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Attorney(S)

Attorney-General for the State. Seawell and Manly for the prisoner.

Judges

TAYLOR, C. J.

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Smart Summary

Case Summary: The State v. Mason Scott

Factual and Procedural Background

The prisoner, Mason Scott, was indicted, tried, and convicted at the Superior Court for Wake County at April Term, 1820, before Judge Paxton. He was charged with the murder of "a negro man slave, Caleb, the property of Frederick S. Marshall" and the indictment concluded against the form of an act of the General Assembly and against the peace and dignity of the State. The deceased was stabbed with a dagger at about 10 o'clock at night.

During juror selection one Daniel Peck was asked under oath whether he had formed or expressed an opinion unfavorable to the prisoner; Peck answered he had not and was sworn as a juror. After conviction, the prisoner moved for a new trial on four grounds: (1) that juror Peck had made up an opinion before being sworn; (2) that juror Peck was insane and lacked capacity; (3) that the court rejected proper evidence offered on the prisoner's behalf (specifically the prisoner's declarations and conversations the morning after the homicide to prove insanity); and (4) that the court misdirected the jury regarding proof of the title/ownership of the deceased slave as alleged in the indictment. The court overruled the motion for a new trial, refused the prisoner's request for benefit of clergy, sentenced him to death, and he appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a juror's out-of-court declaration, that he had "made up his opinion" prior to being sworn, suffices to warrant a new trial when the juror denied that statement under oath when examined as a juror.
Whether evidence offered after trial showing that a juror was allegedly insane supports a new trial.
Whether a defendant's declarations and conversations (specifically those made the morning after the homicide) are admissible evidence to prove the defendant's insanity at the time of the homicide.
Whether the State was required to prove, as laid in the indictment, that the deceased slave was the property of the named owner (F. S. Marshall), i.e., whether proof of ownership as alleged is essential to the offense charged.
Whether the defendant convicted of killing a slave is entitled to the benefit of clergy, given statutory changes (including the act of 1817) and prior statutes (including 23 Hen. VIII ch. 1) relating to taking away clergy from murder.

Arguments of the Parties

Prisoner's (Defendant's) Arguments

That juror Peck had in fact stated before being sworn that he "had made up his opinion," and that this should support a new trial.
That juror Peck was insane or deranged and therefore lacked capacity to serve; affidavits were offered to that effect.
That the court erred in excluding evidence of the prisoner's own declarations and conversations the morning after the homicide, which his counsel offered to show he was insane at the time of the killing.
That the court should have instructed the jury that the evidence did not sufficiently prove the alleged ownership of the slave Caleb as laid in the indictment.
That the prisoner was entitled to the benefit of clergy and thus should not suffer the death penalty.

State's Arguments

The Attorney-General produced testimony to establish that the deceased, Caleb, belonged to S. Marshall and thereafter to his only child, F. S. Marshall, to support the allegation of ownership in the indictment.
Implicit in the prosecution's position (as adopted by the court) was that the juror's earlier out-of-court statement was not sufficient to overturn the verdict, that the proffered declarations of the prisoner were inadmissible unless pars res gestae, and that ownership of the slave as laid in the indictment need not be strictly proved because ownership is not of the essence of the offense.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Pye's case	Principle that proof of an allegation about location/ownership in an indictment (as in Pye) may be immaterial to the essence of the offense.	Applied analogously to hold that the ownership of the slave is not of the essence of the offense; therefore a defect in proving ownership as laid in the indictment is not fatal.
Susanna Johnson	The opinion references this case alongside Pye to support the position regarding immateriality of certain allegations.	Used to reinforce the Court's view that proof of ownership as laid in the indictment is not essential to the crime charged.
S. v. Kimbrough	The provided opinion lists this case as cited; no rule or principle drawn from it is described in the text provided.	The opinion lists it among cited authorities; the provided text does not explain how the court applied it.
Norwood v. Marrow	The provided opinion lists this case as cited; no rule or principle drawn from it is described in the text provided.	Listed among cited authorities; the provided text does not state its application.
S. v. Brandon, 53 N.C. 466	The provided opinion lists this case as cited; no rule or principle drawn from it is described in the text provided.	Listed among cited authorities; the provided text does not state its application.
S. v. Penland, 61 N.C. 224	The provided opinion lists this case as cited; no rule or principle drawn from it is described in the text provided.	Listed among cited authorities; the provided text does not state its application.
S. v. Vann, 82 N.C. 634	The provided opinion lists this case as cited; no rule or principle drawn from it is described in the text provided.	Listed among cited authorities; the provided text does not state its application.
S. v. Reitz, 83 N.C. 637	The provided opinion lists this case as cited; no rule or principle drawn from it is described in the text provided.	Listed among cited authorities; the provided text does not state its application.
S. v. Mills, 91 N.C. 596	The provided opinion lists this case as cited; no rule or principle drawn from it is described in the text provided.	Listed among cited authorities; the provided text does not state its application.
S. v. Rhyne, 109 N.C. 795	The provided opinion lists this case as cited; no rule or principle drawn from it is described in the text provided.	Listed among cited authorities; the provided text does not state its application.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed each ground for a new trial and the question of benefit of clergy as follows:

