ROBERTS, Justice.
Prior to 1973, the Pennsylvania Constitution provided, with minor exceptions, that "No person shall, for any indictable offense, be proceeded against criminally by information . . . ." Article I, section 10, P.S. On November 6, 1973, the voters of the Commonwealth approved an amendment to section 10. It now reads:
"Except as hereinafter provided no person shall, for any indictable offense, be proceeded against criminally by information . . . . Each of the several courts of common pleas may, with the approval of the Supreme Court, provide for the initiation of criminal proceedings therein by information filed in the manner provided by law."
The Legislature and this Court have adopted legislation and rules implementing amended section 10. Act of October 10, 1974, P.L. ___, No. 238, §§ 1-6 (to be codified as 17 Pa.C.S.A. § 271-17 Pa.C.S.A. § 276); Pa.R.Crim.P. 3, 225-32, 240, 19 P.S. Appendix. Section 5 of the Act provides that no grand jury shall be impaneled for the consideration of indictments in those judicial districts which have received the approval of this Court to substitute informations for indictments as the method for the initiation of criminal proceedings. In those districts, criminal proceedings are henceforth to be initiated by an information prepared by the attorney for the Commonwealth and filed with the court of common pleas. Pa.R.Crim.P. 225.
See Pa.R.Crim.P. 3(h):
"Information is a formal written accusation of an offense made by the attorney for the Commonwealth, upon which a defendant may be tried, which replaces the indictment in counties in which the indicting grand jury has been abolished."
See Pa.R.Crim.P. 3(g):
"Indictment is a bill of indictment which has been approved by a grand jury and properly returned to court, or which has been endorsed with a waiver as provided in Rule 215." See also id. 3(c):
"Bill of Indictment is a formal written accusation of an offense made by the attorney for the Commonwealth which has not been acted upon by a grand jury."
"No grand jury shall be impaneled in any judicial district where this act is applicable for the purpose of considering bills of indictment: Provided, however, That nothing in this act shall prohibit the impaneling as heretofore of, or affect the functioning of a grand jury for the purpose of investigating offenses against the criminal laws of the Commonwealth or for any other purpose as provided by law."
Act of October 10, 1974, P.L. ___, No. 238, § 5. See also id. § 2:
"This act shall not affect criminal proceedings held before the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, district justices of the peace and magistrates, as now provided by law and rules of criminal procedure, nor, except as herein provided, shall it affect criminal proceedings subsequent to the filing of the information by a district attorney or a special attorney appointed by the Attorney General in the manner provided by law. Except as otherwise provided in this act or to the extent that they are specifically inconsistent with prosecutions initiated by information, existing statutory law applicable to criminal prosecutions initiated by indictment shall be applicable to the information filed by a district attorney or a special attorney appointed by the Attorney General in the manner provided by law hereunder."
On November 13, 1973, the Court of Common Pleas for the Forty-ninth Judicial District (Centre County) promulgated an order providing that in that district "criminal proceedings shall be instituted by information filed in the manner provided by law without the necessity of an indicting grand jury." This Court approved the order on January 6, 1975.
Meanwhile, Alfred Webster was charged by complaint on December 2, 1974, with escaping from the Centre County prison in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5121 (1973) while being held in lieu of bail on charges of robbery and conspiracy. He waived a preliminary hearing. On January 6, 1975, Webster was arraigned, at which time he entered a plea of not guilty and requested that a bill of indictment be submitted to a grand jury for its consideration. He was informed by the attorney for the Commonwealth that it intended to proceed against him by information prepared and filed in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 225 226.
The record does not indicate why Webster was arraigned before an information was filed, in apparent violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 317(a). This apparent irregularity is not asserted as a basis for relief.
On January 25, 1975, Webster filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He contended that requiring him to stand trial on a criminal charge without having first been indicted by a grand jury violated the rights guaranteed him by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. He demanded that, unless a bill of indictment were submitted to a grand jury, he be discharged. The court of common pleas denied relief on January 27, 1975. Webster and the Commonwealth jointly petitioned this Court to assume plenary jurisdiction, which we did by per curiam order on February 17, 1975. We now affirm.
Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970, Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, art. II, § 205, 17 Pa.C.S.A. § 211.205 (Supp. 1974).
Webster is foreclosed from contending that article I, section 10 violates any rights guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution. Because permission to substitute informations for indictments is granted by the amended Constitution, any other provision of the Constitution that heretofore would have prohibited initiation of criminal proceedings in the manner permitted by article I, section 10 is pro tanto modified to permit it. Furthermore, Webster concedes that initiation of proceedings by indictment is not required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S.Ct. 111, 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884); see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 n. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2660 n. 25, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 1226-27, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972).
"[W]e are unable to say that the substitution for a presentment or indictment by a grand jury of the proceeding by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, certifying to the probable guilt of the defendant, with the right on his par to the aid of counsel, and to the cross-examination of the witnesses produced for the prosecution, is not due process of law."
110 U.S. at 538, 4 S.Ct. at 122.
His sole contention is that the difference in treatment of criminal defendants in judicial districts which have substituted informations for indictments and defendants in districts which have not is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We disagree.
The starting point of equal-protection analysis is a determination whether the State has created a classification for the unequal distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens. See American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781, 94 S.Ct. 1296, 1306, 39 L.Ed.2d 744 (1974); see generally Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 1225 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955); F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920); Tussman TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif.L.Rev. 341 (1949); Developments in the Law — Equal Protection, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065 (1969). Webster's contention flounders on this preliminary point. Because, in our view, initiation of proceedings by indictment affords a defendant no protection of his interests and substitution of information for indictment does not adversely affect him, it follows that initiation by indictment is no benefit and substitution of information is no burden. Therefore, there is no unequal distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens.
