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Docket Number

11415

Attorney(S)

Messrs. Dunlap Dunlap, for appellant, cite: Action brought under Civil Code 1922, Sec. 5279. Magistrate had jurisdiction: Code Proc., 1922, Sec. 213; 10 S.C. 301; 24 S.C. 508; 106 S.C. 227. Notice of appeal imperative: 20 S.C. 581. Finding of magistrate confirmed by the Circuit Court as to a fact is binding: 79 S.C. 56. Additional grounds not available in law case: 72 S.C. 179. Mr. William J. Cherry, for respondent, cites: Title in question: 1 S.C. 258; 26 S.C. 208. Summary proceedings against tenant can be maintained only when there is the relationship of landlord and tenant: 16 R.C.L., Sec. 706; 18 Enc. L., 436; 169 U.S. 295; 123 Ky., 552; 86 A.S.R., 607; 21 Am., Dec., 217; 49 L.R.A., 435; 81 S.C. 461. A tenant may dispute title of one claiming under the landlord: 16 R.C.L., Sec. 156; 18 Enc. L., 419; 22 Am. Dec., 557; 33 Am. Dec., 745; 49 Am. Dec., 389; 89 A.S.R., 111.

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Stewart-Jones Co. v. Shehan, Supreme Court of South Carolina (Feb. 7, 1924) — Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Stewart-Jones Company (plaintiff/appellant) previously brought an action against D.B. Hankins, in which it attached a house and lot in Rock Hill. After a default judgment, the property was sold by the sheriff; Stewart-Jones purchased the property and received a sheriff's deed dated November 13, 1922.

Subsequently Stewart-Jones instituted a proceeding in a Magistrate's Court under the statute authorizing summary dispossession of tenants (Section 3509, Civ. Code 1912; now Section 5279, Vol. 3, Code 1922) seeking to eject R.L. Shehan from the premises. The complaint alleged ownership by Stewart-Jones, that Shehan was in possession, was holding over, had failed to pay rent after demand, and that demand for possession had been made.

Shehan demurred to the magistrate's complaint; the demurrer was overruled. Shehan answered denying Stewart-Jones' ownership, possession, and the existence of any landlord-tenant relationship with plaintiff, alleging instead that Mrs. D.B. Hankins owned the premises and that Shehan had been a tenant of Hankins since August 1, 1922, having paid rent through January 1, 1923. Evidence supporting Shehan's account was introduced; no evidence was introduced showing that Stewart-Jones was ever in actual possession or that Shehan had attorned to Stewart-Jones or to D.B. Hankins.

On appeal from the magistrate's judgment, the Circuit Judge held that the magistrate was without jurisdiction because the title to the property was in question and was disputed by the defendant (citing Code Civ. Proc. 1922, § 225). Stewart-Jones appealed that ruling; the defendant (Shehan) appealed an order settling the case for appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a magistrate has jurisdiction under the summary dispossession statute (Section 5279, Code 1922) to eject a person from real property when the defendant disputes title and there is a question whether a landlord-tenant relationship exists.
Whether a mere denial of the landlord's title by a defendant in such summary proceedings suffices to oust the magistrate's jurisdiction under the State Constitution (Art. 5, § 21) and statutory law (Code Civ. Proc. 1922, § 225).
Whether the trial court properly excluded certain matters from the record on appeal (procedural question regarding settlement of the case for appeal and the costs of printing the appendix).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's (Stewart-Jones Company) Arguments

The plaintiff contended (through three exceptions) that the question of title cannot be raised in a summary proceeding so as to oust the magistrate of jurisdiction; instead, title could only be involved as part of determining whether the defendant has shown sufficient cause not to be ejected.
The plaintiff relied on prior state decisions (e.g., State ex rel. O'Neale v. Fickling (10 S.C. 301), State v. Marshall (24 S.C. 507), State v. Fort (24 S.C. 519), Swygert v. Goodwin (32 S.C. 148)) for the proposition that raising title does not oust magistrate jurisdiction in summary landlord-tenant ejectment proceedings.
The plaintiff argued that a magistrate's factual finding that a landlord-tenant relation existed should be binding and not readily reversed by the Circuit Court.

