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Case Summary: Clara F. Murphy v. Lena G. Hanright et al.

Factual and Procedural Background

In December 1907 Dennis Murphy owned land in Wakefield. By a deed dated August 10, 1908 (acknowledged September 8, 1908), Dennis purportedly conveyed the property to his son Thomas Murphy subject to a life-payment condition and with an eventual fee simple if Dennis predeceased Thomas. Thomas reconveyed the property to Dennis by deed dated December 13, 1911 (recorded March 12, 1912). In December 1912 a deed in fee from Dennis to Thomas dated August 10, 1908 was recorded; however, after the 1908 acknowledgment and before that 1912 recording Thomas had already reconveyed to Dennis in 1911.

The Land Court found (on evidence described in the opinion) that the 1908 deed, though recorded in 1912, had not been delivered in 1908 and "was not delivered as a present conveyance of title in 1912." In September 1915 Thomas gave a deed to his father purporting to give Dennis a life estate with reversion to Thomas on Dennis's death. Dennis died testate in 1918; his will left pecuniary legacies and devised residue to a daughter. In 1919 Thomas conveyed (through an intermediary) to the present petitioner Clara F. Murphy.

The petitioner filed a petition in the Land Court (Nov. 24, 1919) seeking registration of title based on the 1908 deed as recorded in 1912. At the Land Court hearing the petitioner requested rulings that (1) the 1915 deed from Thomas to Dennis was prima facie evidence of delivery and acceptance of the 1908 deed at a date that would validate the 1915 conveyance, and (2) the 1915 conveyance's delivery and acceptance was conclusive evidence of delivery and acceptance of the 1908 deed as of a validating date. The Land Court judge refused these requested rulings, found no delivery of the 1908 deed at any relevant time, and dismissed the petition. The petitioner excepted to the refusals and to admission of certain declarations by the deceased Dennis Murphy. The Supreme Judicial Court heard the exceptions and overruled them.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the acceptance by Dennis of the 1915 deed from Thomas is conclusive evidence, as between the parties and their claimants, of prior delivery and acceptance of the deed dated August 10, 1908 (recorded in 1912) at a date that would validate the 1915 conveyance.
  2. Whether the 1915 deed is prima facie evidence of delivery and acceptance of the 1908 deed as of a date that would make the 1915 deed valid, and if so whether that prima facie effect requires a ruling that it alone justifies or requires a finding of delivery absent other evidence.
  3. Whether admission into evidence of declarations by the deceased grantor (Dennis Murphy), made shortly before his death, was proper absent a specific, on-the-record finding that the declarations were made in good faith and from the declarant's personal knowledge as required by G.L. c. 233, § 65.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner asserted title through Thomas Murphy based on the deed dated August 10, 1908 (recorded December 18, 1912) and sought rulings that: (a) the 1915 deed from Thomas to Dennis was prima facie evidence of earlier delivery of the 1908 deed at a date validating the 1915 conveyance; and (b) the 1915 deed's delivery and acceptance should be treated as conclusive evidence of delivery and acceptance of the 1908 deed as of such a validating date.
  • The petitioner excepted to the Land Court judge's refusal to give those rulings and to the admission of certain hearsay declarations of Dennis Murphy without a specific preliminary finding on the record as to the statutory prerequisites for admissibility under G.L. c. 233, § 65.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents (children and heirs at law of a sister of Thomas) contended that the deed recorded in 1912 (the 1908 deed) was never delivered, that Dennis owned the land at his death, and that the land was subject to his will (under which Thomas received only a small pecuniary legacy), so that title did not vest in Thomas by the recorded 1908 deed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Garden Cemetery Corp. v. Baker, 218 Mass. 339 Distinguishing findings of fact from rulings of law. Used to support that the Land Court's finding that the 1908 deed was not delivered is a factual finding, not a legal ruling.
Parrott v. Avery, 159 Mass. 594 Issue of delivery of a deed is ordinarily one of fact. Supported the statement that on conflicting evidence delivery is a question of fact for the judge.
Hastings v. Merriam, 117 Mass. 245 An order of dismissal imports necessary factual findings to support it. Applied to hold that the dismissal carried with it findings necessary to uphold it and that those findings are conclusive.
Adams v. Dick, 226 Mass. 46 Authority for the proposition that findings supporting dismissal are to be inferred where appropriate. Grouped with other authorities to support the conclusion that the Land Court's dismissal implies factual findings.
Prentiss v. Gloucester, 236 Mass. 36 Similar support for inference of findings consistent with an order. Used as additional authority that necessary findings are to be taken as made when consistent with the order.
