SMITH v. FLACK

CAMPBELL, Judge.

This is an original mandamus proceeding brought by four court-appointed criminal defense attorneys (relators) who seek to compel the Harris County Auditor and Commissioners Court (respondents) to act pursuant to their statutory authority by paying attorney fees in accordance with Article 26.05, § 1(a) (e), V.A.C.C.P. (Supp. 1987). We will conditionally grant relief.

Article 26.05, § 1(a) (e), supra, provides:

Sec. 1. A counsel appointed to defend a person accused of a felony or a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment, or to represent an indigent in a habeas corpus hearing, shall be paid from the general fund of the county in which the prosecution was instituted or habeas corpus hearing held, according to the following schedule:

(a) For each day or a fractional part thereof in court representing the accused, a reasonable fee to be set by the court but in no event to be less than $50;

(e) For the prosecution to a final conclusion of a bona fide appeal to a court of appeals or the Court of Criminal Appeals, a reasonable fee to be set by the court but in no event to be less than $350[.] (emphasis added). Relators also argue that the county's failure to pay court-appointed attorney fees interferes with a defendant's right to counsel under the federal constitution. U.S. Const. amend. VI. However, we need not address that claim because we will grant relief on the statutory claim. But cf. Martin County v. Makemson, ___ U.S. ____, 107 S.Ct. 908, 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987) (White, J., dissenting to denial of petition for writ of certiorari) (discussing conflicting decisions on whether Sixth Amendment requires states to compensate attorneys for representation of indigent defendants).

I.

On June 4, 1986, a majority of the "Board of District Judges Trying Criminal Cases [in Harris County]," hereinafter referred to as the "Board of Judges," agreed upon a schedule for setting fees for court-appointed attorneys in criminal cases. In connection with the adoption of the fee schedule, Honorable Jon N. Hughes, acting as "Administrative Judge of District Judges Trying Criminal Cases," issued the following orders, which took effect June 5:

All dates refer to 1986 unless otherwise indicated.

The "Board" only includes judges from 22 of the district courts in Harris County. But cf. V.T.C.A., Government Code § 24.101 et seq. (Pamphlet 1987) (listing district courts in Harris County). According to the respondents, there were 17 judges from those courts present at the meeting establishing the fee schedule, 15 of whom voted in favor of the schedule. The Board of Judges, in an amicus curiae brief, do not contradict these facts.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Auditor of Harris County is not to approve payments stated on the claim for any fee for court appointed attorneys in excess of the maximum fees stated above.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event that a claim is received in excess of the maximum as stated above, the claim is to be returned to the Administrative Offices of the District Courts for a judicial review.

On August 13, the Board of Judges amended their local rules to conform with this order by adding the following: "the Board of District Judges Trying Criminal Cases shall establish a fee schedule for court appointed attorneys stating a minimum and maximum for the categories as provided in Art. 26.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure." Rules of the Judicial District Courts of Harris County, District Courts Trying Criminal Cases, R. VI(E).

Meanwhile, on July 15, the County Auditor requested by letter an Attorney General's opinion "regarding the constitutionality and enforcement of the Order setting out the maximum amount of payment to court-appointed attorneys in Harris County. . . ." (Relators' Application for Writ of Mandamus, Exhibit 2). In that letter, the County Auditor took the position that the fee schedule was a valid order, promulgated pursuant to the Court Administration Act, V.A.C.S., Article 200a-1 (Supp. 1987).

On July 22, the Attorney General responded by informing the County Auditor that his request for an opinion should be directed to the local county or district attorney. See V.T.C.A., Government Code § 41.007 (Pamphlet 1987). However, the Attorney General also referred the County Auditor to Article 26.05, supra, and Attorney General Opinion H-499 (1975), which states:

The commissioners court of a county is under a duty to budget and order paid the amount of any reasonable attorney's fee properly set by a criminal court judge pursuant to article 26.05, Tex. Code Crim.Proc., for the representation of indigent defendants. The trial judge's order can be overturned only on a showing that it was so arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious as to amount to an abuse of discretion.

Id. at 4.

The Attorney General also referred the County Auditor to Attorney General opinions JM-403 (1985) and H-789 (1976). However, those opinions are not relevant to the instant case.

Subsequently, the County Auditor recommended to the Commissioners Court that it adopt Judge Hughes' order. On July 29, the Commissioners Court adopted Judge Hughes' order.

