WILSON v. PACIFIC S.S. CO

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Docket Number

Nos. 146 and 173.

Judges

James Clark McReynolds

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On November 29, 1922, twelve miles off the coast of California, two vessels, the Newport, an iron passenger steamer, and the Svea, a wooden steam schooner, collided. The Newport was proceeding eastward at nine knots, and the Svea was steaming northward at eight knots on crossing courses in clear weather and smooth seas. The vessels had been in full view of each other for over half an hour before the collision. Twenty minutes prior to the collision, the Newport’s master left the bridge, leaving an inexperienced third officer in charge without clear evidence of any directions or precautions taken. The Svea maintained her course and speed and attempted repeatedly by whistle blasts to ascertain the Newport’s intentions, but to no avail. The Newport could have averted the collision by maneuvering two minutes before impact.

The owner of the Svea filed a libel in the District Court, Southern District of California, charging the Newport and her master with sole fault. The District Court held the Newport and her master liable and exonerated the Svea. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, finding mutual fault and holding both vessels and the Newport’s master liable. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflicting findings.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the master of the Newport was personally liable for the collision, including liability for the negligence of subordinates.
Whether the Svea was at fault for maintaining her course and speed under the International Rules for Navigation at Sea.
Whether the rule requiring the privileged vessel to keep her course and speed is absolute or qualified by circumstances requiring departure to avoid collision.
The applicability and scope of the burden of proof regarding fault and negligence in collisions at sea.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners (Wilson et al.)

Both vessels have distinct legal obligations; neither is privileged in any absolute sense.
The rule that the privileged vessel "shall keep her course and speed" is an imperative duty equivalent to the duty of the other vessel "to keep out of the way."
In the absence of distinct indication that the Newport would fail to avoid collision, the Svea was not at fault for maintaining course and speed.
The Newport, being at fault, had the burden to prove that some fault of the Svea contributed to the collision.
The master of the Newport was not free from negligence and is liable for the collision.
The writ of certiorari on the cross-petition was improvidently granted and should be dismissed as moot.
The master is legally liable for the negligence of subordinates to whom navigation is delegated.

Respondents (Pacific Mail Steamship Company et al.)

The rule requiring the privileged vessel to hold course and speed is qualified by the note to Article 21, Article 27 (prudential rule), and Article 29 (good seamanship), allowing departure under special circumstances to avoid danger.
Every navigator must understand that navigation rules aim to prevent collisions and preserve life and property.
Lower courts have recognized that primary navigation rules are subject to qualification under special circumstances.
The privileged vessel must act to avoid collision if it receives distinct indication that the other vessel will fail in its duty.
In open ocean collisions with perfect visibility, there is a presumption of mutual fault; the vessel seeking exoneration must prove freedom from fault by clear evidence.
Both vessels are prima facie negligent in such collisions unless one is clearly free from culpable blame.
The Svea received distinct indication that the Newport was not going to give way (e.g., deserted bridge, unacknowledged whistle signals) and was at fault for failing to act.
The time for the Svea to act was when it could effectively avert collision alone.
The doctrine holding a shipmaster liable for subordinates' torts conflicts with established respondeat superior principles and should no longer be applied.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
The Delaware, 161 U.S. 459	Privileged vessel must keep course and speed unless distinct indication of failure to avoid collision; burden of proof on faulting vessel.	Confirmed that the Svea was justified in maintaining course and speed absent distinct indication Newport would fail to avoid collision.
The City of New York, 147 U.S. 72	Burden of proof on vessel at fault to show other vessel's fault contributed to collision.	Applied to require Newport to prove Svea's fault; found insufficient evidence to exonerate Newport's master.
The Victory and The Plymothian, 168 U.S. 410	Presumption of mutual fault in collisions on open seas with clear visibility; burden on vessel seeking exoneration.	Supported the court's presumption of mutual fault absent clear exoneration of one vessel.
Furness Co. v. Insurance Ass'n, 242 U.S. 430	Certiorari should be dismissed if petition presents a moot question.	Used to dismiss cross-petition certiorari as improvidently granted.
Southern Power Co. v. Public Service Co., 263 U.S. 508	Mootness doctrine regarding certiorari petitions.	Supported dismissal of moot cross-petition.
The Sunnyside, 91 U.S. 208	Rules of navigation are to prevent collisions and preserve life/property; qualification of primary rules under special circumstances.	Reinforced that rules are not absolute and must be applied with prudence and good seamanship.
The New York, 175 U.S. 187	Qualified application of navigation rules; privileged vessel must depart from primary duty if danger arises.	Supported the principle that Svea had to act if distinct indication of Newport's failure appeared.
The Britannia, 153 U.S. 130	Privileged steamer not at fault for maintaining course and speed absent distinct indication of failure by other vessel.	Confirmed that Svea was justified in holding course absent clear evidence Newport would not avoid collision.
Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674	Maintaining course and speed is fundamental unless distinct indication to the contrary.	Supported the rationale for the privileged vessel's duties.
The Senator Rice, 223 F. 524	Indications that burdened vessel is failing in duty require privileged vessel to act.	Applied to find Svea received distinct indication Newport would not give way and thus was at fault for inaction.
The Tenadores, 298 F. 740	Presumption of mutual fault and requirement of clear proof to exonerate one vessel.	Supported mutual fault presumption in this collision.
City of Corinth v. Tasmania, 15 A.C. 223	Burdened vessel must act affirmatively when distinct indication of failure by other vessel is received.	Applied to hold Svea at fault for failure to act despite indications.
Stone v. Cartwright, 6 Term. Rep. (Durn East 411)	Established doctrine of respondeat superior regarding liability for subordinates' torts.	Referenced in discussion on shipmaster’s liability for subordinate negligence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the facts of the collision, emphasizing the clear weather and visibility, the crossing courses of the vessels, and the Newport master’s abandonment of the bridge to an inexperienced officer without evidence of proper precautions. The Court applied the International Rules for Navigation at Sea, particularly Articles 19, 21, 27, and 29, which establish that the vessel required to keep out of the way must do so, while the privileged vessel must maintain course and speed unless special circumstances require otherwise.