Maynard v. Maynard, 10 Mass. 456 Deed may remain undelivered despite recordation. Support for the proposition that recording does not necessarily establish delivery.
Powers v. Russell, 13 Pick. 69 Deed may remain undelivered though recorded. Same purpose: authorities showing recording does not prove delivery.
Samson v. Thornton, 3 Met. 275 Deed may remain undelivered though recorded. Same general support regarding nonconclusive effect of recording on delivery.
Hawkes v. Pike, 105 Mass. 560 Deed may remain undelivered though recorded. Used as authority for the proposition that recording is not conclusive of delivery.
Barnes v. Barnes, 161 Mass. 381 Deed may remain undelivered though recorded. Reinforced the point that recording alone does not establish present conveyance.
Parker v. Hill, 8 Met. 447 Delivery may be established after recordation. Authority for the proposition that delivery can be shown post-recording.
Mills v. Gore, 20 Pick. 28 Delivery of a deed is ordinarily a question of fact. Supported the court's treatment of delivery as a factual question for the trial judge.
O'Kelly v. O'Kelly, 8 Met. 436 Question of delivery depends on acts and intent. Used to underline that delivery depends on conduct and intent, not just formalities.
Creeden v. Mahoney, 193 Mass. 402 Acceptance of a conveyance may be evidence of recognition of an earlier deed; under some circumstances recognition compels finding of delivery. Cited to show that acceptance of a later deed may, in some cases, legally operate as recognition sufficient to support finding of delivery of an earlier deed; here the court distinguished the facts and found the 1915 acceptance insufficient to be conclusive.
Gould v. Day, 94 U.S. 405 Acceptance of a conveyance is proper evidence to consider on delivery question. Supported the court's view that the 1915 deed's acceptance was evidence to be weighed but not conclusive as a matter of law.
Wiley v. London Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 89 Conn. 35 Acceptance of a conveyance may be relevant evidence on delivery/recognition issues. Used as analogous authority for treating acceptance of the 1915 deed as evidence for the judge to consider.
Draper v. Brown, 153 Mich. 120 Purpose and effect of a transaction remain open for determination when acceptance is involved. Cited to show that the court must consider the purpose and effect of the 1915 transaction rather than treat it as automatically decisive.
Blackwell v. Blackwell, 196 Mass. 186 Acceptance of a conveyance does not have an inflexible or conclusive effect in all cases. Supported the proposition that the 1915 deed had "no hard and fast effect" compelling delivery of the 1908 deed.
Barker v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., 228 Mass. 421 Judge not obliged to rule on the effect of part only of the evidence. Applied to justify refusal to give a ruling addressing only part of the evidentiary picture (the 1915 deed) when other evidence existed.
Wakefield v. American Surety Co. of New York, 209 Mass. 173 Interpretation of "prima facie" and when an absence of other evidence can or cannot compel a finding. Used to support refusal of a ruling that would treat the 1915 deed as requiring a finding in the absence of other evidence.
Chandler v. Prince, 217 Mass. 451 Similar authority on meaning and effect of "prima facie" evidence and the judge's role. Supported the conclusion that the requested prima facie ruling was improper where other evidence existed.
Wigmore on Evidence § 2494 (treatise) Evidence principles concerning prima facie proof and burden. Invoked to support the court's treatment of the term "prima facie" and limitations on compelling findings in the absence of other evidence.
Horan v. Boston Elevated Railway, 237 Mass. 245 A preliminary judicial finding required for admissibility of declarations by a deceased person may be inferred from the reception of the evidence. Applied to uphold admission of Dennis Murphy's declarations, reasoning the necessary preliminary finding could be inferred from the judge's reception of the evidence unless exceptions showed otherwise.
Hasey v. Boston, 228 Mass. 516 Example where it was apparent that no such preliminary inquiry or determination could have taken place. Distinguished from the present case to show that here the record did not demonstrate impossibility of the requisite finding and therefore the evidence was admissible.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the Land Court's factual findings and legal rulings. It emphasized that the Land Court's determinations that the 1908 deed was not delivered in 1908 and "was not delivered as a present conveyance of title in 1912" are findings of fact (citing Garden Cemetery Corp. v. Baker) and therefore conclusive on appeal when supported by the record. The court observed that if the 1908 deed had been delivered when executed, title under it would have antedated Thomas's 1911 reconveyance and would have revested in Dennis by that 1911 deed; the Land Court, however, found no delivery and thus Thomas had no title to pass except as affected by later transactions.