Defendant's (Shehan) Arguments

The defendant argued that summary dispossession proceedings can be maintained only where a landlord-tenant relationship exists; if that relationship is absent, the statutory summary remedy is inappropriate.
The defendant relied upon authorities and treatises (including 16 R.C.L., Section 706; 18 Enc. L.; and cases such as Willis v. Eastern Trust Co., 169 U.S. 295; Lewis v. Colley, 81 S.C. 461) supporting the proposition that the foundational fact for summary jurisdiction is a landlord-tenant relation and that a tenant may dispute title of one claiming under the landlord.
Shehan maintained that he had been a tenant of Mrs. D.B. Hankins and had paid rent; therefore Stewart-Jones' attempt to proceed under the summary statute was improper where title and the landlord-tenant relationship were in dispute.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
State ex rel. O'Neale v. Fickling, 10 S.C. 301	Earlier decision holding that raising the question of title did not necessarily oust the jurisdiction of a trial justice in certain summary ejectment proceedings.	The Court acknowledged this line of pre-1895 cases but explained that the reasoning based on the previous Code distinctions is less tenable after the 1895 Constitution; nevertheless the Court noted the rule can be adhered to when the landlord-tenant relation exists so that the tenant is estopped to deny title.
State v. Marshall, 24 S.C. 507	One of the cases cited for the proposition that title questions did not oust magistrate jurisdiction in summary proceedings (pre-1895).	Referenced as part of the line of earlier cases; Court distinguished the earlier reasoning in light of the Constitution of 1895 but preserved the practical outcome when landlord-tenant relationship exists.
State v. Fort, 24 S.C. 519	Another decision in the pre-1895 line concerning jurisdiction in summary proceedings when title is raised.	Used alongside other pre-1895 cases to explain prior rule; Court treated these decisions as rooted in pre-1895 procedural distinctions but did not adopt them as controlling where facts show no landlord-tenant relation.
Swygert v. Goodwin, 32 S.C. 148, 10 S.E. 933	Decision stating that raising the question of title did not oust the jurisdiction of trial justices in certain ejectment proceedings.	Cited as part of the earlier line supporting magistrate jurisdiction; Court recognized the decision but limited its application in light of constitutional provision that magistrates lack jurisdiction where title to real estate is in question unless the statutory landlord-tenant relation exists.
Willis v. Eastern Trust, etc., Co., 169 U.S. 295	Authority (U.S. Supreme Court) quoted for the proposition that the foundation for summary jurisdiction is the tenant's possession by virtue of the landlord-tenant relation.	The Court quoted and relied on this principle to support the conclusion that summary statute jurisdiction presupposes an existing landlord-tenant relationship.
Steele v. Bond, 28 Minn. 273, 9 N.W. 775	Expresses that the foundation fact for jurisdiction is that the tenant is in possession by virtue of the landlord-tenant relation.	Quoted (via Willis) to show prevailing view in other jurisdictions that the landlord-tenant relation is essential to summary dispossessory jurisdiction.
Whaley v. Whaley, 1 Speers 225	Authority cited for the proposition that a tenant is estopped by the landlord-tenant relationship to deny the landlord's title.	Used to support the legal principle that where a landlord-tenant contract exists the tenant may not deny the landlord's title to defeat a summary proceeding.
Givens v. Mullinax, 4 Rich. 590	Another authority cited for the estoppel principle arising from the landlord-tenant relationship.	Adduced to support the Court's statement that the tenant is estopped to deny the landlord's title when the relationship exists.
Goodgion v. Latimer, 26 S.C. 208, 2 S.E. 1	Recognized in this State as assuming that a conventional landlord-tenant relation is a prerequisite to magistrate jurisdiction in summary proceedings.	Cited as South Carolina authority recognizing the necessity of the landlord-tenant relation for summary jurisdiction.
Carlisle v. Prior, 48 S.C. 183, 26 S.E. 244	Used for the proposition that one may not use a summary dispossessory statutory proceeding to eject the true owner of premises.	Applied to caution against allowing a party to claim another as tenant in order to eject the true owner; used to show limits on summary procedure.
Lewis v. Colley (Cooley/Cooley variants cited), 81 S.C. 461, 62 S.E. 868	Recognized that the magistrate may determine as a fact whether the relation of landlord and tenant exists.	Relied upon to support the proposition that the magistrate can and must determine whether a landlord-tenant contract exists; if it does, the tenant is estopped to deny title.
Lewis v. Cooley (as cited "Lewis v. Cooley, supra")	Supports the magistrate's fact-finding role with respect to the landlord-tenant relation.	Referenced to justify that determination of the factual existence of the relationship is properly within the magistrate's function.
Additional state citations in counsel's briefs: 106 S.C. 227; 20 S.C. 581; 79 S.C. 56; 72 S.C. 179; 1 S.C. 258; 26 S.C. 208 (Goodgion)	These citations were offered by counsel in support of arguments about jurisdiction, appeal procedure, and the binding nature of magistrate findings.	The Court considered the general thrust of these authorities in framing the applicable rules about jurisdiction, the estoppel effect of landlord-tenant relations, and the limits imposed by the Constitution of 1895.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the problem as whether the magistrate had jurisdiction to issue a warrant directing dispossession under the summary statute (Section 5279, Code 1922) when the title to the property was disputed by the defendant and the existence of the landlord-tenant relation was contested.

