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Docket Number

6 Div. 921.

Attorney(S)

Marion F. Lusk, of Guntersville, for appellant. The Teacher Tenure Act is remedial and should be liberally construed in favor of the teachers who constitute the class designated as primary beneficiaries of the act. Board of Education v. Baugh, 240 Ala. 391, 199 So. 822. The mandate of the Teacher Tenure Act that a teacher in the public schools shall be deemed re-employed for the succeeding year unless notified by employing board not later than May 1st cannot be defeated by proof later that derelictions occurred before that time, no formal action by the board having been taken under either § 117 of the School Code or § 10 of the Tenure Act. Andrews v. Claiborne Parish School Board, La. App., 189 So. 355; Kennington v. Red River Parish School Board, La. App., 200 So. 514; 17 C.J.S., Contracts, p. 894, § 407; Hughes v. Grant Parish School Board, La. App., 145. So. 794; Board of Education v. Baugh, supra. J. T. Johnson, of Oneonta, for appellee. The breach of her contract or agreement under the Teacher Tenure Act by appellant would justify the board in discharging her as a teacher. She may not, therefore, come into equity and enforce her alleged contract for salary as a teacher since she does not come with clean hands and has failed to do equity herself. Code 1940, Tit. 52, § 86; School Code 1927, § 117; Lauderdale Power Co. v. Perry, 202 Ala. 394, 80 So. 476; Coburn v. Coke, 193 Ala. 364, 69 So. 574. No person is authorized to teach in the public schools of the State who does not have a certificate issued by the department of education. Code 1940, Tit. 52, § 332; School Code 1927, § 339.

Judges

THOMAS, Justice.

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Smart Summary

Case Summary — Brown v. Board of Education of Blount County, 6 Div. 921 (Ala. Jan. 15, 1942)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit by a teacher (complainant) seeking a judicial declaration and specific performance under the Teacher Tenure Act (Code 1940, T. 52, § 351 et seq.). The bill, filed October 3, 1940, alleged the complainant taught in Blount County during 1939-40 at Woodard School for $65 per month; the Board did not give written notice on or before May 1, 1940, that she would not be re-employed; she informed the Board of her readiness to teach for 1940-41; and the Board nevertheless refused assignment and salary while employing others (including one-year teachers and out-of-county teachers).

The defendant admitted employment and failure to serve written notice by May 1, 1940, but raised affirmative defenses: that the complainant did not present her readiness to teach before service of summons, breached her 1939-40 contract by failing to teach the minimum seven-month term (leaving a week early), failed to return a mailed contract, knew of consolidation eliminating her position, failed to seek assignment per Board policy, sought employment in another county (abandonment), and employed an unlicensed sister as an eight-day substitute without permission. Evidence showed the complainant taught several Saturdays at the secretary's suggestion, employed her unlicensed sister for about eight days while sick, received a contract (alleged mailed) that was not returned (complainant denied receipt), and received a final pay check on June 22, 1940, based on a payroll certified by the superintendent and chairman.

The trial court dismissed the bill, concluding the Teacher Tenure Act must be strictly construed and that complainant's contract breaches deprived her of rights under the Act. The complainant appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama. The Supreme Court reversed the decree and rendered judgment for complainant.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Teacher Tenure Act (Code 1940, T. 52, § 360) deems a teacher re-employed for the succeeding school year when the employing board has not given the written notice of non-reemployment on or before the statutory deadline (last day of term and no later than May 1).
Whether alleged breaches of duties by the teacher (leaving school early, use of an unlicensed substitute, failure to return a contract, seeking work elsewhere) precluded relief under the Teacher Tenure Act despite the absence of the required written notice of non-reemployment.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The Teacher Tenure Act is remedial and should be liberally construed in favor of teachers, the statute's primary beneficiaries.
The Act's mandate that a teacher be deemed re-employed unless notified by May 1 cannot be defeated by proof of prior derelictions where the board took no formal action under §117 of the School Code or §10 of the Tenure Act.
Cited authorities (as presented by appellant's counsel) supporting liberal construction and that reemployment status cannot be defeated by subsequent proof: Board of Education v. Baugh, Andrews v. Claiborne Parish School Board, Kennington v. Red River Parish School Board, Hughes v. Grant Parish School Board, and general contract authorities.

