JOHN A. ROSSMEISSL, Bankruptcy Judge
I.
Procedural Posture and Jurisdictional Statement
The debtors in the above captioned Chapter 13 cases are all represented by Gary McGlothlen. In each of these cases Mr. McGlothlen sought an award of attorneys fees from the court, allowable as a cost of administration in this case. The court, after receiving Mr. McGlothlen's fee application, ordered that a hearing be conducted on these fee requests. The hearing on these ten fee requests were consolidated for purpose of convenience. At the consolidated hearings, evidence was introduced including the testimony of expert witnesses. Mr. McGlothlen represented himself in these hearings, as did the Chapter 13 trustee, Daniel Brunner. The United States Trustee's office was represented by Robert M. Miller.
The issues in these cases involve the administration of these respective Chapter 13 cases filed under Title 11 of the United States Code. The issues before this court in these cases are core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) (B).
II. Issue
Whether the attorneys fees requested by Mr. McGlothlen in each of these cases should be allowed as a cost of administration in the respective cases?
III. Discussion
A. Statutes and Rules Applicable to an Award of Compensation.
The debtors' attorney seeks compensation for attorneys fees and reimbursement as costs of administration in these Chapter 13 cases. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(2). An award of attorneys fees and costs will be allowed if it meets the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 330. This section provides for compensation to Chapter 13 debtors' attorneys as follows:
In a chapter 12 or chapter 13 case in which the debtor is an individual, the court may allow reasonable compensation to the debtor's attorney for representing the interests of the debtor in connection with the bankruptcy case based on a consideration of the benefit and necessity of such services to the debtor and the other factors set forth in this section.
11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(B).
The other factors referred to in § 330(a)(3) are:
(3)(A)[*]In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded, the court shall consider the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, taking into account all relevant factors, including —
(A) the time spent on such services;
(B) the rates charged for such services;
(C) whether the services were necessary to the administration of, or beneficial at the time at which the service was rendered toward the completion of, a case under this title;
(D) whether the services were performed within a reasonable amount of time commensurate with the complexity, importance, and nature of the problem, issue, or task addressed; and
(E) whether the compensation is reasonable based on the customary compensation charged by comparably skilled practitioners in cases other than cases under this title.
[*] So in original.
Compensation is also limited by the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(A) which provides:
(4)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the court shall not allow compensation for —
(i) unnecessary duplication of services; or
(ii) services that were not —
(I) reasonably likely to benefit the debtor's estate; or
(II) necessary to the administration of the case.
Thus the attorney for the debtor in a Chapter 13 may be reasonably compensated for services representing the interest of the debtor, which are of benefit to the debtor's estate, or necessary to the administration of the case.
In addition to these statutory limitations on compensation, the compensation of a debtor's attorney is also regulated by the provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Washington State Bar. Mr. McGlothlen is a member of the Washington State Bar Association, a member of the bar of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, and as a member of these bars governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Washington State Bar. LR 83.3(a)(2); LR 83.2(a).
The Washington State Rules of Professional Conduct also deals with attorneys fees. RPC 1.5(a) states:
(A) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the terms of the fee agreement between the lawyer and client;
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) The amount involved in the matter on which legal services are rendered and the results obtained;
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) Whether the fee agreement or confirming writing demonstrates that the client had received a reasonable and fair disclosure of material elements of the fee agreement and of the lawyer's billing practices.
These two sources of authority overlap considerably. The provisions of § 330 are specifically applicable to the issues before this court in these cases and will be primary source of authority on the issue of reasonable compensation, supplemented however by R.P.C. 1.5(a).
B. Factors Affecting Compensation.
1. Time spent.
Mr. McGlothlen has provided the court with time records which reflect time spent on these matters to the tenth of an hour. This time was kept on Mr. McGlothlen's computer while he did the work in question. These time records were not reconstructed after the fact, with the inherent untrustworthiness of that practice. Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 553 n. 2 (10th Cir. 1983); In re Dann, 136 Wn 2d 67, at 78; 960 P.2d 416 at 420 (1998). The court accepts the debtors attorney's account of the actual time expended on each of these cases.
2. The rates charged.
Mr. McGlothlen charged his services at the rate of $120 per hour in these cases. This hourly rate, when compared with that of other attorneys in the district, is somewhat lower than the average. The attorney witnesses that testified in this matter charged in the range of $150.00 per hour for their time, and all considered the McGlothlen hourly rate reasonable.
This review of hourly billing rates is not however the end of the inquiry. In this area of Chapter 13 practice the vast majority of work is done on a flat fee basis, or in limited number of cases a flat fee plus hourly for additional work. Mr. McGlothlen is one of the practitioners which charges a flat fee plus an hourly charge. This flat fee is $1,000.00 in each of these cases currently before the court. It is not clear what services are included in the $1000.00 minimum fee.
Although Mr. McGlothlen enters into a written fee agreement with his client these agreements with clients were never introduced into evidence. It is unclear what benefit, if any, flows to the clients if Mr. McGlothlen spends less than the $1,000.00 (8.33 @ $120.00/hr) on any given case. In the cases before the court, Mr. McGlothlen seeks in excess of the $1,000.00 minimum fee.
This $1,000.00 minimum fee, happens to coincide with the rules adopted in this district effective May 1, 1996, which allow a Chapter 13 debtor's counsel to apply for an award of $1,000.00 or less, without providing an itemization of time expended. LBR 2016-1(d). This rule was adopted to minimize the administrative work for Chapter 13 debtor's counsel in getting paid up to $1,000.00 without a more burdensome detailed and itemized fee application. However if counsel seeks an award cumulatively in excess of $1,000.00, then all time, including that in the initial $1,000.00 must be itemized.
The court in adopting this rule did not set a minimum fee for handling a Chapter 13 case. In fact, at the time of the rules adoption, most practitioners handling Chapter 13 cases, charged less than $1,000.00 for handling a Chapter 13 case. The adoption of the rule did not abrogate or limit the court's authority to review fees in bankruptcy cases. 11 U.S.C. § 329. In appropriate circumstances the court may require a review of fees charged less than $1,000.00, and in such review require detailed, contemporaneously recorded time records supporting the fee.
The fees charged in the ten cases before this court, are among the highest fees charged by debtor's counsel in Chapter 13 cases in this district during the time frame of these cases. Accordingly, the court has undertaken this review of the fees sought.
