PEOPLE v. COURTS

COLEMAN, J. (to affirm).

On appeal, defendant concedes the validity of his conviction for operating a motor vehicle without a certificate of registration and stipulates that his record of traffic offenses is such that the sentence imposed by the trial judge would not be unreasonable or invalid. However, he contends that the district court has no power to individualize punishment after trial because it had established a Traffic Court Violations Bureau which can accept guilty pleas to certain traffic offenses and impose fines according to a schedule. Because the scheduled fine upon a plea of guilty for this offense was $15, defendant claims that although he did not plead guilty, the court could impose no greater sentence than it would have had he pled guilty. He claims that history of traffic violations or other circumstances may not be considered in sentencing.

This Court has issued a per curiam opinion agreeing with him and reversing the circuit court and Court of Appeals.

We would affirm.

As Judge BRENNAN observes in the Court of Appeals opinion:

"The courts of this state have found constitutionally permissible various situations in which a defendant obtains some benefit from his decision to plead guilty and forego his constitutional right to trial."

We do not see the adoption of a schedule of fines for those who choose to plead guilty as a judicial declaration against individualized punishment after trial. Instead, it is a method by which courts can efficiently dispose of and control great volumes of uncontested traffic violations. The right to a trial remains and Mr. Courts availed himself of it.

We cannot agree with an interpretation which takes from the judge all discretion to sentence the multiple offender after trial more severely than the first offender. The public interest in highway safety and the Legislature's constant concern for such militate against an interpretation which converts a case volume control measure into a rigid proscription upon judicial discretion after trial. We cannot attribute such a policy to the Legislature.

Indeed, we must strain the words of the statute to arrive at such a result. MCLA 600.8391; MSA 27A.8391 delineates the offenses which may be included in a traffic bureau schedule of fines, and includes those with a 90-day maximum jail term. However, the section only provides that fines and costs be collected by the non-judicial traffic bureau personnel upon a plea of guilty.

If we are to accept the per curiam interpretation, all jail sentences statutorily provided for the same offenses would be nullified because a judge after trial would be forbidden to order a jail term under any circumstances.

This defendant did not plead guilty. This sentence was within the limits set by the Legislature. The statute in question does not repeal those limits by permitting a process for taking guilty pleas.

Both state and Federal courts too numerous to mention have recognized the constitutionality of offering to a defendant a benefit to avoid full trial. Even in most serious crimes, a defendant may be faced with the choice of taking his chances at trial on one charge or pleading guilty to a lesser offense, often with a lesser maximum sentence provided by statute.

Appellee well states the position of the defendant:

"The thrust of [defendant's] argument in the instant appeal is that he was offered the opportunity to plead guilty in exchange for a lenient sentence, and once that offer was made, even though refused by the [defendant], it eliminated thereafter the exercise of sentencing discretion by the trial judge, no matter what the subsequent circumstances may turn out to be."

We submit that defendant's argument is not posited in any statute or in any apposite legal concept. Defendant relies upon authority which speaks to an ill not present in this case — the imposition of a harsher sentence because a constitutional right had been exercised. Here all agree that the trial judge rendered a sentence (1) within the statutory limits and (2) not unreasonable. No constitutional right was violated.

Defendant and dissenting Judge T.M. BURNS in the Court of Appeals rely most heavily upon United States v Jackson, 390 U.S. 570; 88 S Ct 1209; 20 L Ed 2d 138 (1968). This reliance is unwarranted. The case concerned the constitutionality of the Federal Kidnapping Act which provided a person "shall be punished * * * by death if the kidnaped person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend". The Court could find no discretion in the judge to set it aside or mitigate it. The jury decided whether the person lived or died. It was the necessity which the Court found offensive. It recognized the validity of statutes which provided for jury determination of sentence in capital cases given the choice between life imprisonment and death.

In summary, there is no valid reason in our statutes or in case law to overturn the trial judge's sentence. One cannot fairly ascribe to the Legislature an intent which precludes judicial consideration of any number of additional offenses and revelations at trial when the time for sentencing arrives. Nor do we believe that the Legislature intended to nullify statutory provisions for trial and sentence by permitting a system for routine guilty pleas. Neither can we fairly ascribe to any judicial precedent the notion that the choice of a trial which may bring a greater penalty than a guilty plea is therefore "chilling" of the exercise of that choice.

We would affirm.