Appellee's (Defendant's) Arguments

The teacher breached her contract (e.g., failing to teach the minimum term, employing an unlicensed substitute), which justified discharge and precluded equitable relief because she did not come with clean hands.
No person is authorized to teach in public schools who lacks a certificate issued by the department of education (citation of statutory authority).
Cited authorities (as presented by appellee's counsel) supporting equitable defenses and the need for proper certification: Code provisions and cases such as Lauderdale Power Co. v. Perry and Coburn v. Coke.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Board of Education v. Baugh, 240 Ala. 391, 199 So. 822	Construction that the Tenure Act secures continuing service unless written notice of non-reemployment is given on or before May 1; that the county board's notice involves a delicate exercise of discretion and the board "speaks through its records."	The court relied on this construction to interpret the Act's notice requirements and to ask whether the facts showed the complainant within the protected class; quoted and applied its holdings regarding notice and board records.
Holcombe v. County Board of Education of Marion County et al., ante, p. 20, 4 So.2d 503	That § 360 (T. 52) requires notice of non-employment to be given according to the statute whether or not the teacher is in continuing service status.	The court cited this case to support the proposition that § 360's notice requirement applies broadly to teachers and to frame the controlling question as whether notice was given.
Andrews v. Claiborne Parish School Board, La. App., 189 So. 355	Cited by appellant as authority supporting that reemployment presumption cannot be defeated by later proof of dereliction absent formal board action.	Cited by appellant's counsel; the opinion does not indicate the Alabama court expressly relied on this Louisiana decision in reaching its disposition.
Kennington v. Red River Parish School Board, La. App., 200 So. 514	Cited by appellant as supporting the same general proposition regarding reemployment presumption under tenure-like rules.	Cited by appellant's counsel; the court's opinion does not state that it relied on this authority in its analysis.
Hughes v. Grant Parish School Board, La. App., 145 So. 794	Cited by appellant in support of limiting board defenses to formal action requirements.	Listed in appellant's counsel citations; the opinion does not reflect express reliance on this case by the Alabama court.
Lauderdale Power Co. v. Perry, 202 Ala. 394, 80 So. 476	Cited by appellee regarding equitable doctrines (unclean hands) and defenses to equitable relief.	Cited by appellee's counsel; the court's opinion records the citation as part of appellee's argument but does not indicate it was pivotal to the court's decision.
Coburn v. Coke, 193 Ala. 364, 69 So. 574	Cited by appellee concerning equitable defenses and the necessity of coming to equity with clean hands.	Cited by appellee's counsel; the opinion notes the citation but does not rely on it as the basis for the reversal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the statutory framework: the Teacher Tenure Act defines "teacher" and establishes continuing service status requirements (Code 1940, T. 52, § 352) and the reemployment presumption (Code 1940, T. 52, § 360). Section 352 conditions continuing-service status on three consecutive years of service in the same county or city school system and re-employment beginning in fall 1940 or later.

The court focused on § 360's operative language (quoted in the opinion) deeming a teacher re-employed for the succeeding year "unless the employing board of education shall cause notice in writing to be given said teacher on or before the last day of the term ... and provided ... that in no case shall such notice be given ... later than the first day of May." The court treated prior decisions construing the Act (notably Board of Education v. Baugh) as establishing that written notice by the county board is the mechanism by which non-reemployment is effected and that the board's action is evidenced through its records.

The court observed that Holcombe had construed § 360 to require the statutory notice whether or not a teacher had continuing-service status, thereby framing the controlling factual issue as whether the required notice was given to the complainant.

Reviewing the evidence, the court found that it was undisputed that no written notice of discontinuance of employment was given to the complainant as required by statute. Although the trial court had concluded that the teacher's breaches deprived her of the right to claim under the Act, the Supreme Court held that, given the statutory notice requirement and the absence of such notice, the trial court's dismissal was erroneous.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The decree of the trial court is REVERSED AND RENDERED for the complainant. The Supreme Court ruled that the statutory notice required by § 360 was not given and, accordingly, judgment was entered for the complainant.

Implications: The direct effect is that the complainant prevailed on appeal and judgment was rendered in her favor because the statutory notice of non-reemployment was not given. The opinion's analysis rests on statutory construction of the Teacher Tenure Act and prior Alabama decisions interpreting the notice requirement; it does not announce a broader novel rule beyond applying the established interpretation that written notice by the board (within the statutory time frame) is essential to deprive a teacher of reemployment under § 360.

Decision rendered January 15, 1942. GARDNER, C.J., and BROWN and FOSTER, JJ., concurred.

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BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF BLOUNT COUNTY.

THOMAS, Justice.

The bill sought construction and application of complainant's status as a teacher in the public schools under § 10 of the Teacher Tenure Act. Code 1940, T. 52, § 360. The pertinent provisions of said act are given place in our Code of 1940, T. 52, § 351 et seq.

