LEAMAN v. OHIO DEPT. OF MENTAL RETARDATION, (S.D.Ohio 1985)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Mark Kate Leaman, was employed by the Ohio Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities (DMR) as a case management specialist from December 12, 1983, until her dismissal on April 7, 1984. The dismissal was based on alleged failure to fulfill job requirements. Plaintiff appealed to the Ohio Personnel Board of Review, which dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The conflict began when Plaintiff advocated for a juvenile named D.M., whose placement in a facility for the profoundly retarded was challenged by Plaintiff based on her assessment that D.M. was only mildly retarded. This advocacy led to Plaintiff’s termination. Plaintiff filed suit seeking injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, naming DMR and several individual defendants. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a virtually identical complaint in the Ohio Court of Claims. Defendants moved to dismiss the federal suit on grounds including sovereign immunity and the effect of the Court of Claims action.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the suit against the Ohio Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities (DMR).

Whether Plaintiff’s filing of a complaint in the Ohio Court of Claims bars the federal suit against the individual defendants under Ohio Revised Code § 2743.02(A)(1).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)	Complaint facts are accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss.	Used to establish that the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true in ruling on the motion to dismiss.
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979)	Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states by citizens seeking monetary relief from state funds.	Applied to confirm sovereign immunity protection for DMR as a state entity.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)	Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to suits against states and state agencies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.	Reinforced that DMR is protected from suit by sovereign immunity.
Lee v. Western Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Center, 747 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1984)	State agencies are arms of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.	Supported characterization of DMR as an arm of the state immune from suit.
Hall v. Medical College, 742 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1984)	Similar to Lee, confirming state agency immunity.	Further supported dismissal of DMR based on sovereign immunity.
Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208 (10th Cir. 1982)	State law that cuts off federal § 1983 remedies is inconsistent with federal law.	Distinguished from current case; court found Ohio statute does not bar § 1983 claims but requires them to be brought in state Court of Claims.
42 U.S.C. § 1988	Allows application of state law to federal civil rights suits only if not inconsistent with federal law.	Applied to evaluate whether Ohio’s Court of Claims statute is consistent with federal § 1983 remedies.
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980)	State courts have jurisdiction to hear § 1983 cases.	Supported conclusion that Ohio Court of Claims can adjudicate § 1983 claims, preserving federal remedies.
Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944)	States may limit waiver of sovereign immunity to suits brought in their own courts.	Supported Ohio’s limitation of waiver of immunity to Court of Claims jurisdiction.
Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900)	Similar principle permitting states to limit waiver of immunity to their own courts.	Reinforced the legitimacy of Ohio’s statutory scheme.

Precedent

Rule or Principle Cited For

Application by the Court

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)

Complaint facts are accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss.

Used to establish that the court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true in ruling on the motion to dismiss.

Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979)

Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states by citizens seeking monetary relief from state funds.

Applied to confirm sovereign immunity protection for DMR as a state entity.

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)

Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to suits against states and state agencies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Reinforced that DMR is protected from suit by sovereign immunity.

Lee v. Western Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Center, 747 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1984)

State agencies are arms of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Supported characterization of DMR as an arm of the state immune from suit.

Hall v. Medical College, 742 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1984)

Similar to Lee, confirming state agency immunity.

Further supported dismissal of DMR based on sovereign immunity.

Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208 (10th Cir. 1982)

State law that cuts off federal § 1983 remedies is inconsistent with federal law.

Distinguished from current case; court found Ohio statute does not bar § 1983 claims but requires them to be brought in state Court of Claims.

42 U.S.C. § 1988

Allows application of state law to federal civil rights suits only if not inconsistent with federal law.

Applied to evaluate whether Ohio’s Court of Claims statute is consistent with federal § 1983 remedies.

Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980)

State courts have jurisdiction to hear § 1983 cases.

Supported conclusion that Ohio Court of Claims can adjudicate § 1983 claims, preserving federal remedies.

Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944)

States may limit waiver of sovereign immunity to suits brought in their own courts.

Supported Ohio’s limitation of waiver of immunity to Court of Claims jurisdiction.

Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900)

Similar principle permitting states to limit waiver of immunity to their own courts.