Although $120.00/hr is admittedly a reasonable rate for attorneys time, it would not be an appropriate charge for time spent on secretarial, clerical or administrative matters. Mr. McGlothlen is a sole practitioner in the literal sense of the words. He has no employees and performs all work himself. Mr. McGlothlen explains that he does not charge for time spent on secretarial, clerical and administrative matters which should be part of his overhead and included in his hourly rate. The court however doubts this assertion despite its obvious sincerity. An examination of the time expended from first client interview to first meeting of creditors reflects expenditures from 8.48 hours in the Adams case to 22.33 hours in the Frank case. The fees requested range from $1,017.60 to $2,679.60 over the ten cases, all substantially in excess of the average fee in this district charged by practitioners doing similar work. This suggested that despite Mr. McGlothlen's protestations, he is in fact charging for secretarial, clerical, and administrative work at the rate appropriate for attorney services. As a result his services are more expensive than other Chapter 13 practitioners for the same work, despite the fact they bill at higher hourly rates for attorney services.
3. Necessity and Benefit.
A Chapter 13 debtor's counsel may be allowed fees as costs of administration if they are of benefit and necessity to the interests of the debtor or of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3) (4). Although the interests of the debtor and of the estate may not necessarily coincide, the debtor's attorney's services may be compensated if they serve either interest. Services for the interests of either the debtor or the estate however must be reasonable if they are to be allowed.
These statutory provisions may set up a certain tension in practice since it is difficult to serve two masters. For example, one of the attorney expert witnesses called on behalf of Mr. McGlothlen observed that some debtors would occupy as much time as their attorney would be willing to allow them, although this time was more than that required to perform the service. This arguably would be beneficial to the debtor's interests. Yet payment of the services off the top out of debtor's limited disposable income depletes the funds available for distribution to the debtor's other creditors. In addition it may well require the debtor to extend the term of the his/her plan beyond the statutory minimum term so that these additional charges may be paid and the debtor's plan meet the statutory payment requirements. Thus a psychological benefit to the debtor may also have an economic cost to the debtor as well as his/her creditors. Given the shifting nature of the economic landscape in Chapter 13 cases it is often difficult to determine who will ultimately bear the cost of the debtor's attorneys fees, the debtor or the creditors. This uncertainty as to ultimate benefit makes the concept of necessity all the more important in these cases at the time the decision is to be made whether to incur the particular services.
The economics of a Chapter 13 plan can vary widely during the course of the case depending on factors including who files claims, valuation of collateral, determination of priorities to name but a few.
For example, debtors often are uncertain about the exact amount they owe to a particular creditor. It might take considerable time and effort to arrive at the precise number to be included in the debtor's schedules. Insisting on exactness in this regard might well be unnecessary in most cases. The amount that is paid out in a Chapter 13 depends on the claim that is filed and not the amount in the schedules. If they dispute the creditor's claim that may be resolved in claims litigation. An insistence on scientific exactness in preparation of the schedules might not pass a cost benefit analysis in most cases since the amount paid by the trustee will generally depend on the claims filed by the creditor to which the debtor and the trustee have an opportunity to object.
Likewise, the filing of objections to claims should meet some sort of cost benefit analysis. If there is ample disposable income to pay a $400.00 secured claim why should the debtor's counsel incur $300.00 worth of fees to have this claim disallowed.
The benefit to the debtor and the estate may not be worth the diversion of the debtor's disposable income from payment of this creditor's claim to payment of the debtor's attorney for these services. The Chapter 13 trustee has an obligation to monitor the claims filed in the case and if an improper claim significantly impacts distribution to the other creditors the trustee may well choose to object. In a Chapter 13 context, it is the trustee who has fiduciary duties to the creditors rather than the debtor's counsel in this regard.
4. Time Expended Commensurate with Problem.
The court must determine whether the time expended for the services in question are commensurate with the complexity, importance, and nature of the problem faced.
The ten cases currently before the court were filed over a period of about one year. Although the cases may vary in complexity, the court sees a trend over this period in which the time spent for similar work is decreasing. One expects that this may be the result of counsel's greater familiarity with the process as time progresses.
Effective May 1, 1996, the court adopted revised local court rules. One of the major areas of revision lay in the Chapter 13 practice. The court abandoned a procedure utilizing a one page (somewhat cryptic) plan summary, in favor of a detailed seven page mandatory form Chapter 13 plan. This plan must be accompanied by a plan payment declaration, plan funding analysis and a liquidation analysis on the proscribed local forms.
This change was instituted as a result of dissatisfaction and confusion arising from use of the minimalistic plan summary. Accordingly, a more specific and detailed plan was adopted to make the process more accessible to practitioners and the public and to provide a more detailed road map and checklist for navigation through the often complicated provisions of Chapter 13. This change of procedure has been generally well received and is operating successfully. However, as with all changes in procedure, they require some adjustments while adapting to the changes. The fees in the ten cases before this court fall generally in that period of transition. These cases were among the first ones handled by Mr. McGlothlen under this new procedure.
As previously mentioned the vast majority of Chapter 13 cases filed in this district during the time period in question were charged on a flat fee basis for $1,000.00 per case or lower. The practitioners in this area also had to familiarize themselves with the new form and procedures. This required additional attorneys time which the court witnessed in the course of processing these cases. In these flat fee cases the time expended in education, familiarizing one self with the new process, and devising administrative practices to accommodate the new procedures were absorbed into the overhead as a result of the flat fee process.
The expenditures of this time made the attorneys more efficient and economical in the handling of these matters. In other words this expenditure of time educated counsel and made them more efficient to compete in the marketplace. Should the cost of that time be passed on to the specific client on whose case it was actually spent, or should it be passed on more generally as part of overhead?
In answering these questions, it is important to keep in mind that these cases are not unique. They do not deal with esoteric issues which will be met but once in a lifetime of practice.
These are problems that will be faced day in and day out in a practice which emphasizes bankruptcy work as does Mr. McGlothlen.
C. Discussion of Specific Cases.
1. Methodology
The court has discussed the issues relating to these various fee applications in fairly general terms. The court now will engage in a more specific analysis on a case by case basis. The method of analysis the court used in analyzing these cases focuses on using the chronological time records. The court looked at the time expended in three distinct time periods. The first period is from initial contact with the client through the first meeting of creditors. The second period is from conclusion of the first meeting of creditors to confirmation of the debtor's plan. The third period is post confirmation. The court used these time periods rather than the task segregated time records which the debtor's counsel had also provided because it made comparison easier and eliminated the variations attributable to an individuals characterization of the tasks involved. Attention was directed to the various tasks in analyzing the time spent in the three time periods. For example, the greater time spent in one case in the time between initial client contact and first meeting than another case might be explained by the fact that in the first case the debtor's counsel had to deal with stay relief matters which were absent in the second case. The following is a list of non exclusive factors which the court considered in its analysis: the nature and number of objections to confirmation; the nature and number of modifications to the plan; the nature and number of hearings actually conducted; priority problems to be dealt with; claims matters including separate classification requirements; objections to claims; valuation problems; request for stay relief; whether business or consumer case and whether the case is combined with a dissolution.
Having outlined methodology, we will now proceed to a discussion of the specific fee applications in the ten cases before the court.
