Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
  • The cause was submitted for the plaintiff on the brief of W.J. Wehrli of Casper, Wyoming, County and Prosecuting Attorney of Natrona County. The action was brought under Chapter 149, Session Laws of Wyoming 1925. Ordinarily it is sufficient to charge a statutory offense in the language of the statute. In Re McDonald, 4 Wyo. 150, 33 P. 18; Koppala v. State, 15 Wyo. 398, 93 P. 662; State v. Greiner, (Wash.) 114 P. 897; People v. Cochrane, (Calif.) 205 P. 473; 30 Cyc. 1565; 31 C.J. 708 and cases cited. In addition to being charged in the language of the statute, defendant is charged with having been appointed city engineer of Casper, his appointment being confirmed by the council. We believe this to be sufficient under the authorities: State v. Collins, 159 N.W. 604; Price v. State, (Wis.) 171 N.W. 77; People v. T. Wah Hing, (Calif.) 190 P. 662; Reeves v. State, (Okla.) 253 P. 510; Board v. Wooding, (N.J.) 135 A. 785; Com. v. Dragon, (Mass.) 132 N.E. 356. The information alleges facts in addition to the terms of the statute. The duties of a city engineer are defined by statute. 1806 C.S. The general definition of professsional engineering is established by authorities. 20 C.J. 1260. Acceptance of appointment as city engineer is an offer to practice professional engineering, as defined by Chap. 149, Session Laws 1925. The only question for decision is whether the amended information avers facts constituting an offer to practice professional engineering. The following authorities maintain the affirmative of the question. State v. Wild, (Mo.) 202 S.W. 613; People v. Banks, (Mich.) 209 N.W. 935; State v. Bohls, (Minn.) 175 N.W. 915; State v. Bresee, (Ia.) 114 N.W. 45; Com. v. St. Pierre, (Mass.) 55 N.E. 482. The cause was submitted for defendant on the brief of E.E. Enterline of Casper, Wyoming. The court below sustained a motion to quash the information on the ground that it failed to charge an offense under the laws of the state. Chap. 149 of the Session Laws 1925 does not define professional engineering. The Koppala case cited by the counsel for the state, is therefore, not in point. The same may be said of the cases of State v. Greiner and People v. Cochrane, also relied upon by the state; some of the duties of a city engineer as defined by 1806 C.S. could be performed by a land surveyor. The term "professional engineering" has a well understood meaning. Webster's dictionary. Defendant was not prosecuted for surveying. The ruling of the trial court is abundantly sustained by the authorities. Art. 1, Sec. 10, Constitution of Wyoming. U.S. v. Cruickshank, 92 U.S. 542; Evans v. U.S., 153 U.S. 584; State v. Wolf, (Mont.) 185 P. 556; McCarthy v. Territory, 1 Wyo. 313; McGinnis v. State, 16 Wyo. 72; U.S. v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483; U.S. v. Carll, 105 U.S. 712. The exception mentioned in Sec. 9 of Chap. 149, Laws 1925, is not pleaded in the information. U.S. v. Cook, 21 L.Ed. 538. Sec. 11 of the Act does not include municipal corporations. If it did an engineer or surveyor employed by a domestic corporation and doing the same work that might be done by a city engineer, would enjoy a privilege denied an engineer employed by a municipality which would, of course, violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. But we do not intend to discuss constitutional questions, unless the court should request a citation of authorities on that subject. The ruling of the trial court should be sustained.
Judges
  • KIMBALL, Justice.
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Click here to upload
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Docket Number
Attorney(S)
