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ANSON W. ALDRICH v. GEORGE A. HOWARD.

James Tillinghast, with whom was Bradley, for the defendant:

This is a bill, filed by a private individual, to compel the defendant to take down and remove a certain building, at the time of the filing of the bill in process of erection, (and then far towards completion) by the defendant, upon his lot on the corner of Washington and Baker streets, in this city, demanding this relief, as we construe the bill, upon two grounds: —

I. That the building, when completed, is, as the bill charges, to be used as a "livery stable," and as such, will become a nuisance.

II. That the building is an infringement of the act "concerning the erection of buildings in the City of Providence." See City Ordinances, pp. 78, c.

I. As to the first ground, we say: the bill is prematurely filed. The only averment in the bill of any present injury, is, "that your orator's said property has already been much depreciated in value by the building of said stable;" clearly, we submit, damnum absque injuria, unless the building itself, aside from its use, is a nuisance, which cannot be pretended, and is not alleged in the bill. But even were the building itself a nuisance, and so averred, it is well settled that mere diminution of value of adjacent property, without other irreparable injury, furnishes no foundation for equitable relief. Attorney General v. Nichol, 16 Vesey, 342, (per Eldon, Ld. Chan.); White v. Cohen, 19 Eng. Law and Eq. 146; Kirkman v. Handy, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 409-10. But here it is not a present nuisance that is complained of; but only what the plaintiff assumes will become such at some future time, if the building, when completed, is put to certain uses. We reply: a livery stable in the City of Providence is not per se a nuisance. Too many already exist, and have always existed in every part of the city, as of every other city, — in fact, within a stone's-throw of this very locality. See, too, Kirkman v. Handy, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 406; Harrison v. Brooks, 20 Georgia, 537; express decisions that livery stables in towns and cities are not per se nuisances. It by no means follows, therefore, that if a livery stable is opened in this building it will become a nuisance. The most the plaintiff can claim is, it may or it may not, according to the manner in which it is kept. In this locality, a well conducted and properly kept livery stable will rather prove a public convenience, — a convenience and benefit, rather than an injury, to the plaintiff's hotel estate. At all events, it is what Lord Brougham calls, in Earl of Ripon v. Hobart, 3 Mylne and Keen, 169, (8 Eng. Cond. Ch. 337) an " eventual or contingent nuisance," and as to which he says, "that no instance can be produced of the interposition by injunction." See, also, same case, 1 Cooper's Sel. Cases, 333, (8 Eng. Cond. Ch. 469); and Barnes v. Baker, 3 Atkyns, 750, by Lord Hardwicke, that "the fears of mankind, though they be reasonable ones, will not create a nuisance." See, too, per Kent, C.J., in People v. Sands, 1 John. 90. The averments in this bill of anticipated injury are but the expression of the plaintiff's opinions, fears, — not statements of facts; and so are not admitted by the demurrer, nor susceptible of answer. That courts of equity do not take jurisdiction over these contingent nuisances, see further: Cummings v. Barrett, 10 Cush. 186; Hudson and Delaware Canal Co. v. New York and Erie Railroad, 9 Paige, 323; Grey v. Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 1 Grant's Cases, Penn. 412; Dumesnil v. Dupont, 18 B. Mon. 800; Tichenor v. Wilson, 4 Halst. Chan. 197; Gwin v. Melmoth, 1 Freem. Chan. 505; Wilder v. Strickland, 2 Jones, Eq. N.C. 386; Laughlin v. President, etc., of Lamasco, 6 Ind. 223. We submit, therefore, it will be time enough for the plaintiff to seek the interference of this court to enjoin the defendant from the use of his estate, when that use actually proves to be a nuisance and a special and irreparable damage to the plaintiff; and that until then, the court will leave the plaintiff to his legal remedies, which are full and adequate. Even then the remedy will be, not by destroying the defendant's property, as sought by this bill, but by limiting its use. State v. Paul, 5 R.I. 185, (194); State v. Keeran, 5 Ib. 497, (513); Barclay v. Commonwealth, 25 Penn. St. (1 Casey) 503; Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, (N.S.) 475.

II. As to the second ground on which the bill rests, — that the building is illegal, as infringing the act concerning buildings in that section of the city, — we say: 1. That act does not make the building a nuisance. For its infringement, the act itself prescribes the remedy and affixes the penalty; and this court has no jurisdiction, even on information by the attorney general, much less on a bill, as here, by a private individual. Attorney General v. Utica Insurance Co. 2 John. Chan. 370, (379); Mayor of Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige, 261; Smith v. Lockwood, 13 Barb. 209; see, also, Higgins v. Mayor, c., of Princeton, 4 Halst. Chan. 309. 2. But even if it did thereby become a nuisance per se, it is a common public nuisance; and the bill alleges no special injury to this plaintiff arising from this cause. The plaintiff, therefore, cannot maintain this bill. To entitle him to do so, he must show some special injury, and that, too, of an irreparable character, that cannot be compensated in damages at law, peculiar to himself, and not suffered in common with the public or the community. Irwin v. Dixion, 9 How. 10, and cases there collected by Judge Woodbury; Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co. 12 Peters, 91; Spooner v. McConnell, 1 McLean, 337; and from the mere proximity of the plaintiff's estates, the court will not infer such special damage. Higgins v. Princeton, 4 Halsted, Chan. 309; O'Brien v. Norwich and Worcester Railroad Co. 17 Conn. 372; Seeley v. Bishop, 19 Ib. 128; Smith v. Lockwood, 13 Barb. 209.