Reinforced the legitimacy of Ohio’s statutory scheme.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the motions to dismiss. It then analyzed whether sovereign immunity barred suit against DMR, concluding that as a state-created, operated, and financed institution, DMR is an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. This immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims against DMR, necessitating dismissal for failure to state a claim.

Next, the court considered Ohio Revised Code § 2743.02(A)(1), which waives the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity only when claims are brought in the Ohio Court of Claims and the plaintiff waives the right to sue state officers or employees for the same acts. Plaintiff had filed suit in the Court of Claims, effectively waiving her right to sue the individual defendants in federal court. The court distinguished the Ohio statute from Wyoming law considered in Rosa v. Cantrell, noting that unlike the Wyoming statute which cut off federal remedies, Ohio’s statute preserves Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim by requiring adjudication in a special state court. This arrangement aligns with Supreme Court precedent permitting states to limit immunity waivers to their own courts.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the individual defendants from the federal action, subject to Plaintiff’s ability to refile if the Court of Claims later finds the defendants acted outside the scope of employment or with malicious intent, bad faith, or recklessness.

Holding and Implications

The court GRANTED Defendants’ motions to dismiss as to the Ohio Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities (DMR), dismissing it based on sovereign immunity.

The court also GRANTED the motions to dismiss as to the individual defendants, conditioned on Plaintiff’s waiver by filing in the Ohio Court of Claims. Plaintiff may refile in federal court against individual defendants only if the Court of Claims finds they acted outside the scope of their employment or with maliciousness, bad faith, or recklessness.

The decision directly affects the parties by dismissing the federal suit against DMR and the individual defendants, preserving Plaintiff’s ability to pursue claims in state court. No new legal precedent was established; rather, the court applied established principles of sovereign immunity and state waiver statutes consistent with federal law.

Mark Kate LEAMAN, Plaintiff, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL RETARDATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, et al., Defendants.

ORDER

CARL B. RUBIN, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and (b)(1) Motions to Dismiss. (Doc. Nos. 5, 10) For the reasons that follow, the motions are GRANTED as outlined below.

A. FACTS

The following facts are taken from the complaint and accepted as true for the purpose of this motion. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).

1. Plaintiff was employed by the Ohio Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities (DMR) from December 12, 1983, until April 7, 1984. During that time, Plaintiff was a case management specialist assigned to the Cincinnati office. On April 7, 1984, DMR dismissed Plaintiff stating that she failed to fulfill the requirements of her position. (Doc. No. 1, Exhibit B) Plaintiff appealed her dismissal to the Ohio Personnel Board of Review. The Board of Review found that DMR had complied with the applicable statute and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the Ohio Administrative Code § 124-1-06. (Doc. No. 1, Exhibit A)

2. Plaintiff's difficulties with DMR began when she was assigned to the case of a juvenile named D.M. DMR had been directed by the Hamilton County Juvenile Court to provide for the care, custody, and well-being of D.M. consistent with the provisions of Ohio Revised Code § 5123.67. (Doc. No. 1 at 5) When Plaintiff took over D.M.'s Case, the juvenile resided in a facility for the profoundly retarded. After visiting D.M. and reviewing her records, Plaintiff formed the opinion that D.M. was only mildly retarded and that placement was inappropriate. A running battle ensued among Plaintiff, her supervisors, and the Juvenile Court over the proper placement of D.M.

To provide for the anonymity of this particular juvenile, Plaintiff has used the juvenile's initials for purposes of its pleadings

3. As a result of her advocacy of D.M.'s interests in this battle, Plaintiff was fired. She now seeks injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Named as Defendants in the action are DMR; Minnie Fells Johnson, Director of DMR; Sandra A. Crockett, Commissioner of Residential Services at DMR; Joyce Scott, Chief of Client Services at DMR; and Shirley Wilson-Young, Assistant Chief of Client Services at DMR.

4. Five months after commencing this action, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the State of Ohio in the Ohio Court of Claims based on the same set of facts above. (Doc. 10, Exhibit B) This complaint is virtually identical to the original complaint filed in this Court.