  • The cause was submitted for the plaintiff on the brief of W.J. Wehrli of Casper, Wyoming, County and Prosecuting Attorney of Natrona County. The action was brought under Chapter 149, Session Laws of Wyoming 1925. Ordinarily it is sufficient to charge a statutory offense in the language of the statute. In Re McDonald, 4 Wyo. 150, 33 P. 18; Koppala v. State, 15 Wyo. 398, 93 P. 662; State v. Greiner, (Wash.) 114 P. 897; People v. Cochrane, (Calif.) 205 P. 473; 30 Cyc. 1565; 31 C.J. 708 and cases cited. In addition to being charged in the language of the statute, defendant is charged with having been appointed city engineer of Casper, his appointment being confirmed by the council. We believe this to be sufficient under the authorities: State v. Collins, 159 N.W. 604; Price v. State, (Wis.) 171 N.W. 77; People v. T. Wah Hing, (Calif.) 190 P. 662; Reeves v. State, (Okla.) 253 P. 510; Board v. Wooding, (N.J.) 135 A. 785; Com. v. Dragon, (Mass.) 132 N.E. 356. The information alleges facts in addition to the terms of the statute. The duties of a city engineer are defined by statute. 1806 C.S. The general definition of professsional engineering is established by authorities. 20 C.J. 1260. Acceptance of appointment as city engineer is an offer to practice professional engineering, as defined by Chap. 149, Session Laws 1925. The only question for decision is whether the amended information avers facts constituting an offer to practice professional engineering. The following authorities maintain the affirmative of the question. State v. Wild, (Mo.) 202 S.W. 613; People v. Banks, (Mich.) 209 N.W. 935; State v. Bohls, (Minn.) 175 N.W. 915; State v. Bresee, (Ia.) 114 N.W. 45; Com. v. St. Pierre, (Mass.) 55 N.E. 482. The cause was submitted for defendant on the brief of E.E. Enterline of Casper, Wyoming. The court below sustained a motion to quash the information on the ground that it failed to charge an offense under the laws of the state. Chap. 149 of the Session Laws 1925 does not define professional engineering. The Koppala case cited by the counsel for the state, is therefore, not in point. The same may be said of the cases of State v. Greiner and People v. Cochrane, also relied upon by the state; some of the duties of a city engineer as defined by 1806 C.S. could be performed by a land surveyor. The term "professional engineering" has a well understood meaning. Webster's dictionary. Defendant was not prosecuted for surveying. The ruling of the trial court is abundantly sustained by the authorities. Art. 1, Sec. 10, Constitution of Wyoming. U.S. v. Cruickshank, 92 U.S. 542; Evans v. U.S., 153 U.S. 584; State v. Wolf, (Mont.) 185 P. 556; McCarthy v. Territory, 1 Wyo. 313; McGinnis v. State, 16 Wyo. 72; U.S. v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483; U.S. v. Carll, 105 U.S. 712. The exception mentioned in Sec. 9 of Chap. 149, Laws 1925, is not pleaded in the information. U.S. v. Cook, 21 L.Ed. 538. Sec. 11 of the Act does not include municipal corporations. If it did an engineer or surveyor employed by a domestic corporation and doing the same work that might be done by a city engineer, would enjoy a privilege denied an engineer employed by a municipality which would, of course, violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. But we do not intend to discuss constitutional questions, unless the court should request a citation of authorities on that subject. The ruling of the trial court should be sustained.
Judges
  • KIMBALL, Justice.
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This criminal prosecution arises under Chapter 149, Session Laws of Wyoming 1925, which regulates the practice of professional engineering and land surveying. The amended information alleged, in summary adopted by the prosecuting attorney, that the defendant was the duly appointed and acting city engineer of the City of Casper (a city of the first class), that he was actually engaged in the work and duties of that office, and that he did not have a certificate of registration to practice professional engineering under the 1925 Act.