The Court found that the Newport was at fault for failing to take timely action to avoid collision, as it could have maneuvered two minutes before impact. The Svea adhered to the fundamental rule by maintaining course and speed and attempted to communicate intentions through whistle signals, which went unacknowledged. Because there was no distinct indication before the collision that the Newport would fail in her duty, the Svea was not at fault for maintaining her course.

The Court also addressed the issue of the master’s liability for subordinate negligence. It held that the master is presumptively negligent and personally liable absent clear evidence to the contrary, especially given the master’s failure to demonstrate reasonable care and supervision.

Ultimately, the Court reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling that both vessels were at fault and affirmed the District Court’s finding that the Newport and her master were solely at fault. The Court affirmed the principle that the privileged vessel must maintain course and speed unless clear indications require otherwise, and that a master is liable for negligence of subordinates unless personally exonerated by clear evidence.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in No. 146 and affirmed the District Court’s decree holding the Newport and her master liable for the collision. In No. 173, the Circuit Court of Appeals’ decree was affirmed. The Svea was not at fault for maintaining course and speed, and the Newport’s master was personally liable for the collision.

Implications: This decision reinforces the strict application of the International Rules for Navigation at Sea, emphasizing the privileged vessel’s duty to maintain course and speed unless distinct indications require otherwise. It affirms the principle that a shipmaster bears personal liability for negligence, including that of subordinates, absent clear exoneration. The ruling clarifies burdens of proof in collision cases and underscores the importance of prudent navigation and active management by masters. No new precedent altering the law was set; rather, existing principles were reaffirmed and applied to the facts.

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WILSON ET AL. v. PACIFIC MAIL STEAMSHIP COMPANY ET AL. PACIFIC MAIL STEAMSHIP COMPANY ET AL.

Mr. Louis T. Hengstler, with whom Mr. Frederick W. Dorr was on the brief, for petitioners in No. 146 and respondents in No. 173.

Both vessels have distinct legal obligations; neither the one nor the other is privileged in any proper sense. That this view is the correct one appears from the language of the rule itself: "shall keep her course and speed." This is as imperative a duty as the duty of the other vessel, that it "shall keep out of the way." The Delaware, 161 U.S. 459; The Orduna, 14 Asp. 574; The Haida, 191 F. 623.

