Evidence, Likely to distract attention of jury, Relevancy and materiality, Presumptions and burden of proof, Of ownership. Agency, Scope of authority. Practice, Civil, Conduct of trial, Exceptions. Replevin. Estoppel.
At the trial of an action of replevin for certain machines, it appeared that the machines were protected by letters patent, that they had been in the possession of one to whom the plaintiff had conveyed them under leases which recited that they were patented, and one of the terms of which was that the lessee should not transfer possession of the machines without the consent of the plaintiff. There had been a fire in the factory of the lessee and the machines had been damaged. The defendant contended and introduced evidence tending to show that there had been negotiations between the plaintiff and the lessee authorizing the lessee to sell the machines as junk, and that under that authority they had been sold to one who sold them to the defendant. The plaintiff introduced evidence tending to contradict that of the defendant, and offered the letters patent, thirty-eight in number, as evidence affecting the probability of his consenting to have the machines sold as junk. Both parties throughout the trial assumed that the machines were patented and referred to the fact in their arguments. The letters patent were long, complicated and elaborate, included drawings and specifications, and were full of technical terms, and the presiding judge excluded them on the ground that they might mislead the jury more than they would aid them. Held, that, even if the evidence offered was competent, the plaintiff was not harmed by its exclusion, and that the ruling of the judge was warranted for the reason which he gave.
At the trial of an action of replevin for certain machines, a question at issue was whether the plaintiff had given to one to whom he had leased the machines authority, after a fire in the lessee's factory in which the machines were damaged, to sell them as junk, and there was evidence, introduced by the defendant but controverted by the plaintiff, tending to show that the lessee had a conversation with one W., in which he was told that, if one S., after examination of the machines on behalf of the plaintiff, told the lessee that they were worthless, the lessee might sell them as junk. The plaintiff was a corporation and W. was its assistant general manager. There was evidence that his "duties were not prescribed," but were "looking after the general management of the business," and there was testimony of W. and admissions of the plaintiff tending to show that he had authority from the plaintiff to do whatever he did in the transaction with the lessee. The defendant, after introducing evidence of S.'s examining the machines, was then allowed, subject to exception by the plaintiff, to show that S. said to the lessee that he did not think that the machines were of any value, the presiding judge admitting the testimony "only so far as it was within the scope of the authority given by W." Held, that there was evidence that W. had authority to delegate authority to S., that he had done so, and that S. had acted within the authority thus delegated to him; and, therefore, that the evidence objected to was admissible.
Where a plaintiff excepted to the admission of evidence at a trial, and, in his ruling admitting it, the presiding judge stated that it was a part of the history of the transaction between the parties and might be dealt with later in the trial by striking it out or by giving instructions with regard to it, and later in the trial a witness for the plaintiff in direct examination gave evidence of the same kind and was cross-examined fully upon the subject, and no motion was made by the plaintiff to strike out the evidence or for instructions regarding it, the exception was overruled.
Rulings requested at the trial of a case which were inapplicable because the charge to the jury removed from their consideration the subject to which the rulings referred were held rightly to have been refused.
At the trial of an action of replevin for certain machines, it appeared that the plaintiff formerly had owned the machines and had leased them to one for use in his factory, and that the factory had burned and the machines been damaged. There was evidence tending to show that one having authority to act for the plaintiff had told the lessee that, if a certain person should say that the machines were worthless, the lessee might sell them as junk, that the person designated did say that the machines were worthless, and that the lessee sold them as junk to one from whom the defendant purchased them in good faith. Held, that there was evidence to warrant a submission of the case to the jury and to warrant them in finding for the defendant.
If one stands by and, without disclosing his ownership, allows his property to be sold to an innocent purchaser for value, he is estopped from claiming it afterwards.
Where, at the trial of an action of replevin, the plaintiff introduces evidence from which the jury might draw inferences which would warrant them in finding for the plaintiff, but which, without such inferences, would not warrant a finding for the plaintiff, and the defendant introduces no evidence, the presiding judge rightly may refuse to rule that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to the property replevied.
At the trial of an action of replevin, the plaintiff introduced evidence from which the jury might draw inferences which would warrant a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant introduced no evidence. The presiding judge instructed the jury: "The possession of the property by the defendant and exercising rights of ownership over it is evidence of ownership to consider." Held, that the instruction was correct.
KNOWLTON, C.J.