The defendant filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it failed to allege the specific acts constituting an offer to practice or the practicing of professional engineering. The District Court sustained the motion to quash. The prosecuting attorney of Natrona County excepted to that order and sought review under the procedure set forth in Sections 7539–7542, W.C.S. 1920. The Wyoming Supreme Court (Justice Kimball) considered the prosecuting attorney's exception to the District Court's order sustaining the motion to quash.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the amended information alleged acts with sufficient particularity to show an offer to practice or the practice of professional engineering, as required to withstand a motion to quash for indefiniteness.
  2. Whether the acceptance of the office of city engineer and engaging in the "work and duties" of that office, as alleged, constitutes an offer to practice professional engineering under Chapter 149, Laws of 1925.
  3. Whether, in ruling on a motion to quash for indefiniteness, the trial court abused its discretion in requiring more specific allegations of the acts constituting the offense.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecuting Attorney's Arguments (as summarized in brief)

  • Ordinarily a statutory offense may be charged in the language of the statute; citing authorities to that effect.
  • In addition to statutory language, the information alleged that the defendant had been appointed city engineer and that the appointment was confirmed by the council; this, it was argued, was sufficient to show an offer to practice professional engineering.
  • Acceptance of appointment as city engineer is an offer to practice professional engineering as defined by Chapter 149, and additional cited authorities support that proposition.

