CORNETT v. NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL CORP., (S.D.Ind. 2001)

LARRY J. MCKINNEY, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Navistar International Corporation's ("Navistar") Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff Larry Cornett ("Cornett") sued Navistar, claiming that it violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., when it terminated his employment for insubordination. Cornett believes that his race is the real reason that he lost his job. Of course, Navistar denies that it discriminated against Cornett in any manner. The Court will now consider the parties' arguments.

Navistar operates an engine assembly plant in Indianapolis where it manufactures diesel truck engines. Stmt. of Facts ¶ 1. Cornett, who was represented by the United Automobile, Aerospace, Agricultural Implement Workers of America Local 98 ("UAW"), was a Spare Operator in Navistar's Department 8, Trim Line. Id. ¶¶ 2, 7. An engine conveyor carrier system that transported engines throughout the assembly process ran through the area in which Cornett worked. Id. ¶ 8. The conveyor carrier device contained pins that extended downward. In Cornett's department, Navistar covered the pins with protective rubber caps. Id. ¶ 9. Sometime in late 1998, Navistar learned that an engine carrier had dropped down on one side as a result of a loose carrier nut. Id. ¶ 10. In response, Navistar removed the rubber protective caps from the pins so the maintenance and assembly workers could visually inspect the engine conveyor carrier as it passed through their work stations. Id. ¶ 11.

On or around March 2, 1998, Navistar Safety/Medical Team Leader Steve Metz ("Metz") was summoned to talk to Cornett, who was refusing to work because the carrier pins were allegedly hitting him in the head. Id. ¶ 12. In response, Navistar first considered whether an equipment modification or reconfiguration was feasible. Navistar could not, however, raise the height of the entire engine carrier device because of the nature and size of the assembly. Id. ¶ 13. Instead, Navistar concluded that giving Cornett a hard hat to protect his head was an effective solution to the pin concern. Id. ¶ 15.

On or around March 2, 1998, Metz provided Cornett with an approved hard hat and instructed him to wear it at any time he might hit his head. Id. ¶ 16. On March 3, 1998, Cornett presented a written medical restriction from his doctor that read, "Larry Cornett suffers from headaches due to bumping his head in his work area. He needs a different work area or job assignment due to medical necessity." Id. ¶ 17. Metz subsequently met with Cornett and his union representatives. Metz explained that, based upon the medical restriction which was not confined to any specific hazard, Cornett would have to permanently wear the hard hat unless and until the doctor lifted the restriction. Id. ¶ 18. Navistar then ordered Cornett to wear the hat in any area where he could hit his head. Id. ¶ 19. During these discussions, Cornett expressed his desire for a "medical bump" to a different job. Metz responded that obtaining a medical bump was a last option, which was only allowed within the UAW seniority scheme and only if engineering controls or personal protective equipment were not feasible solutions. Id. ¶ 20. Cornett then asked if the rubber protective covers could be restored. Metz responded that even if the caps were restored, based upon his doctor's note Cornett would still have to wear the hard hat. Id. ¶ 21.

On March 5, 1998, Navistar supervisor Eric Tharp ("Tharp") formally counseled Cornett for failing to wear his hard hat. Id. ¶ 22. Tharp and Loss Prevention Director Bill Seagraves ("Seagraves") told Cornett that if he refused to wear the hard hat he would be terminated for insubordination. Id. ¶ 23. Cornett responded that he did not need to wear the hard hat since the pins had been recapped. Id. ¶ 24. Tharp and Seagraves explained, however, that the doctor's restriction was not limited to the pins in their uncapped state and that if Cornett got another doctor's statement clarifying the restriction they could lift the hard hat requirement. Id. ¶ 25.