Step-by-step analysis in the opinion:

The Court acknowledged a line of pre-1895 decisions holding that raising title did not oust jurisdiction of trial justices in summary ejectment proceedings. Those decisions rested on distinctions in the earlier Code that treated the particular summary proceedings as not strictly "actions" for Code purposes.
However, the Court observed that the Constitution of 1895 (Article 5, § 21) provides that the jurisdiction of magistrates shall not extend "to cases where the title to real estate is in question," a provision that undercuts the pre-1895 rationale that limited those earlier holdings.
Despite the constitutional change, the Court reasoned that the earlier rule (that title questions do not automatically oust summary jurisdiction) could be preserved in a narrower and sounder form by grounding it on a substantive factual prerequisite: the existence of a conventional landlord-tenant relationship. The Court explained that the statutory summary remedy (Section 5279) applies only where that relation exists, and where it does the tenant is estopped from denying the landlord's title, so the title issue does not properly arise to defeat jurisdiction.
The Court reviewed authority (both treatises and cases, including out-of-state decisions and U.S. Supreme Court authority) supporting the proposition that the foundation fact for summary dispossessory jurisdiction is that the person in possession is there by virtue of a landlord-tenant relation.
The Court emphasized that the magistrate is competent to determine, as a factual matter, whether a landlord-tenant contract existed (express or implied). If such a contract exists, the tenant is estopped to deny the landlord's title and the magistrate's jurisdiction to proceed under the statute is proper. Conversely, if no such contract appears, the statutory summary remedy does not apply and the matter is a general action to recover possession or damages for trespass — matters that properly raise title and thus fall outside magistrate jurisdiction.
Applying these principles to the record, the Court found that Stewart-Jones neither adequately alleged nor proved the requisite landlord-tenant relationship. The plaintiff relied on a sheriff's deed purportedly conveying title of D.B. Hankins, alleged unlawful possession and nonpayment of rent, but presented no evidence of any contract (express or implied) between the plaintiff (or its predecessor) and Shehan establishing the landlord-tenant relationship. There was also no evidence of attornment by Shehan to Stewart-Jones or to D.B. Hankins.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Circuit Judge correctly found the title to the land was in question and that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to entertain the summary proceeding under Section 5279. The Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the magistrate had in fact found that the landlord-tenant relation existed; the magistrate's order did not show such a factual finding, and the Circuit Judge's finding was supported by the record.
On the defendant's appeal concerning the settlement of the case for appeal, the Court held that the complaint filed in the magistrate's court and the testimony before the magistrate were pertinent and should have been included in the settled case; the trial court should have allowed amendments to include that material. Other appendix matter was not materially relevant, and the Court ordered that the cost of printing the appendix be divided equally between the parties.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The judgment of the Circuit Court was affirmed. The Court held that the magistrate was without jurisdiction to entertain the summary dispossessory proceeding because the record showed the title to the real estate was in question and the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship (a prerequisite to summary jurisdiction under Section 5279, Code 1922). The appellant's exceptions were overruled.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: Stewart-Jones' appeal was unsuccessful; the magistrate's dispossessory proceeding was properly dismissed by the Circuit Court for lack of jurisdiction. The Circuit Court judgment affirming dismissal was upheld on appeal.
Procedural consequence: The Court directed that the complaint and testimony from the magistrate's court should have been included in the settled case for appeal; the remainder of the appendix was not materially relevant. The parties were ordered to divide equally the cost of printing the appendix.
Scope of precedent: The opinion interprets and applies existing principles (including constitutional limits on magistrate jurisdiction and the estoppel effect of an existing landlord-tenant relationship) but does not purport to announce a novel broad principle beyond applying those rules to the record before it. The decision emphasizes that summary dispossessory statutes presuppose an existing landlord-tenant relation; absent such relation, summary remedy is inappropriate and title questions remove the matter from magistrate jurisdiction.