On the specific exception concerning the legal effect of the 1915 deed, the court analyzed two related requests made by the petitioner. First, the petitioner sought a ruling that the 1915 deed's delivery and acceptance were conclusive evidence of delivery and acceptance of the 1908 deed at a date validating the 1915 conveyance. The court held that acceptance of the 1915 deed was competent evidence for the judge to consider but was not conclusive as a matter of law; whether it amounted to recognition of the earlier deed and thus established delivery was a factual determination for the trial judge (citing Creeden v. Mahoney and other authorities) and on this record did not compel the result the petitioner sought.

Second, the petitioner requested a ruling that the 1915 deed was "prima facie evidence" of delivery of the earlier deed in the sense either that it would justify a finding of delivery or that, in the absence of other evidence, it required a finding of delivery. The court held that the Land Court properly refused both formulations: if the request meant merely that the 1915 deed was evidence sufficient to justify a finding, the judge was not required to single out part of the evidence for a separate ruling (Barker v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co.); if the request meant that it should in the absence of other evidence require a finding, that was also improper given the other evidence before the judge (citing Wakefield v. American Surety Co., Chandler v. Prince, Wigmore).

Regarding the exception to admission of Dennis Murphy's declarations shortly before his death, the petitioner argued the judge failed to make an explicit preliminary finding (as required by G.L. c. 233, § 65) that the declarations were made in good faith and were from the declarant's personal knowledge. The court explained that a necessary preliminary judicial determination may be inferred from the reception of the evidence unless the record affirmatively shows that no such finding was made or could have been made (citing Horan v. Boston Elevated Railway). The court distinguished Hasey v. Boston (where such a finding could not have been made) and concluded that the evidence was properly admitted on the record before it.

The Supreme Judicial Court therefore concluded that the Land Court's denial of the petition and its attendant factual findings were supportable, that the refusals to give the requested legal rulings were proper in light of the mixed evidence and the judge's factfinding role, and that admission of the declarations of the deceased was permissible because the necessary preliminary finding could be inferred.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The exceptions taken by the petitioner were overruled; the Land Court's dismissal of the petition (based on its factual finding that the 1908 deed was not delivered) stands.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petition for registration of title was properly dismissed by the Land Court because the judge found the 1908 deed was not delivered; that factual finding is conclusive on appeal and the petitioner's exceptions do not overturn it.
  • On evidentiary questions: Acceptance of a later deed (the 1915 deed) is competent evidence to be weighed on the question whether an earlier deed was delivered, but it is not necessarily conclusive as a matter of law and the trial judge need not treat one piece of evidence in isolation by making a special ruling on its prima facie force when other evidence bears on the question.
  • On hearsay/declaration admissibility under G.L. c. 233, § 65: A trial judge's preliminary finding that the declarant spoke in good faith and from personal knowledge may be inferred from the admission of the evidence unless the record affirmatively shows that no such finding could have been made.
  • No novel legal rule or broad new precedent was created; the court applied existing principles about (a) the factual nature of delivery questions, (b) the evidentiary weight of acceptance of subsequent conveyances, and (c) the inference of required preliminary findings for admission of declarations of deceased persons.

Disposition in the Supreme Judicial Court: "Exceptions overruled." (Opinion by Jenney, J.; Rugg, C.J., De Courcy, Crosby, Pierce and Jenney JJ. present.)

CLARA F. MURPHY vs. LENA G. HANRIGHT others.

Deed, Delivery, Recording. Evidence, Presumptions and burden of proof, Of delivery of deed, Declaration of deceased person. Land Court, Findings by judge, Exceptions. Practice, Civil, Exceptions.

Findings by a judge of the Land Court upon the hearing of a petition for the registration of the title to certain land, that a certain deed of the land, dated and acknowledged in 1908 and recorded in 1912, upon a delivery of which the petitioner relied for his title, was not delivered in 1908 and "was not delivered as a present conveyance of title in 1912," are findings of fact and not rulings of law; and, if the judge makes rulings and findings as to other necessary elements of the petitioner's claim of title in accordance with his contention and orders the petition dismissed, he must be held to have found that the deed in question never was delivered; and, upon a record setting forth such findings and rulings, his findings must be held to be conclusive.

