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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On April 21, 1954, the Secretary of Labor sued J.W. Reynolds and Mrs. Velma Jeanne Rutledge, doing business as J.W. Reynolds Lumber Company, seeking to enjoin alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act's overtime, recordkeeping, and shipping provisions. [1]

The defendants denied violating the Act. After interrogatories and requests for admissions were answered, the case was tried to the court without a jury on October 27, 1954. The court considered the pleadings, testimony, discovery responses, exhibits, and the parties' contentions before issuing formal findings of fact and conclusions of law. [2] [3]

Department of Labor investigations had previously identified compliance problems, including unpaid overtime. The defendants cooperated with investigators and employed a former Wage and Hour Division investigator to review their books and assist with compliance. [4] [5]

Several employees nevertheless recorded identical hours rather than their actual hours worked. After a 1954 investigation, the defendants required employees to record their actual hours; since April 1954, all employees except Chester C. Jones had done so. [6] [7] [8]

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendants' prior violations and their continuing violation concerning Chester C. Jones warranted an injunction under Section 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. [9] [10]
  2. Whether the defendants could avoid recordkeeping responsibility by delegating the recording of work hours to employees. [11]
  3. Whether Jones qualified for an executive or administrative exemption from the Act. [12]

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff argued that the defendants' past violations, together with the present violation involving Jones, justified an injunction. [9]

Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants argued that their past violations were technical rather than substantial, that they had attempted to comply with the Act, and that they were then complying with respect to all employees except Jones. [13]
  • They represented that they would immediately comply with the Act concerning Jones and urged the court to exercise its discretion against issuing an injunction. [13]

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tobin v. Anthony-Williams Mfg. Co., Inc., 8 Cir., 196 F.2d 547, 551 An injunction under Section 17 is committed to the court's sound discretion; when a defendant violates the Act and expresses no intention to comply, the court must issue an appropriate injunction. The court used this principle to evaluate the defendants' past violations against their expressed intention to comply. [10]
Durkin v. Bell, D.C.Ark., 111 F. Supp. 599, 603 Blanket injunctions against general statutory violations should not be lightly sought or granted. The court relied on this principle in determining that an injunction was unnecessary given the defendants' substantial compliance and apparent sincerity. [10]
Tobin v. Little Rock Packing Co., 8 Cir., 202 F.2d 234 The opinion cites this decision in connection with the discretionary nature of injunctive relief under the Act. The court included it among the authorities governing its consideration of the requested injunction. [10]
Beatty v. United States, 8 Cir., 191 F.2d 317, 321 Blanket injunctions against general statutory violations are repugnant to the American spirit and should not lightly be granted. The court applied this caution against broad injunctions in assessing whether relief was justified. [10]
Walling v. Sun Pub. Co., D.C.Tenn., 47 F. Supp. 180, 191, affirmed in 6 Cir., 140 F.2d 445 An employer may delegate the task of recording hours to employees but remains responsible under the Act and cannot escape its recordkeeping provisions through delegation. The court held that the defendants' delegation of time recording did not eliminate their statutory responsibility. [11]

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court found that, before April 1954, six employees failed to record their actual hours. Although the defendants' office records were properly maintained, the inaccurate employee time records caused employees to receive somewhat different overtime compensation than they would have received with accurate records. [14] [15]

The defendants could require employees to record their own hours, but that delegation was undertaken at the defendants' peril and did not relieve them of responsibility under the Act. [11]

The court also determined that Jones was not exempt. His monthly salary of $250 was below the $75-per-week requirement for administrative classification, and he spent one-third of his time performing non-supervisory activities, exceeding the permitted twenty percent for the executive exemption. [12]

The court recognized that the defendants had violated the Act, including its overtime, recordkeeping, and shipping provisions, and that Jones remained improperly classified. [11] [16] [17]

Nevertheless, since April 1954 the defendants had complied with the Act as to every employee except Jones. Their prior investigations had been met with cooperation, they had employed a former Wage and Hour investigator to assist with compliance, and the court was convinced that they sincerely intended to correct the Jones classification. [4] [5] [8] [18] [19]

Because injunctive relief was discretionary and blanket injunctions were disfavored, the court concluded that the defendants' present compliance and intention to comply made an injunction unjustified. [10] [18]

Holding and Implications

The complaint was dismissed, and no injunction was issued. The court held that the defendants had previously violated the Act and that Jones was not entitled to an executive or administrative classification, but their present compliance as to all other employees and their stated intention to comply regarding Jones made injunctive relief unwarranted. [16] [17] [20] [21]

The direct effect was that the defendants avoided the requested injunction, subject to their obligation to comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act. The opinion did not establish a broader new precedent.

James P. MITCHELL, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff. v. J.W. REYNOLDS and Mrs. Velma Jeanne Rutledge, indi

JOHN E. MILLER, District Judge.

On April 21, 1954, plaintiff filed his complaint against defendants seeking to enjoin them from allegedly violating the overtime, record keeping, and shipping provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq.