Disposition summary: Judgment of the Circuit Court affirmed; exceptions overruled; costs of printing the appendix divided equally between appellant and respondent.

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STEWART-JONES CO. v. SHEHAN.

February 7, 1924. The opinion of the Court was delivered by

MR. JUSTICE MARION.

Appeal from an order of his Honor, T.J. Mauldin, Circuit Judge, overruling the issuance by a magistrate of a warrant directing dispossession of an occupant of real estate in a proceeding sought to be maintained under Section 3509, Civ. Code 1912, now Section 5279, Vol. 3, Code 1922.

The facts giving rise to the controversy appear to be substantially as follows:

The Stewart-Jones Company, a corporation, the appellant here, brought action, presumably in the Circuit Court, against one D.B. Hankins, and on August 5, 1922, attached a house and lot in Rock Hill as the property of Hankins. Judgment by default was recovered in that action, and the house and lot were sold by the sheriff under execution. The Stewart-Jones Company bought this property at the sheriff's sale, and received a deed therefor, dated November 13, 1922. Thereafter Stewart-Jones Company instituted this proceeding in a Magistrate's Court to eject R.L. Shehan, the respondent here, from the premises so conveyed to it by the sheriff's deed, alleging that the plaintiff was the owner of the premises, that Shehan was in possession and was holding over the said premises, that he had failed and refused to pay rent after demand, and that demand for the possession had been made. Shehan demurred to the complaint. The magistrate overruled the demurrer, and Shehan then answered, denying that the plaintiff was the owner or was ever in possession of the premises, or that the relation of landlord and tenant had ever existed between plaintiff and defendant, by contract or otherwise, and alleging that the premises were owned by Mrs. D.B. Hankins, under whom he had been in occupation of the premises as tenant from August 1, 1922, and to whom he had paid the rent in full to January 1, 1923. Shehan adduced evidence tending to establish the facts set out in his answer. No evidence was adduced to establish that the Stewart-Jones Company was ever in actual possession of the premises, or that Shehan, as tenant, had ever attorney to said company or to D.B. Hankins as landlord.

On appeal from the magistrate's judgment the Circuit Judge held, in substance, that it appeared on the trial from the plaintiff's own showing that the title to real property was in question, and that such title was disputed by the defendant, and hence that the magistrate was without jurisdiction. Code Civ. Proc. 1922, § 225. From the judgment based on that ruling, the plaintiff appeals. From an order settling the case for appeal, the defendant appeals.

PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL

The three exceptions advance substantially the one proposition that —

"The question of title cannot be so raised in a summary proceeding as to oust the magistrate of jurisdiction, and can only be an issue as to whether the defendant has shown sufficient cause as to why he should not be ejected."

That contention is based upon the decisions of this Court in State, etc., v. Fickling, 10 S.C. 301. State, etc., v. Marshall, 24 S.C. 507. State, etc., v. Fort, 24 S.C. 519. Swygert v. Goodwin, 32 S.C. 148; 10 S.E., 933, etc. The ruling relied on is thus stated (Willard, C.J.), in State ex rel. O'Neale v. Fickling, supra.