2. Charlene L. Houston
Charlene Houston filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on September 26, 1996. Her schedules reflect assets of $101,615.16 ($67,410 — real property; $34,205.16 personal property) and liabilities of $89,034.67 ($70,902.87 secured; $18,131.80 unsecured). Houston's schedules reflect income of $2,352.28 and expenses of $2,109.18.
Houston's initial plan was a $8,748 base plan to be paid over 36 months with a payment of $243.00 per month. This plan provided for payment of two secured claims in the plan — Fred Meyer $500.00 at $16.61 month and Sears Charge Plus $500.00 at $16.61 month.
The plan provided for a reduction of these two secured claims from $4,517.49 for Fred Meyer and $2,848.06 for Sears Charge Plus down to each creditor's collateral value $500.00. The debtor also proposed to pay the secured claims on her home, car and central air conditioning unit directly. The Plan funding analysis indicated payments to secured claims of $1,195.92 and unsecured claims $6,277.28 over the term of the Plan.
The trustee objected to Houston's proposed plan on the grounds that debtor was improperly paying an impaired secured claim on a vehicle directly and budgeting excessively for discretionary expenses including paying insurance on two of the debtor's son's vehicles. When the matter came on for hearing on the trustee's objection, confirmation was denied and the debtor given fifteen days to file an amended plan.
Houston's First Amended Plan provided for a base of $9,224.00 to be paid over 36 months, $243.00 for 8 months and $260.00 for 28 months. This Plan provided no payments to Sears on either of its secured claims. Objections were filed to Sears two secured claims. The objections state that the attachments to Sears claims were not readable, there was no evidence of perfection and that Sears had failed to respond to numerous inquiries as to the secured status of these claims. Sears did not respond to these objections and orders were entered disallowing both of Sears secured claims but allowing them as unsecured.
The Chapter 13 Trustee withdrew his objection to confirmation and the First Amended Plan was confirmed on November 13, 1997. Mr. McGlothlen filed an application for attorney fees in this case of $3,852.00, of which $1,000 has been paid, leaving a balance of $2,852.00.
Mr. McGlothlen seeks award as an administrative expense for 32.1 hours expended on this matter. Of that total 15.14 hours were spent during the period between initial client contact and the first meeting of creditors. Of this time, 12.84 hours were spent on preparation of schedules and plan and attendance at the first meeting in this matter. This time charged at Mr. McGlothlen's billing rate is $1,540.80. This total is half again as much as the average flat fee charged in this district for processing an entire case.
The court's review of the schedules and pleadings revealed nothing unusual in either the amount and nature of debt or the number of creditors (approximately 20). Mr. McGlothlen explained that this debtor had previously been working with a credit counseling organization. It is not clear why that would increase the cost of preparing bankruptcy pleadings as opposed to reducing it. Although there may have been some confusion about the exact amount owed to specific creditors, those problems appear more easily resolved when and if the creditor chooses to file a claim which the debtor wished to contest. The charges for attorney fees in this period between initial contact with the client and the first meeting of creditors are excessive in light of problems faced. The charges allowed for this period between initial interview and first meeting are $600.00.
Turning now to the period between conclusion of the first meeting and confirmation, Mr. McGlothlen seeks compensation for 13.54 hours expended or $1,624.80, once again over one and one half times the average flat fee in this district.
A portion of this time was expended preparing for a hearing on the Chapter 13 trustee's objection to confirmation. This hearing was not in reality a contested hearing. It took approximately five minutes of court time. During the course of the hearing Mr. McGlothlen conceded that a modification needed to be filed, a draft of which was available at the hearing. In essence this was a status conference relating to a proposed modification of debtor's plan.
Considering the time spent in this period the court attributes 8.29 hours to the modification process, including the trustee's objection to confirmation. This was not a fully contested case but rather a negotiated one. The time expended in this modification process was excessive in regard to the problems faced. The court allows 2.5 hours as a reasonable fee for this plan modification work, or $300.00.
Also, included in the period between conclusion of the first meeting and confirmation is a substantial amount of time in dealing with claims. The total time expended on claims matters in this case is 8.22, including 2.3 hours pre first meeting and .93 hours post confirmation. The vast majority of this time related to the Sears claims. The debtor ultimately objected to the secured nature of Sears two claims, which resulted in denial of secured status to Sears of approximately $1,400.00 in claims. The debtor objected because Sears had failed to appropriately document its claim of secured status. The time expended on this matter is inordinate. The problem could have been dealt with by simple filing of objection to the claims. The end result did not impact the amount the debtor needed to pay to fund her plan. The increased dividend to general unsecured creditors appears negligible in light of the costs claimed for the procedure. The amount allowed for these claim matters is 1.5 hours or $180.00. Aside from the .92 hours which the court has just considered concerning claims, the post confirmation period time expended is 2.5 hours, all of which is devoted to an application for fees. The court having reviewed the fee request as well as the fee requests in the nine other consolidated cases, concludes that 1.5 hours is a reasonable time for preparation of the average fee request in a Chapter 13 case. In absence of any showing of unusual circumstances relating to the fee request, the court will allow 1.5 hours or $180.00 for the fee request in this case.
The court is aware, substantial additional time was expended in seeking additional fees in excess of those awarded herein. Counsel has not prevailed and the additional time expended is attributed to that failed request.
In summary, Mr. McGlothlen has not met his burden in showing that the additional fees requested in this matter were reasonable and necessary. The court allows as reasonable fees in this matter $600.00 for the first time period, $300.00 for the objection to confirmation/modification process and $180.00 for the claims matters, and $180.00 for the fee application, for a total award for fees as costs of administration in this matter of $1,260.00, as opposed to the $3,852.00 requested.
3. Robert Eugene Gimlin and Tawnee Marie Gimlin.
Robert E. Gimlin and Tawnee Gimlin filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on January 24, 1997. Their schedules reflect assets of $108,933.00 ($26,000.00 — real property; $82,933.00 personal property) and liabilities of $81,193.00 ($31,818.00 secured; $49,375.00 unsecured). Gimlins' schedules reflect income of $4,320.82 and expenses of $3,033.69.
Gimlins' initial plan was a 100% plan to be paid over 47 1/3 months with a graduated payment beginning at $1240.00 per month. The Plan funding analysis indicated payments to unsecured claims of $49,375.00 over the term of the Plan.
The trustee did not object to Gimlins plan. The plan was amended twice before confirmation. Each amendment altered the schedule of graduated payments somewhat but otherwise was essentially the same 100% plan. The plan as amended was confirmed.
Post confirmation the plan was modified three times. This series of modifications was caused by Mr. Gimlin's loss of employment and the debtors move to Vancouver, Washington. The first two post confirmation modifications provided a 100% plan, the third modification was a $23,548.95 base plan with a term of 47 months. In addition the third modification provided for a secured claim for Sears.