The mere facts, that, in 1915, a son gave to his father a deed conveying certain land to him for life and that the father accepted the deed, are not as a matter of law conclusive evidence as between the parties to that deed that a deed of the land to the son, dated and acknowledged in 1908 and recorded in 1912, was delivered by the father to the son on a date which would make the later deed a valid conveyance.

At the hearing of a petition in the Land Court involving the question of the delivery of the deed dated and acknowledged in 1908 and recorded in 1912, above described, where there was other evidence upon that question besides the 1915 deed, the judge may refuse a request for a ruling that the 1915 deed was prima facie evidence of the delivery of the earlier deed at a date that would make the 1915 deed valid, whether the ruling requested was taken to mean that the 1915 deed was such evidence as would justify a finding of such delivery and acceptance of the earlier deed, or to mean that it was such evidence as, in the absence of other evidence, required a finding of such delivery and acceptance of the earlier deed.

An exception to the admission, by a judge of the Land Court hearing a petition for a registration of title, of evidence of a declaration of a deceased person without first making a specific finding of the facts, necessary to the admissibility of the evidence under G.L.c. 233, § 65, that the declaration was made in good faith on the part of the declarant and of his own personal knowledge, will not be sustained where the record does not show that the judge did not make such preliminary finding or that such a finding could not have been made on the evidence, the fact of such a finding being inferable from the admission of evidence.

JENNEY, J.

In December, 1907, Dennis Murphy was the owner of a parcel of land with buildings thereon in Wakefield, Massachusetts. By deed dated August 10, 1908, he conveyed it to his son, Thomas Murphy, to hold for the life of the son upon the express condition that he (the grantee) should pay to the grantor $36 each month, and that if the grantor predeceased his son, then to the son in fee. Thomas Murphy reconveyed the property to his father by deed dated December 13, 1911, and recorded March 12, 1912.

In December, 1912, there was recorded a deed in fee from the father to the son which was dated August 10, 1908, and acknowledged on September 8, 1908. It should be remembered that after the date of the acknowledgment of this deed, but before its record, Thomas had reconveyed to his father by a deed duly recorded before the record of the second deed from Dennis to Thomas.

The judge who heard the case in the Land Court upon a petition for registration of title found that in 1908, the father had had trouble with one Julia Murphy who had threatened to sue him, and that he had been advised to put his property in the name of the son to prevent attachment; that in November, 1908, he was sued and an attachment made; that the suit in which the attachment had been made was settled in 1912; and that the father, who could not read thereafter desired to get his property back, and knew that the deed of his son given to him in 1911 had not been signed by his son's wife (who is the present petitioner), and asked for another deed containing a release by her.

The son testified that his father, in 1912, stated his desire that he (the son) should have full title after his father's death, and informed him that he had recorded the deed drawn in 1908 but not then delivered. The judge found that this deed, which was recorded in 1912, was not delivered in 1912 as a present conveyance of title. This is a finding of fact and not a ruling of law. See Garden Cemetery Corp. v. Baker, 218 Mass. 339. The findings that there were no delivery and acceptance of the deed in 1908, when it was executed, or thereafter in 1912, when it was recorded, must stand. The bill of exceptions, including as a part thereof the judge's findings, does not purport to include all the evidence. If the deed had been delivered when executed, the title thereunder would have antedated the deed of Thomas to his father dated December 13, 1911. In that contingency the rights, if any, of the son thereunder would have revested in his father by said deed.

Although Thomas then was left without any interest in the premises, in September, 1915, he gave another deed to his father in which dower and homestead were released. This deed was drawn on the ordinary warranty deed blank and is thus described in the decision of the Land Court: "At the end of the description is the following recital: 'Said Dennis Murphy to have above named property during his natural life, receiving whatever revenue there is from it and on the death of said Dennis Murphy the above mentioned property reverts back.' Then followed a clause providing for mortgaging with the written consent of Thomas, which clause, however, was stricken out. Then follows the ordinary habendum clause, in which the name 'Thomas' had been inserted and then erased, and the name 'Dennis' written in in its place, so that the habendum reads, 'to Dennis Murphy and his heirs and assigns to their own use and behoof forever.' Then follow the usual covenants of a warranty deed, and a release of dower and homestead by the present petitioner." The judge ruled that if this deed conveyed anything, it vested in the father a "life estate only." No exception was taken to this ruling: and as it constitutes the law of the case, the deed must be so construed in considering the findings made.

The father died testate in 1918, leaving pecuniary legacies to the son and others, and devising the rest and residue of his property, which included whatever title he had to the land in controversy, to his daughter Mary. In 1919 Thomas gave a deed of the property to one Cade and later, in the same year, Cade conveyed it to the petitioner. These deeds were without pecuniary consideration.

