserted potential prejudice from that delay.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

The plaintiff moved to dismiss the defendants' affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel on the ground that the dismissal of the first action was not intended to operate as a final judgment on the merits, because the plaintiff purportedly lacked capacity to sue at the time the first action was commenced (citing CPLR 3211[a][3]).
The plaintiff asserted entitlement to the six-month extension provided by CPLR 205(a) after appointment as administrator, making the present action timely.
The plaintiff showed lack of prejudice to the defendants from the delay in appointing a proper party, opposing the laches defense (and specifically disputing that Maimonides had shown any possibility of prejudice).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Yonkers Contr. Co. v. Port Auth. Trans–Hudson Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 375, 379–380	Illustrates circumstances where a dismissal is not a final, preclusive judgment on the merits.	The court relied on the principle to conclude that, despite the first action being denominated "with prejudice," the Supreme Court had not intended to preclude the plaintiff from commencing a new action once he acquired capacity; therefore the dismissal was not preclusive under res judicata or collateral estoppel.
Carrick v. Central Gen. Hosp., 51 N.Y.2d 242, 249	Application/interpretation of CPLR 205(a), providing a six-month extension to commence an action after a party obtains capacity.	Used to support the conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to the six-month extension under CPLR 205(a), rendering the present action timely.
George v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 170, 174–175	Further authority regarding application of CPLR 205(a) to permit commencement of suit within six months after acquiring capacity.	Applied alongside Carrick to uphold the plaintiff's entitlement to the CPLR 205(a) extension.
Egan v. Neghavi, 84 A.D.3d 1014, 1014	Case law recognizing the six-month extension under CPLR 205(a) in analogous circumstances.	Relied upon to support the court's conclusion that the statute-of-limitations defense should be dismissed.
Dwyer v. Mazzola, 171 A.D.2d 726, 727	Authority discussing whether delay in appointment of a proper party results in prejudice to a defendant.	The court cited Dwyer in evaluating whether the delay in appointing an administrator prejudiced Maimonides; the plaintiff had shown lack of prejudice and Dwyer supported that analysis.
Rosenfeld v. Rosenblum, 176 A.D.2d 645, 646	Authority on the necessity for a defendant asserting laches to demonstrate the possibility of prejudice from delay.	The court applied Rosenfeld to conclude that Maimonides failed to demonstrate the possibility of prejudice and thus laches did not bar the claim.
Galasso, Langione & Botter, LLP v. Liotti, 81 A.D.3d 880, 882–883	Discusses the standard for demonstrating prejudice in laches and related delay contexts.	Cited as a comparative authority in the court's discussion of laches and prejudice; the court distinguished any showing made by Maimonides as insufficient under the cited standards.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Appellate Division evaluated the Supreme Court's order and analyzed the legal effect of the dismissal of the first action and the viability of the defendants' affirmative defenses.

On the preclusion defenses (res judicata and collateral estoppel): the court observed that although the first action's dismissal was labeled "with prejudice," the trial court did not intend to bar the plaintiff from commencing a new action once he obtained the capacity to sue (the opinion references CPLR 3211[a][3] in this context). Because the dismissal was not meant to operate as a final judgment on the merits, it was not preclusive under res judicata or collateral estoppel. The court cited Yonkers Contr. Co. to support that principle and affirmed the grant of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss those affirmative defenses.
On the statute-of-limitations defense: the court concluded the plaintiff was entitled to the six-month extension under CPLR 205(a) after appointment as administrator of the decedent's estate. The court relied on established authorities (Carrick; George; Egan) interpreting CPLR 205(a) to hold that the present action was timely, and thus properly dismissed the statute-of-limitations affirmative defense.
On laches (Maimonides only): the court considered whether the delay in appointing a proper party to assert Sharline's claims prejudiced Maimonides. The opinion notes that the plaintiff made a showing as to lack of prejudice and that Maimonides failed to demonstrate even the possibility of prejudice from the delay. The court relied on authorities (Dwyer; Rosenfeld; and comparative citation to Galasso) addressing the requirement that a defendant asserting laches must show prejudice. Because Maimonides did not meet that burden, the laches defense was properly dismissed.
Result: the Appellate Division affirmed that portion of the Supreme Court's order granting the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the specified affirmative defenses. The opinion states the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's order insofar as appealed from, which granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendants' affirmative defenses of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and statute of limitations, and to strike Maimonides Medical Center's affirmative defense of laches. The affirmation was accompanied by an award of one bill of costs.