Defendant's Arguments (as summarized in brief)

  • Chapter 149 does not define "professional engineering" in a way that makes the plaintiff's charging method sufficient; some duties of a city engineer could be performed by a land surveyor, and the information fails to distinguish which acts were allegedly professional engineering.
  • The information failed to plead exceptions provided by the Act (e.g., the exception in Section 9), and constitutional objections raised by plaintiff's counsel were not pleaded or need not be reached.
  • The trial court's ruling sustaining the motion to quash should be sustained by the authorities cited in the defendant's brief.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In Re McDonald, 4 Wyo. 150, 33 P. 18 Cited in plaintiff's brief for the general proposition that it is ordinarily sufficient to charge a statutory offense in the language of the statute. Cited in the plaintiff's brief; the court did not rely on it as controlling in its disposition of the motion to quash.
Koppala v. State, 15 Wyo. 398, 93 P. 662 Cited in plaintiff's brief for the sufficiency of charging in statutory language. Cited in plaintiff's brief; the court noted the case in briefs but found Koppala not in point because Chapter 149 does not define professional engineering as urged by plaintiff's counsel.
State v. Greiner, (Wash.) 114 P. 897 Cited by plaintiff in support of charging-by-statute-language principle. Cited in plaintiff's brief; not treated as dispositive by the court in ruling on particularity.
People v. Cochrane, (Calif.) 205 P. 473 Cited by plaintiff for the same general charging principle. Cited in plaintiff's brief; court did not base its decision on this authority.
30 Cyc. 1565 Encyclopedic statement cited by plaintiff regarding sufficiency of statutory language in an information. Cited in plaintiff's brief; memorial citation only—court did not rely on it as the basis for its ruling.
31 C.J. 708 Encyclopedic authority cited by plaintiff on pleading offenses. Cited in plaintiff's brief; court did not adopt it as the controlling basis for denying the motion to quash.
State v. Collins, 159 N.W. 604 Cited by plaintiff to support that alleging the appointment as city engineer suffices to show offer to practice. Cited in plaintiff's brief; the court considered the plaintiff's theory but found the information insufficiently specific.
Price v. State, (Wis.) 171 N.W. 77 Cited by plaintiff as supporting authorities for sufficiency of allegations. Cited in plaintiff's brief; not relied upon by the court in disposing of the motion to quash.
People v. T. Wah Hing, (Calif.) 190 P. 662 Cited by plaintiff in support of charging practice/offering to practice by office acceptance. Cited in plaintiff's brief; court did not adopt it as dispositive of the particularity issue.
Reeves v. State, (Okla.) 253 P. 510 Cited by plaintiff as authority supporting its theory. Cited in plaintiff's brief; not specifically relied upon by the court.
Board v. Wooding, (N.J.) 135 A. 785 Cited by plaintiff in support of sufficiency of allegations. Cited in plaintiff's brief; court did not base its ruling on this case.
Com. v. Dragon, (Mass.) 132 N.E. 356 Cited by plaintiff for the proposition that appointment/acceptance may constitute offering to practice. Cited in plaintiff's brief; court did not rely on this authority in its decision on particularity.
State v. Wild, (Mo.) 202 S.W. 613 Cited by plaintiff as authority holding acceptance may constitute an offer to practice. Cited in plaintiff's brief; court considered the plaintiff's authorities but found the information insufficiently definite.
People v. Banks, (Mich.) 209 N.W. 935 Cited by plaintiff supporting the affirmative view that acceptance of office may be an offer to practice. Cited in plaintiff's brief; not adopted by the court as controlling.
State v. Bohls, (Minn.) 175 N.W. 915 Cited by plaintiff as authority for the proposition that appointment/acceptance is an offer to practice. Cited in plaintiff's brief; not specifically relied upon in the court's analysis of particularity.
State v. Bresee, (Ia.) 114 N.W. 45 Cited by plaintiff in support of its theory. Cited in plaintiff's brief; court did not depend on it in its ruling.
Com. v. St. Pierre, (Mass.) 55 N.E. 482 Cited by plaintiff to support that acceptance of an office may constitute offering to practice a profession. Cited in plaintiff's brief; court considered the general proposition but required greater particularity in the information.
U.S. v. Cruickshank, 92 U.S. 542 Cited by defendant in brief in the context of constitutional arguments and protections invoked. Cited in defendant's brief; the court noted the defendant's reliance on constitutional authorities but did not decide any constitutional question.
Evans v. U.S., 153 U.S. 584 Cited by defendant in brief as a constitutional authority. Cited in defendant's brief; court declined to address constitutional questions and did not base its ruling on this case.
State v. Wolf, (Mont.) 185 P. 556 Cited by defendant in support of the trial court's ruling. Cited in defendant's brief; court did not rely on it in its disposition of the particularity issue.
McCarthy v. Territory, 1 Wyo. 313 Cited by defendant as an authority; context in brief supporting trial court ruling. Cited in defendant's brief; court did not rest its decision on this case.
McGinnis v. State, 16 Wyo. 72 Cited by defendant and by the court for the principle that a motion to quash does not reach the question whether the facts alleged constitute a punishable offense. Relied upon by the court (cited in opinion) to explain the proper scope of a motion to quash and what it does and does not decide.
U.S. v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483 Cited by defendant in brief as part of constitutional authorities. Cited in defendant's brief; court did not decide constitutional issues and did not base its ruling on this case.
U.S. v. Carll, 105 U.S. 712 Cited by defendant in brief in the context of constitutional/pleading authorities. Cited in defendant's brief; the court did not rely on it in reaching its disposition.
U.S. v. Cook, 21 L.Ed. 538 Cited by defendant regarding pleading exceptions and related procedural points. Cited in defendant's brief; court did not rule on the constitutional or exception-pleading questions raised.
Richey v. State, 28 Wyo. 117, 201 P. 154 Cited by the court for the proposition that indefiniteness in the charge is a defect reachable by motion to quash. Relied upon by the court as precedent establishing that indefiniteness is a proper ground for quashing an information.
State v. Tobin, 31 Wyo. 355, 226 P. 681 Cited by the court similarly on the scope of defects attackable by motion to quash. Relied upon by the court to support the principle that indefiniteness is a defect for which a motion to quash lies.
State v. Toliver, 109 Kan. 660, 202 P. 99, 20 A.L.R. 502 Cited by the court to show a motion to quash does not raise the question that the facts stated do not constitute a punishable offense. Relied upon by the court for the procedural principle limiting the scope of a motion to quash.
People v. Watson, 196 Mich. 36, 162 N.W. 943 Cited by the court to illustrate that a general allegation may include acts that are innocent. Relied upon by the court to support the conclusion that the information's allegation of engaging in "work and duties" was too general and might encompass innocent acts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by framing the statutory scheme of Chapter 149 (1925): the Act defines "land surveyors" and "professional engineers," requires registration with the state board of examining engineers, and makes it a misdemeanor to practice or offer to practice either profession without registration (subject to stated exceptions). The statute also provides that surveying and engineering work done by political subdivisions shall be performed by or under the direction of a duly registered professional engineer or land surveyor, and that a city may employ other engineers or assistants for work.

