Negligence, In use of way, Motor vehicle. Law of the Road. Practice, Civil, Requests, rulings and instructions, Charge to jury, Ordering verdict, Exceptions.
At the trial of an action of tort for damage to the plaintiff's automobile resulting from a collision with an automobile operated by the defendant, there was evidence for the plaintiff that the collision occurred near the intersection of two streets, one of which at that place was divided into two travelled ways, one passing to the left and the other to the right of a triangular plot of grass having its base approximately on the side line of the second street; that there were shrubs growing on the grass plot and at the sides of the two parts of the first street; that the plaintiff parked his automobile on the right side of the first street facing towards the second street, about twenty-two feet therefrom and about seven feet from the apex of the grass plot; that the defendant approached the intersection on the second street from the direction to the right of the plaintiff's automobile and turned to his left into the first street on the part thereof which was nearer to him, so that the grass plot was to his right; and that his automobile collided with the front part of the plaintiff's automobile, which had not moved. There was evidence for the defendant that he followed the usual course of vehicles in turning that corner; that he would have had to turn a very sharp corner if he had gone on and turned into the further part of the first street; that his automobile was moving at about ten miles per hour; that the plaintiff's automobile also was moving and was about six feet from the corner at the time of the collision; and that he could not turn to his right to avert the collision because of the grass plot. It was stated that, on such conflicting evidence, the trial judge could not properly have ordered a verdict in favor of either party. The judge at the trial above described instructed the jury that the defendant was not negligent as a matter of law in driving to the left of the grass plot as he did. There was no evidence that the grass plot formed a part of the first street. Held, that (1) Even if the grass plot were a part of the first street, the instructions was correct; (2) There was no merit in a contention by the plaintiff that the instruction, by "Isolating certain controverted evidence by a ruling that it did not constitute negligence," was a violation of G.L.c. 231, § 81. G.L.c. 90, § 14, as amended by St. 1925, c. 305, did not require the defendant, in the circumstances above described, to go beyond the nearer part of the first street and enter that street by the further part thereof. It appeared from a bill of exceptions presented by the plaintiff after the trial above described that the plaintiff duly had filed numerous requests for rulings, which the trial judge did not read before charging the jury; that his charge sufficiently covered the issues presented in the action; that, at the close of the charge, the judge, upon his attention being called by the plaintiff's counsel to the requests for rulings, stated that it would take a long time to give all the rulings requested and that he did not like to read rulings to the jury; that he asked the plaintiff's counsel to select those that were important; that counsel then stated that he thought them all important and requested the judge to give them all; that the judge refused to do so; that counsel saved an exception "to those you are not going to give"; and that the judge then read some of the rulings requested to the jury. It did not appear with any certainty which rulings requested were read and which were not. Held, that no error prejudicial to the plaintiff appeared in the judge's disposition of his requests.
WAIT, J.
These three cases, which were tried together, are before us upon exceptions of the plaintiffs after verdicts for the defendant. The bill of exceptions is not entirely clear with regard to the exceptions claimed; and we deal only with such as are argued in the brief for the plaintiffs.
The evidence was contradictory, and would support findings for either party in respect to negligence of the defendant and the due care of the plaintiffs. A verdict for either party therefore could not have been directed properly unless as matter of law uncontradicted facts or incontrovertible inference required a verdict for the one or the other. We find no such fact or inference.
The accident occurred near the point in East Street in Sharon where it divides and, by one travelled way passing to the right and by another passing to the left of a triangular grass plot at the intersection, runs into Bay Street. The defendant turned from Bay Street into East Street by using the travelled way first met at his left. He did not drive on along the side of the triangle on Bay Street until he reached the further travelled path into East Street before making his turn. He used a method of turning from Bay Street commonly in use by travellers approaching East Street from the direction in which he was going. There were shrubs growing on the triangular plot and by the sides of the travelled paths of East Street.
There was no error in instructing the jury that it was not negligence, as matter of law, for him to drive to the left of the grass plot as he did. There was no evidence that the plot formed part of East Street; but, even if it did, we think it could not be said that as matter of law he was required to pass a travelled way leading to the broad travelled part of East Street in order to go beyond the center of the intersection of East and Bay streets and then turn sharply to his left to enter by the further way. Whether his conduct was negligent depended upon the entire circumstances at the time, and was matter of fact for a jury. Such triangular junctions are not uncommon; and a traveller who wishes to enter from his left is not bound as matter of law to keep on to the further roadway. In many cases he may be ignorant that a second entrance exists. G.L.c. 90, § 14, (see present amended form in St. 1925, c. 305) is not to be interpreted to require such action.
There was no violation of G.L.c. 231, § 81. The judge did not charge with respect to matters of fact. Whitney v. Wellesley Boston Street Railway, 197 Mass. 495, 502.
We are not satisfied that the plaintiffs were prejudiced by the action of the trial judge in dealing with the plaintiffs' requests for rulings. The law applicable to the cases was not complicated. How thirty-four requests for rulings were called for is not readily understood. The judge saved exceptions to all not given. If he refused to read them before argument began, the plaintiffs lost no right. In this the case differs from Maxwell v. Massachusetts Title Ins. Co. 206 Mass. 197, where the judge not only did not examine the requests presented but also refused to save exceptions.
The charge covered the cases sufficiently. The plaintiffs had the benefit of all that they were entitled to; and have no good exception, as already stated, to such requests of the defendant as were given. The jurors were not misled to the plaintiffs' prejudice in matters of law; nor were they charged upon the facts. Partelow v. Newton Boston Street Railway, 196 Mass. 24.
Exceptions overruled.