ZAPPALA, Justice.
Phar-Mor, Inc. failed to establish any of the prerequisites under the Labor Anti-Injunction Act, 43 P. S. § 206a et seq., necessary to grant injunctive relief. The record in this case demonstrates that Phar-Mor sought to enjoin nothing more than peaceable leafletting and brief contacts with its employees by union agents. The trial court properly found that the union's activities did not fall within the narrowly circumscribed exceptions in § 206 under which injunctive relief may be granted.
The Labor Anti-Injunction Act deprives the courts of this Commonwealth of jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in labor disputes except in strict conformity with its provisions. 43 P. S. § 206d. No restraining order or injunction may be issued contrary to the stated public policy of the Act, which is declared as follows:
Under prevailing economic conditions developed with the aid of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment,
and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint or coercion of employers of labor or their agents in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
43 P. S. § 206b.
In furtherance of this stated policy, the Act provides that no court shall issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction except under extremely limited circumstances. 43 P. S. § 206i. To issue a restraining order or grant injunctive relief, a court must conduct a hearing upon a complaint made upon oath and make findings of fact that each of the following prerequisites have been established:
(1) unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed unless restrained, or have been committed and will be continued unless restrained;
(2) that substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will follow unless the relief requested is granted;
(3) that greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by granting of relief;
(4) the complainant has no adequate remedy of law; and
(5) that public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant's property are unable to furnish adequate protection.
43 P. S. § 206i(a), (b), (c), (e), (f).
In this case, the parties agreed to waive an evidentiary hearing and submitted the matter to the trial court on the basis of the facts alleged in the complaint. The union agreed to accept the factual averments in the complaint as true solely for purposes of the court's decision on Phar-Mor's request for a preliminary injunction, with certain exceptions relating to the extent of damages claimed by Phar-Mor. The parties agreed that the union would file preliminary objections to the complaint on the grounds that the grant of an injunction was prescribed by the Labor Anti-Injunction Act.
Phar-Mor's complaint addressed instances of union activity at two separate locations and attached the affidavits of the store managers from each location. On July 3, 1990, the United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1776 began distributing literature and soliciting employees at Phar-Mor's location on Franklin Mills Circle in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, identified as Store No. 164. The union appeared at the store during working hours to solicit employees and to distribute literature on the sales floor and within non-public areas of the facility. The union organizers and agents subsequently appeared at Store No. 164 on three separate occasions on August 7, 1990, on October 8, 1990, and on November 14, 1990. Six organizers distributed literature on October 8, 1990; eight organizers were present on November 14, 1990.
The affidavit of Bill Vincent, Store No. 164's manager, provided additional details of the union organizers' activities on those occasions. Vincent stated that on July 3, 1990, the organizers distributed union materials and cards to employees throughout the store during work hours. On July 8, 1990, a store meeting was held at 6:30 p.m. for all store employees. One hour later, 12 vehicles pulled into the store parking lot. The individuals who were in the vehicles handed out union materials and cards to employees as they were leaving and also placed the materials on windshields of cars in the parking lot. Vincent informed the organizers of Phar-Mor's No Distribution/No Solicitation policy and asked them to vacate the premises. He called mall security and the Philadelphia Police Department when they refused to leave. At that time most of the Phar-Mor employees had gone, leaving the organizers' vehicles, three mall security chiefs, five Philadelphia police vehicles and one unmarked police vehicle parked in front of the store. This show of security and police force was the manager's response to the mere presence of the union organizers and leafletting outside of the store. The organizers left.
On July 9, 1990, four union organizers entered the store. The store manager spoke with them about Phar-Mor's policy and asked them to leave. After a brief discussion, Vincent asked one of the individuals to get out of the store. On August 7, 1990, the union organizers solicited the employees during work hours and distributed literature throughout the store. On September 24, 1990, a Phar-Mor employee who was not scheduled to work was found placing union literature into employee time card slots. She was informed that this was in violation of Phar-Mor's policy and was asked to stop.
On October 8, 1990, six organizers attempted to distribute union flyers to employees during work hours. The literature was left scattered throughout the store. On November 14, 1990, approximately eight organizers entered the store and went in different directions to speak with employees who were on duty. They were escorted out of the building but attempted to return. The Civil Affairs Division of the Philadelphia Police Department was called, but the store received no response.
As to Phar-Mor's Store No. 223 located at Great Northeast Plaza in Philadelphia, the complaint asserted only that the union has repeatedly entered the store to solicit employees and distribute literature. The literature was discovered by employees throughout the store, including shelf areas. The affidavit of Mike Moran, the manager, stated that the union appeared at the store on July 3, 1990. He indicated that organizers repeatedly attempted to enter the store after that to solicit employees and distribute literature. The affidavit failed to specify any dates other than July 3, 1990, or even the number of occasions on which the organizers appeared at the store.
Moran indicated that he informed the organizers of Phar-Mor's policy and asked them to vacate the premises. The organizers resisted leaving the store and occasionally shouted at management personnel within the store. On one occasion, he called the Civil Affairs Division of the Philadelphia Police Department for assistance.
The presence of the union organizers at Store No. 164 to distribute literature and to speak to employees on four occasions averaging once per month was claimed to have caused "a severe disruption of [Phar-Mor's] work force." Phar-Mor complained that the appearance of the stores had been negatively affected by distribution of union literature resulting in a loss of goodwill with its customers. There was no claim that the union's activity at either store caused any personal or property damage. Nor did Phar-Mor assert that the presence of the union organizers at Store No. 223, or at Store No. 164 during the four days spread throughout July to November, caused a loss of revenues.