The defendants on June 23, 1954, filed their answer in which they denied violating the Act. Thereafter, plaintiff served upon defendants certain interrogatories and requests for admissions, which in due time were answered by defendants.

Upon the issues thus joined the case was tried to the Court, without a jury, on October 27, 1954, and at the conclusion of the trial the Court, having considered the pleadings, ore tenus testimony of the witnesses, interrogatories and request for admissions and responses thereto, exhibits, and contentions of the parties, orally announced its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and in accordance therewith the Court now makes and files herein its formal findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated.

Findings of Fact 1.

The plaintiff is the Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor. The individual defendants are citizens and residents of the Western District of Arkansas, El Dorado Division, and are doing business as a partnership under the name of J.W. Reynolds Lumber Company.

2.

Prior to 1954, Investigators of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor had investigated defendants' business several times. On at least one of these occasions it was discovered that defendants were not in full compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act, and defendants were required to make additional payments to some of their employees, apparently for unpaid overtime compensation. However, in each of these investigations defendants cooperated fully with the Investigators and made an honest effort to meet the requirements of the Act.

In fact, defendants were so desirous of complying with the Act that they employed John F. Stroud, a former Investigator of the Wage and Hour Division, to check their books periodically and assist them in complying with the Act. Mr. Stroud first began working for defendants in July of 1950, and at that time he ascertained that defendants' books were apparently being kept properly, but noticed that certain employees were turning in the same number of hours each week.

Due to the nature of the work, it was not feasible for the defendants' supervisory personnel to keep an accurate record of the number of hours worked each week by each employee, and beginning in July, 1950, certain employees were given individual time cards upon which they were to record the number of hours they worked each day and each week. Most of these employees had been working for defendants for a number of years, and were trusted with the keeping of their own hours. At the time the cards were given to the employees Stroud instructed them to keep an accurate record of the actual number of hours they worked each week, and J.L. Toland, defendants' bookkeeper and office manager, typed the following notation upon the backs of the employees' first time cards:

"In line with your talk to Mr. Stroud in regard to your working hours, please fill in the exact number of hours you have worked and at the end of each pay period please turn in your time card and pick up a new card for the next period. J.L. Toland."

Subsequent to that time, and up until April of 1954, Stroud, Toland and N.B. Rutledge, Manager of the Company, each instructed the employees from time to time that they should keep an accurate record of the actual number of hours worked each week. However, some of the employees did not keep an accurate record of the number of hours they worked, but instead recorded the same number of hours every week or every two weeks. There were two reasons for the employees' failure to keep accurate records of the number of hours worked. First, they thought it was unnecessary and was too much trouble, and second, they wanted to be assured of the same amount of pay each pay period, even though some weeks they might not work the required number of hours they thought necessary to entitle them to receive the same amount of pay for each pay period.

3.

In January and February of 1954, Charles F. Routon, Jr., an Investigator of the Wage and Hour Division, made an investigation of defendants' business. He discovered that several of the employees were not recording the actual number of hours they worked each week, and also learned that one of the persons defendants had classified as an executive or administrative employee did not meet the necessary requirements for such an exemption. As a result of this investigation, and the fact that prior investigations of defendants' business had revealed some violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, plaintiff instituted the present action seeking to enjoin any further violations of the Act by defendants.

In the meantime defendants, having been informed by Investigator Routon of the violation by certain employees in failing to keep a record of the actual hours worked, again discussed the matter with the particular employees and demanded of them that they record the actual number of hours they worked. Since April, 1954, all of defendants' employees, with the exception of Chester C. Jones, have been keeping accurate records of the actual number of hours they work each week.

4.

Specifically, prior to April, 1954, the following employees failed to record the actual number of hours they worked each week: H.G. Alston, saw filer, D.C. Brian, charged with duty of maintaining planer equipment, Jim Crawford, sawyer and charged with duty of maintaining saw mill equipment, Chester C. Jones, woods supervisor, also having other duties in connection with timber, Dave Purser, saw filer, and T.R. Sturgis, lumber checker. Subsequent to April, 1954, all of the employees except Jones have kept and recorded the actual number of hours they worked each week.

5.

Both prior to and after April, 1954, defendants' books were properly kept insofar as the office records were concerned. That is, if the employees had turned in the actual number of hours worked, the office records would have been accurate and the employees would have received proper overtime compensation. But, the failure of the named employees to record the actual number of hours worked by them resulted in them receiving a slightly different amount of overtime pay than they would have received if the hours had been properly recorded. However, since April of this year all the records have been properly kept and overtime pay has been correctly determined, except on Chester C. Jones who was carried as an administrative employee.

6.

The defendants employed and are now employing approximately 100 employees in and about their place of business in Smackover, Arkansas, in the production of rough and finished pine and hardwood lumber. Substantially all of the goods produced by these employees have been, and are being, produced for interstate commerce, and have been, and are being, shipped, delivered, transported, offered for transportation and sold in interstate commerce.

7.