On July 28, Honorable Woody Densen, Judge of the 248th District Court of Harris County, entered an order awarding payment of attorney fees to Relator James R. Smith in the amount of $2,500 for prosecution of an appeal. See Article 26.05, § 1(e), supra. Smith then presented his claim to the Respondent County Auditor for payment. Because the claim exceeded the maximum amount established in the Board of Judges' fee schedule, the County Auditor immediately forwarded the claim to the Board of Judges for judicial review.

The fee schedule established a maximum payment of $1,500 for the prosecution of a noncapital appeal. Respondents acknowledged during oral argument that they had not yet made any independent, internal determination whether Smith's claim should be approved or paid. Instead, the decision to refer the claim to the Board of Judges was based solely on the fact that the claim exceeded the amount specified in the fee schedule.

Smith's claim was then reviewed by a "Judges' Committee," which consisted of three district judges selected from the Board of Judges. On August 14, the committee ordered that Smith's claim be denied and that a payment of $1,700 be made instead. On August 19, the County Auditor forwarded Smith's claim to the Commissioners Court, recommending approval of the reduced amount. On August 26, the Commissioners Court approved the reduced fee for payment.

An identical sequence of events occurred for Relators David A. Jones, David Mitcham and Charles Freeman. In each case, the County Auditor automatically transferred the relator's claim to the Board of Judges for a judicial review upon observing that the claim exceeded the maximum fee for that particular service as set by the fee schedule established by the Board of Judges and adopted by the Commissioners Court. The claims were then denied and a reduced amount was approved by a Judges' Committee. On August 5, the Commissioners Court, following the recommendation of the County Auditor, approved each of the reduced fees for payment. Jones presented a claim for $250 and was paid $150. Mitcham presented a claim of $250 and was paid $150. Freeman presented a claim of $500 and was paid $425.

Before addressing the merits of relators' application for a writ of mandamus, we must first determine whether this Court has jurisdiction over the instant cause.

II.

This Court has the power to issue writs of mandamus in all "criminal law matters." Tex. Const. art. V, § 5; State ex rel. Wade v. Mays, 689 S.W.2d 893, 897 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985). The term "matter," when used in the context of a legal dispute, generally refers to the "subject of [the] litigation." Black's Law Dictionary 882 (5th ed. 1979). The subject of the mandamus litigation ("matter") is modified in Article V, § 5, supra, by the terms "criminal law." Therefore, when read as a whole, Article V, § 5, supra, grants this Court the power to issue writs of mandamus when a criminal law is the subject of the litigation. See Dickens v. Second Court of Appeals, 727 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tex.Cr.App. 1987) (criminal discovery law was subject of litigation).

Relators argue that the instant case involves a criminal law matter because they seek relief pursuant to Article 26.05 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See Weiner v. Dial, 653 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983). We agree.

In Weiner, an attorney sought to force a trial judge to award him fees under Article 26.05, supra, for work not authorized by the trial court. This Court held that "the provision for appointment and compensation of attorneys to represent indigents in criminal [cases, see Article 26.05, supra,] is certainly itself a criminal law matter." Weiner, 653 S.W.2d at 787.

In the instant case, four court-appointed attorneys are challenging the manner in which the County Auditor and Commissioners Court have paid claims for attorney fees. The fees were originally set by a trial judge under the authority of Article 26.05, supra.

Respondents have not raised any objection to the consolidation of the claims of these four relators into a single application for mandamus.

While it is true that the instant suit does not seek to compel a trial judge to award fees as in Weiner, supra, relators are attempting to enforce a trial judge's orders for attorney fees that arose from criminal cases and were issued pursuant to a provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Undoubtedly, the enforcement of an order issued pursuant to a criminal statute is a criminal law matter as much as the issuance of the order itself, even if it requires this Court to examine civil laws in the process. Were it otherwise, this Court's power to decide criminal law matters would be seriously eroded or eliminated altogether by the incidental presence of civil law matters. Cf. Commissioners' Court v. Beall, 98 Tex. 104, 81 S.W. 526 (1904) (discussing respective duties of Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Appeals to decide civil and criminal law). We hold that the subject of the instant lawsuit directly involves a criminal law matter and is, therefore, within this Court's mandamus jurisdiction. We now address the merits of relators' claims for payment of attorney fees, focusing particularly on whether the equitable remedy of mandamus is available to the relators.

III.