The court adopted the prosecuting attorney's summary of the information for purposes of deciding the exception: that defendant was appointed and acting city engineer of a first-class city, actually engaged in the work and duties of that office, and lacking a certificate to practice professional engineering.

The court explained the proper scope of a motion to quash under Wyoming practice: such a motion reaches defects in the form and manner of charging, and indefiniteness is a proper ground. However, a motion to quash does not decide whether the facts alleged constitute a punishable offense. In ruling on a motion to quash for lack of particularity, the trial court exercises discretion akin to ordering a pleading made more definite and certain; the appellate court will reverse only for abuse of that discretion.

Applying these principles, the court examined the state's theory that acceptance of the office and engagement in the office's duties constitutes an offer to practice professional engineering. The court observed that Section 1806 (defining city engineer duties) includes work that may be performed by land surveyors, work requiring a professional engineer's certificate (designing works), and work (execution of work designed by an engineer) that does not require a certificate. Because the information did not allege whether the defendant lacked registration as a land surveyor, and because a land surveyor is not forbidden to accept the office of city engineer, the allegation that defendant engaged in the "work and duties" of the office was too general.

The court further noted that the statutory authorization allowing a city to employ "other engineers or assistants" made it doubtful that acceptance of the office necessarily amounted to an offer to perform all duties enumerated by the statute. Consequently, the court concluded the general allegation likely included acts that were innocent and failed to plead the specific acts constituting an offer to practice professional engineering. The range of duties potentially encompassed by the general allegation required more specific pleading, and the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's sustaining of the motion to quash.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Exception Overruled. The Wyoming Supreme Court overruled the prosecuting attorney's exception to the District Court's order sustaining the defendant's motion to quash the amended information.

Implications: The direct effect is that the trial court's ruling sustaining the motion to quash (on the ground that the information failed to allege with sufficient particularity the acts constituting an offer to practice professional engineering) stands. The court did not decide whether the facts alleged, if more specifically pleaded, would or would not state a punishable offense, nor did it rule on any constitutional questions raised in the briefs. The opinion requires more specific allegations of the acts constituting the offer or practice of professional engineering for the information to survive a motion to quash; it does not announce or apply a new substantive rule beyond enforcing the pleading standards and the proper scope of a motion to quash.

Show full summary ...

STATE v. BUTLER

KIMBALL, Justice.

This is a criminal case brought here by procedure set forth in Sections 7539-7542, W.C.S. 1920, for the decision of questions raised by the exception of the prosecuting attorney of Natrona County to the order of the District Court sustaining defendant's motion to quash the information.

The information was drawn under Chapter 149, Laws of 1925, an act to regulate the practice of professional engineering and land surveying. "Land surveyors" and "professional engineers" are the statutory names for the two classes of persons affected by the law. A land surveyor is "any person who does land surveying," and land surveying is defined. Sec. 6 (a). A "professional engineer" is "anyone who practices professional engineering," and professional engineering "means the practice of any branch of the profession of engineering, other than military engineering," but "the execution of work designed by a professional engineer shall not be deemed to be the practice of professional engineering." Sec. 6 (b). Both land surveyors and professional engineers are required to register with the state board of examining engineers, and it is made a misdemeanor punishable by fine for any person (with stated exceptions not necessary now to be considered) to practice or offer to practice land surveying or professional engineering without having registered. It is declared that nothing in the act "shall be construed as authorizing a duly registered professional engineer to make land surveys." Sec. 6 (a).

By Section 6 (c) it is provided, that:

"All surveying and engineering work done by or under the authority of any village, town, city, county or other political subdivision, or the State of Wyoming, shall be performed by or under the direction of a duly registered professional engineer or land surveyor, as provided by this Act, and no town, city or county surveyor or engineer, or surveyor or engineer employed by the State of Wyoming, shall be eligible as a candidate for appointment, re-appointment, election or re-election, until he has secured a certificate of registration, authorizing him to do the class of work for which he is employed."

We shall not quote the allegations of the information, but for the purposes of our opinion shall adopt the prosecuting attorney's summarization thereof as contained in his brief, as follows:

"That the defendant was the duly appointed and acting city engineer of the City of Casper;

"That the City of Casper is a city of the first class organized, created and existing under and by virtue of the general municipal incorporation laws of the State of Wyoming;

"That the defendant was actually engaged in the work and duties of City Engineer of the City of Casper;

"That the defendant was not legally authorized to practice professional engineering, according to the provisions of Chapter 149 of the Session Laws of Wyoming 1925, in that the defendant did not have a certificate of registration to practice professional engineering."

The motion to quash was sustained by the trial court upon the ground stated thus in the motion:

"Because the said amended information wholly fails to set forth or allege what act or acts was or were committed by the defendant, which constituted or constitutes the offer to practice or the practicing of professional engineering by the defendant."

So, the court, in sustaining the motion, held that the information ought to contain an allegation of the act or acts of defendant which it was claimed constituted the practicing of, or offer to practice, professional engineering.