The traditional view is that an indicting grand jury is a bulwark of liberty and a guardian of the innocent from oppression by the State. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 1373, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962):
"Historically, [the grand jury] has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society of standing between the accuser and the accused, whether the latter be an individual, minority group, or other, to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will." (footnote omitted)
Whether the indicting grand jury has in fact performed this function in the past is a question for historians. See generally Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 701 (1972). We can say with confidence, however, that in Pennsylvania today the indicting grand jury affords no comparative advantages to those accused of crime. Our conclusion rests on two distinct propositions.
First, no aspect of the operation and procedures of an indicting grand jury works to the advantage or protection of an accused. The presentation of evidence before the grand jury is wholly ex parte. Even if in theory the grand jury's decisions are reached independently of the prosecution, the prosecutor is in fact the grand jury's only source of information and legal instruction. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 209. Its proceedings are secret, cf. Rule 206(b) (c) and the testimony presented to it cannot be discovered by a defendant because the transcription or reproduction of that testimony is prohibited. Rule 208. It has been said that the grand jury must ascertain whether the Commonwealth's evidence makes out a prima facie case of the defendant's guilt. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 34 Pa. D. C. 237, 241 (Q.S. Delaware County, 1937) (dictum); Commonwealth v. McIlvaine, 28 Pa. D. C. 133, 135 (Q.S. Delaware County, 1936) (dictum). However, the inadequacy, incompetency, or even illegality of the evidence presented to the grand jury do not constitute grounds for the quashing of an indictment returned on the basis of such evidence. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 78 S.Ct. 311, 2 L.Ed.2d 321 (1958); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956); Commonwealth v. Dessus, 423 Pa. 177, 181-85, 224 A.2d 188, 190-93 (1966); Commonwealth v. Hirsch, 225 Pa. Super. 494, 499-500, 311 A.2d 679, 682 (1973). Even if a grand jury refuses to return an indictment, the prosecutor may, with leave of court, resubmit the bill to the same or a subsequent grand jury. Rule 217. Realistically the grand jury does not serve a protective screening function for "[a]ny experienced prosecutor will admit that he can indict anybody at any time for almost anything before any grand jury." Campbell, Delays in Criminal Cases, 55 F.R.D. 229, 253 (1972). We conclude that the operation of an indicting grand jury affords no protection to an accused. See Campbell, Delays in Criminal Cases, supra; Rosenberg, The Indicting Function of the Grand Jury Should Be Abolished, 42 Pa. Bar Q. 31 (1970); Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153 (1965).
"The grand jury's sources of information are widely drawn, and the validity of an indictment is not affected by the character of the evidence considered. Thus, an indictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence, . . . or even on the basis of information obtained in violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination."
414 U.S. at 344-45, 94 S.Ct. at 618 (citations omitted).
"The law is well settled in Pennsylvania that an indictment can be found by a Grand Jury based upon hearsay testimony or upon evidence which was incompetent or inadequate to make out a prima facie case."
423 Pa. at 181, 224 A.2d at 191.
Second, the substantial rights of an accused are equally protected regardless of the method used to initiate the proceeding. Irrespective of how a proceeding is commenced, no final judgment can result except after a trial in which procedural and substantive rights are accorded equally to all defendants. Neither an indictment nor an information may be filed against a defendant unless the Commonwealth has first established a prima facie case of the defendant's guilt to the satisfaction of a neutral judicial officer at a preliminary hearing. See Act of October 10, 1974, P.L. ___, No. 238, § 3(a); Rules 143(a), 224, 225 (a), 231. In certain limited circumstances an information or indictment may be filed without a preliminary hearing first having been held or waived, but the circumstances are identical regardless of whether initiation is by indictment or information. Compare Rule 224 with Rule 231. The rights of an accused at a preliminary hearing are far greater than those afforded him in the operation of an indicting grand jury. See Rule 141(c); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970); see also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538, 4 S.Ct. 111, 122, 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884). These rights do not depend on whether he will be proceeded against by information or indictment. Every defendant has an identical right to notice of the charges against him without regard to how the proceeding is commenced, for the standards for the substantive sufficiency of indictments and informations are identical. Compare Rules 213(a)(1)-(6), 218, 221, with Rules 225(b)(1)-(6), 227, 230; see also Rule 141(c)(4).
"The defendant shall be present at any preliminary hearing except as provided in these rules, and may, if he desires:
1. be represented by counsel;
2. cross-examine witnesses and inspect physical evidence offered against him;
3. call witnesses other than witnesses to his good reputation only, offer evidence on his own behalf and if represented by counsel, testify; and
4. make written notes of the proceedings, or have his counsel do so, or make a stenographic, mechanical or electronic record of the proceedings."
Pa.R.Crim.P. 141(c).
In summary, an indicting grand jury affords an accused no substantial protection of his interests. The protective function that grand juries may have performed in the past is today meaningfully served by the preliminary hearing regardless of how the proceeding is initiated. In all other respects, all defendants are treated equally.
We conclude, therefore, that any difference in treatment of defendants in judicial districts which have substituted informations for indictments and defendants in districts which have not is not burdensome to the former or beneficial to the latter. Accordingly, Webster's equal protection challenge must fail.
Order affirmed.
JONES, C. J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
MANDERINO, J., concurs in the result.
POMEROY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.