This Court has adopted the traditional two-part test for determining whether writ of mandamus should issue. State ex rel. Vance v. Routt, 571 S.W.2d 903 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978). To obtain relief through a writ of mandamus, a relator must establish that 1) the act he seeks to compel is ministerial, rather than discretionary, in nature and 2) no other adequate remedy at law is available. Id.; see also Ordunez v. Bean, 579 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979).

A.

"An act is 'ministerial' if it constitutes a duty clearly fixed and required by law." Curry v. Gray, 726 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex.Cr.App. 1987) (opinion on rehearing) (citing Wade v. Mays, supra). It must be "accomplished without the exercise of discretion or judgment." Id.

In the instant case, relators argue that the County Auditor and Commissioners Court have a ministerial duty to pay attorney fees awarded by the trial court pursuant to Article 26.05, supra, or establish, through a lawsuit, that the fees are unreasonable. See Commissioners Court v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100, 104 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But cf. Smith v. McCoy, 533 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1976, writ dismissed).

The provisions of Article 26.05, supra, should be liberally construed to attain the objectives intended by the Legislature. In construing Article 26.05, supra, this Court is guided by the Code Construction Act. See V.T.C.A., Government Code § 311.002(2) (Pamphlet 1987); see also Barbee v. State, 432 S.W.2d 78 (Tex.Cr.App. 1968). However, we need not use those construction aids if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous as to legislative intent. Dickens, at 547.

Through Article 26.05, the Legislature has provided in plain language that court-appointed attorneys " shall be paid from the general fund of the county in which the prosecution was instituted." Article 26.05, § 1, supra (emphasis added). It has granted the trial court sole authority to set the fees to be paid to court-appointed attorneys. Id. at § 1(a)-(f), supra ("to be set by the court"). While the trial court is limited by the statutory minimum fees allowed for particular types of cases, the Legislature has expressly avoided setting specific maximum limits on the size of court-appointed attorney fees. Instead, it has granted the trial court sole authority to set a "reasonable fee." Id. at § 1(a)-(f). Given such unambiguous language, we find that Article 26.05 clearly places a mandatory duty upon the county to pay court-appointed attorney fees.

For example, the trial court may award no less than $350 "[f]or prosecution to a final conclusion of a bona fide appeal to a court of appeals or the Court of Criminal Appeals." Article 26.05, § 1(e); see also id. at § 1(a)-(d), (f).

Prior to August 30, 1971, the Legislature had set both minimum and maximum fees for court-appointed attorneys. See Acts 1969, 61st Leg., p. 1054, ch. 347, § 1. However, the 62nd Legislature rewrote Article 26.05 and removed all references to maximum fees. It replaced such language with the requirement that the trial court set a "reasonable fee," which shall be no less than the amounts specified for particular types of cases. See Acts 1971, 62nd Leg., p. 1777, ch. 520, § 1. That requirement has been retained despite subsequent amendments to Article 26.05. See Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 1126, ch. 426, art. 3, § 3; Acts 1981, 67th Leg., p. 803, ch. 291, § 106.

We also note that the legislative history of Article 26.05, supra, confirms this construction. Under a predecessor statute, which did not contain the "reasonable fee" standard, the Legislature had provided that "[t]he Commissioners Court of any county in the State may determine within its discretion whether or not such county shall pay the fees provided herein." Acts 1951, 52nd Leg., p. 25, ch. 19. However, that provision was specifically repealed in 1959 and has never been revived. See Acts 1959, 56th Leg., 2nd C.S., p. 147, ch. 31, § 2. As Presiding Judge Onion noted in his commentary on the 1959 version of Article 26.05, payment of court-appointed fees "have been made mandatory whereas under the old article [494a] the fee schedule was discretionary with the trial judge and the Commissioners Court of the County." Onion, Special Commentary, 2 Tex. Code Crim.Pro. 276 (Vernon 1966).

Respondents argue that their mandatory duty to pay court-appointed attorney fees under Article 26.05, supra, is discretionary as to the amount of the fee to be paid because they have statutory authority to use discretion in deciding the "reasonableness" of such fees. However, we need not address that argument because we find that the respondents did not reject relators' claims on that basis. Instead, respondents rejected relators' claims without considering the reasonableness of the amounts. Respondents automatically rejected those claims upon finding that the claims exceeded the amounts authorized in the fee schedule established by the Board of Judges and adopted by the Commissioners Court. Cf. Chrestman v. Tompkins, 5 S.W.2d 257 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1928, writ ref'd) ("In this situation it is not necessary for us to determine the scope of the discretion committed to the auditor; it being only necessary for our present purpose to decide whether or not he was empowered to exercise the discretion attempted.").

