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Docket Number

No. 40289.

Attorney(S)

Wright, Overstreet Kuykendall, Jackson, for appellant. I. The Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act as construed by the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi does allow temporary total disability and permanent and total disability. First Natl. Bank of Memphis v. State Tax Comm., 210 Miss. 590, 50 So.2d 146; J.F. Crowe Well Servicing Contractor v. Fielder, 224 Miss. 353, 80 2d 29; Laurel Daily Leader v. James, 224 Miss. 654, 80 So.2d 770; Sec. 6998-09, Code 1942. II. The appellees are in error in saying that there was no period of temporary total disability. J.F. Crowe Well Servicing Contractor v. Fielder, supra. Butler, Snow, O'Mara, Stevens Cannada, Jackson, for appellee. I. Under the Mississippi Act, an award for temporary total disability may not be made in addition to an award for permanent total disability so as to exceed the statutory maximum of $8,600, when the proof shows that claimant has been permanently and totally disabled from the beginning. J.F. Crowe Well Servicing Contractor v. Fielder, 224 Miss. 353, 80 So.2d 29; First Natl. Bank of Memphis v. State Tax Comm., 210 Miss. 590, 49 So.2d 410; Laurel Daily Leader v. James, 224 Miss. 654, 80 So.2d 770; Marsh v. Aljoe (Wyo.), 284 P. 260; Woin v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. (Mont.), 43 P.2d 663; Sec. 6998-09, Code 1942. II. Even if an award for temporary total disability could be made in addition to an award for permanent total disability in a proper case, still the evidence in the present case does not warrant a finding that there was a period of temporary total disability and a subsequent period of permanent total disability. Woin v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., supra; Laurel Daily Leader v. James, supra.

Judges

HALL, J.

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Smart Summary

Morgan v. J.H. Campbell Construction Co., No. 40289 (Miss. Nov. 19, 1956)

Factual and Procedural Background

On August 14, 1952, Bob Morgan, while employed by J.H. Campbell Construction Company, suffered a heart attack diagnosed as an acute myocardial infarction. The employer and its insurer refused compensation, and Morgan filed a claim. An attorney-referee found the disability arose out of and in the course of employment and, by order dated March 14, 1953, awarded compensation for temporary total disability under Section 8(b) of the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act. The carrier paid $25.00 per week from the date of injury until June 29, 1954.

Morgan was treated by Dr. T.E. Wilson. On April 16, 1953, Dr. Wilson certified improvement but stated Morgan remained unable to engage in gainful employment and that a re-examination after sixty days might show ability to work. On May 17, 1954, Dr. Wilson certified that Morgan had been permanently and totally disabled since the date of the attack.

On August 18, 1954, the employer and carrier moved the compensation commission to adjudge that Morgan had been permanently and totally disabled since August 14, 1952, and that their obligation was limited to permanent total disability benefits under Section 8(a) (statutory maximum $8,600). The attorney-referee, on December 16, 1954, found Morgan totally and permanently disabled since the date of his heart attack and directed payment for permanent total disability from August 14, 1952, subject to the statutory cap and less amounts already paid.

Morgan appealed to the full commission. On September 22, 1955, the full commission concluded the attorney-referee erred: it ordered payment of temporary total disability benefits from August 14, 1952, up to May 17, 1954, and thereafter permanent total disability benefits beginning May 18, 1954, at the same weekly rate, subject to the statutory maximum.

The employer and carrier appealed to the Circuit Court of Hinds County. The circuit court reversed the full commission and directed payment for permanent and total disability from August 14, 1952, subject to the statutory limitations and with deduction of amounts already paid. Morgan appealed the circuit court's judgment to the Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a claimant whose disability, in truth, was permanent and total from the date of injury may recover both (a) temporary total disability benefits for the period up to the time the disability was recognized as permanent and (b) permanent total disability benefits thereafter, such that the two recoveries combined would exceed the statutory maximum for permanent total disability.
Whether payments previously made for temporary total disability must be treated as part of the compensable period if the temporary disability later is determined to have been permanent from the date of injury (i.e., whether the permanent disability "relates back" to the date of injury, requiring inclusion/deduction of earlier payments from the statutory maximum).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Morgan's) Arguments

The Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act, as construed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, allows awards for temporary total disability and for permanent total disability (citing decisions including First Natl. Bank of Memphis v. State Tax Comm.; J.F. Crowe Well Servicing Contractor v. Fielder; Laurel Daily Leader v. James; and Code Sec. 6998-09).
The appellees are incorrect in asserting there was no period of temporary total disability; appellant cites J.F. Crowe Well Servicing Contractor v. Fielder in support of entitlement to temporary total benefits for an initial period.

