BELL, Judge
In accordance with the memorandum opinion herewith,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (docket # 22) be and hereby is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment (docket # 27) be and hereby is
GRANTED and judgment is hereby entered in favor of defendants.
OPINION
This is a civil action brought by a pro se plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On July 12, 1998, plaintiff was involved in a confrontation with Deputy Sheriff Danny Robinson inside the lobby of the Mecosta County Sheriff's Department offices. Plaintiff was attempting to enter an interview room from the lobby. Inside the interview room was a cat that police believed was stolen property. Plaintiff, a volunteer for an organization known as The Pet Connection, believed that this cat had been the victim of neglect by its owner. Plaintiff claims a violation of her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure when Deputy Sheriff Robinson touched her in the process of preventing plaintiff from entering the interview room. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on July 12, 2000, naming Deputy Robinson and the County of Mecosta as defendants. Plaintiff seeks an award of monetary damages in excess of $250,000.
Discovery in this case did not proceed smoothly. On May 11, 2001, the court conducted a hearing upon discovery motions by both parties. Plaintiff withdrew any claim of personal injury, mental anguish, emotional distress, or psychological suffering rather than allowing defendants discovery into these areas. On May 16, 2001, the court issued an order precluding plaintiff from presenting any claim for personal injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress or mental anguish. Plaintiff's sole claim is limited to compensation for the deprivation of her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure. (5/16/2001 Oder, docket # 61).
Plaintiff incorporated an affidavit into her February 27, 2001 brief in support of her motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's statements in her affidavit concerning physical and emotional injuries are precluded by plaintiff's responses during her March 9, 2001 deposition, statements plaintiff made on the record at the May 11, 2001 hearing, and the court's order of May 16, 2001.
The matter is now before the court on cross motions for summary judgment by plaintiff (docket # 22) and by defendants (docket # 27). For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion will be granted and plaintiff's motion will be denied.
Applicable Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Hiney Printing Co. v. Brantner, 243 F.3d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 2001); Redding v. St. Edward, 241 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2001); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1009 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc). The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is whether "the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986); see Groner v. Golden Gate Gardens Apartments, 250 F.3d 1039, 1043 (6th Cir. 2001); Strouss v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 250 F.3d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 2001); Burnett v. Tyco Corp., 203 F.3d 980, 982 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 928 (2000).
The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 403 (6th Cir. 1997). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, but need not support its motion with affidavits or other materials "negating" the opponent's claim. Moore v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339 (6th Cir. 1993). Once the movant shows that "there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," the non-moving party has the burden of coming forward with evidence raising a triable issue of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
To sustain this burden, plaintiff may not rest on the mere allegations of her pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Campbell v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 238 F.3d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2001); Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 1995). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment has the burden to come forth with requisite proof to support his legal claim, particularly where he has had an opportunity to conduct discovery. See Cardamone v. Cohen, 241 F.3d 520, 524 (6th Cir. 2001); Noble v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 997, 999 (6th Cir. 1994); Street v. J. C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d at 1478-81. In so doing, plaintiff must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see Mounts v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 198 F.3d 578, 580 (6th Cir. 2000); Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996); Brennan v. Township of Northville, 78 F.3d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1996). Conclusory statements, unsupported by specific evidence to support a claim, do not meet this standard. Kensu, 87 F.3d at 175-76. Applying these standards, defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted.
Facts
The following facts are beyond genuine issue. On the afternoon of July 12, 1998, Deputy Sheriff Andrew Nielsen was dispatched to a residence on 15318 Clear Lake Drive, Big Rapids, Michigan. The Sheriff's Department had received a complaint concerning unlawful entry and stolen property. At the Clear Lake residence, Deputy Nielsen met with Steven Perkowski. Mr. Perkowski identified himself as an off-duty law-enforcement officer from Gross Isle, Michigan. Mr. Perkowski reported that he had been staying at his sister's Clear Lake residence while vacationing. Perkowski advised Deputy Nielsen that on July 8, 1998, he and his family went to Traverse City to attend the National Cherry Festival. Perkowski indicated that two family cats had been left behind at the Clear lake residence with more than sufficient amounts of food, water, and cat litter. Perkowski and his family returned to Clear Lake on Sunday, July 12th, at approximately 2:00 p.m. They discovered a note attached to the exterior door stating, "The cat in this house has been taken by The Pet Connection Humane Society." Attached to the note was a business card for The Pet Connection. Mr. Perkowski advised Deputy Nielsen that he had called the telephone number on the business card and had spoken to a woman identifying herself as Lori Jones. Perkowski stated that Ms. Jones advised him that he would not be able to retrieve his cat. The Pet Connection was holding the cat until it could be examined by a veterinarian and law enforcement action could be taken against Perkowski for cruelty to animals. Thereafter, Perkowski contacted the Mecosta County Sheriff's Department.