Mr. McGlothlen filed an application for attorneys fees in this case for $4,079.20 of which $1,000.00 has been paid, leaving a balance requested of $3,079.20.
Between the initial interview with the client and the first meeting of creditors, Mr. McGlothlen spent 14.67 hours and seeks $1,758.00. This is twice what other practitioners charge to reach the first meeting and more than the average fee charged for handling the entire case. The Court examined the specifics of the attorney fee charges to determine what unusual factors contributed to these charges.
The court's review of the schedules and pleadings reveal that this is a consumer case with approximately ten creditors. The case does not appear to be a complicated one and there are few special provisions in the original plan. The plan was amended twice before confirmation, but these amendments merely changed the graduated payment plan, although they did necessitate the preparation of an amended income and expense schedules and plan payment declaration. In addition, the first meeting of creditors was postponed because of a death, and this caused additional expenses of time. These circumstances would generate some additional costs but hardly the amount requested.
The court finds that 9 hours (7 hours for preparation of pleadings, 2 hours for delay of the first meeting) is a reasonable time for the accomplishment of these tasks and thus allows $1,080.00 for fees in the period between initial contact with the client through the first meeting of creditors.
In the period from the conclusion of the first meeting to confirmation of the plan Mr. McGlothlen spent 5.85 hours and requested an award of $702.00. The activity in this time period dealt mainly with two amendments of the debtors' budget and plan to reflect changes in debtors' circumstances. The second of these amendments is a minor change to the payment schedule. Three hours is a reasonable expenditure for these tasks for an award of $360.00.
In the period post confirmation, Mr. McGlothlen spent 13.5 hours and seeks $1,619.20 in fees. During this period the debtors modified their plan three times reflecting changes in their circumstances, objected to the Sears claim, engaged in miscellaneous activities and communications with the debtors and the trustee's office and prepared a fee application.
Mr. McGlothlen seeks $530.00 of fees for 4.42 hours devoted to plan modification. These are form documents and the legal work involves doing the appropriate math based on the client's information and completing the form and communicating with the trustee's office. It appears that some of the time claimed here is devoted to what should be secretarial duties. The court allows 2 hours or $240.00 for the plan modification.
Also during this period Mr. McGlothlen devoted 3.33 hours of time for claims objections, for which he seeks an award of $400.00. The majority of this time appears to be devoted to objection to a secured claim of Sears for $937.86. The ground for this objection is that the collateral is not identified. The objection was sustained and an order was entered disallowing the secured nature of this claim. However in the final modification, this secured claim is once again provided for in the debtors' plan. The reason for this change of treatment after disallowance of the claim is unclear although the modification now identifies the item of collateral. The question arises, why did Mr. McGlothlen bother to object to the Sears secured claim? The funds available to pay the secured claim in all the various plans, amendments and modifications are more than adequate to pay the Sears claim in full. The final modification provides for a base of $23,548.95, all to unsecured claims with the exception of the Sears claim and Mr. McGlothlen's fees. Why expend $400.00 on such a task? In addition, the time expended is excessive. The court allows 1.5 hours for tasks related to claims in this case for a fee of $180.00.
The balance of time in this period post confirmation is spent on miscellaneous matters relating to sale and purchase of property by the debtor and communication with the debtors and trustee's office for which the court allows the amount requested $454.43 for 3.79 hours expended.
The court also allows the $180.00 for the time expended on the fee application.
The court allows as a reasonable fee in this matter $1,080.00 for the period between initial client contact through first meeting, $360.00 for the period after first meeting to confirmation, and $454.43 for the miscellaneous post confirmation services and $180.00 for the fee application, for a total allowed for attorneys fees in the sum of $2,074.43 as opposed to $4,079.20 requested.
4. Cheri Lynn Topping
Cheri Lynn Topping filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on January 30, 1997. Her schedules reflect assets of $33,255.00 (all personal property) and liabilities of $18,672.05 ($4,140.71 secured; $10,763.76 priority; $3,767.58 unsecured).
Topping's schedules reflect income of $1,383.44 and expenses of $1,107.00.
Topping's initial plan was a $4,686.20 base plan to be paid over 36 months with a payment of $276.44 per month. The plan listed four creditors that asserted priority claims but the debtor disputed these claims and proposed to pay them nothing. The debtor also proposed to pay the secured claims on her car directly. The Plan funding analysis indicated payments to unsecured claims of $3,767.58 over the term of the Plan.
The trustee objected to Topping's proposed plan on the grounds that it improperly required the trustee to refund plan payments to the debtor if she needed them to pay her taxes. The trustee contended this provision was unworkable. The trustee also objected on the grounds that the debtor's disposable income should be increased by the amount of child support she was receiving. Mr. McGlothlen responded to this objection by modifying the plan to eliminate the objectionable provision relating to a refund of payments by the trustee to pay the debtor's current taxes. Mr. McGlothlen also filed a number of objections to claims in this case: including the claims of the IRS; State Department of Revenue; Labor Industries and Developers Insurance Co. The basis for the debtor's objection was that these claims related to the debtor's former boyfriend's construction business which he was able to coerce or trick her into putting into her name although she had no ownership interest nor control.
The state responded to these motions by asserting that the debtor had obtained a license for the business identifying herself as the owner and had signed an agreement acknowledging the debt and agreeing to repay it. The IRS also contested the objection to its claim. An order was entered disallowing the claim of the bonding company.
The State of Washington also objected to confirmation of debtor's plan on the grounds she was not paying it's secured and priority claims.
The debtor's plan as modified was confirmed on March 25, 1998. The order confirming the plan increased the base to be paid to $9,951.84, to provide sufficient funds to pay the administrative expenses, priority claims and secured tax claims. It appeared that no funds would be paid to unsecured claimants.
Mr. McGlothlen filed an application for attorney fees in this case of $3,606.00 of which $1,000.00 has been paid to date. Between the initial interview with the client and the first meeting of creditors, Mr. McGlothlen spent 14.5 hours and seeks $1,740.00 in fees. The court examined the specifics of the attorney fee charges to determine what factors contributed to these charges.
The court's review of the Schedules and pleadings revealed nothing unusual in the number of creditors (approximately 17). It does not appear that there were any unusual or unique problems in preparing the schedules or Statement of Affairs. The plan's special provisions included the following: listing the amounts claimed as priority but contested; a consumer car loan to be paid directly; and the provision for refund by the trustee to pay current taxes. One of Mr. McGlothlen's expert witnesses, Mr. Royal, testified in most cases he handles, the charges from initial interview to first meeting do not usually exceed $600.00. Mr. McGlothlen's requested fees for this same period are nearly three times that much. The evidence before the court does not justify or explain why this case was so expensive to handle in this initial contact to first meeting time frame.