Appellees' (Employer and Carrier) Arguments

Under the Mississippi statute, an award for temporary total disability may not be made in addition to an award for permanent total disability so as to exceed the statutory maximum of $8,600 when the proof shows the claimant was permanently and totally disabled from the beginning (citing J.F. Crowe Well Servicing Contractor v. Fielder; First Natl. Bank of Memphis v. State Tax Comm.; Laurel Daily Leader v. James; Marsh v. Aljoe; Woin v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co.; Code Sec. 6998-09).
Even assuming temporary total benefits could be added to permanent total benefits in some cases, the evidence here does not warrant a finding that there was a discrete period of temporary total disability followed by a subsequent period of permanent total disability (citing Woin and Laurel Daily Leader v. James).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
J.F. Crowe Well Servicing Contractor v. Fielder, 224 Miss. 353, 80 So.2d 29	Interpreted Section 8(c): where temporary total compensation is paid and claimant later is rated permanently partially disabled, permanent partial compensation may follow the temporary total payments as provided by statute.	The Court distinguished this case as dealing with permanent partial disability (subsection (c)), not with permanent total disability following temporary total disability; it therefore did not control the outcome here.
First Natl. Bank of Memphis v. State Tax Comm., 210 Miss. 590, 49 So.2d 410	Cited by appellant as authority that the Mississippi Act allows temporary total disability and permanent total disability awards.	Referenced as part of the parties' citations; the Court did not treat it as authorizing cumulative awards that would exceed the statutory maximum for permanent total disability.
Laurel Daily Leader v. James, 224 Miss. 654, 80 So.2d 770	Recognized that temporary total disability may follow payments for permanent total disability, but that the sum of such awards should not exceed the statute's maximum.	The Court cited this decision to show prior Mississippi authority limiting combined awards so they do not exceed the statutory maximum; it supported the Court's restriction on double recovery.
Baggett v. "M" System Trailer Co., et al, 86 So.2d 874	Holds that when an entire disability stems from a single accident and is in substance permanent and total, an allowance for total and permanent disability is all-inclusive and does not permit separate additional awards for other types of disability arising from the same accident.	The Court described Baggett as "more in point" and used it as persuasive authority to support the view that the permanent-total award is inclusive where the entire disability arises from a single accident.
Marsh v. Aljoe (Wyo.), 284 P. 260	Explains that where the evidence shows the disability was permanent from the beginning, a jury's arbitrary determination of a temporary period does not create entitlement to double compensation; double allowance is error and inconsistent with legislative intent.	Quoted and relied upon as persuasive out-of-state authority demonstrating the rule that temporary payments that in reality reflect a permanent total disability should be treated as part of the permanent award and not duplicated.
Woin v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. (Mont.), 43 P.2d 663	Holds that when temporary total disability ultimately is found to be permanent total disability relating back to the original injury, earlier temporary payments must be included in the compensable period and deducted from the permanent total award.	The Court cited Woin to support the proposition that the temporary period "became" permanent and that prior payments should be included in and reduce the period/amount available for permanent total compensation.
Dosen v. East Butte Copper Mining Co., 78 Mont. 579, 254 P. 886	Interprets statute to treat a disability that proves permanent (rather than temporary) as governed by the permanent-disability provision, with the period of compensation set by that provision (no double payment).	Used by the Court as supporting authority for the view that a permanent condition from the start is compensated under the permanent statute and that earlier temporary payments are part of that permanent compensable period.
Baffi v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 87 Pa. Super. 579	States that when a claimant has been paid the maximum amount for total disability, no additional allowance arising from the same accident may be made.	Cited to bolster the Court's conclusion that maximum payment for permanent total disability is final for the consequences of that injury and prevents "tagging on" another disability award.
Appeal of Sargent Co., 93 Conn. 26, 104 A. 490	Listed among authorities holding that additional allowances should not be made where total/permanent compensation has been paid.	Referenced as additional supportive authority consistent with the Court's holding against double recovery for the same injury.
Industrial Commission v. Ocean Acc. Guar. Corp., 67 Colo. 427, 180 P. 568; Georgia Casualty Co. v. Jones, 156 Ga. 664, 119 S.E. 721; Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm., 57 Utah 208, 193 P. 821; Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm., 60 Utah 553, 210 P. 611; Moses v. National Union Coal Mining Co., 194 Iowa 819, 184 N.W. 746; Fame Armstrong Laundry Co. v. Brooks, 226 Ky. 22, 10 S.W.2d 478	Collected to show that courts are not unanimous: some hold temporary total disability may be compensated in addition to permanent partial (or other categories), while others do not.	The Court quoted Marsh's survey of divergent authorities to acknowledge the split of authority among jurisdictions and to explain why it favored the line of decisions treating an essentially permanent disability as a single compensable condition rather than permitting double awards.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a statutory and comparative analysis grounded in Section 8 (subsections (a), (b) and (c)) of the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act (Section 6998-09, Code of 1942). It examined (a) the text of subsection (c), which expressly provides that compensation for permanent partial disability "shall be paid following compensation for temporary total disability" and (b) the absence of a comparable textual provision authorizing permanent total disability payments in addition to temporary total disability payments.