Defendants have filed motions to dismiss both the complaint and an amended complaint. These motions raise numerous issues, only two of which need be addressed for disposition of the case. The first issue is whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars suit against DMR. The second issue is whether Plaintiff's suit in the Court of Claims suit bars this action against individual Defendants.

B. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. The amendment bars suits brought in federal court by private parties seeking to impose a liability that must be paid from public funds in the state treasury. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1143, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979). Its prohibition includes suits by citizens against their own state or state agencies. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1355-56, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); See, e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890). The amendment applies to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Edelman, 451 U.S. at 675-77, 94 S.Ct. at 1361-62.

Plaintiff does not dispute DMR's claim to sovereign immunity nor can she. As a state created, operated, and financed institution, DMR is clearly an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ch. 5123 (Page 1981). See, e.g., Lee v. Western Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Center, 747 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1984); Hall v. Medical College, 742 F.2d 299 (6th Cir. 1984). DMR must, therefore, be dismissed from the suit for Plaintiff's failure to state a claim against it upon which relief can be granted.

C. OHIO REVISED CODE § 2743.02(A)(1)

The second issue in this case involves an application of § 2743.02(A)(1) of the Ohio Revised Code (O.R.C.). That section waives Ohio's Eleventh Amendment protection from actions brought in a specially created Court of Claims. To obtain such waiver, the Plaintiff must waive her right to bring claims against state officers or employees that arise from the same act or omission that formed the basis of the suit against the state. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2743.02(A)(1) (Page 1981). Plaintiff's waiver is void if the Court of Claims determines that the state officer or employee was acting outside the scope of his employment or acted with malicious purpose, bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. Id.

On December 14, 1984, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the state in the Ohio Court of Claims. Application of § 2743.02(A)(1) requires dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against the individual Defendants in this case. Plaintiff argues against such a result claiming that the Ohio law is inconsistent with the laws of the United States. She cites in support of her contention Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821, 104 S.Ct. 85, 78 L.Ed.2d 94 (1983).

Rosa involved a § 1983 suit for the wrongful death of Plaintiff's husband at the hands of a city public safety director. The Defendant city interposed the defense that Plaintiff, by accepting state workers' compensation benefits was barred under Wyoming law from bringing any claims against the employer city. The court analyzed this defense under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which allows state law to govern civil rights suits where no federal law applies, State law may only apply, however, when "not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United States. . . ." Id. The Court found the exclusive remedial provision of the state workers' compensation statute to be inconsistent with the available federal remedy. 705 F.2d at 1221. In arriving at its conclusion, the court noted that by limiting Plaintiff's remedy, the Wyoming statute thwarted § 1983's policy of preventing abuses of power by those acting under color of state law. Id. See also Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 591, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978).

The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of this Title, . . . shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry out the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause. . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)

Such is not the case here. Rather than cut off Plaintiff's § 1983 cause of action and remedy as did the Wyoming statute, application of the Ohio statute would leave Plaintiff's claim intact. Ohio merely requires adjudication of the claim in a special state court. Plaintiff's action and the policies behind § 1983 are preserved as state courts have jurisdiction to hear § 1983 cases. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980). Further, the Ohio statute is in line with United States Supreme Court holdings permitting states to limit waiver of their immunity to suits brought against them in their own courts. See Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 64 S.Ct. 873, 88 L.Ed. 1121 (1944); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 20 S.Ct. 919, 44 L.Ed. 1140 (1900).

By filing in the Ohio Court of Claims, Plaintiff has made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of her right to bring claims against officers and employees of the state. In exchange for that waiver, Plaintiff received a solvent Defendant. There being no statutory or constitutional impediment to such an arrangement, this Court will hold Plaintiff to her quid pro quo and dismiss the individual Defendants for failure to state a claim against them.

D. CONCLUSION

Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED as to Defendant DMR. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED as to the remaining Defendants with the condition that Plaintiff may refile in this Court against the individual Defendants should the Court of Claims find that they acted outside the scope of employment, with maliciousness, bad faith, or wantoness or recklessness.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Mark Kate LEAMAN, Plaintiff, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL RETARDATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, et al., Defendants.

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