In the period between the first meeting and plan confirmation, Mr. McGlothlen seeks an additional $1,671.60 for 13.93 hours of work. The vast majority of this time was spent on claims or research on claims and objections issues. Some 12.47 hours was devoted to these activities. The results of this claim litigation was mixed. The claim of the bonding company was disallowed as duplicative of the claim of the Department of Revenue. The claims of the State of Washington were allowed as secured and priority claims although somewhat reduced in amount. The resolution of the dispute on the IRS claim is unclear from the record. The plan ultimately confirmed required the debtor to increase the base of her plan from $4,686.20 to $9,951.84, and extend the term of the plan from 36 months to 47 months. Allowance of the McGlothlen fee request in full would require plan payments over an additional 11 months.
Mr. McGlothlen seeks an additional $194.40 for fees incurred post confirmation including preparing a fee request.
The court finds that Mr. McGlothlen fee request for the period between his initial meeting with the client through the first meeting of creditors is excessive. The problems of this debtor were not unusually complicated and comparable charges by other counsel for similar tasks are in the area of $600. The problems with the various taxing agencies would increase this somewhat. The court allows an additional two hours or $240.00 for this. Leaving a total allowable fee for the period initial contact through first meeting of $840.00.
For the period after the first meeting through confirmation, the court allows the $1,671.60 requested as reasonable fees for dealing with the claims and confirmation contest. It appears that the matters disputed were of some substance and needed to be resolved.
As to the period post confirmation, which primarily involved preparation and prosecution of fee requests, the court allows the $174.00 requested.
The court allows as a reasonable fee in this matter $840.00 for the period from initial contact to first meeting, $1,671.60 for the period after the first meeting to confirmation, and $174.00 for post confirmation services, for a total allowed claim for attorney fees in the sum of $2,685.00 as opposed to the $3,606.00 requested.
5. James Edward Lorton
James Edward Lorton filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on February 13, 1997. His schedules reflect assets of $19,425.00; all personal property and liabilities of $51,024.30 ($6,311.64 secured; $13,820.19 priority; $30,892.47 unsecured).
Lorton's schedules reflect income of $6,680.00 and expenses of $6,396.00.
Lorton's initial plan was a $14,462.54 base plan to be paid over 41 months with a payment of $284.00 for 23 months and $439.00 for the remaining 18 months. This plan provided for payment of 2 secured claims in the plan — Sears $100.00 at $2.63/month and Future Shop $425.00 at $11.19 month. The plan provided for a reduction of the secured claims of Sears from $512.67 to $100.00; and for the Future Shop claim from $998.97 to $425.00. The debtor also proposed to pay the secured claims on his 1991 Dodge directly. The Plan funding analysis indicated payments to secured claims of $663.66, to priority claims $12,152.63 and $0.00 to the general unsecured claims over the term of the Plan.
The trustee objected to Lorton's proposed plan on a number of grounds: excessive discretionary expenses; proposed payments to a creditor of less than $15.00 per month; the proposed refund by the Chapter 13 trustee if debtor needed funds to pay current taxes; and failure to serve the monthly financial statement required for a business debtor.
In response to these objections, the debtor filed a modified plan. The modified plan deletes the provision requiring the Chapter 13 trustee to refund plan payments to pay current taxes, provides in full for payment of the Sears secured claim on confirmation, and extended the plan payments of $439.00 per month, an additional two months to a 43 month term.
The trustee did not contest this modification and the plan as modified was confirmed with a new base of $15,312.00.
Mr. McGlothlen filed an objection to the secured claim of Hurly State Bank dba Future Shops credit plan stating as grounds the claim failed to identify the creditor's collateral and was not supported by the requisite documentation. The Hurly State Bank did not contest these allegations and an order was entered disallowing the secured claim.
Mr. McGlothlen filed an application for attorneys fees in this case for $2,217.60 of which $550.00 had been paid, leaving a balance requested of $1,667.60.
Between the initial interview with the client and the first meeting of creditors, Mr. McGlothlen spent 10.87 hours and seeks $1,304.40. The Court examined the specifics of the attorney fee charges to determine what unusual factors contributed to these charges.
The court's review of the schedules and pleadings reveal that this is a business case with approximately ten creditors. The major problem in the case appears to be a $13,820.00 of priority debt to the IRS, which is the only major creditor the debtor proposed to pay. A review of the pleadings does not reflect there was a substantial dispute about the amount of this claim.
Although this is a business case it does not appear that fact significantly increased the tasks in this case. It does appear that there was a delay of some six months between first client contact and filing which may have added some expense.
The court finds Mr. McGlothlen's fee request for the period between his initial meeting with the client through the first meeting of creditors is excessive. The problems of this debtor were not unusually complicated and comparable charges by other counsel for similar tasks are in the area of $600.00. The delay between first client contact and filing may have caused additional time to be spent and the fact that this was a business filing may have caused some additional costs for which the court allows an additional hour or $120.00 for this, leaving a total allowable fee for this period between initial contact through first meeting of $720.00.
Between the conclusion of the first meeting and the entry of the order confirming the modified plan, Mr. McGlothlen spent 6.39 hours and seeks $766.80. Nearly half of this time appears devoted to gathering the debtor's business financial reports and analyzing this information for use in modifying the plan. Also included in this period is some time on objection to a late claim of Hurly State Bank.
For the period after the first meeting through confirmation, the court allows the $766.80 requested, with the majority of this sum justified by the additional work required for a business case, such as dealing with monthly reports and analysis, preparing the modification and objecting to the claim of Hurly State Bank. The court allows the sum of $146.40 requested for preparation of the fee request.
The court allows as a reasonable fee in this matter $720.00 for the period between initial client contact through first meeting, $766.80 for the period after first meeting to confirmation, and $146.40 for post confirmation service, for a total allowed for attorneys fees in the sum of $1,633.20 as opposed to $2,217.60 requested.
6. Clyde E. Steen and Tina M. Steen
Clyde Ernest Steen and Tina Marie Steen filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on May 1, 1997. Their schedules reflect assets of $19,879.00 (all personal property) and liabilities of $51,887.51 ($0 secured; $564.24 priority; and $51,323.27 unsecured).
Steens' schedules reflect monthly income of $2,685.70 and expenses of $2,383.00.
Steens' initial plan was a $7,650.00 base plan to be paid over 36 months with a payment of $300.00 per month, but which fluctuated to $0.00 in the summer. This plan provided for payment of $564.24 to priority claims and $5,870.56 to general unsecured claims over the term of the plan.
The trustee objected to Steens' proposed plan on the grounds that it improperly required the trustee to refund plan payments to the debtors if they needed them to pay their current taxes. The trustee contended this was unworkable. The trustee also contended the debtors were budgeting excessively for discretionary expenses and proposing unfair discrimination among creditors of the same class.