The Court reasoned that while the legislature explicitly structured a sequential payment scheme for permanent partial disability following temporary total disability (subsection (c)), there is no statutory language permitting permanent total disability benefits to be added on top of temporary total benefits in a way that would allow combined recovery beyond the statutory maximum enumerated for permanent total disability (subsection (a)). The Court stated it was bound to follow the statute's terms and not to "rewrite the Act or to add to its terms."

To interpret the statutory scheme, the Court reviewed prior Mississippi decisions and persuasive out-of-state authorities. It explained:

The Court distinguished J.F. Crowe (Fielder) because that case concerned permanent partial disability following temporary total disability (subsection (c)), not a situation where temporary total disability is succeeded by permanent total disability.
The Court relied on precedents (Baggett, Marsh, Woin, Dosen, Baffi, and others) holding that where the evidence shows the disability in substance was permanent from the outset, the temporary-total designation merely reflected the claimant's healing period and in reality the disability "related back" to the date of injury as permanent total disability; in such circumstances, payments made as temporary total should be included in the compensable period that permanent total disability governs and should reduce the remaining compensation available under the permanent-total cap.
The Court noted policy concerns cited by Marsh: permitting both awards in full when the disability was permanent from the start would create incentives for delay and unequal treatment among similarly situated claimants, contrary to the statutory scheme.

Applying these principles to the stipulated facts, the Court found that the entire disability "relates back to the beginning of his rating of temporary total disability" and that the disability "later became permanent as of the date of the injury," i.e., it had proved to be permanent total from the date of injury. Consequently, the claimant could not recover both temporary total benefits through May 17, 1954, and then begin a fresh 450-week (or $8,600) permanent total period thereafter; instead, the permanent-total award governs, with earlier payments treated as part of the compensable permanent-total period.

On that basis the Court concluded the attorney-referee and circuit court rulings — which directed payment for permanent total disability from the date of injury subject to statutory limits and deduction of amounts already paid — were correct, and the full commission's contrary order was erroneous.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the circuit court judgment directing payment for permanent and total disability from August 14, 1952, at $25.00 per week for up to 450 weeks or the maximum of $8,600.00 (whichever is lesser), with deduction of amounts previously paid. The Court held that the claimant may not recover both temporary total disability benefits for the initial period and then, in addition, a full permanent total disability award that would permit combined recovery exceeding the statutory maximum because the disability was permanent from the date of injury and thus the permanent-total award is inclusive of the earlier period.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The claimant's recovery is limited to the statutory maximum for permanent total disability; payments already made as temporary total disability are to be treated as part of the compensable period under the permanent total award (thereby reducing the remaining amount/duration available under the statutory cap). The circuit court's judgment ordering such treatment was affirmed.
Legal consequence: The Court applied existing statutory text and prior authorities to limit cumulative recovery where a claimant's disability, in truth, was permanent and total from the outset. The opinion applies and synthesizes precedent rather than announcing a novel rule beyond those authorities; it enforces the statutory maximum for permanent total disability where the injury's consequences were permanent from the date of the injury.

Disposition: Affirmed (McGehee, C.J., and Justices Lee, Kyle and Holmes concurred).

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MORGAN v. J.H. CAMPBELL CONSTRUCTION CO., et al.

1. Workmen's Compensation — temporary total disability — which later became permanent total disablity as of date of injury — claimant limited to recovery only of maximum allowable for permanent total disability.