Juror impartiality: The Court held the post-trial affidavit that juror Peck had said he "had made up his opinion" was insufficient to warrant a new trial because the out-of-court statement was not made under oath and was contradicted by the juror's sworn statement when questioned as a juror. Thus the Court treated the juror's oath as decisive.
Juror insanity: The Court found the affidavits alleging Peck's derangement insufficient. The evidence did not show Peck's mental state at the time he took his seat; one affidavit referred to events a year earlier and drinking observed during the week of trial but did not establish actual derangement when sworn. The Court observed that insanity as a disqualification is of a nature that should be readily perceptible, and more full and satisfactory proof would be required.
Exclusion of prisoner's declarations: The Court relied on precedent and principle that a party's declarations are not admissible in his favor to prove the truth of the matters asserted unless they accompany relevant acts and form part of the res gestae (pars res gestae). The Court therefore affirmed exclusion of the prisoner's statements the morning after the killing as evidence to prove insanity at the time of the homicide.
Proof of ownership alleged in the indictment: The Court concluded ownership of the slave as alleged in the indictment is not of the essence of the offense of killing a slave; identity may be the practical relevance, but whether the slave was the property of the person named is immaterial to the guilt. The Court invoked Pye's case and Susanna Johnson to support the principle that such particulars are not fatal defects.
Benefit of clergy and statutory construction: The Court examined the common-law history of clergy and statutes that took away clergy for willful murder (23 Hen. VIII c. 1). It interpreted the State statute of 1817 (c. 18) as declaring that killing a slave shall be considered and denominated "homicide" and shall partake of the same degree of guilt, when accompanied by like circumstances, that homicide does at common law. Because the prisoner was convicted of killing the slave with malice aforethought—conduct amounting to murder at common law—the Court held the offense to be murder and thus within the scope of statutes that oust the benefit of clergy (i.e., clergy is not available). The Court emphasized that an offense created by statute under a known legal name assumes the qualities of that name and that clergy is ousted if a prior or subsequent statute so provides.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court overruled the motion for a new trial, held that the prisoner's proffered declarations were inadmissible to prove insanity, held that proof of ownership of the slave as laid in the indictment was not essential to the offense, and held that the prisoner was not entitled to the benefit of clergy. Judgment of death was ordered against the prisoner.

Implications:

The court reaffirmed that an out-of-court, unsworn statement by a juror that he had formed an opinion, when contradicted by the juror's oath, does not by itself justify a new trial.
The court required clear and satisfactory proof to establish juror insanity as a basis for a new trial, noting the perceptible nature of such a disqualification.
The court reiterated the rule that a defendant's declarations are inadmissible to prove insanity unless they are part of the res gestae; thus declarations the morning after a homicide may not be used to prove insanity at the time of killing.
The court held that the ownership of the slave as laid in the indictment is not of the essence of the offense of killing the slave; defects or variations in ownership allegations do not necessarily defeat a prosecution for the killing itself.
The court concluded, by statutory construction and reference to 23 Hen. VIII and the State act of 1817, that killing a slave with malice aforethought constitutes murder for which the benefit of clergy is ousted; the direct consequence for the defendant was affirmation of the death sentence.