Any distinct indication that the Newport was about to fail in her duty to avoid the Svea being absent, the Svea was not in fault under the Delaware case for maintaining her course and speed until the vessels were in extremis.

Under the settled law, the Newport, being admittedly at fault, assumed the burden of showing beyond any doubt that some fault of the Svea contributed to the collision. The City of New York, 147 U.S. 72; The Victory The Plymothian, 168 U.S. 410.

The record fails to show that the master was free from negligence. It contains affirmative evidence of his negligence. It fails to identify the admitted fault of the ship with any negligence of the subordinate.

The courts below have made no finding that the evidence. absolves the master from personal negligence.

Cross-petitioners' petition having been presented on a moot question, the writ of certiorari was improvidently granted, and should be dismissed. Furness Co. v. Insurance Ass'n, 242 U.S. 430; Southern Power Co. v. Public Service Co., 263 U.S. 508.

The master of a ship is legally liable for the negligence of a subordinate to whom he delegates the function of navigating the ship on the high seas. The reason for the rule is stronger under modern conditions.

Mr. Farnham P. Griffiths, with whom Messrs. Edward J. McCutchen and Warren Olney, Jr., were on the brief, for respondents in No. 146 and cross-petitioners in No. 173.

The rule requiring the privileged vessel on crossing courses to hold course and speed (Article 21) is not unqualified, but is subject to the provisions of the note to Article 21, the general prudential rule (Article 27) and the rule of good seamanship (Article 29), under which, in special circumstances, the privileged vessel must depart from her primary duty in order to avoid immediate danger of collision.

These rules, by their very terms, qualify all the other rules, thus recognizing and enforcing the doctrine of this Court that "every navigator ought to know that rules of navigation are ordained, not to promote collisions, but to save life and property by preventing such disasters." The Sunnyside, 91 U.S. 208; The New York, 175 U.S. 187; The America, 92 U.S. 432.

The lower federal courts have repeatedly called attention to the qualification under special circumstances of the primary rules. La Lorraine, 12 F.2d 436; The Admiral Watson, 266 F. 122; The George S. Tice, 287 F. 127; The Senator Rice, 223 F. 524; The Devonian, 110 F. 588; The Southern, 224 F. 210; The Jason, 288 F. 57; The Non Pareille, 33 F. 524; The Aurania and The Republic, 29 F. 98.

A case of special circumstances arises and the privileged vessel must depart from her primary duty and take affirmative action to avert collision if she receive distinct indication that the giving way vessel is about to fail in her duty. The Delaware, 161 U.S. 459; The New York, 175 U.S. 182; The Sunnyside, 91 U.S. 208.

In a collision, occurring as this did, on the open ocean with perfect visibility and nothing to obstruct navigation, there is a presumption of mutual fault, and the vessel ( Svea) seeking to be excused, must exonerate herself by the clearest evidence. The City of New York, 147 U.S. 72; The Victory and The Plymothian, 168 U.S. 410; The Binghamton, 271 F. 69; The Tasmania, 6 Asp. 517.

The courts have repeatedly stated that collisions of this character seem impossible without the concurring negligence of both sets of navigators; that it is hardly possible that the stupidity or obstinacy of a single master can produce them; and that both vessels will be deemed prima facie negligent and neither exonerated unless "upon the closest scrutiny of the navigation of each vessel it can be discovered that one of them was free from all culpable blame." The Tenadores, 298 F. 740; The Senator Rice, 223 F. 524; The Coamo, 280 F. 282; Insurance Ass'n v. Furness Co., 215 F. 859; The Comus, 19 F.2d 774; The West Hartland, 2 F.2d 834; The Tasmania, supra. See also David Wright Smith, in The Law Relating to the Rules of the Road at Sea.

