JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III.
Cecil Marion Aldridge, Jr. was convicted in a bench trial of selling cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-248. He appeals on the ground that the Commonwealth violated his due process rights by delaying eighteen months to indict him and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.
On December 7, 1989, Thomas Carr was working for the Clifton Forge Police as an undercover informant of drug transactions. He wore a wire so that the police could monitor his conversations. That evening, Vincent Cooper approached Carr and told him that he knew where Carr could buy some cocaine. Carr then drove Cooper, at Cooper's direction, to Cecil Aldridge's apartment. Carr gave Cooper $100 with which to purchase the cocaine. Cooper went in Aldridge's apartment while Carr remained in his vehicle. Cooper returned and gave Carr a substance that was determined to be cocaine.
At trial, Cooper testified that Aldridge had been at home and had sold him the cocaine that he delivered to Carr. He testified that Aldridge had packaged the cocaine that he sold to Cooper. According to Cooper, Aldridge also gave Cooper $10 and two lines of cocaine as a commission. Carr testified that he had not seen or heard the person from whom Cooper had purchased the cocaine.
Aldridge denied that he had sold cocaine to Cooper. He claimed that he was not at home on the evening of December 7, 1989, and that he was visiting his parents and uncle for dinner. Aldridge claimed that Cooper was testifying falsely and was attempting to frame him to take revenge for his having fired Cooper in April, 1990, after learning that Cooper had been indicted for the December 7 drug sale. Aldridge testified that Cooper had been an employee at his auto repair shop. He testified that Cooper often came by his apartment to borrow money to buy food and other items for his children and that he had on occasion furnished Cooper with an automobile and alcohol. Aldridge produced several witnesses who testified to having heard Cooper threaten to take revenge on Aldridge. Aldridge did not produce his parents or uncle as alibi witnesses because, he said, his parents were not physically able to testify, and his semi-retarded uncle could not remember the events of December 7, 1989.
Cooper, who had previously pled guilty to his role in the drug transaction, testified that he did not tell the police or identify Aldridge as his source until his sentencing hearing in April, 1991. He testified that he received no consideration for testifying against Aldridge, and he denied having made any statements that he wanted revenge against Aldridge for firing him. The Commonwealth indicted Aldridge on May 6, 1991, after Cooper had identified him as his drug source at his sentencing hearing in April, 1991.
The trial judge denied Aldridge's motion to strike the evidence as being insufficient and, at the close of all the evidence, found Aldridge guilty as charged.
We first address Aldridge's claim that the Commonwealth denied him due process by delaying eighteen months from the date of the offense to indict him. Aldridge's claim is procedurally barred.See Rule 5A:18; Jones v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 14, 18 n. 1, 334 S.E.2d 536, 539 n. 1 (1985); Parnell v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. App. ___, ___, 423 S.E.2d 834, 838 (1992). He failed to raise the issue at trial, and we will not consider it for the first time on appeal. An accused can waive a constitutional claim by failing to raise it timely. Parnell, ___ Va. App. at ___, 423 S.E.2d at 838. We refuse to address the constitutional question because Aldridge failed to raise it at trial.
As to whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that Aldridge was the person who sold Cooper cocaine, on appeal we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975); Traverso v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 172, 176, 366 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1988). The credibility of witnesses and the weight accorded their testimony are matters solely for the fact finder, who has the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, to observe their demeanor, and to weigh their explanation of events. Schneider v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 379, 382, 337 S.E.2d 735, 736-37 (1985); Collins v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 177, 179, 409 S.E.2d 175, 176 (1991). The trial judge's finding that a witness is credible "may only be disturbed on appeal if this Court finds that [the witness'] testimony was `inherently incredible, or so contrary to human experience as to render it unworthy of belief.'" Robertson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 854, 858, 406 S.E.2d 417, 419 (1991) (quoting Fisher v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 296, 299-300, 321 S.E.2d 202, 204 (1984)); see also Yates v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 140, 143, 355 S.E.2d 14, 16 (1987). A trial court's judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Code § 8.01-680;Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 145-46, 314 S.E.2d 371, 381 (1984), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989). Applying this standard, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support Aldridge's conviction.
Aldridge asserts that his conviction cannot rest solely upon the testimony of Cooper, a convicted felon, who had a motive for framing him. However, an accused may be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Yates, 4 Va. App. at 143, 355 S.E.2d at 15-16. Cooper's testimony would be legally insufficient to convict Aldridge only if we could say, as a matter of law, that it was inherently incredible and unworthy of belief. Id.
The trial judge, having observed Cooper testify and having evaluated his credibility as a witness, found Cooper's testimony to be worthy of belief. The trial judge's finding is supported by the evidence and, therefore, we cannot conclude that Cooper's testimony was "inherently incredible, or so contrary to human experience as to render it unworthy of belief." Robertson, 12 Va. App. at 858, 406 S.E.2d at 419.
Although Cooper's testimony identifying Aldridge as the person who supplied him cocaine was uncorroborated, it was otherwise consistent with and corroborated by the testimony of the informant Carr and the police officer as to the events leading up to when Cooper entered Aldridge's apartment. By contrast, the judge could have found Aldridge's testimony not to have been credible. He could have found that the evidence did not support Aldridge's theory that Cooper had a motive to frame Aldridge. Cooper did not implicate Aldridge in the drug sale until eighteen months after Aldridge had fired Cooper. Furthermore, Cooper, who had already been convicted for the December 7 drug sale, received nothing in exchange for his testimony against Aldridge. Finally, Aldridge offered no explanation as to why Cooper would have feigned obtaining cocaine from Aldridge by going to his apartment on December 7, 1989, a time when both were still on friendly terms. From this evidence, the trial judge was entitled to find Cooper's testimony to be credible. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's judgment against Aldridge.
Affirmed.