"The proceeding sought to be asserted was brought by the respondent, D. Utley, before the respondent F.W. Fickling, as trial Justice, to eject the relator, L.A. O'Neale, from certain premises alleged to be held by her as tenant at will of the said Utley. The relator joined issue on the petition, denying the existence of a tenancy at will, alleging want of title in the petitioner and title in herself. The petition was filed under Section 12, C. 84, of the General Statutes, p. 435. The first ground of appeal is for error in holding that the proceeding was not an action. The section in question was enacted prior to the adoption of the Code of Procedure, at a time when it could not in any sense be regarded as an action, nor is anything pointed out in the Code that can have the effect of changing its nature. If the jurisdiction conferred by the statute in question is to be regarded as constituting an action, then, under Section 74 of the Code it is denied to a trial Justice. That this was not intended is evident from the fact that this section was reenacted as part of the General Statutes after the Code took effect. It follows that subdivision 2 of Section 81 of the Code, that excludes trial Justices from the cognizance of `civil actions' where the title to land is in question, is inapplicable to the case. * * * The third ground of appeal is that it appeared on the face of the return that the relator was not a tenant at will of the respondent, D. Utley. It was for the trial Justice to ascertain by proofs whether the relation of landlord and tenant existed between the parties, and, if a tenancy existed, whether it was of the character that the statute required."

In the case of Swygert v. Goodwin, supra, the Court (Simpson, C.J.), said:

"It has been decided in several cases in this State, * * * that trial Justices had jurisdiction of such cases, and that raising the question of title did not oust that jurisdiction;" etc.

The cases cited, however, were decided before the adoption of the Constitution of 1895, and the reason assigned for the ruling, viz., that the limitation upon the jurisdiction of a trial Justice imposed by the Code applied to "actions" only, and not to special proceedings, would seem to be no longer tenable in view of the provision of the present Constitution (Article 5, § 21) that the jurisdiction of magistrates shall not extend "to cases where the title to real estate is in question."

But we think the ruling may be substantially adhered to without infringement of the present constitutional provision. The rule may be rested and soundly grounded upon the perfectly valid assumption that the issue of title cannot properly arise in such a proceeding, for the reason that the proceeding contemplated and authorized by the statute is one by a landlord against a tenant who is estopped by the relationship to deny his landlord's title, 16 R.C.L., p. 649, § 137. Whaley v. Whaley, 1 Speers, 225; 40 Am. Dec., 594. Givens v. Mullinax, 4 Rich., 590; 55 Am. Dec., 706; Section 5279, Vol. 3, Code 1922. The language of the statute (Section 5279, Code 1922) is as follows:

"In all cases where tenants hold over after the expiration of their lease or contract for rent, whether the same be in writing or by parole, or shall fail to pay the rent when the same shall become due, the landlord is hereby authorized and empowered, either in person or by agent, to demand possession thereof from the tenant or person in possession thereof; and in case of refusal or resistance, it shall be lawful for the person so letting said premises, houses or tenements, his agent or attorney, to apply to a Magistrate," etc.

By its express terms the statute is applicable only to a case where the relationship of landlord and tenant actually exists. The Courts of other jurisdictions, in construing similar statutes, have generally, if not universally, held that, in order to maintain such summary proceedings, it is essential that the conventional relation of landlord and tenant exist. 16 R.C.L., p. 1183, Par. 706; 18 Ency., Law (2d Ed.), 436; 437. That view is thus well expressed by the Minnesota Court:

"The foundation fact upon which the jurisdiction rests is that the tenant is in possession of the land in consequence and by virtue of that relation, and unlawfully withholds possession after a default in the performance of the terms upon which he entered, or after his term has expired." Steele v. Bond, 28 Minn., 273; 9 N.W., 775, cited and quoted in Willis v. Eastern Trust, etc., Co., 169 U.S. 295; 18 Sup. Ct., 347; 42 L.Ed., 752.