This summary is based exclusively on the material contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond that text.

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THE STATE v. MASON SCOTT.

1. A person called as a juror in a capital case said, on oath, that he had not formed nor expressed an opinion respecting the guilt or innocence of the prisoner; and, after the verdict, it was proved that he had declared a few minutes before to a third person, "that he could not serve because he had made up his opinion," which was unknown to the prisoner at the time he accepted the juror.

2. Held, that there shall not be a new trial — first, because such declaration was not on oath; and, secondly, because it is contradicted by the juror on oath.

3. If the insanity of a juror be alleged as a reason for a new trial, being a disqualification so easily perceptible from its nature, it must be proved by clear and full evidence.

4. The declarations of a party cannot be offered in evidence on his behalf in any case, unless they accompany acts and be pars res gestae, and are offered as such. They are not admissible even to show the insanity of a prisoner.

5. Held, therefore, where a prisoner had committed homicide at 10 o'clock at night of one day, that evidence of what he said the next morning could not be received to prove his derangement.

6. The property in a slave is not of the essence of the offense of the murder of him, and it is immaterial whether it be laid in the indictment or not; hence it need not be proved upon the trial as laid. Quere — if the property be proved to be different from that laid?

7. If a statute take away clergy from any offense, and another statute, either prior or subsequent, create that offense by its known, legal and technical name, all the qualities of its name will attach to it; hence it will stand ousted of clergy.

8. The statute, 23 Hen. 8, c. 1, ousted murder of clergy. Our act of 1817, c. 18, gives to a slave the character of a human being and places him within the peace of the State, so far as regards his life.

9. Hence, it is held, that one convicted of willfully killing a slave with malice prepense is guilty of murder and not entitled to the benefit of clergy.

TAYLOR, C. J.

All felonies were clergiable at the common (27) law; that is, all who could read were burnt in the hand. The question is whether murder has not been ousted of clergy.

HENDERSON, J., after stating the facts and the questions (32) as they appear upon the record:

The ground of the first reason for a new trial is not sufficiently proved. Ruth states that Peck informed him that he had formed an opinion. When Peck said so he was not on oath, and when offered as a juror he denied in on oath. The second reason is in the same situation. It does not appear what was the state of Peck's mind at the time he took his seat as a juror. One of the witnesses speaks of his situation twelve months past; and although he saw him drinking during the week of the trial he does not pretend to say that his mind had actually become affected, but concludes that possibly it might. The affidavit of the other witness does not prove anything; and both taken together can scarcely raise a doubt much less satisfy us that the juror was deranged when he was sworn on the jury. The nature of the disqualification would render it perceptible to many of the numerous bystanders who commonly surround a court, and more full and satisfactory evidence of the fact, if true, should have been produced.

Were I left to myself, unshackled by adjudications, I must confess that I should be inclined to respect the third reason; but it is in vain for me to contend against precedents; I must submit to the law as I find it written, and my brothers entertain no doubt of the correctness of the decisions upon principle. The declarations of the party, say they, cannot be offered in evidence in his behalf unless they accompany acts. They then form part of the acts, and as such are heard. But, with due deference to these opinions, it appears to me that a man's acts are as much within his control as his words, and that both ought either to be received or both rejected. Yet it is the daily practice to give the party's acts in evidence for him. I do not contend that the party's declarations should be given in evidence for him to prove the truth of the facts declared or asserted by him, but only that the jury should be at liberty to draw inferences from his (33) having made such declarations.