On February 5, 1991, the trial court entered an order dismissing Phar-Mor's Petition for Preliminary Injunction. The court specifically found that none of the prerequisites to the grant of injunction required under 43 P. S. § 206i had been established. The court noted that Phar-Mor's sole basis for injunctive relief was that union proponents had approached its employees on store property to discuss the benefits of union membership and to distribute pro-union literature.
In the absence of any allegation or suggestion that there had been damage to Phar-Mor's property or any injury to its customers, employees, or management personnel, the trial court concluded that injunctive relief was inappropriate. The court specifically found that
. . . there was no testimony or evidence, with the exception of the few moments which a Union proponent engaged an employee in conversation regarding the benefits of Union membership, that the conduct of plaintiff's business has been in any way disrupted. On the contrary, testimony tended to show that employees and customers have been free to enter and exit plaintiff's premises without threats of coercion or intimidation, and sales have been transacted without interruption.
(Trial court slip opinion at 7). The court determined that union activity which inconvenienced Phar-Mor's No Solicitation/No Distribution policy was an insufficient basis for relief and that "there was absolutely no reasonable basis . . . to conclude that defendant has engaged in any illegal activity."
The standard of review of the grant or refusal of a preliminary injunction requires consideration only of whether there were any apparently reasonable grounds for the action of the lower court. Wilkes-Barre Independent Company v. Newspaper Guild, Local No. 120, 455 Pa. 287, 314 A.2d 251 (1974). "[W]e will not further consider the merits of the case or pass upon the reasons for or against such action, unless it is plain that no such grounds existed or that the rules of law relied on are palpably wrong or clearly inapplicable." Id., 455 Pa. at 289, 314 A.2d at 253 (Citation omitted.).
Pursuant to § 206i of the Labor Anti-Injunction Act, injunctive relief may not be granted unless all of the prerequisites have been established. The record in this case supports the trial court's conclusions that none of the prerequisites were met. No unlawful acts were committed or threatened to be committed by the union. The distribution of union literature in the stores and contact with store managers is not unlawful conduct under 206i(a).
I agree with the lower courts that the union's disregard of Phar-Mor's No Solicitation/No Distribution policy by engaging in discussions with employees and leafletting was not an unlawful act of criminal trespass under the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503.
No evidence was submitted which would establish that substantial and irreparable injury to Phar-Mor's property would follow unless an injunction was granted. Phar-Mor's discomfort that the stores' condition fell below its customary maintenance standard is neither a substantial nor irreparable injury to property. Litter resulting from the distribution of handbills fails to satisfy this standard.
This case falls far short of the activity which was found to be sufficient to warrant issuance of an injunction in Giant Eagle Markets v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local Union No. 23, 539 Pa. 411, 652 A.2d 1286 (1995). There, the trial court had granted injunctive relief based upon evidence that union workers were engaged in mass picketing during a strike, resulting in violence and intimidation directed against employees and individuals who wished to cross the picket line. Witnesses testified that fifty to sixty pickets would stand shoulder to shoulder and block store entrances and exits, sometimes surrounding customers to prevent them from entering. Various violent acts occurred during the pickets, including a shattered windshield of a delivery van, flattened tires of another delivery truck, and rodent traps in the aisles of one store.
We stated that isolated instances of the application of force or intimidation do not constitute a seizure, but "when pickets begin a consistent pattern of subjecting customers and employees to such acts, a seizure occurs. . . ." Id. 539 Pa. at 425, 652 A.2d at 1292. We concluded that the trial court had reasonable grounds to find that the actions of the pickets had the effect of denying Giant Eagle's agents and employees free access to its property. We held that mass picketing constitutes a "seizure" under Section 206d of the Labor Anti-Injunction Act "when it ceases to perform its lawful purpose of placing the public on notice that a strike is underway, and instead becomes a means of influencing labor negotiations through harassment and intimidation." Id., 539 Pa. at 426, 652 A.2d at 1293. The mass picketing and resulting seizure of the employer's property which established a basis for injunctive relief is not present in the instant case.
Section 206d, 43 P. S. § 206d, establishes a separate basis for the grant of injunctive relief in instances where the activities of a labor organization or its members result in a seizure of the property of the employer.
Nor does the union's activity rise to the level of the actions in Indiana Cobra v. Local No. 23, 406 Pa. Super. 342, 594 A.2d 368 (1991), alloc. den., 530 Pa. 655, 608 A.2d 30 (1992), in which the Superior Court reversed a trial court order granting injunctive relief to the owner and operator of a Giant Eagle supermarket. The evidence established that union pickets appeared at the store to pass out leaflets and to advertise that it was a non-union store. Approximately ten to twelve pickets would block the exit from the store and customers were forced to push through them or to walk on a busy thoroughfare. Store employees and customers pushing carts had to walk on the street to avoid physical confrontation with the pickets. Pickets used threatening language and gestures to customers and employees.
The Superior Court indicated that the trial court failed to make the requisite findings under § 206i. The trial court had merely stated in its opinion that there was the danger of public disorder and irreparable harm and an attempt to seize the store's property. The Superior Court held that the evidence was insufficient to prove a seizure of the property and that there was no factual basis to support the findings required to enjoin the union's informational picketing activities.
In this case, the lower courts found (1) that Phar-Mor had failed to show that the inconveniences occasioned by the union's sporadic appearances at its stores and distribution of literature would result in a greater injury to Phar-Mor than the harm that would result if the union was precluded from peacefully dispensing union information to Phar-Mor employees; and (2) that the police department's failure to take action reflected its belief that the union activity did not constitute unlawful behavior rather than an inability to handle the situation. The record supports these conclusions as well. For these reasons, the order of the Superior Court should be affirmed.
CAPPY and CASTILLE, JJ., join this Opinion in Support of Affirmance.
OPINION IN SUPPORT OF REVERSAL