The Legislature has required that "[a]ll claims, bills and accounts against the county be filed in ample time for the auditor to examine and approve same before the meetings of the commissioners court. No claim, bill or account shall be allowed or paid until it has been examined and approved by the county auditor thereon." V.A.C.S., Article 1660 (1962) (emphasis added). Under that authorizing statute, a county auditor must make an independent examination of a claim and approve it before submitting it to a commissioners court. Assuming arguendo that such an examination involves discretionary power, the Legislature has not provided a county auditor with any authority to delegate that duty to another legal entity or office. In other words, a county auditor has "a duty clearly fixed and required by law" to perform his statutory duties within his own office. See Curry, supra.

In the instant case, the County Auditor has not examined the claims for attorney fees awarded to relators pursuant to Article 26.05, supra. Instead, the County Auditor referred the claims to the Board of Judges — a body with no privity to the County Auditor's office. Subsequently, the County Auditor accepted the Board of Judges' adjustment of relators' claims, again without following his statutory duty to examine and approve those claims himself. See note 5, ante, at 788. Given these circumstances, we find that relators correctly seek to compel the County Auditor to perform a ministerial act; relators can seek to compel the County Auditor to refrain from abdicating his duties to the Board of Judges and "to examine and approve" their claims for attorney fees. Article 1660, supra.

The Texas Constitution provides that a commissioners court "shall exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all county business, as is conferred by this Constitution and the laws of the State, or as may be hereafter prescribed." Tex. Const. art. V, § 18(b). The Legislature thereafter provided that "[e]ach commissioners court shall . . . [a]udit and settle all accounts against the county and direct their payment." V.A.C.S., Article 2351(10) (Supp. 1987) (emphasis added). A commissioners court is required to independently perform those duties. Even if those duties are considered discretionary, a commissioners court must have statutory authority to abdicate them to some other legal entity or office. See Guerra v. Rodriguez, 239 S.W.2d 915, 919-20 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1951, no writ) ("In the absence of statutory authority, the powers of a Commissioners' Court involving the exercise of judgment and discretion can not be delegated. . . .").

In the instant case, the Commissioners Court relinquished its financial responsibilities to the Board of Judges by relying upon the Board of Judges for judicial review and ultimate adjustment of relators' claims. However, the Legislature has not provided the Commissioners Court with the authority to surrender such duties to the Board of Judges. The Commissioners Court has "a duty clearly fixed and required by law" to perform those financial duties itself. See Curry, supra. Given these circumstances, we find that relators correctly seek to compel the Commissioners Court to perform a ministerial act; relators can require the Commissioners Court to refrain from abdicating its duties to the Board of Judges and to "[a]udit and settle" their claims for attorney fees and to "direct their payment." Article 2351, supra.

We do note that the Commissioners Court of Harris County has been given authority to contract with certain legal entities to provide counsel for indigent defendants in lieu of paying for court-appointed counsel. See Art. 26.041, V.A.C.C.P. (Supp. 1987). Through that authority, the Commissioners Court can certainly control the amount of money paid for the defense of indigent defendants in criminal prosecutions. Cf. Art. 26.05, supra. However, in the instant case, the Commissioners Court did not contract with relators pursuant to Article 26.041, supra.

Respondents, and the Board of Judges in its amicus curiae brief, argue that the respondents' payment of lesser fees was proper because of the fee-setting limitations placed on trial judges by Rule VI(E), which was promulgated pursuant to the Court Administration Act (hereinafter "Act"), Article 200a-1, supra. We disagree.

The Act provides courts with a direct statement of legislative intent. Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 732, § 1. In part, the Legislature intended for the Texas Judicial Council and the Supreme Court to prepare a plan for reapportionment of the supreme judicial districts. Id. However, it had another reason for passing the Act:

It is the further intent of the legislature that the administration of trial courts in this state be improved in order to provide all citizens of this state a prompt, efficient, and just hearing and disposition of all disputes before the various courts, and that all district and statutory county courts adopt rules of administration as provided by this Act.

Id.