During the period in question defendants at all times had more than twelve employees employed in planting or tending trees, cruising timber, surveying or felling timber, or in preparing or transporting logs or other forestry products to the defendants' sawmill, or to transportation terminals.

8.

Chester C. Jones was hired by defendants as a Woods Foreman at a salary of $250 per month. His duties include the supervision of the log crew, the buying of timber, scaling of logs, and related items. At least one-third of his time is spent away from the log crew.

Discussion

The plaintiff concedes that defendants are now and since April of this year have been in compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act with respect to all the employees except Chester C. Jones. But plaintiff contends that defendants' past violations, together with the present violation with respect to Jones, are sufficient to invoke the Court's discretion and to necessitate an injunction against the defendants.

The defendants, on the other hand, contend that their past violations were technical rather than substantial; that they endeavored to comply with the Act; that they are presently in compliance as to all employees except Jones, and that they will immediately comply as to the said Jones; and that the Court should, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, refrain from issuing the injunction sought by plaintiff.

The issuance of an injunction under Section 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 217, addresses itself to the sound discretion of the Court. Tobin v. Anthony-Williams Mfg. Co., Inc., 8 Cir., 196 F.2d 547, 551; Durkin v. Bell, D.C.Ark., 111 F. Supp. 599, 603. See also, Tobin v. Little Rock Packing Co., 8 Cir., 202 F.2d 234. It has been said that "Blanket injunctions against general violation of a statute are repugnant to American spirit and should not lightly be either administratively sought or judicially granted." Beatty v. United States, 8 Cir., 191 F.2d 317, 321; Durkin v. Bell, supra, at page 603 of 111 F. Supp. But, if a defendant violates the Act, and expresses no intention of conforming in the future, the duty devolves upon the Court to issue the proper injunction. Tobin v. Anthony-Williams Mfg. Co., supra.

In the instant case, prior to April, 1954, defendants violated Sections 6, 7 and 15 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 206, 207, 215, as a result of the failure of certain employees to record the actual number of hours they worked each week. In this connection, while there is nothing to prevent an employer from delegating to his employees the duty of keeping a record of their hours, the employer does so at his peril. He cannot escape the record keeping provisions of the Act by delegating that duty to his employees. See, Walling v. Sun Pub. Co., D.C.Tenn., 47 F. Supp. 180, 191, affirmed in 6 Cir., 140 F.2d 445, certiorari denied 322 U.S. 728, 64 S.Ct. 946, 88 L.Ed. 1564. However, since April, 1954, all of defendants' employees except Jones have kept records of the actual number of hours they worked, and since that time defendants have been in full compliance with the Act except with respect to the said Jones.

The defendants have been paying Jones upon a straight salary basis upon the assumption that he is an executive or administrative employee exempted from the Act by Section 13, 29 U.S.C.A. § 213. The said Jones, however, fails to meet the requirements of a bona fide executive or administrative employee. His salary, being $250 per month, is not sufficient to entitle him to an administrative classification, since a salary of at least $75 per week is required. 29 Code of Federal Regulations, Sec. 541.2(e). And, inasmuch as he devotes one-third of his time to activities of other than a supervisory nature, he does not qualify for the executive exemption, which permits a maximum of twenty per cent of the employee's time to be spent in activities that are not of a supervisory nature. 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(e). It follows that defendants are in error, and are in violation of the Act, in classifying the said Jones as an executive or administrative employee, but the defendants expressed an earnest desire to comply with the Act and the Court is convinced that they will immediately correct their error with respect to Jones.

It is true that defendants have violated the provisions of the Act, but they are presently in complete compliance, except with respect to the said Jones, and are apparently sincere in their desire to comply fully with the Act. In view of these facts, the Court is of the opinion that an injunction would not be justified, and that plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed.

In passing it may be stated that plaintiff is not to be criticized for bringing the instant suit. At the time the suit was filed, April 21, 1954, defendants had been in violation of the Act, and it may be more than a coincidence that it was in the month of April that defendants' employees began recording the actual number of hours they worked. In other words, the filing of the suit in all probability expedited the action of defendants in fully complying with the Act, but the court is convinced that defendants thought they were in compliance at all times and their action in employing an expert, a former Wage-Hour investigator, to check their books every month and to advise them fully substantiates their verbal expressions of their intention and desire to comply at all times with the law.

Conclusions of Law 1.

The Court has jurisdiction of the parties to and the subject matter of this proceeding.

2.

Prior to April, 1954, defendants violated the overtime, record keeping and shipping provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act with respect to six of its employees. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 206, 207, 215.

3.

Defendants' employee, Chester C. Jones, is not entitled to an administrative or executive classification under the Act.

4.

Since April, 1954, defendants have been in full compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act with respect to all their employees except the said Chester C. Jones.

5.

In view of defendants' present compliance and intention to comply in the future, an injunction should not be issued, and the complaint of plaintiff should be dismissed.

A judgment in accordance with the above should be entered.

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MITCHELL v. REYNOLDS, (W.D.Ark. 1954)
(Nov 12, 1954)