Mr. McGlothlen filed an affidavit contesting the trustee's position as to the debtors' budget. When the matter came on for hearing before the court, it was set over for an evidentiary hearing. However, the matter was settled before this hearing. Mr. McGlothlen filed amended I J Schedules (debtors' budget) and a modification. The provision regarding refund of plan payments for taxes was deleted. The provision for varying plan fluctuating payments was eliminated with a provision which provided for plan payments of $127.00 per month for the remaining 27 months of the plan. The base was modified to $5,979.00, a reduction from the original plan's base of $7,650.00. This plan as modified was confirmed.
Mr. McGlothlen filed an application for attorneys fees in this case for $3,109.20 of which $550.00 was paid prior to filing. Between the initial interview with the client and the first meeting of creditors, Mr. McGlothlen spent 12.07 hours and seeks $1,448.40 in fees. The court examined the specifics of the attorney fee charges to determine what factors contributed to these charges.
The Court's review of the Schedules and pleadings revealed nothing unusual in the number of creditors (approximately 15). It does not appear that there were any unusual or unique problems in preparing the schedules or statement of affairs. A reasonable charge for these services through the first meeting of creditors is $600.00.
In the period between the conclusion of the first meeting and plan confirmation, Mr. McGlothlen seeks an additional $1,502.40 for 12.52 hours of work. This time was spent dealing with the trustee's objections to confirmation. The objection to provision for refund of payments to pay current taxes was easily disposed of by the deletion of this unacceptable provision. The contest over the nature and extent of the debtors' disposable income was much more serious and demanding of effort. The Debtors' counsel prepared an extensive affidavit focusing on the specifics of debtors' budget and prepared for an evidentiary hearing on this issue. The disputes were however settled before trial and a modified plan submitted and confirmed. The expenditures in this regard appear reasonable and the court allows the full $1,502.40.
The Debtors' counsel seeks $158.40 for post confirmation services which are primarily the costs of preparing his fee request. This sum is also reasonable and is approved. The court allows a reasonable fee in this matter of $600.00 for the period from initial client contact to first meeting, $1,502.40 for the period from conclusion of first meeting to confirmation and $158.40 for post confirmation services, for a total allowed for attorney fees in the sum of $2,260.80 as opposed to the $3,109.20 requested.
7. Renato Quiroz and Joellen Quiroz
Renato and Joellen Quiroz filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on June 9, 1997. Their schedules reflect assets of $62,117.00 ($57,000.00 — real property; $5,117.00 personal property) and liabilities of $54,080.69 ($30,198.29 secured; $23,882.40 unsecured). Quiroz' schedules reflect income of $1,786.00 and expenses of $1,592.65.
Quiroz' initial plan was a $19,760.00 base plan to be paid over 36 months with a payment of $190.00 per month for two months and $570.00 month for the remaining 34 months. This plan provided for payment of two secured claims in the plan — Yakima County Treasurer, $484.46 when funds available and McMahans Furniture — $300.00 at $15.00 month. The plan provided for a reduction of the McMahan secured claims from $1,323.00 down to the creditor's collateral value $300.00. The Plan funding analysis indicated payments to secured claims of $784.00 and unsecured claims $16,550.00 over the term of the Plan.
The trustee objected to Quiroz' proposed plan on the grounds that it improperly required the trustee to refund plan payments to the debtors if they needed them to pay their current taxes. The trustee contended that this allowed debtors to modify their plan without adequate notice to the creditors. Mr. McGlothlen immediately responded to this objection by striking the objected to provision from the plan. The trustee then withdrew his objection to confirmation.
However shortly thereafter the trustee filed another objection to plan confirmation, this time stating that the plan failed to provide for the secured claim of Sears in the amount of $1,044.12. The debtors, through their counsel, Mr. McGlothlen filed a motion objecting to the Sears secured claim of $1,044.12, contending that it should be allowed only for the value of the collateral $290.00. This objection to claim was not contested and an order was entered granting debtors the requested relief.
Likewise, Mr. McGlothlen objected to the secured claim of Helig-Meyers in the sum of $1,470.77, contending that it should be allowed only for the value of the collateral $200.00. This objection was not contested and an order was entered granting debtors the requested relief.
The debtors' plan was confirmed with provision for payment of the secured claims upon resolution of the claims disputes. Mr. McGlothlen filed an application for attorney fees in this case for $2,073.60 of which $1,000.00 has been paid to date. Between the initial interview with the clients and first meeting of creditors, Mr. McGlothlen spent 9.03 hours and seeks $1,740.00 in fees. The court examined the specifics of the attorney fee charges to determine what factors contributed to these charges.
The Court's review of the schedules and pleadings revealed nothing unusual in the number of creditors (approximately 23 creditors). The plan had few special provisions, dealing only with the secured claims of the Yakima County Treasurer and Sears. The court finds no reason for these charges to exceed $600.00. In the period between first meeting and plan confirmation, Mr. McGlothlen seeks an additional $394.80 for 3.29 hours of work. This time includes 1.78 or $213.60 directed to claims disputes. The court allows $181.20 for this period and will deal with the total allowed for claims litigation in the next period.
In the period post confirmation, Mr. McGlothlen seeks $391.20 for 3.26 hours of work. This time is devoted entirely to claims litigation and when added to the claim litigation time expended between first meeting and confirmation totals 5.04 hours and $604.80 in fees. This sum is excessive for the simple nature of this uncontested claim litigation. The Court finds 2.5 hours reasonable for this task and allows $300.00 of fees for claims litigation.
The Court also allows 1.5 hours for the fee application in this case for an award of $180.00.
The Court allows as a reasonable fee in this matter $600.00 for the period from initial contact to first meeting, $181.20 for the period from first meeting to confirmation, $300.00 for claims litigation and $180.00 for the fee application, for a total allowed claim for attorneys fees in the sum of $1,261.20 as opposed to the $2,073.60 requested.
8. Jeanette A. Adams
Jeanette A. Adams filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on June 9, 1997. Her schedules reflect assets of $29,694.00 ($5,500.00 — real property; $24,194.00 personal property) and liabilities of $88,990.76 ($4,554.36 secured; $84,436.40 unsecured).
Adams' schedules reflect income of $2,708.12 and expenses of $2,033.58.
Adams' initial plan was a $24,120.00 base plan to be paid over 36 months with a payment of $670.00 per month. The Plan funding analysis indicated payments to unsecured claims $21,258.00 over the term of the Plan.
The trustee objected to Adams' proposed Plan on the grounds that it improperly required the trustee to refund plan payments to the debtor if she needed them to pay taxes. The trustee contended this provision allowed modification of the plan without adequate notice to the creditors. The trustee also objected that the debtor was not paying all her disposable income into the plan, contending that she could pay an additional $335/month for a total monthly payment of $1005.00.