Apart from presumption, the Svea received distinct indication that the Newport was not going to give way. The combination of an apparently deserted bridge, three successively unacknowledged whistle signals, two of them danger blasts, and an unchanging course of a vessel whose unquestionable duty it was to give way, seem to us as powerful a grouping of indications that the burdened vessel was failing in her duty as one could put together. The Senator Rice, 223 F. 524; The Tenadores, 298 F. 740; The New York, 175 U.S. 187; The Sunnyside, 91 U.S. 208; Nautik v. Oostvoorne, 6 Lloyds List 110; The Coamo, 280 F. 282; The Jason, 288 F. 57; The George S. Tice, 287 F. 127; The Devonian, 110 F. 588.

Having received distinct indication, the Svea was at fault for not acting. City of Corinth v. Tasmania, 15 A.C. 223; The Zampa, 113 F. 541; The Charles A. Campbell, 142 F. 996; The Queen Elizabeth, 122 F. 406; The Shawmut, 261 F. 616; The Montauk, 180 F. 697.

The time for action by the Svea was when there was room for her to act effectively so as to avert the threatened collision by her action alone. The Delaware, 161 U.S. 459; The Lepanto, 21 F. 651; The Aurania, 29 F. 98; The Normandie, 43 F. 151.

The ruling that the master of a vessel, although not personally negligent, is legally liable for the torts of his subordinates, is in conflict with the established doctrine of respondeat superior. Stone v. Cartwright, 6 Term. Rep. (Durn East 411); Brown Sons Lumber Co. v. Sessler, 128 Tenn. 665; American Annotated Cases, 1915, c. 103; Mechem's Agency, 2d Ed. § 1643.

The authorities relative to the liability of a shipmaster for the torts of subordinates are in conflict. Those holding him liable, although free from personal fault, are based either upon fallacious reasoning or upon a misconception of previous authorities.

Even if there once were a possible basis for holding a shipmaster liable for the negligent acts of his subordinates, the reason for such harsh doctrine has ceased to exist and the rule should no longer be applied.

In fine, clear weather, on a smooth, open sea, the Newport, an iron passenger steamer, proceeding eastward at nine knots, rammed the port side of the Svea, a wooden steam schooner, steaming northward at eight knots. They had been approaching each other in full view for more than half an hour. Twenty minutes before the collision, the master of the Newport quitted the bridge, leaving an inexperienced officer in charge; and, at the trial, he failed to explain this conduct or to show what, if any, directions he gave or precautions he took to insure proper navigation. Each vessel held her course and speed up to the moment of the collision. The Svea had tried, in vain, by repeated blasts of her whistle, to ascertain the Newport's intention. The Newport could have averted the collision by porting her helm or reversing her engines two minutes before it occurred, and there was nothing to inform the Svea that this would not be done until too late for her master to maneuver into safety. Held: 1. That the master of the Newport was presumptively negligent and, in the absence of clear exonerating evidence, was personally liable. P. 460. 2. The Svea was not at fault in maintaining her course and speed, pursuant to the fundamental rule of the International Rules for Navigation at Sea. Her master could not possibly know the result of departing from it, and, on the facts, could not be held indiscreet in following it. P. 460. 15 F.2d 342, (C.C.A.,) reversed in part, affirmed in part. District Court (Am. Mar. Cas. 1924, 1285,) affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Twelve miles off the shore of California, 9:53 A.M., November 29, 1922, sky clear, sea smooth and uninterrupted, the Newport, an iron passenger steamer 337 feet long — 2,643 tons — drove her prow amidships into the port side of the Svea, a wooden lumber steam schooner of 618 tons and 170 feet long. Both vessels were seriously injured. The owner of the Svea libeled the Newport, her owners and master in the District Court, Southern District of California. They charged that the collision resulted from the sole fault of the Newport and her navigators and asked for full damages. A cross libel admitted fault, but claimed that the other vessel contributed, and prayed for application of the half-damage rule.

The trial court concluded that the collision resulted solely from the gross negligence and plain fault of the Newport, and granted a decree against her and the master — McKinnon — for all established damages. The Circuit Court of Appeals held there was mutual fault, divided the damages, and definitely declared that under the approved rule the master was responsible for the negligence of subordinates without regard to his personal fault.

Counsel for cross-petitioner McKinnon earnestly maintain that, considering present conditions of navigation, the master, when free from fault, ought not to be held liable for the action of others. But it is unnecessary now to discuss that question.