Implications and direct effects:

The defendants' asserted affirmative defenses of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and statute of limitations were dismissed and may not be asserted to bar the present action on the record and reasoning provided in this opinion.
Maimonides' laches defense was dismissed for failure to demonstrate the possibility of prejudice from the delay in appointing a proper party.
The court's rulings were grounded in preexisting statutory and case law (CPLR 3211[a][3]; CPLR 205[a]; and the cited cases). The opinion resolves the parties' dispute on these motions but does not purport to announce a novel legal doctrine or broader departure from cited precedent; its immediate effect is to allow the plaintiff's present action to proceed without those particular affirmative defenses.

This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion and does not include any information beyond that text.

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Anthony BROWN, etc., respondent, v. LUTHERAN MEDICAL CENTER, et al., appellants.

RUTH C. BALKIN

Dopf, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Martin B. Adams of counsel), for appellant Lutheran Medical Center. Vaslas Lepowsky Hauss & Danke, LLP, Staten Island, N.Y. (Ida A. Caputo of counsel), for appellant Maimonides Medical Center.
Joseph M. Lichtenstein, P.C., Mineola, N.Y., for respondents.
RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, PLUMMER E. LOTT, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.

In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice and wrongful death, etc., the defendants, Lutheran Medical Center and Maimonides Medical Center, separately appeal, as limited by their respective briefs, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Knipel, J.), dated February 6, 2012, as granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to strike certain affirmative defenses asserted in their respective answers.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

In March 2007, the plaintiff's wife, Sharline Brown, allegedly sustained injuries as a result of the defendants' medical malpractice. In July 2009, the plaintiff commenced an action (hereinafter the first action) individually and as proposed guardian ad litem for Sharline, seeking to recover, inter alia, damages for medical malpractice. While the first action was pending, Sharline died. More than a year later, and prior to any substitution of her estate as plaintiff, the Supreme Court dismissed the first action. The dismissal was denominated as being “with prejudice.” Subsequently, the plaintiff was appointed as administrator of Sharline's estate, and, within six months after the first action was dismissed, he commenced the present action, as administrator and individually. In the present action, the plaintiff alleged a cause of action to recover damages for wrongful death in addition to the causes of action asserted in the first action. After the defendants separately answered the complaint, the plaintiff moved to dismiss their affirmative defenses of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the statute of limitations, and the affirmative defense, asserted only by the defendant Maimonides Medical Center (hereinafter Maimonides), of laches. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion, and the defendants separately appeal.

The record makes clear that, notwithstanding its denomination of the dismissal of the first action as “with prejudice,” the Supreme Court did not intend to preclude the plaintiff from commencing a new action once he acquired the capacity to sue, which he purportedly lacked when he commenced the first action ( seeCPLR 3211[a][3] ). Consequently, as the Supreme Court stated in the order appealed from, the dismissal of the first action was not a final judgment on the merits and it was not preclusive, under either res judicata or collateral estoppel, of claims or issues in the present action ( cf. Yonkers Contr. Co. v. Port Auth. Trans–Hudson Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 375, 379–380, 690 N.Y.S.2d 512, 712 N.E.2d 678). Thus, the court properly granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to dismiss the affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

The Supreme Court also properly granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to dismiss the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations, inasmuch as the plaintiff was entitled to the six-month extension of the statute of limitations provided under CPLR 205(a) ( see Carrick v. Central Gen. Hosp., 51 N.Y.2d 242, 249, 434 N.Y.S.2d 130, 414 N.E.2d 632;George v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 170, 174–175, 417 N.Y.S.2d 231, 390 N.E.2d 1156;Egan v. Neghavi, 84 A.D.3d 1014, 1014, 922 N.Y.S.2d 800).

Finally, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to dismiss Maimonides' affirmative defense of laches. In opposition to the plaintiff's showing as to the lack of prejudice to Maimonides from any delay in the appointment of a proper party to assert Sharline's claims ( see Dwyer v. Mazzola, 171 A.D.2d 726, 727, 567 N.Y.S.2d 281), Maimonides failed to demonstrate the possibility of prejudice from that delay ( see Rosenfeld v. Rosenblum, 176 A.D.2d 645, 646, 575 N.Y.S.2d 73;cf. Galasso, Langione & Botter, LLP v. Liotti, 81 A.D.3d 880, 882–883, 917 N.Y.S.2d 664).

Brown v. Lutheran Med. Ctr.