In order to give any effect to the deed of the father recorded in 1912, it must have been delivered at some time. Upon evidence not before us in its entirety, the court denied the petition for registration. To maintain that petition, it was necessary on the judge's ruling as to the construction of the deed of 1915, to find that the deed recorded in 1912 was delivered after the date of its record. On conflicting evidence, this was a question of fact. Parrott v. Avery, 159 Mass. 594. The order of dismissal imported a finding of facts necessary to uphold it and consistent with the express findings made. Hastings v. Merriam, 117 Mass. 245. Adams v. Dick, 226 Mass. 46. Prentiss v. Gloucester, 236 Mass. 36.

A deed may remain undelivered, although it has been recorded. Maynard v. Maynard, 10 Mass. 456. Powers v. Russell, 13 Pick. 69. Samson v. Thornton, 3 Met. 275. Hawkes v. Pike, 105 Mass. 560. Barnes v. Barnes, 161 Mass. 381. A delivery, however, may be established after such record. Parker v. Hill, 8 Met. 447. The issue of delivery is ordinarily one of fact. Mills v. Gore, 20 Pick. 28. This question depends on the acts done and the intent with which they are performed. O'Kelly v. O'Kelly, 8 Met. 436.

The discussion of the judge as to the evidence and its effect clearly indicates that he found there had been no delivery of the deed at any time, although no express finding to that effect was made. Such finding, however, must be assumed to have been made, as otherwise, on the judge's construction of the deed of 1915, the petitioner would have been entitled to a decree of registration.

As all the evidence is not reported, the only questions open as to such delivery are those involved in the rulings to which the petitionerys exceptions relate.

These are, that the delivery and acceptance by the father of the deed of 1915 to him are conclusive evidence of the delivery and acceptance of the deed recorded in 1912 as of a date which would make the deed first referred to a valid conveyance, and that the deed of 1915 was prima facie evidence of the delivery of the deed recorded in 1912 as of a date which would make the deed of 1915 valid.

Unquestionably, if the father recognized the deed recorded in 1912 as valid by conduct or by express recognition, it may be found in legal effect to have been delivered and accepted after the date of its record. The effect of the acceptance of the deed of 1915 by the son to the father was considered by the judge. It was not conclusive evidence of delivery and acceptance of the deed recorded in 1912. Acceptance of the conveyance of the whole or a qualified interest in the property was evidence proper for consideration on that question. Creeden v. Mahoney, 193 Mass. 402. Gould v. Day, 94 U.S. 405. Wiley v. London Lancashire Fire Ins. Co. 89 Conn. 35. The purpose and effect of the transaction, however, were still open for determination. Draper v. Brown, 153 Mich. 120. It did not on this record import such recognition of the deed recorded in 1912 as to compel a finding of its delivery and acceptance as was required in Creeden v. Mahoney, supra. See also Blackwell v. Blackwell, 196 Mass. 186. It had no hard and fast effect.

If the requested ruling that the acceptance of the deed of 1915 was prima facie evidence of delivery and acceptance of the deed from the father recorded in 1912 means that it was such evidence as would justify a finding of delivery and acceptance, it was properly refused. The judge was not obliged to rule as to the effect of part only of the evidence. Barker v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. 228 Mass. 421. In fact he did consider the effect of the acceptance of the deed of 1915. This was all that he was required to do.

If the ruling used the words " prima facie evidence" as meaning that in the absence of other evidence a finding in accordance with the request must be made, it was properly refused for reasons already stated. See Wakefield v. American Surety Co. of New York, 209 Mass. 173, 176; Chandler v. Prince, 217 Mass. 451, 454; Wigmore on Ev. § 2494.

The only other exception on which the petitioner relies is to the admission of the evidence as to declarations of Dennis Murphy made shortly before his death. This exception is based expressly on the omission of the judge to make a finding that the declaration was made in good faith on the part of the declarant and of his own personal knowledge. It is well settled that such judicial action is inferable from the reception of the evidence, unless the exceptions taken show that no such finding was or could have been made. Horan v. Boston Elevated Railway, 237 Mass. 245, and cases cited. In Hasey v. Boston, 228 Mass. 516, relied upon by the petitioner, it was apparent that no such inquiry or determination could have taken place. The evidence was admitted properly.

Exceptions overruled.

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MURPHY v. HANRIGHT
(Mar 10, 1921)