Where a claimant's entire disability related back to the beginning of his rating of temporary total disability and such disability later became permanent as of the date of the injury, claimant was not entitled to recover both for temporary total disability up to the date on which his disability was discovered to be permanent, and also to recover for permanent total disability after the discovery of such total disability, but was limited to recovery only of the maximum allowable for permanent total disability.

Headnote as approved by Hall, J.

HALL, J.

On August 14, 1952, Bob Morgan while in the employment of J.H. Campbell Construction Company suffered a heart attack which was diagnosed as an acute myocardial infarction. The employer and its insurance carrier refused to pay compensation and subsequently a claim was filed and was heard by the attorney-referee, who found that the disability arose out of and in the course of the employment and awarded compensation for temporary total disability under Section 8, subsection (b), of the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act. The date of this order and finding is March 14, 1953. Thereafter the carrier paid compensation in the amount of $25.00 per week from the date of injury to June 29, 1954.

The claimant was under the treatment of Dr. T.E. Wilson who on April 16, 1953, certified that the claimant's condition was improved but he stated that claimant was still unable to participate in any gainful occupation. He expressed the belief however that after sixty days, a re-examination would reveal his condition to be such that he might be able to go to work at that time. The claimant continued under Dr. Wilson's treatment and on May 17, 1954, Dr. Wilson certified that the claimant has been permanently and totally disabled since the date of his attack.

On August 18, 1954, the attorneys for the employer and the carrier filed a motion with the compensation commission to determine and adjudge that the claimant is now and has been permanently and totally disabled since the date of his heart attack on August 14, 1952, and that they are obligated only to pay compensation for permanent total disability not to exceed the sum of $8,600.00 in accordance with Section 8 (a) of the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act. This motion was controverted and on December 16, 1954, the attorney-referee found that the claimant has been totally and permanently disabled since the date of his heart attack and directed payment of compensation from August 14, 1952, for permanent total disability at the rate of $25.00 per week for a period not to exceed 450 weeks or the maximum of $8,600.00, whichever shall be the lesser in amount, as provided in the Act, less the amount already paid.

The claimant appealed this decision of the attorney-referee to the full commission, which on September 22, 1955, entered an order that the attorney-referee was in error and that his order should be amended, and it accordingly ordered the employer and the insurance carrier to pay to the claimant compensation from August 14, 1952, for a period of time up until May 17, 1954, and that such compensation shall be designated as compensation for temporary total disability. The commission further ordered that thereafter and beginning on May 18, 1954, compensation shall be paid to the claimant at the rate of $25.00 per week for a period not to exceed 450 weeks, or the maximum of $8,600.00, whichever shall be the lesser in amount, and that such payments after May 17, 1954, shall be designated as payment for permanent and total disability.

On the hearing no testimony was offered but there was a stipulation by agreement of counsel which embodied the material findings of the original order of the attorney-referee. Dr. Wilson's letter was also stipulated as being his evidence in the case and it was further stipulated that this letter was obtained by a representative of the carrier; that the said Dr. Wilson was the personal attending physician of the claimant from and after the date of the award for temporary total disability up until the present time, and, as such, conducted all the ways and means of the treatment of the claimant, which was all done with the knowledge and approval of the employer-carrier; that up until the date of said letter of May 17, 1954, neither the claimant nor the employer, carrier, nor their counsel, had any official knowledge of a determination that the disability of the claimant was permenent and total. It was further stipulated that the exact time that Dr. Wilson determined the permanent and total character of the claimant's disability may not have been the exact date of said letter but that it was on or about that time and this in spite of the fact that he said in his letter that it was permanent from the date of the original injury, and it was stipulated that during the said period of time that the claimant was treated by Dr. Wilson, the doctor was endeavoring to treat him in such a way that he could recover from his disability, either wholly or partially, which, according to his letter he failed to do.

From the order of the commission the employer and carrier appealed to the circuit court, which court reversed the order of the commission and directed the payment of compensation benefits from August 14, 1952, for permanent and total disability at the rate of $25.00 per week for a period not to exceed 450 weeks or the maximum of $8,600.00, whichever shall be the lesser in amount, deducting, of course, the benefits already paid to the claimant. From that order of the circuit court the claimant appeals here.