About an hour after counseling Cornett, Tharp again noticed him without his hard hat. Tharp summoned the union steward and other witnesses and told Cornett to put on the hard hat. Cornett refused, and Tharp gave him a directive. Id. ¶ 26. Tharp gave Cornett two minutes to comply with the directive. Id. ¶ 27. Instead of complying, Cornett picked up the hard hat and threw it away. Id. ¶ 28. Cornett was then advised that he was discharged. He turned over his company identification card and was escorted out of the plant. Id. ¶ 29. On March 6, 1998, Navistar sent Cornett written notice that his employment was terminated effective March 5, 1998, based upon insubordination. Id. ¶ 30. Cornett claims that two other white employees committed similar offenses, yet retained their jobs. Id. ¶ 41.

Navistar filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on August 29, 2000. On February 7, 2001, the Court granted the motion and entered judgment in Navistar's favor. At Cornett's request, the Court subsequently vacated that judgment and allowed him additional time to complete discovery and to file a response to Navistar's motion. Cornett has filed his response and the motion is ripe for ruling.

As stated by the Supreme Court, summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); see United Ass'n of Black Landscapers v. City of Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1317 (1991). Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Once a party has made a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not simply rest upon the pleadings but must instead submit evidentiary materials which "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The nonmoving party bears the burden of demonstrating that such a genuine issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 96 F.3d 992, 997 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997). It is not the duty of the court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying the evidence upon which he relies. Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996). When the moving party has met the standard of Rule 56, summary judgment is mandatory. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992).

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a court should draw all reasonable inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and should view the disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 257 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1109 (1997). The mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is not sufficient to bar summary judgment. Only factual disputes that might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law will preclude summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; JPM Inc. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 94 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996). Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter summary judgment — even when in dispute. Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir. 1992). "If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, one on which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted to the moving party." Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115 (1997).

Because Cornett has not attempted to offer any direct evidence of race discrimination, he must proceed under the indirect method of proof. Under that method, Cornett must initially set forth, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, Cornett must establish that: (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was meeting Navistar's legitimate performance expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) Navistar treated similarly situated persons not in the protected class more favorably. Stalter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 195 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 1999). If Cornett makes a showing sufficient to prove a prima facie case he will enjoy a rebuttable presumption of discrimination that shifts the burden of production to Navistar to articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its actions. Hughes v. Brown, 20 F.3d 745, 746 (7th Cir. 1994).

Navistar may do so by producing evidence, whether or not persuasive, of a nondiscriminatory reason. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. at 2747 (noting that the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of intentional discrimination). If Navistar succeeds in this task, the presumption dissolves and the burden shifts back to Cornett to demonstrate that the proffered reason for his termination is a pretext for discrimination. Essex v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 111 F.3d 1304, 1309 (7th Cir. 1997). Although the burden of production rests on the employer for the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry, "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Tyler v. Ispat Inland Inc., 245 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2001), citing Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). With these standards in mind, the Court will now consider Cornett's claim.

Navistar contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because Cornett cannot establish even a prima facie case of discrimination. Again, to establish a prima facie case Cornett must show that: (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was meeting Navistar's legitimate performance expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) Navistar treated similarly situated persons not in the protected class more favorably. Stalter, 195 F.3d at 289. Specifically, Navistar argues that Cornett cannot show that he was performing up to its legitimate expectations, nor can he establish that it treated similarly situated individuals outside the protected class more favorably. Even if Cornett could pass those hurdles, says Navistar, his claim would still fail because there is no evidence that its reason for terminating his employment was a pretext for discrimination.

Aside from the incident that produced this lawsuit, there is no evidence in the record that Cornett had any significant performance problems. Accordingly, the Court will assume that he has established that element of his prima facie case. With respect to Navistar's treatment of similarly situated individuals outside the protected class — the fourth element of the prima facie case — Cornett produced employment records of two other Navistar employees that the company had disciplined. He noticeably omitted any evidence of the race of either employee, a critical fact in establishing that they were outside the protected class. Because Navistar did not dispute that they were outside the protected class, however, the Court will assume that to be the case. In any event, Navistar terminated one of the employees for fighting — with whom the Court does not know — and it suspended the other for five days for verbal abuse of a team leader. Based upon the limited evidence Cornett provided, the Court cannot conclude that the employee discharged for fighting was similarly situated. If the employee scuffled with a supervisor or team leader, this might amount to "insubordination" and could be sufficiently similar to Cornett's conduct to be considered in the analysis. If he were simply fighting with another co-worker, however, this would not have involved any act of insubordination and would be totally irrelevant. Because Cornett has not offered any other explanation of the "fighting" incident, the Court will not consider it.