Currey, with whom was R. W. Greene, for the complainant:

I. The defendant demurs to said bill and the plaintiff joins therein, and thereupon the plaintiff contends that the defendant admits by said demurrer — 1. That he is constructing said building in violation of the statutes of the State. 2. That he is constructing said building to be used for a livery stable. 3. That the very construction of said building has already greatly damaged the plaintiff's said property. 4. That the use of said building for a livery stable will be an irreparable injury to the plaintiff's said property:

The plaintiff further contends —

II. That the erection and proposed use of said building for a livery stable is in violation of the principle, that a man shall not so use his own as to injure that of another.

III. That the admission by demurrer, that the use of said building for a livery stable will be an irreparable injury to the plaintiff's property, or will have a necessary tendency to such injury, is an admission that it will be a nuisance, and therefore unlawful. Burditt v. Swenson, 17 Texas 489[ 17 Tex. 489]; Pickhard v. Collins, 23 Barbour, 444; Harvey v. Dewoody, 18 Ark. 252; Ray v. Lynes, 10 Ala. 63; Robeson v. Pittenger, 1 Green's Ch. 57; 2 Eden's Injunction, 270, and notes, and following pages and notes.

A bill in equity to enjoin the defendant from erecting a large livery stable in close proximity to the complainant's dwelling house, hotel, and stores, with a prayer for general relief, and containing allegations that the use of the stable, as proposed by the defendant, will cause irreparable damage to the complainant by rendering, from its disagreeable and unwholesome effluvia, its noise, flies, and other nuisances, his dwelling house untenantable, and break up the custom and diminish the rents of his hotel and stores, is not demurrable for want of equity; nor, as stating a case in which the sole remedy of the complainant is at law; nor, because it does not state that the rights of the parties have been settled in favor of the complainant, before the filing of the bill, in an action at law, or does not give some equitable reason why such action has not been first brought.

AMES, C. J.

This demurrer cannot be sustained, for want of equity in the bill. The bill states, in substance, that the stable which is in the course of erection by the defendant, is designed to be used by him as a livery stable; and that being so used, it will, from its proximity to his dwelling house, hotel and stores, and by its disagreeable and unwholesome effluvia, its noise, flies, and other nuisances, cause him irreparable damage, by rendering his house untenantable, by breaking up the business and by diminishing the rents of his hotel and stores. These are allegations of facts, into the truth of which we are not to enquire upon this demurrer; but supposing them to be true, to ask ourselves, if the defendant's stable would not be a nuisance against which the complainant would be entitled to equitable relief, not, indeed, in the special mode prayed for, but in some appropriate mode, under his prayer for general relief? We cannot say, as a matter of law, that a livery stable placed so near the complainant's dwelling house and hotel will not, by the unwholesome and disagreeable effluvia attributed to it in the bill, produce all the effects therein alleged, destructive to the complainant's property; and the demurrer admits that it will, as a matter of fact. If this be so, how can we say, that a case may not be made out under the bill which will require us to interpose for the complainant's protection, — which is the test whether a bill in equity is demurrable for want of equity, as decided in Dike and another v. Greene, 4 R.I. Rep. 285.

A destructive nuisance may certainly be enjoined by a court of equity, although it is also the subject of ordinary legal redress. Nor is it true, that a bill to enjoin such a nuisance is demurrable, because it does not state that the rights of the parties, in support of the bill, have been settled by a judgment at law. It may be very proper that they should be, if uncertain, before the court affords its specific relief; but the title of the plaintiff to the relief he asks may be admitted by the answer, as it is by this demurrer, and, then, why should it be further ascertained, to induce the action of the court? As late as 1851, Sir Richard Kindersley, Vice-Chancellor, said, that it was true that equity will only interfere, in case of nuisance, where the thing complained of is a nuisance at law, — and that there was no such thing as an equitable nuisance, — but asks, "Is it a ground of demurrer that the matter has not yet been tried at law? It may be ground, and is ground very often, for refusing an injunction, upon motion; but is it ground of demurrer? No, I am not aware of any cases in which it has been so determined." Soltau v. De Held, 9 Eng. L. Eq. 117; and see Sprague v. Rhodes and others, 4 R.I. Rep. 301.

Our attention was directed by the counsel for the defendant to two cases, in which it was said that demurrers were sustained to such a bill as this: Kirkman v. Handy, 11 Humph. R. 406, and Harrison v. Brooks, 20 Geo. 537. Upon looking into these cases, we find, that in the first, the demurrer was disallowed, and the bill went to a hearing; and in the other, that the case came before the Supreme Court of Georgia, after answer, upon exceptions to the rulings of a judge of the Superior Court of that state, upon a motion to dissolve, or modify by giving security, a special injunction that had been granted in it, upon the ground, that the equity of the bill had been fully met by the answer, which the judge below had overruled.

In fine, without touching the other questions which have been argued, and without expressing an opinion upon the merits of this case, which we reserve until we can know what in truth the case is, we can only express our regret at the delay caused by the interposition of this demurrer, and overruling it, order the defendant to answer the bill; the question with regard to the costs of this term being reserved.

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ALDRICH v. HOWARD
(Sep 1, 1861)