The second cat in the residence had apparently eluded detection and had not been removed.
Deputy Nielsen's investigation on July 12 included interviews with Pauline Hagen, Kris Hagen and Liz Owczarak. The Hagens were neighbor caretakers of the house at 15318 Clear Lake Drive. Ms. Owczarak had been performing yard work for neighbors on the opposite side of the residence. Ms. Owczarak had apparently observed the cat inside the house and did not believe that it had sufficient food and water. Owczarak contacted the Hagens. The Hagens were in the process of entertaining guests and simply thought the cat was a wild cat that had entered the house without the owner's knowledge. The Hagens gave their key to Ms. Owczarak. She apparently entered the house, removed the cat, and left the note. Deputy Nielsen was unable to contact Ms. Owczarak on the afternoon of July 12th.
Deputy Nielsen then called The Pet Connection and spoke with a woman identifying herself as Loretta Jones. (Loretta Jones Dep. At 23, docket #30). When questioned regarding how she came into possession of the cat, Loretta Jones indicated that the cat had been recovered by Owczarak and had been given to her. Deputy Nielsen advised Loretta Jones that the cat had not been lawfully taken by Owczarak and that the cat would have to be returned. Deputy Nielsen arranged to have Loretta Jones meet him at the Mecosta County Sheriff's Department at 5:00 p.m. that evening to transfer custody of the cat.
Plaintiff Janice Jones is the daughter of Loretta Jones. Plaintiff and her mother are affiliated with an organization known as "The Pet Connection." Plaintiff described herself as a volunteer. At her deposition, plaintiff described The Pet Connection as a humane society. Plaintiff would not answer questions regarding the location of The Pet Connection. (Plf. Dep. at 7-10, docket #41, Ex.1).
Plaintiff testified that on the afternoon of July 12, 1998, Loretta Jones asked plaintiff to accompany her to the offices of the Mecosta County Sheriff's Department. (Plf. Dep. at 35, 69; Loretta Jones Dep. at 4). Plaintiff stated that this cat was "her mother's case." Plaintiff testified that she did not know how the cat came into her mother's possession. (Plf. Dep. at 35-38, 69-70, 72, 80). The Joneses transported the cat in a kennel to the Mecosta County Sheriff's Department offices.
At approximately 5:00 p.m., Deputy Nielsen met with Loretta and Janice Jones at the Sheriff's Department's office for the purpose of transferring the possession of the cat to Deputy Nielsen. Plaintiff carried the cat inside. Inside the lobby, they met with Deputy Nielsen, who directed the Joneses to an interview room. (Plf. Dep. at 36, 72-73; Loretta Jones Dep. at 4, 24). Nielsen met with the Joneses in that interview room. He photographed the cat. Deputy Nielsen related that he had spoken with Kris Hagens, and although Owczarak had obtained a key from Hagens, the police considered the cat to be stolen property. (Plf. Dep. at 75).
Plaintiff's mother asked to speak to the prosecutor about the cat's condition. (Plf. Dep. at 76). Deputy Nielsen indicated that the cat looked fine. When Deputy Nielsen explained to Janice and Loretta Jones that the cat would be returned to its owner, they became "highly agitated." Loretta and Janice Jones began to raise their voices and, according to Nielsen, became very argumentative regarding the return of the cat. (Nielsen Aff. ¶ 9, docket # 63). Plaintiff testified that she was concerned that Deputy Nielsen was not adequately addressing the issue of the cat's condition. She was concerned that Nielson was not taking a statement from her mother about the cat. According to plaintiff, Nielsen indicated that there might be a prosecutor on call that Sunday evening and indicated that he would attempt to contact the prosecutor. (Plf. Dep. at 34-35, 38, 76, 80, 84).