That leaves evidence of the other employee who verbally abused a team leader. It appears that Navistar suspended that employee for five days, then later rescinded the suspension and reinstated him.

Again, Cornett offers no other facts that explain exactly what transpired between the employee and the team leader. He does not identify the team leader, nor does he indicate the supervisor responsible for issuing the discipline. This is insufficient to establish that the other employee was similarly situated to Cornett. In disciplinary cases, a plaintiff "must show that he is similarly situated with respect to performance, qualifications, and conduct." Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617-618 (7th Cir. 2000), citing Byrd v. Ronayne, 61 F.3d 1026, 1032 (1st Cir. 1995). "This normally entails a showing that the two employees dealt with the same supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and had engaged in similar conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them." Id.

The Court is willing to accept that verbally abusing a team leader involves at least some level of insubordination. Cornett, however, fails to explain how this other employee's circumstances were otherwise similar to his. The Court has no way of knowing, for example, whether they were subjected to the same standards or whether they even dealt with the same supervisor. Cornett argues that Navistar has not identified the decision-maker responsible for his termination, and he testified that he is not sure who actually terminated him. See Cornett Dep. at 115. But it is his burden — not Navistar's — to establish a prima facie case, part of which involves showing that he was treated differently from a similarly situated person outside the protected class. Yet he has not even argued that the same supervisor was involved in disciplining him and the other employee. As the Seventh Circuit has explained, that is likely fatal to his case:

A demonstration of substantial similarity would also require a showing that a common supervisor offered one of these other employees a position for which Radue was qualified, and that this same supervisor also knew about Radue's availability but refused to offer the job to him. Radue hasn't shown a common supervisor, and in fact doesn't even mention who offered Williams and Nankervis their positions. This omission alone probably precludes a showing of similarity because when `different decisionmakers are involved, two decisions are rarely similarly situated in all relevant respects.' Different employment decisions, concerning different employees, made by different supervisors, are seldom sufficiently comparable to establish a prima facie case of discrimination for the simple reason that different supervisors may exercise their discretion differently. These distinctions sufficiently account for any disparity in treatment, thereby preventing an inference of discrimination.

Radue, 219 F.3d at 618. The Court concludes that Cornett has failed to establish that the other employee disciplined for verbal abuse was similarly situated to him. There is no evidence that the same supervisor was involved or that he and the other employee were subject to the same standards. As a result, Cornett has failed to establish a prima facie case and Navistar is entitled to summary judgment.

Even assuming Cornett had established a prima facie case, his claim would still fail. Navistar has offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions: Cornett refused a direct order of a supervisor, which the company considered to be insubordination. It is thus Cornett's burden to establish that Navistar's reason is really a pretext for discrimination. Logan v. Caterpillar, Inc., 246 F.3d 912, 920 (7th Cir. 2001), citing Jackson v. E.J. Brach Corp., 176 F.3d 971, 983 (7th Cir. 1999). In this context, pretext is defined as "a lie, specifically a phony reason for some action." Id., citing Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995). "Pretext may be established directly by showing that the employer `was more likely than not motivated by a discriminatory reason,' or indirectly by presenting evidence that the `employer's explanation is not credible.'" Id., citing Jackson, 176 F.3d at 984 (citations omitted). If a plaintiff does not have direct evidence of pretext, he may show pretext indirectly by presenting evidence that (1) defendant's explanation for the adverse job action had no basis in fact; (2) the explanation was not the real reason for the adverse job action; or (3) the reason given was insufficient to warrant the adverse job action. Id., citing Bahl v. Royal Indem. Co., 115 F.3d 1283, 1291 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

Cornett claims that Navistar's reason is pretextual for several reasons, including the following: (1) there exists an issue as to whether the supervisor's directive to wear a hard hat was reasonable and whether Cornett refused to follow this directive; (2) at least two other employees had complained that they had been injured by the pins, yet Navistar only required Cornett to wear the hard hat; and (3) Navistar's definition of "insubordination" is unclear and "there are patent `disparities' in applying a consistent definition of insubordinate conduct which calls into question [Navistar's] proffered justification and make summary judgment inappropriate." See Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 8-10.