The objection as to the refund of payments for taxes was eliminated. The objection regarding disposable income was compromised with the debtor agreeing to increase her payments to $720.00/month and thus increasing the base to $25,920.00 and the Plan was confirmed.
Mr. McGlothlen filed an application for attorney fees in this case for $1,636.80 of which $1,000.00 has been paid to date. Between the initial interview with the client and the first meeting of creditors, Mr. McGlothlen spent 8.48 hours and seeks $1,017.60 in fees.
The Court's review of the schedules and pleadings revealed nothing unusual in the number of creditors (approximately 20). It does not appear there were any unusual or unique problems in preparing the schedules or Statements of Affairs. The only non-standard provision related to direct payments by debtor of her car loan. The charges for these services should not have exceeded $600.00.
In the period between the first meeting and plan confirmation, Mr. McGlothlen seeks an additional $355.20 for 2.96 hours of work. This is reasonable given the fact there was an objection relating to disposable income.
The debtor's attorney seeks $264.00 for 2.2 hours of work in preparing the fee application. A portion of this appears to be work on the attorney's computer and should be part of overhead. The court allows $180.00 for this fee application preparation. The court allows as a reasonable fee in this matter $600.00 for the period from initial contact to first meeting, $355.20 for the period between first meeting and confirmation, and $180.00 for post confirmation services, for a total allowed claim for attorneys fees in the sum of $1,135.20 as opposed to the $1,636.80 requested.
9. Guadalupe Montelongo and Francisca Montelongo
Guadalupe and Francisca Montelongo filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on June 24, 1997. Their schedules reflect assets of $68,541.00 ($65,000 — real property; $3,541.00 personal property) and liabilities of $42,153.64 ($40,423.00 secured; $1,739.64 unsecured).
Montelongo's schedules reflect income of $1,419.88 and expenses of $568.85.
Montelongo's initial plan was a $51,061.33 base plan to be paid over 60 months with a payment of $851.03 per month. This plan provided for payment of the secured claims on the debtors' home in the sum of $31,500.00 plus the arrearage on the same obligation of $14,005.20. The Plan funding analysis indicated payments to secured claims of $45,505.20 and unsecured claims of $0.00 over the term of the Plan.
Between the initial interview with the client and the first meeting of creditors, Mr. McGlothlen spent 11.52 hours and seeks $1,384.40 in fees. The court examined the specifics of the attorney fee charges to determine what factors contributed to these charges.
The court's review of the schedules and pleadings revealed nothing unusual in the number of creditors (approximately 5). It does not appear that there were any unusual or unique problems in preparing the schedules or Statements of Affairs. The plan's few special provisions involve paying the secured claim on their residence within the plan and paying the arrearage on this claim during the plan term. The reasonable charges for this period should not exceed $600.00.
There were no objections filed to debtors' plan and the plan was confirmed.
Post confirmation, Mr. McGlothlen filed an objection to the claims of Yakima County Credit service for $2,757.49 and $983.97, alleging it should hold an allowed claim in the sum of $2,000.00 as a general unsecured claim. There was no objection and the relief requested by debtors was granted.
Mr. McGlothlen filed an application for attorneys fees in this case of $2,282.40 of which $1,000.00 has been paid to date. In the period between first meeting and plan confirmation, Mr. McGlothlen seeks an additional $330.00 for 2.75 hours of time. Of these 2.75 hours 1.72 hours were spent on claims issues, leaving a balance of 1.03 on other matters. The Court allows these 1.03 hours or $123.60 for this period.
As to claims matters in addition to the 1.72 hours spent pre-confirmation, an additional 3.44 hours were spent on claims matters post confirmation or a total of 5.16 on claims issues or $730.80 of time. It should be kept in mind the plan proposed and confirmed pays little to the unsecured claims. Although there may be some utility in clarifying the claim of Yakima County Credit Service, it doesn't justify or require the expenditure of $730.80 worth of time. A reasonable allowance for this claim activity would be $240.00.
Mr. McGlothlen claims and should be allowed 1.41 hours of time or $169.70 for his fee application.
The Court allows as a reasonable fee in this matter $600.00 for the period from initial contact to first meeting, $123.60 for the non claim activities after the first meeting to confirmation, $240.00 for the claim litigation, and $169.20 for the fee application, for a total allowed claim for attorney fees in the sum of $1,132.80 as opposed to the $2,282.40 requested.
10. Robert Wayne Frank Catina Marie Frank
Robert Catina Frank filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on July 18, 1997. Their schedules reflect assets of $17,983.00 ($17,983.00 personal property) and liabilities of $37,306.72 ($13,304.08 secured; $2,668.05 priority; $21,334.59 unsecured).
Franks' schedules reflect income of $3,046.34 and expenses of $2,662.00.
Franks' initial plan was a $15,167.18 base plan to be paid over 36 months with a payment of $384.34 initially and payments fluctuating thereafter. The Plan funding analysis indicated payments to secured claims of $1,068.81, $2,668.00 to priority claims, $3,004.36 to separately classified claims and $6,459.29 to unsecured claims.
The debtors original plan was a complicated one. It featured fluctuating payments, payments to secured creditors, payments to priority creditors, separate classification of criminal fines, and direct payments to secured creditors on the debtors' cars. The schedules listed 36 creditors.
The trustee objected to the original plan alleging that the plan payment should be $644.00/month as opposed to the $384.34 proposed; that debtors were improperly proposing to pay an impaired claim directly; that the debtors had not met the requirements for separate classification of claims; and that they were not paying a 60 month plan in light of the proposed separate classification. There was substantial litigation during the course of this case. Three different contested confirmation hearings were held. The case was never confirmed and the debtors ultimately converted the case to one under Chapter 7.
Post conversion Mr. McGlothlen filed an application seeking $4,750.00 of which $650.00 has been paid. The amount paid to the trustee during the life of the Chapter 13 and currently on hand is $1,687.42.
The debtors' attorney seeks $2,190.00 of compensation for the expenditure of 18.25 hours in preparation of the initial schedules, plan and required accompanying documents. This is in excess of three times what one might expect in the typical case.
As already noted the plan was a complicated one with a number of different issues to deal with. However this does not justify the expenditure of the amount of time claimed. The number of creditors (36) and the number of special provisions would justify an enhanced charge and the court allows 7.5 hours or $900.00 for preparation of the petition, schedules, plan and other required documents.
A portion of the time in the period prior to the first meeting was devoted to research related to the separate treatment of the debtor's criminal fines. Additional time was devoted to this issue after the first meeting. With the total time devoted to the separate classification of criminal fines totaled some 6.5 hours.