Consistent with that intent, the Legislature provided that "[t]he district and statutory county court judges in each county shall, by majority vote, adopt local rules of administration." Article 200a-1, § 5.003(a), supra. Those rules are specifically limited to providing for the various administrative needs of the district and statutory county courts. See Article 200a-1, § 5.003(b)(1)-(5), supra. However, "[t]he rules may provide for any other matter necessary to carry out this Act or to improve the administration and management of the court system and its auxiliary services." Article 200a-1, § 5.003(c), supra.

The Board of Judges relies upon this last provision for its authority to promulgate Rule VI(E), which binds all district judges trying criminal cases to a schedule for setting court-appointed attorney fees. However, such a construction of this provision will not support such a claim.

We find that it was not the intent of the Legislature to authorize a group of district courts to control a single trial court's independent discretion in setting court-appointed attorney fees under the guise of establishing "administrative rules." A trial court's decision to award a particular fee to a court-appointed attorney does not involve an administrative function. It is a "criminal law matter" controlled by Article 26.05, supra. Therefore, the Board of Judges had no authority under the Court Administration Act to establish a fee schedule pursuant to Rule VI(E) for payment of court-appointed attorney fees.

Having so found, we conclude that the respondents' reduction of relators' claims for court-appointed attorney fees could not have been authorized by local rules of administration adopted by the Board of Judges. Because we find no other authorization for the county's actions, we must conclude that the County Auditor and the Commissioners Court failed to perform the ministerial act of reviewing relators' claims within their statutory authority.

Having found that relators properly seek to compel respondents to perform a ministerial act, we must now determine whether they have any other adequate remedy at law.

B.

Relators acknowledge that a remedy at law, e.g., filing a suit in civil district court, may exist in the instant case. However, they argue that the mere existence of some remedy at law does not necessarily prevent mandamus from issuing. We agree.

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that compels a respondent to perform some ministerial act. Often involved are sensitive questions concerning an elected official's authority to perform a particular duty. To assure that a relator will not prematurely apply for extraordinary relief via writ of mandamus, this Court, consistent with the Supreme Court, requires that a relator show that he has no other adequate remedy at law before mandamus will issue.

In some cases, a remedy at law may technically exist; however, it may nevertheless be so uncertain, tedious, burdensome, slow, inconvenient, inappropriate or ineffective as to be deemed inadequate. See, e.g., Houston T.C. Ry. Co. v. City of Dallas, 98 Tex. 396, 84 S.W. 648, 656 (1905) ("there is not a plain, adequate, certain, and speedy remedy"); City of Highland Park v. Dallas Ry. Co., 243 S.W. 674, 681 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1922, writ ref'd) (remedy must be "equally convenient, beneficial, and effective as the proceeding by mandamus").

Given the subjective nature of such terms as "plain" and "uncertain," "convenient" and "inconvenient," "effective" and "ineffective," this Court must examine the specific circumstances of each case and carefully exercise its discretion before deciding whether a particular remedy at law is adequate. See, e.g., Dickens, at 551-552 (discussing the adequacy of reviewing pretrial discovery orders through appeal). In addition, equitable principles are necessarily involved when we consider whether mandamus should issue. See Callahan v. Giles, 137 Tex. 571, 155 S.W.2d 793, 795 (1941).

Whether the construction of a criminal statute such as Article 26.05, supra, by civil courts in a civil lawsuit is an adequate remedy at law presents a question of first impression to this Court. Several courts of appeals have found, in cases similar to the instant case, that a civil suit is an inadequate remedy at law to compel a county to pay a claim for money. Guerra v. Weatherly, 291 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco 1956, no writ); Wichita County v. Griffin, 284 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Chrestman v. Tompkins, supra; Ham v. Garvey, 155 S.W.2d 976 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1941, no writ); Hood v. Cain, 32 S.W.2d 485 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1930, writ refused).

Respondents cite two cases from the courts of appeals in support of their claim that a civil suit is an adequate remedy under the instant circumstances. See Smith v. McCoy, supra, at 461 ("remedy here is a suit against the county"); Lovell v. Bynum, 315 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("remedy was to bring suit against Houston County"). However, in both cases, the courts rejected the relators' applications for mandamus because there was no ministerial act to compel. Consequently, the courts did not address the adequacy of the suggested remedy at law.