The last reason is that the court refused to instruct the jury as to the effect of the testimony, allowing it to be true, relative to the title of the slave Caleb. This is a demurrer to evidence ore tenus. Observing that the evidence does not prove the property in the deceased to be otherwise than as laid, is it then a fatal defect, even if it be admitted that it does not prove the property to be as laid? We think it is not. The ownership forms no part of the offense; it is equally criminal to kill the slave of one person as of another. The prisoner is no further interested in having that stated than for the sake of identity. We give no opinion upon a case where it is proved that the property is in a different person from the one alleged in the indictment. Had the prisoner been acquitted by the jury for this defect of proof there can be no doubt but that on a second indictment for killing the same slave Caleb, charging him to be the property of some other person than F. S. Marshall, he could safely rely on a plea of such acquittal, with proper averments that the slave Caleb mentioned in one indictment is one and the same person with the slave Caleb mentioned in the other. This incontestably proves that the title or ownership of the slave is not of the essence of the offense of killing him. For then an acquittal upon the charge of killing a slave, the property of A, could not be an acquittal for killing a slave, the property of B. This case is within the principle of Pye's case and that of Susanna Johnson. Pye was charged with robbing a person in the dwelling house of A; the robbery was proved to have been from the person, but it was not proved to whom the house belonged. Upon conference of all the judges it was held to be immaterial. 2 East Cr. L., 785.

The motion for a new trial must therefore be overruled.

To avert the punishment which the law has affixed to murder the counsel for the prisoner insists that he is (34) entitled to clergy. This depends on the construction of the act of 1817, in connection with former acts on the subject of murder. As a preliminary remark I will observe that at the common law all felonies (murder inclusive) are punishable with death. But a clergyman, from the veneration in which the clerical character was held by the founders of our law, was exempted from the punishment of death if the bishop would claim him as a clerk, and of his being so, reading was the evidence. Hence came the benefit of clergy. In process of time this benefit was extended to all persons, and thence it came to pass that the most enormous crimes were unpunished. The Legislature, perceiving this, hath proceeded from time to time to take away the benefit of clergy from certain offenses. The consequence is that clergy is allowable in all felonies but where it has been expressly ousted by statute. The question therefore is reduced to this, is the benefit of clergy taken away from the offense of which the prisoner is convicted?

The statute, 23 Hen. VIII, ch. 1, ousteth clergy in cases of willful murder, of malice prepense. Our statute (1817, ch, 18) declares the offense of killing a slave shall thereafter be considered and denominated homicide, and shall partake of the same degree of guilt, when accompanied with the like circumstances, that homicide does at common law. The prisoner has been convicted of killing the slave Caleb with malice aforethought; and such a killing of a human being is, at the common law, murder. Of murder, therefore, is the prisoner guilty. The effect of the act of 1817 is to give to a slave the character of a human being, and to place him within the peace of the State as far as regards his life. This latter act, therefore, virtually declares this offense to be murder, and the statute, 23 Hen. VIII, takes away clergy. Nor does it make any difference whether the benefit of clergy be taken away by the same statute which creates the offense, or by any other, prior or subsequent. For (35) when the supreme authority creates an offense, giving it a well known legal and technical name, the offense assumes all the qualities of its name, that is, it becomes the thing the Legislature declares it shall be. Our statutes of bigamy, mentioned in the argument, bear no analogy to this case. The statute, 1790, provides that bigamy shall be felony, and that the felon shall suffer death; yet a person convicted under it was allowed his clergy, because it was not taken away by that or any other statute, and at common law it still remained. We are not, however, left to our own reasoning alone upon this question, the authorities are the same way. Foster, in his Treatise, lays down the law thus, Fost. Tr., 190, 191: The statute, de Clero, 25 Ed. III, provides that clerks convict for treasons or felonies touching all persons other than the king himself, or his royal majesty, shall have privilege of Holy Church. Treasons created by after statutes relative to the coin, the establishing of the king's regal and abolishing the papal supremacy, were ousted of clergy without express words, as coming within the exception of the statute de Clero, because they were treasons touching the king's royal majesty.

We are therefore of opinion that the prisoner is not entitled to the benefit of clergy, and that judgment of death be awarded against him.

Cited: S. v. Kimbrough, 13 N.C. 439; Norwood v. Marrow, 20 N.C. 589; S. v. Brandon, 53 N.C. 466; S. v. Penland, 61 N.C. 224; S. v. Vann, 82 N.C. 634; S. v. Reitz, 83 N.C. 637; S. v. Mills, 91 N.C. 596; S. v. Rhyne, 109 N.C. 795.

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STATE v. SCOTT