At the time of this expenditure the appropriate manner of treatment of criminal fines in Chapter 13 was unresolved in this court. The expenditure of time in research was appropriate. In addition, time was expended as a result of the debtor's arrest for criminal violations. The time of 6.5 hours or $780.00 expended on these criminal related matters are appropriate and should be allowed. The debtors objected to the claim of Hurly State Bank/Future Shop, $1,183.70 claimed as secured in undisclosed collateral and $509.48 as unsecured. Hurly State Bank amended its claim to $1,693.18 unsecured and the debtor withdrew its objection to the amended claim. Mr. McGlothlen expended 3.1 hours on this matter. An expenditure of that much time on this matter is unjustified.
The court allows 1 hour or $120.00 on this claim matter. In the course of this case there were two trustee objections to confirmation, two modification, three hearings, and finally a conversion of the case to one under Chapter 7, as a result of a separation of the debtors and additional criminal problems. All of these problems, justified expenditure of attorney time. At the time of the conversion of this case, the Chapter 13 Trustee had on hand the sum of $1,687.42. Pursuant to § 1326(a)(2), Mr. McGlothlen has sought payment to him of that sum as allowed costs of administration. Mr. McGlothlen has previously received $650.00 from his client for fees in this matter, thus the total fees paid or available for payment amounts to $2,337.42.
The court has determined that $900.00 was a reasonable fee for preparation of the pleadings in this case, $780.00 was an appropriate fee related to criminal problems and separate classification of these claims, and that $120.00 was allowed for claims litigation, or a total of $1,800.00. The court believes that the balance of the time expended by Mr. McGlothlen on this case justifies charges in excess of the $537.42 remaining available for distribution. Therefore, the court allows attorney fees in this case of $2,337.42 of which $650.00 has already been paid, leaving a balance of $1,687.42 in the hands of the Chapter 13 Trustee to be distributed to Mr. McGlothlen as costs of administration in this case.
11. Andie S. Getchell.
Andie S. Getchell filed a petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on October 22, 1997. Her schedules reflect assets of $20,380.00 (all personal property) and liabilities of $46,538.51 ($11,545.00 secured; $34,993.51 unsecured).
Getchell's schedules reflect income of $2,447.78 and expenses of $2,369.00.
Getchell's initial plan was a $12,565.68 base plan to be paid over 36 months with a payment of $78.78 per month for two months and fluctuating plan payments thereafter. The debtor proposed to pay the secured claims directly. The Plan funding analysis indicated payments to unsecured claims of $10,584.11 over the term of the Plan.
The trustee objected to the debtor's proposed plan on the basis that she was not devoting all her disposable income to the plan, suggesting that an additional $200.00 per month was available. The debtor contested this objection and the matter was set for an evidentiary hearing. This objection was ultimately withdrawn by the trustee and the plan confirmed as drafted. Mr. McGlothlen filed an application for attorneys fees in this case of $2,721.60, of which $1,000.00 has been paid to date.
Between the initial interview with the client and the first meeting of creditors, Mr. McGlothlen spent 16.74 hours and seeks $2,008.80 in fees. The court examined the specifics of the attorney fee charges to determine what factors contributed to these charges.
The court's review of the schedules and pleadings revealed nothing unusual in the number of creditors (approximately 9). It does not appear that there were any unusual or unique problems in preparing the schedules or statement of affairs. The plan's few special provisions; a graduated payment schedule with supplemental payments, and direct payment to three secured creditors. These special provisions do not justify charges much out of the ordinary. The Court would allow a base amount of $600.00 for these services. The filing was evidently an emergency one to deal with levying creditors and this would increase the cost somewhat as would the fact that notices must be specially sent to the levying creditors.
These factors would justify an additional 2 hours of time or $240.00. Likewise the first meeting of creditors was in Richland requiring Mr. McGlothlen to travel, justifying an additional three hours of travel time or $360.00. The court finds a fee of $1,200.00 reasonable for the services rendered between initial contact with the debtor through the first meeting.
In the period between the first meeting and plan confirmation, Mr. McGlothlen seeks an additional $567.60 for 4.73 hours of work. This time was expended on dealing with the contested confirmation issues concerning the debtor's disposable income and some claims matters. It appears this time is appropriate and should be awarded as requested.
The debtor's attorney requests an allowance of 1.21 hours for preparing his fee application. This is reasonable and is allowed in the amount to $145.20.
The Court allows as a reasonable fee in this matter $1,200.00 for the period from initial contact to first meeting, $567.60 for the period after the first meeting to confirmation, and $145.20 for preparation of the fee application, for a total allowed claim for attorney fees in the sum of $1,912.80 as opposed to the $2,721.60 requested.
12. Costs
Mr. McGlothlen has sought an additional allowance for costs expended in each of the consolidated cases. The costs requested in each of the respective cases are allowed as costs of administration in said cases.
IV. Summary and Conclusion
Mr. McGlothlen is awarded attorneys fees and costs as follows:
In the case of Charlene L. Huston, attorneys fees of $1,260.00 and costs of $220.95, a total of $1,480.95, of which $1,000.00 had been paid as of the time of the hearing;
In the case of Robert Eugene Gimlin and Tawnee Marie Gimlin, attorneys fees of $2,074.43 and costs of $135.56, a total of $2,209.99 of which $1,000.00 had been paid as of the time of the hearing;
In the case of Cheri Lynn Topping, attorneys fees of $2,685.60 and costs of $136.35; a total of $2,821.95 of which $1,000.00 had been paid as of the time of the hearing;
In the case of James Edward Lorton, attorneys fees of $1,633.20 and costs of $95.35, a total of $1,728.55 of which $550.00 had been paid as of the time of the hearing;
In the case of Clyde E. Steen and Tina M. Steen, attorneys fees of $2,260.80 and costs of $118.31, a total of $2,379.11 of which $550.00 had been paid as of the time of the hearing;
In the case of Renato Quiroz and Joellen Quiroz, attorneys fees of $1,261.20 and costs of $102.23, for a total of $1,363.43 of which $1,000.00 had been paid as of the time of the hearing;
In the case of Jeanette A. Adams, attorneys fees of $1,135.20 and costs of $108.65, a total of $1,243.85 of which $1,000.00 had been paid as of the time of the hearing;
In the case of Guadalupe Montelongo and Francisca Montelongo attorneys fees of $1,132.80 and costs of $72.23, a total of $1,205.03 of which $1,000.00 had been paid as of the time of the hearing;
In the case of Robert Wayne Frank and Catina Marie Frank attorneys fees of $2,337.42 and costs of $267.55, a total of $2,604.97 of which $650.00 had been paid as of the time of the hearing; and
In the case of Andie S. Getchell attorneys fees of $1,912.80 and costs of $125.22, a total of $2,038.02 of which $1,000.00 had been paid as of the time of the hearing.
This memorandum opinion shall constitute the Court's findings of facts and conclusions of law pursuant to F.Bk.R.P. 9014 and 7052.