The claimant contends that he is entitled to benefits for temporary total disability up to the time of Dr. Wilson's letter of May 17, 1954, and that from and after that date he is entitled to permanent total disability benefits over and above and in addition to what has already been paid him for temporary total disability. We do not think that the claimant's position is well taken. Section 8 of the Compensation Act, which is found in Section 6998-09 of the Mississippi Code of 1942, provides in part as follows:

"Compensation for disability shall be paid to the employee as follows:

"(a) Permanent total disability: In case of total disability adjudged to be permanent, sixty-six and two-thirds per centum (66 2/3%) of the average weekly wages, subject to the maximum limitations as to weekly benefits as set up in this act, shall be paid to the employee not to exceed four hundred fifty (450) weeks or the maximum of eight thousand six hundred dollars ($8,600.00), whichever shall be the lesser in amount. Loss of both hands, or both arms, or both feet, or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall constitute permanent total disability. In all other cases permanent total disability shall be determined in accordance with the facts.

"(b) Temporary total disability: In case of disability total in character but temporary in quality, sixty-six and two-thirds per centum (66 2/3%) of the average weekly wages, subject to the maximum limitations as to weekly benefits as set up in this act, shall be paid to the employee during the continuance of such disability not to exceed four hundred fifty (450) weeks or the maximum of eight thousand six hundred dollars ($8,600.00), whichever shall be the lesser in amount.

"(c) Permanent partial disability: In case of disability partial in character but permanent in quality, the compensation shall be sixty-six and two-thirds per centum (66 2/3%) of the average weekly wages, subject to the maximum limitations as to weekly benefits as set up in this act, which shall be paid following compensation for temporary total disability paid in accordance with subdivision (b) of this section, * * *".

It will be noted that subsection (c) provides that permanent partial disability shall be paid following compensation for temporary total disability paid in accordance with subdivision (b) of the Section. It nowhere provides that permanent total disability shall be paid in addition to payments for temporary total disability. While we are committed to a liberal interpretation of the Act, we are not authorized to rewrite the Act or to add to its terms.

Appellant relies on the case of J.F. Crowe Well Servicing Contractor, et al v. Fielder, 80 So.2d 29, not yet reported in the State Reports. In that case we held that where compensation has been paid for temporary total disability and the claimant has reached the maximum benefit from medical care and treatment before the expiration of 450 weeks or before the total paid amounts to $8,600.00, and the claimant immediately following is rated as permanently partially disabled, he is entitled to be paid for such permanent partial disability under the above mentioned subdivision (c). The case did not deal at all with the question of a total permanent disability following a temporary total disability. There we simply followed the exact provisions of the statute.

Appellant also relies on the case of Laurel Daily Leader, Inc., et al v. James, 80 So.2d 770, 773, not yet reported in State Reports. We there held that temporary total disability might follow payments for total and permanent disability, but we were very careful to say that the two combined should not exceed the maximum provided by the statute.

We think that more in point is the case of Baggett v. "M" System Trailer Co., et al, 86 So.2d 874, not yet reported in State Reports. In that case the appellants contended that after having drawn benefits for total and permanent disability in the maximum amount, they were also entitled to permanent partial disability for the loss of the use of two fingers, the contention being that the benefits under our compensation law should be applied consecutively. We there stated that in certain instances, which were not there applicable, we have so held, but we then stated, "But in this case we are of the opinion that since the entire disability in this case stems from and originated as the result of a single accident, the allowance of total and permanent disability is all inclusive."

In the case of Marsh v. Aljoe, et al, (Wyo.) 284 P. 260 (263), the Supreme Court of Wyoming passed on the identical question here involved and said:

"Courts are not agreed as to whether or not total temporary disability may be compensated in addition to permanent partial disability, some holding that a workman's temporary total disability is distinct from permanent partial disability, even though arising out of the same injury. Industrial Comm. v. Ocean Acc. Guar. Corp., 67 Colo. 427, 180 P. 568. Others hold the contrary. Georgia Casualty Co. v. Jones, 156 Ga. 664, 119 S.E. 721, and cases cited; Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm., 57 Utah 208, 193 P. 821; Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm., 60 Utah 553, 210 P. 611; Moses v. National Union Coal Mining Co., 194 Iowa 819, 184 N.W. 746; Fame Armstrong Laundry Co. v. Brooks, 226 Ky. 22, 10 S.W.2d 478; Snyder, Workmen's Compensation Law, Sec. 570.