Cornett's first argument requires little discussion. Whether his supervisor's order to wear a hard hat was reasonable is not for this Court to decide. As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, courts "do not sit as a kind of `super-personnel department' weighing the prudence of employment decisions made by firms charged with employment discrimination." O'Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 984 (7th Cir. 2001), citing Wollenburg v. Comtech Mfg. Co., 201 F.3d 973, 976 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Giannopoulos v. Brach Brock Confections, Inc., 109 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 1997). As a result, the Court will not consider whether it was wise or prudent for Navistar to require Cornett to wear a hard hat. For even if the directive were unreasonable, that would not establish that Navistar's reason for terminating Cornett was pretextual.

Cornett next argues that while at least two other employees had similarly complained about being injured by the pins in the conveyor carrier device, Navistar only required him to wear the hard hat. It is undisputed, however, that Cornett provided Navistar with a written medical restriction from his doctor stating that he "suffers from headaches due to bumping his head in his work area. He needs a different work area or job assignment due to medical necessity." Based upon that physician's written orders, Navistar determined that Cornett would have to permanently wear the hard hat until the doctor lifted the restriction. There is no evidence that Navistar had similar instructions from the other two employees' physicians. As a result, the fact that it required only Cornett to wear a hard hat seems reasonable and does nothing to cast suspicion upon its determination that he was insubordinate for refusing to obey an order.

Finally, Cornett maintains that Navistar's definition of "insubordination" is unclear and "there are patent `disparities' in applying a consistent definition of insubordinate conduct which calls into question [Navistar's] proffered justification and make summary judgment inappropriate." See Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 8-10. It is not clear to which "patent disparities" Cornett refers, for there is no evidence in the record of any similarly situated individuals who received different treatment. Cornett's main contention seems to be that Navistar has not provided a clear definition of "insubordination," and that this fact likens his case to the plaintiff's in Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 2001).

In Gordon, United Airlines terminated the plaintiff, a probationary flight attendant, for "unauthorized deviation" when he deviated from his work schedule without authorization. In concluding that there was a question of fact as to whether United's reason for terminating Mr. Gordon was pretextual, the Seventh Circuit noted that the company did not have a clear definition of what constituted an "unauthorized deviation." Id. at 890. But there were several other facts the Court relied upon in its analysis, including the following: (1) the individuals involved in the plaintiff's termination offered different definitions of the term "unauthorized deviation;" (2) one supervisor relied upon another's definition of "unauthorized deviation" as a justification for firing the plaintiff even though she did not believe that his definition or the facts he alleged constituted an "unauthorized deviation;" and (3) United rarely invoked the "unauthorized deviation" infraction, and although other employees engaged in similar conduct, United deemed their conduct to have been a "missed flight," which warranted only an interim warning. Id.

None of these other facts is present in this case. Although Navistar may not have had a written definition of "insubordination," there is no evidence that its supervisors had different ideas of what the term meant. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how any supervisor would not consider a refusal of a supervisor's direct order to be an act of insubordination. Cornett also presented no evidence that Navistar terminated him even though it did not truly believe that his conduct amounted to "insubordination." Finally, there is no evidence that Navistar characterized other employees' refusals of orders to be anything other than insubordination.

Cornett has failed to present evidence that could enable a jury to find that Navistar's explanation for his termination was a pretext for race discrimination. Accordingly, Navistar is entitled to summary judgment.

Cornett has failed to present sufficient evidence from which the Court could find a genuine issue of material fact on his Title VII race discrimination claim. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Navistar's Motion for Summary Judgment.