The act defines the term teacher as one who may be employed as an instructor, principal or supervisor in the public elementary or high schools of the state. Section 352 of the act is as follows: "Any teacher in the public schools, who shall meet the following requirements, shall attain continuing service status: (a) Such teacher shall have served under contract as a teacher in the same county or city school system for three consecutive years and shall thereafter be re-employed in such county or city school system. (b) Such continuing service status can be conferred only by the re-employment of such teacher for the school year beginning in the fall of 1940, or for some subsequent school year." (Italics supplied.)

The respective claims of the parties at interest in this proceeding, as set out in the pleadings, are to the effect that on October 3, 1940, complainant-appellant filed her bill of complaint, alleging that she was a teacher in the public schools of Blount County, Alabama, during the school year 1939-40, teaching at Woodard School at a salary of $65 per month; that the defendant did not during that school year on or before May 1, 1940, cause notice in writing to be given her that she was not or would not be re-employed for the succeeding school year at the same salary; that complainant before the beginning of the 1940-41 school year informed defendant of her readiness, ability and willingness to perform the duties required of her as a teacher for the coming year, but that defendant failed and refused to recognize complainant as a teacher; that it has failed and refused to assign her to a school or to any teaching service and has failed and refused to pay her salary of $65 per month; that defendant has pretended and claimed that it could not employ complainant because she had taught for only one year, but that defendant in filling vacancies for the 1940-41 term has employed other teachers who had taught for only one year and has even employed teachers residing outside of Blount County for the year 1940-41. The bill also alleged the existence of a dispute between the parties as to complainant's rights, status, or legal relations with defendant under the Teacher Tenure Law and prayed for specific performance of the contract, for a judicial declaration of her rights, for a judgment against defendant, and for general relief.

Defendant's answer, as amended, admitted the employment and admitted that it had not during the school year 1939-40 on or before May 1, 1940, caused written notice to be given complainant that she was not or could not be re-employed for the succeeding school year at the same salary; admitted that it had employed other teachers with only one year's teaching experience and had employed teachers residing outside of Blount County for the year 1940-41, but denied that it had pretended or claimed it could not employ complainant on the ground that she had taught only one year.

The answer then set up the following matters: (1) That defendant had not been informed prior to the service of the summons of complainant's readiness, ability and willingness to perform teaching service; (2) that complainant breached her 1939-40 contract by failing to teach for the minimum term of seven scholastic months without being excused therefrom by the superintendent, and that defendant had never condoned said breach; (3) that defendant near the end of the school year 1939-40 sent complainant a contract for the next school year but that said contract was never returned; (4) that complainant knew or should have known, that the Woodard School was to be consolidated with the Appalachian School beginning with the 1940-41 school year, and the Woodard School abandoned and its pupils enrolled in Appalachian School and her services would no longer be needed at Woodard School; (5) that complainant "has not to this day come to the office of the Superintendent to seek employment for the year 1940-41 or asked for an assignment to a school as required by the policy and rules of the Superintendent and Board;" (6) that complainant by seeking teaching employment in another county for the school year 1940-41 manifestly abandoned any contract she might have had with the Superintendent or Board; and (7) that complainant breached § 3 of her 1939-40 contract by employing her sister to teach in her place for eight school days while complainant was sick, said sister not having a teacher's certificate and not being qualified as a teacher or a substitute teacher, and that defendant has never condoned said breach.

The effect of the testimony is that in addition to confirming the admitted allegations of the complaint, the complainant sometime in March, 1940, went to Supt. Maynor's office and asked if she could arrange to end her school a week earlier in order to go to the State Teachers' School at Jacksonville and prepare herself for a first grade certificate. Mr. Maynor was out, but his secretary Miss Grace Fendley, after discussing the matter with complainant told her that as between the two methods of teaching an extra hour each day, or teaching each Saturday for five Saturdays, the latter method was the better. Complainant did carry out said suggestion, and without objection or even criticism from a single patron of the school, taught school for five Saturdays, the last day on which she taught being Saturday, April 27th, the regular closing of the school having been scheduled for May 3rd; that complainant borrowed money to go to Jacksonville but was prevented by her parents on the ground that her health would be endangered.

The testimony further shows that in March, 1940, complainant was sick for about eight days and employed her sister Audrey to teach in her place for that time, paying her for the time she taught, it being admitted that said sister Audrey had no teacher's certificate of any kind and that complainant did not obtain permission to do this and did not notify the Superintendent or the Board that she was doing it; that sometime in March, 1940, complainant's father John Cornelius met Supt. Maynor in the lower hallway of the courthouse at which time the Superintendent stated that he understood Mr. Cornelius had a sick daughter out at Woodard, to which the father replied that the girl was not at Woodard but at home, and that his other girl was there teaching in her place, to which Supt. Maynor remarked, "fine," and went on up the stairs to his office, after patting Mr. Cornelius on the shoulder.