"That is not the situation in this case. According to all the evidence, and according to the theory of the claimant, his disability was permanent from the beginning, and the jury merely arbitrarily determined that temporary total disability ended at the time of the verdict. Not many cases have been found in which the courts have passed upon the specific point here involved. It appears in the case of Dosen v. East Butte Copper Mining Co., 78 Mont. 579, 254 P. 886, 887, that the statute of Montana allows compensation for temporary total disability for not exceeding three hundred weeks, and compensation for permanent total disability for not exceeding four hundred weeks, at a certain rate and at another rate thereafter. The court, speaking of the allowance to be made for permanent total disability, says:

"`If the total disability proves not temporary, but permanent, payment is governed by section 2913. It was in fact a permanent condition, not a temporary one. There is no concurrent condition here, nor any double payment over the same period. The compensation is paid during the period of disability — the period of total disability — which shall not exceed 400 weeks, and after that at the rate of $5 per week.'

"In the case of Baffi v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 87 Pa. Super. 579, the court held that, when compensation was paid for permanent total disability, no other allowance could be made in addition thereto, and the court said in part:

"`When this claimant was paid the maximum amount for total disability, that ended the matter. He could not get anything more from any cause arising out of the same accident. He cannot be more than totally disabled, and when the fact appears that total disability has been compensated for, he cannot tag on another disability.'

"See, also, Appeal of Sargent Co., 93 Conn. 26, 104 A. 490.

"It is apparent that, if both compensations made in this case could be made in every case in which a permanent total disability appears, it would be an inducement for the claimant to have the compensation for permanent total disability delayed as long as possible, so as to be able to draw the sum of $50 per month during the time of temporary total disability. The one that would be able to delay the matter the longest would be able to get the most, and workmen situated alike would not be treated alike under the law. We do not think that the Legislature contemplated any such situation. We think, accordingly, that the double allowance was error."

In the case of Woin v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., (Mont.), 43 P.2d 663, 669-670, the Supreme Court of Montana also passed on this question and said:

"Defendant contends that `the district court erred in entering judgment for 400 weeks at the rate of $12.50 per week, without any deduction for compensation theretofore paid claimant.' It appears that claimant received compensation at the rate of $12.50 per week for a temporary total disability from May 2, 1924, until about October 1, 1924, approximately 21 weeks, and the court held that he was entitled to further compensation at the rate of $12.50 per week (for permanent total disability) for 400 weeks from March 28, 1930, `without any deduction for compensation heretofore paid him during his healing period.' * * * *

"* * * Claimant bases his claim for compensation for permanent total disability upon the injury which he received May 2, 1924. Therefore, such disability must of necessity relate back to the temporary total disability which arose out of the same injury. In other words, the temporary total disability finally became permanent rather than temporary; in effect, then, there never was any temporary total disability; it was rather a permanent total disability all the time. For such total disability the period of compensation shall not exceed 400 weeks. Accordingly, the period from May 2 to October 1, 1924, during which claimant received compensation, should be included in the 400 weeks. The fact that he did not draw any compensation from October 1, 1924, until March 28, 1930, would not change the legal effect of the situation in the least; neither would it affect or alter the ultimate award to which he was entitled for his total permanent disability. It is not to be understood, however, that claimant was entitled to compensation for the period from October 1, 1924, until March 28, 1930. The record discloses that he did not claim any compensation for that period. Indeed, he disclaimed any right to compensation during that time in order that he might accept employment, and he worked almost continuously during that entire period.

"Claimant was entitled to an award of compensation for a period of 400 weeks from March 28, 1930, less the amount which he received as compensation from May 2, 1924, to October 1, 1924. The court erred in refusing to make that deduction from the award."

(Hn 1) We are of the opinion that under the Mississippi statute and under the foregoing authorities the claimant is not entitled to recover both for temporary total disability up to May 17, 1954, and then to start over again and recover for permanent total disability for a period of 450 weeks after May 17, 1954, or the maximum of $8,600.00, for the reason that his entire disability relates back to the beginning of his rating of temporary total disability and that such disability later became permanent as of the date of the injury, it having proved to be a permanent total disability all of the time from the date of the injury up to now. We are of the opinion that the attorney-referee and the judgment of the circuit court were correct and that the conclusion of the full commission was erroneous, and the judgment of the circuit court is therefore affirmed.

Affirmed.

McGehee, C.J., and Lee, Kyle and Holmes, JJ., concur.

MORGAN v. CAMPBELL CONST. CO