The plaintiff's first exception was to the exclusion of the patents. These were thirty-eight in number, each of which included drawings and specifications, some of which were long, complicated and elaborate. The only ground upon which it can be contended that they were competent is that they affected the probability of the respective contentions of the parties as to the arrangements made between them. It is argued that the plaintiff would be less likely to agree to an abandonment of patented machines, even if they were supposed to be ruined by fire, than to the abandonment of machines that were not patented. The fact is undisputed that the machines were treated by the plaintiff as useless after the fire, and that they were paid for to the plaintiff by the insurance company as for a total loss. If we assume that the evidence was competent, there is nothing to show that the plaintiff was harmed by the exclusion of it. The leases on which the title of each party was founded were in evidence, and they recited that these articles were patented, and they contained elaborate provisions to protect the rights of the owners of the patents. Both parties assumed that the machines were patented throughout the trial, and referred to that fact in argument. There is nothing to show that the details of the patents would have strengthened the plaintiff's contention in this particular. The judge excluded them as a matter of discretion, on the ground that they might mislead the jury more than they would aid them. We are of opinion that he was right in his view of the effect that the reading of these long documents, full of technical terms, would be likely to have upon the trial, and, in the absence of anything to show that their details would have added anything material to the facts before the court, the exception must be overruled.
The statement of Sanborn to Lord, after looking over the property which had been through the fire, that he did not think it of any value, was admitted only so far as it was within the scope of the authority given by Willson, and not on any independent ground. There was evidence of a conversation with Willson, the assistant general manager of the corporation, which would justify the admission of Sanborn's statement if Willson had authority to deal with these damaged machines by taking their full value as for a total loss and allowing the lessee to sell the material as junk. We are of opinion that there was evidence as to the nature of his duties, the method in which business of this kind was done by the plaintiff, and as to the subsequent conduct of the plaintiff in regard to the property, which well warranted a finding that he was authorized to do what the defendants contended that he did. He testified as to his duties, "Well, the duties are not prescribed; it is looking after the general management of the business." When the defendants asked him in cross-examination what was his salary, as bearing upon the importance of his position and the extent of his authority in the company, the plaintiff's counsel objected, and added, "I do not deny his authority. I said a moment ago that I conceded that he had authority to do everything that he said he did." We are of opinion that the testimony was competent.
The evidence in the schedule prepared by the parties, showing that lease premiums were paid to the plaintiffs to the full value of the machines in those cases in which the interest of the plaintiff was not covered by insurance, was admitted, in the first instance, as a part of the history of the machines in the arrangement of the parties, with a suggestion by the judge that it might be dealt with later by striking it out or giving instructions in regard to it. Afterwards the plaintiff, through the witness Willson, introduced evidence of the same kind, namely, that the "bills for insurance are confined to the machines that are put out without the initial license premium." The witness was cross-examined fully upon the subject. No request was made to have the evidence stricken out or any instruction given in regard to it. This evidence showed that the position of the plaintiff was substantially the same in the leases which contained the insurance clause as in those which did not, and it was properly admitted in explanation of the dealings of the parties in reference to the property.
The plaintiff's fifth and sixth requests for instructions were rightly refused on the ground that they were inapplicable to the case as it was to be submitted to the jury. Upon the instruction given, the jury were not permitted to find for the defendant on the ground that the acceptance of the insurance money would deprive the plaintiff of its title.
The plaintiff's first, second, third and fourth requests for instructions were rightly refused. The jury's answer "Yes," to the question, "Did Charles H. Willson give to F.W. Lord and Company and Bowers and Shaw an unrestricted right to sell the materials which had passed through the fire?", which was well warranted by the testimony, taken in connection with the evidence of authority in Willson to give such a right, shows that neither of these requests could properly have been given.
The instruction that "if the plaintiff knew that this property was going to be sold and he wanted to exercise any further rights of ownership upon it, knowing that rights of other parties might intervene, it was his duty to do it within a reasonable time, and it is for you to say whether he took any action within a reasonable time," was correct. This was simply an application of the principles which lie at the foundation of the law of estoppel. It is a familiar rule that, if one stands by and allows his property to be sold to an innocent purchaser without disclosing his ownership, he is estopped from claiming it afterwards. The hypothetical case stated in the instruction was within the reason of this rule.
In the fourth case the judge rightly refused to instruct the jury that, if they believed the evidence, the plaintiff was entitled to the grip slugger and was also entitled to the corrugated tackers. The submission of the case to the jury upon the evidence was a ruling that the evidence would warrant a finding for the plaintiff. We understand that the request was for a ruling, in substance, that the plaintiff was entitled to the property as matter of law, if the evidence was true. With inferences of fact that might be drawn from the evidence, the plaintiff's case would have been made out; but the jury might or might not draw these inferences. Without them the case was not proved.
The instruction in regard to possession was correct. It is a familiar rule that possession of property, with the exercise of rights of ownership over it, is some evidence of title. Ordinarily it makes a prima facie case for the proof of title by the possessor. If testimony is introduced to control it, the whole evidence is considered together to determine the true title, and possession, with the exercise of the usual rights of an owner, is not disregarded. In each of the cases the entry must be,
Exceptions overruled.