The witness William F. Maynor, Supt. of Education, testified that during the latter part of April, 1940, he went to Woodard School and learned that complainant had left the school a week earlier than the scheduled date for closing; that she had in the preceding month employed an unlicensed substitute to teach for her for eight days and that complainant was seeking employment in another county, but that he did nothing about it and the board did nothing about it.

The witness further testified that he knew his secretary (who had sixteen year's experience in her position) talked with the teachers when they came in to see about things and knew that they talked with Miss Fendley. Such was the practice in the spring of 1940 as in other years and he had never reproached or corrected his secretary for talking with the teachers and advising them about the school matters.

The witness Maynor further testified that about April 1, 1940, he mailed to complainant a contract signed by him for the board for the school year 1940-41, providing for a seven months term at $65 a month, and that the contract was never returned by complainant. The complainant testified she never received the contract. The superintendent further testified that he had recommended complainant to the board as possessing the requisite character and that he had told complainant he would do what he could to find her a school; that he had a contract for her to sign in the event he did find a school for her; that he treated her just like the others; that complainant came to his office several times during the summer of 1940 and on those occasions he told her he would use her if he could, "if he had a place," that she would be no exception to the rule but that he had to use first those with three years' experience. The witness repeated that before the contract was mailed to complainant, he had recommended her to the board "to pass the character test," and that she had passed the character test; that under § 161 of the 1927 School Code (Code of 1940, T. 52, § 123) it was then his duty to place her; that in March or April of each year the board approved a list of teachers as a whole, making it then his duty to place them.

The superintendent further testified that he never did complain to complainant about closing her school a week early and that he never said anything to complainant about her sister having substituted for her in March. On the issue of whether or not defendant had condoned complainant's failure to teach until May 3rd and her action in having her sister Audrey teach for her, the testimony shows that complainant received her last check on June 22, 1940, said payment being based on a payroll made up about May 10, 1940, containing a certificate by Superintendent Maynor and endorsed "O.K." by George E. Pass, the Chairman of the Board.

The testimony of Miss Grace Fendley, Secretary to the Superintendent, showed that complainant came to the office a few days before June 22nd and stated that her check had been refused at the bank on the ground that her school register had not been properly filled out; that complainant took her register away and brought it back a few days later completed and signed, and upon delivery of this register to witness, she instructed the bank to deliver complainant's check to her, and that until that was done on June 22nd, the money was under the control of the board of education.

The decree held that the Teacher Tenure Act must be strictly construed and that by her breach of the contract complainant had deprived herself of the right to claim under the act and her bill of complaint was dismissed.

The insistence of appellant is that the act is remedial and should be liberally construed in favor of the teachers who constitute the class designated as the primary beneficiaries of the act.

In the case of Board of Education of Marshall County v. Baugh et al., 240 Ala. 391, 199 So. 822, it was held:

"The Teacher Tenure Act was intended to secure to the teacher a continuing service for the succeeding year unless given written notice to the contrary under the direction of the county board not later than the first day of May. Gen. Acts 1939, p. 761, § 10.

"Written notice of the termination of teacher's employment involves a delicate exercise of a wise discretion by the county board which could not delegate the matter to the county superintendent of education or any one else. Gen. Acts 1939, p. 761, § 10.

"The county board of education speaks through its records, or written memorials of its actions."

With this construction of the act, do the averred facts and the evidence supporting the same, show complainant to be within the preferred class?

The provisions of § 360, T. 52, Code 1940, are as follows:

"Any teacher in the public schools, whether in continuing service status or not, shall be deemed re-employed for the succeeding school year at the same salary, unless the employing board of education shall cause notice in writing to be given said teacher on or before the last day of the term of the school in which the teacher is employed; provided, however, that in no case shall such notice be given the teacher later than the first day of May of the termination of such employment, and such teacher shall be presumed to have accepted such employment unless he or she shall notify the employing board of education in writing to the contrary on or before the first day of June." (Italics supplied.)

The section of the Code last quoted has been construed to mean that notice must issue to teachers of non-employment, according to the requirements of statute, whether or not they fall within the continuing service class or status. Holcombe v. County Board of Education of Marion County et al., ante, p. 20, 4 So.2d 503.

Thus the determining question of fact is that of notice vel non to complainant. The evidence was without conflict that notice of discontinuance of employment was not given to complainant as required by the statute.

It results that the decree of the trial court is reversed and one here rendered for complainant.

Reversed and rendered.

GARDNER, C. J., and BROWN and FOSTER, JJ., concur.

BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF BLOUNT COUNTY