Of these cases, one court provided a persuasive discussion of its reasons for finding the remedy at law inadequate. See Chrestman v. Tompkins, supra. In Chrestman, a Dallas attorney applied for a writ of mandamus to compel the county auditor "to countersign a warrant for $500 to be paid him on the order of the board of education of the city for legal services rendered under employment by said board." Id., at 258. After determining that the relator sought to compel the auditor to perform a ministerial act, the court addressed the adequate remedy at law requirement. We quote the court's analysis in its entirety:

One commentator has criticized Texas courts for failing to explain how a particular remedy at law is inadequate before issuing mandamus. See Dix, Appellate Review by Mandamus and Prohibition in Texas Criminal Litigation, 17 Tex.Tech L.Rev. 75, 89-115 (1986).

As heretofore shown, there was no controversy over any matter except as to the legal authority of the board of education to incur the indebtedness and pay for same out of the general school fund of the city. Relator's fee had been earned, it was then due, the board of education was willing to pay, and for that purpose had authorized the issuance of the warrant. Relator was entitled to have his fee paid at once without being forced to pursue the circuitous route of a suit in court to establish the claim, with the expense and delay necessarily incident to such a course.

If the auditor, for the reason stated, is permitted to refuse approval of this claim, clothed as it is with indisputable evidence of validity and correctness, and thus compel institution of a suit for its establishment by judgment before meriting his approval, he could, if in an arbitrary mood, likewise withhold approval from every warrant issued by authority of the board of education for the payment of salaries of officers, teachers, and employees, to the utter demoralization of the school system of the city.

The only adequate, specific, appropriate remedy for the situation presented was the writ of mandamus compelling the auditor to do the only thing necessary to be done; that is, to approve the warrant for payment, no other [remedy] could afford relief as adequate.

In International Water Co. v. City of El Paso, 51 Tex. Civ. App. 321, 327, 112 S.W. 816, 819, responding to the contention that mandamus could not be resorted to because plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law, the court, quoting from High on Extraordinary Remedies, said:

"It is to be borne in mind, in the application of the principle under discussion, that the existing legal remedy relied upon as a bar to interference by mandamus must not only be an adequate remedy in the general sense of the term, but it must be specific and appropriate to the particular circumstances of the case; that is, it must be such a remedy as affords relief upon the very subject matter of the controversy, and if it is not adequate to afford the part aggrieved the particular right which the law accords him, mandamus will lie, notwithstanding the existence of such other remedy."

Id., at 262.

Similar to the situation in Chrestman, only a single legal issue remains. The only issue that remains in the instant case is whether the County Auditor and Commissioners Court could lawfully delegate their authority to examine and approve the county's accounts to the Board of Judges. This is true because it is uncontroverted that Judge Denson ordered reasonable fees paid to relators under Article 26.05, supra.

Nonetheless, respondents have denied, and apparently intend to continue to deny, all claims from court-appointed attorneys for their fees solely on the basis of an unauthorized fee schedule originally established by the Board of Judges. That policy plainly contradicts the method of fee-setting established by the Legislature in Article 26.05, supra, which provides court-appointed attorneys with immediate compensation for their work as set by the various trial courts. Also, as in Chrestman, the respondents' unauthorized policy threatens to erode the confidence of court-appointed attorneys throughout Harris County, if not the entire state, by jeopardizing the very source of their income. If relators are forced "to pursue the circuitous route of a suit in court to establish [their] claim[s], with the expense and delay necessarily incident to such a course[,]" then the important function of court-appointed attorneys in our criminal justice system could be seriously compromised before relief arrives. See Chrestman, supra at 262.

The inadequacy of relators' remedies at law in the instant case is suggested by an additional consideration. Each of the remedies at law theoretically available to relators, e.g., suits for declaratory judgments or civil suits for payment of claims, would require relators to pursue their legal remedies in civil district courts. And, even though relators ultimately could appeal those civil judgments to a court of appeals, they would not be able to appeal from the court of appeals to this Court in that civil suit. Moreover, a court of appeals would have no case precedent from this Court directly relating to the issues raised by relators. Essentially, relators would be forced to seek relief in a criminal law matter before civil law forums, despite the fact that this Court is the final arbiter of criminal law matters. Considering all of the above factors, we find that the remedies at law herein enumerated could not provide relators the same swift, exact and sure relief that is available through mandamus; nor could they provide remedies that are equally as convenient, beneficial and effective as mandamus.

We conditionally grant relators' application for writ of mandamus. Unless respondents reconsider relators' claims for court-appointed attorney fees consistent with this opinion, writ will issue.

WHITE, J., concurs in result.