Under our practice, a motion to quash reaches defects in the form of the information and in the manner in which the offense is charged. Sec. 7483, W.C.S. 1920. Indefiniteness in the charge is a defect of that kind. Richey v. State, 28 Wyo. 117, 125, 201 P. 154, 205 P. 304. State v. Tobin, 31 Wyo. 355, 366, 226 P. 681. A motion to quash, when confined to its proper office, does not raise the question that the facts stated do not constitute a punishable offense. McGinnis v. State, 16 Wyo. 72, 81, 91 P. 936; State v. Toliver, 109 Kan. 660, 662, 202 P. 99, 20 A.L.R. 502. The trial court, therefore in sustaining the motion to quash in the case at bar, did not rule, and we, in deciding the question raised by the prosecuting attorney's exception, need not decide, whether the information charged a crime.

When, as in the case at bar, the motion to quash attacks the information on the ground that the facts are not pleaded with sufficient particularity, it would seem to be analogous to the motion, so common in civil cases, to require a party to make his pleading more definite and certain. The court, in ruling on the motion, must decide whether or not the moving party is entitled to have more specific information. The granting of the motion is in effect a ruling that the pleading ought to be amended. In coming to that decision, the court exercises a discretion, and the ruling ought not to be held to be erroneous unless the discretion has been abused.

The state's theory, as stated in the brief, is that, when defendant became city engineer of a city of the first class, and actually engaged in the work and duties of the office, he thereby offered to perform those duties, as stated in Sec. 1806, C.S. 1920, and in so doing offered to practice professional engineering.

Section 1806 states the duties of city engineers of cities of the first class. Some of those duties might be performed by land surveyors as defined by the law of 1925. Other duties, we may assume, could be lawfully performed by only those persons described as professional engineers. That some of the work of a city engineer may lawfully be done by a registered land surveyor is apparently recognized by the provision of Section 6 (a) of the law of 1925. Section 1806 also provides that nothing therein contained "shall prevent such city from employing other engineers or assistants for any work or labor for said city."

If the state's theory be correct, no engineer could safely accept the position of city engineer until he had registered both as a land surveyor and as a professional engineer. If the legislature intended so to provide, the intention is not made at all clear. Section 6 (a) of the law of 1925, makes the city engineer's eligibility for office depend upon his having registered for the class of work for which he is employed. The information in the case at bar does not allege that the defendant was not registered as a land surveyor, and in the absence of such an allegation, we must assume that he was. Nowhere in the law is a land surveyor forbidden to accept the office of city engineer. In doing so, he is guilty of no crime, unless he thereby practices, or offers to practice, professional engineering.

The duties of city engineer under the provisions of Section 1806, might include the doing of work which, in view of the law of 1925, may be divided into three classes roughly described as: (1) land surveying, for which he should have a certificate of registration as a land surveyor; (2) the designing of works, for which he should have a certificate of registration as a professional engineer, and (3) other work, such as the execution of work designed by a professional engineer, for which he need have no certificate of registration. If a city has no work of class (1) for the city engineer to do, it would seem unreasonable to say that a professional engineer, by accepting the office of city engineer, was offering to practice land surveying; and, if the city had no work of class (2) for the city engineer to do, a land surveyor might, we think, accept the office, without being guilty of offering to practice professional engineering.

We may concede that, ordinarily, a person accepting a public office offers to discharge all the duties of that office, for the law usually requires that he perform them, either in person or by his deputies and assistants. But Section 1806, when it authorizes the city to employ "other engineers" for any work, makes it at least doubtful whether a person, by accepting the office of city engineer, necessarily offers to perform all the duties of that office as set forth in the statute.

If the foregoing views be correct, the allegation that the defendant engaged in the "work and duties" of city engineer was not only quite general, but, in all probability, included the charge of some acts that were innocent. See, People v. Watson, 196 Mich. 36, 162 N.W. 943. This is saying nothing of the possibility that the engaging in such work and duties may not have required defendant to offer to do any act of professional engineering. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in holding that the information was uncertain and that defendant was entitled to have the charge include more specific allegations as suggested by the motion to quash.

Exception Overruled.

BLUME, C.J., and RINER, J., concur.

Use AI to get other relevant cases.
Try AI Pro free for 7 days Upgrade to AI Pro

Comments

STATE v. BUTLER
(Jun 18, 1929)