That the existence of the conventional relation of landlord and tenant is a prerequisite to the assumption and exercise of jurisdiction by the magistrate in such proceedings is clearly recognized and assumed in our own decisions. Goodgion v. Latimer, 26 S.C. 208; 2 S.E., 1. Carlisle v. Prior, 48 S.C. 183; 26 S.E., 244. Lewis v. Colley, 81 S.C. 461; 62 S.E., 868.

Necessarily, therefore, it is competent for the magistrate to determine as a fact whether the relation of landlord and tenant exists. Lewis v. Cooley, supra. Otherwise any tenant, by merely denying the landlord's title or by asserting superior title in himself or in another, could oust the magistrate of jurisdiction and frustrate the plain and salutary object of the statute. On the other hand, it is equally apparent that by merely asserting the claim that another is in possession of real estate as his tenant a party may not be permitted to use the summary statutory proceeding to eject the true owner of the premises or one in possession under the true owner. Carlisle v. Prior, supra. Hence the question of fact, to be resolved by the magistrate, and to the determination of which he is of necessity limited when the question of title is sought to be raised, is this: Was there a contract between the parties, express or implied, which created the relation of landlord and tenant? Without such contract that relation cannot exist. 16 R. C.L., 541; Par. 13. If it does exist as the result of such contract, then the tenant is estopped to deny the title he has contracted to recognize, and may not inject that issue to deprive the magistrate of jurisdiction in a proceeding under the statute.

Applying the foregoing views to the case at bar, we are clearly of the opinion that the Circuit Judge's conclusion that the magistrate was without jurisdiction, and that the proceedings should be dismissed, was correct. The plaintiff neither definitely alleged that the relation of landlord and tenant existed, nor adduced any evidence tending to establish that relationship. It asserted ownership under a sheriff's deed, which purported to convey the title of one D.B. Hankins, claimed that the defendant was in unlawful possession after demand, and that he had failed and refused to pay rent. There was no evidence of any contract of any character, express or implied, between the plaintiff, or its alleged predecessor in interest, and the defendant, to which the relation of landlord and tenant could, in any view, be attributed. The facts made a case to recover possession of real estate and to charge an alleged trespasser with damages for unlawful occupation. If so, it was not the summary proceeding by a landlord to eject a tenant authorized by the statute, and the proposition that the issue of title could not be raised so as to divest the magistrate of jurisdiction does not apply.

It is insisted, however, that the magistrate's judgment involved a finding of the essential fact that the relation of landlord and tenant existed, and that the proceeding was properly brought under the statute; that such finding of fact was not reversed by the Circuit Judge; and, hence, that his conclusion was rested wholly upon an erroneous view of the law, viz., that the raising of the issue of title divested the magistrate of jurisdiction in such a proceeding. The contention is untenable. The magistrate's order sets out in full his findings and conclusions, and it does not appear that he found as a fact that the relation of landlord and tenant existed. If it had so appeared, the Circuit Judge's finding was that —

"From the showing made by the plaintiff before the magistrate both in setting forth its contention and by way of evidence in substantiation thereof the title to the land involved was in question."

Such a showing was entirely inconsistent with the showing essential to the assertion of a landlord's right to eject a delinquent tenant under the statute. The Circuit Judge's finding and the legal conclusion therefrom were therefore equivalent to a reversal of the magistrate's finding of fact, if any there was, to the effect that such relation of landlord and tenant existed as would support the case as a summary proceeding under the statute. As there was ample evidentiary basis for the judge's finding, and as his conclusion thereupon was correct (Code Civ. Proc., 1922, § 225; Const. 1895, Art. 5, § 21), the judgment may not be reversed for error of law. The exceptions must therefore be overruled.

DEFENDANT'S APPEAL

The complaint filed in the magistrate's Court and the testimony adduced before the magistrate were pertinent and material to a satisfactory understanding and consideration of the appeal, and defendant's proposed amendments to the case directed to the inclusion of that matter should have been allowed. The remainder of the matter printed in the appendix was not materially relevant, and the proposed amendments thereto directed were properly disallowed. The cost of printing the appendix should be divided equally between the appellant and the respondent; and it is so ordered.

Subject to the foregoing ruling as to cost of printing, the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

STEWART-JONES CO. v. SHEHAN