Here the record fails to disclose that the master met the exacting duties voluntarily assumed. An amazing casualty occurred while he commanded and presumably, at least, he participated in the admitted fault of his ship. Certainly, nothing short of very clear evidence of intelligent care could possibly absolve him.

The day was fine; the horizon ten miles away. The Newport was proceeding eastward at nine knots with the Svea off her starboard side steaming northward at eight knots. They were approaching each other upon crossing courses and in full view for more than half an hour. Twenty minutes before the collision Captain McKinnon quit the bridge of the Newport, leaving the third officer in charge. Of this subordinate he testified: "This young man was just keeping his first watch on ship; he just shipped the day before, and was making his first voyage." When upon the witness stand, the Captain failed to show what, if any, directions he gave, or that he took reasonable precaution to insure proper navigation in circumstances of obvious danger. He gave no excuse, nor did he indicate any necessity for leaving the bridge. It is impossible for us to say that he acted prudently.

The International Rules for Navigation at Sea (Act 1890, ch. 802, 26 Stat. 327, Act 1894, ch. 83, 28 Stat. 82; U.S.C. Title 33, §§ 104, 106, 112, 121, p. 1055) direct —

"Art. 19. When two steam vessels are crossing, so as to involve risk of collision, the vessel which has the other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way of the other.

"Art. 21. Where, by any of these rules, one of two vessels is to keep out of the way the other shall keep her course and speed.

"Note. — When, in consequence of thick weather or other causes, such vessel finds herself so close that collision can not be avoided by the action of the giving-away vessel alone, she also shall take such action as will best aid to avert collision.

"Art. 27. In obeying and construing these rules due regard shall be had to all dangers of navigation and collision, and to any special circumstances which may render a departure from the above rules necessary in order to avoid immediate danger.

"Art. 29. Nothing in these rules shall exonerate any vessel, or the owner or master or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to carry lights or signals, or of any neglect to keep a proper lookout, or of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen, or by the special circumstances of the case."

The Newport kept her course and speed up to the moment of collision and it is admitted that in so doing she was at fault. But her counsel claim that the Svea also was at fault in holding her course and speed and that by acting differently she should have avoided the accident. The evidence does not support that view. Consideration must be given to the circumstances as they appeared at the time; not as they are now known. The Svea adhered to the fundamental rule. If in the difficult circumstances forced upon him her navigator, whose qualifications are not questioned, exercised his best judgment in not departing therefrom, the burdened vessel must accept the consequences. Having driven him into a perplexing situation, the Newport cannot complain because he failed to make the most judicious choice between the hazards presented.

Without stopping to set out the evidence, it is enough to say that we think there is no clear proof that the Svea failed in her duty. She tried in vain by repeated blasts to ascertain the Newport's intention. Her master could not possibly know the result of departing from the prescribed rule, and we cannot say that he acted indiscreetly in following it.

Big vessels may not insolently disregard smaller ones; super size gives no right to domineer. The Newport was a handy vessel. By porting her helm or reversing her engines two minutes or less before the collision occurred she could have avoided it easily. There was nothing to show that she would not do one of these things until too late for the Svea's master to maneuver his vessel into safety.

The applicable doctrine is plainly announced in The Delaware, 161 U.S. 459, 469 —

"The cases of The Britannia, 153 U.S. 130, and The Northfield, 154 U.S. 629, must be regarded, however, as settling the law that the preferred steamer will not be held in fault for maintaining her course and speed, so long as it is possible for the other to avoid her by porting, at least in the absence of some distinct indication that she is about to fail in her duty. If the master of the preferred steamer were at liberty to speculate upon the possibility, or even of the probability, of the approaching steamer failing to do her duty and keep out of his way; the certainty that the former will hold his course, upon which the latter has a right to rely, and which it is the very object of the rule to insure, would give place to doubts on the part of the master of the obligated steamer as to whether he would do so or not, and produce a timidity and feebleness of action on the part of both, which would bring about more collisions than it would prevent. Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674; The Highgate, 62 L.T.R. 841; S.C. 6 Asp. Mar. Law Cases, 512."

The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals in 146 is reversed and that of the District Court is affirmed. In 173 the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is affirmed.

No. 146, reversed.

No. 173, affirmed.