Criminal law — Extortion — Blackmail — Attorney-at-law — Evidence — Harmless error — Act of June 9, 1911, P. L. 833.
1. The admission of incompetent evidence cannot be assigned as error when the same fact has afterwards been established by other evidence. [396]
2. Where several persons are indicted for extortion in the same indictment, and no motion is made for a separate trial, and no request is made that the evidence of one of the witnesses should not be considered against the appellant, the evidence admissible against one is not to be excluded on the ground that it may prejudice the appellant. [396]
3. Upon the trial of an indictment against an attorney-at-law for extortion under the Act of June 9, 1911, P. L. 833, evidence that after instituting a prosecution for abortion, the defendant insisted upon settling it against the wishes of the prosecutrix, and without the approval of the court, and having intimidated the alleged abortionist by placing her in fear of disgrace by the publicity of a prosecution, secured from her a large sum of money which he thereupon divided between himself, his client, the person who brought him the client and the bondsman for the alleged abortionist, is sufficient to throw a suspicion around the transaction that might well have convinced the jury that there was a levying of blackmail, and to sustain a conviction; and this is the case although defendant never had any personal communication with the alleged abortionist who paid the money. [395-399]
Criminal law — Evidence — Similar offenses to rebut good character.
4. A witness may be asked on cross-examination as to offenses of similar kind charged against defendant to rebut testimony of good character. [399-400]
Mr. Justice MAXEY dissented.
Argued April 22, 1932.
PER CURIAM, June 30, 1932:
All the members of this court, with the exception of Justice MAXEY, who dissents (and Justice LINN, who did not sit in the argument), are of one mind that the judgment and order of the Superior Court in this case should be affirmed upon the record and for the reasons set forth in its opinion, reported in 103 Pa. Super. 518, and it is accordingly so ordered.
The judgment is affirmed and the record remitted that the sentence of the lower court be complied with.
Justice MAXEY dissents on the ground that the evidence does not justify the conviction of the defendant on the charge of extortion; he also holds that there was prejudicial error in the latitude allowed the district attorney in cross-examining defendant's character witnesses.