Deputy Nielsen contacted his supervisor, Sergeant Dave Arnson, at the request of Loretta Jones. Sergeant Arnson responded that he was involved with an emergency call and that he would return to the office as soon as he had "cleared" the emergency. Deputy Nielsen conferred with
Deputy Danny Robinson, the Animal Control Officer for the department, concerning the results of his investigation and what action should be taken regarding the cat. (Robinson Dep. at 15, 30-33, docket # 23; Robinson Dep. at 4, 8,19, 31, docket #58). Following this conference between Nielsen and Robinson, Robinson entered the conference room and sat down. Upon discovering Robinson's identity as the Mecosta County animal control officer, Loretta Jones became even more agitated. She demanded that Robinson immediately leave. Loretta Jones continued to shout hysterically and accused Robinson of numerous past wrongdoings and improprieties. (Nielsen Aff., ¶¶ 11, 12). Deputy Robinson advised plaintiff and her mother that the cat had been improperly removed from the Clear Lake residence and was considered stolen property. Plaintiff and her mother were advised that they would not be able to take the cat with them. Deputy Robinson directed Deputy Nielsen to take possession of the cat. (Robinson Dep. at 8, 9, 31, 36, 46, docket # 23; Plf. Dep. at 61, 77-78, 81).
At that point plaintiff and her mother left the interview room and went out into the lobby. Deputy Nielsen heard plaintiff indicate that she was going to call the Mecosta County Commissioners. (Nielsen Aff., ¶ 14). Plaintiff testified that she got up and left the room without saying anything about where she was going or who she was going to call. (Plf. Dep. at 78). When asked at her deposition why she did not simply leave the Sheriff Department offices at that point, plaintiff responded that she was waiting for some direction as to what to do next. She and her mother had not been asked by the police to leave. They were waiting for an opportunity to make a statement. (Plf. Dep. at 84).
Plaintiff testified that she left the interview room with the intent of calling Liz Oleson, the chairman of the county commission, despite the fact that it was after 5:00 p.m. on a Sunday evening. The pay phone in the lobby lacked a telephone directory. Plaintiff asked to borrow a telephone directory from an officer seated behind the glass partition in the lobby. (Plf. Dep. at 78). Plaintiff was dissatisfied with the way Deputies Robinson and Nielsen had conducted the interview with her mother. (Plf. Dep. at 38). Plaintiff believed that police should not have stated that the cat was stolen until they had completed their investigation. (Plf. Dep. at 40). Plaintiff testified that she did not know what police should have done with the cat until their investigation was completed. (Plf. Dep. at 41). Plaintiff stated that she thought it would have been "fair" to wait until Mr. Perkowski came down to the police station and personally identified the cat in the presence of the Joneses and the police. (Plf. Dep. at 42). Plaintiff ended up leaving a message on Liz Oleson's answering machine.
Deputy Robinson had entered the lobby area after plaintiff and her mother left the conference room. (Robinson Dep. at 10, docket #23). The cat remained behind in the interview room.
As plaintiff was returning from her telephone call, Deputies Robinson and Nielsen overheard plaintiff indicate that she was not going to leave without the cat. (Robinson Dep. at 21, 25, 46, docket # 23; Nielsen Aff., ¶¶ 14, 15). Plaintiff denies making such a statement. As plaintiff was reaching to open the interview room door handle, Robinson prevented her from opening it by putting his foot in front of the door and his hand on the door to hold it shut. (Robinson Dep. at 46). Deputy Nielsen observed plaintiff attempt to push her way past Deputy Robinson in an apparent attempt to enter the interview room and recover the cat. (Nielsen Aff., ¶ 17).
According to plaintiff, she saw an empty cat kennel in a corner of the lobby on her way back to the interview room. (Plf. Dep. at 85). She states that she did not hear or see Deputy Robinson until he grabbed her right arm between the shoulder and the elbow as plaintiff was reaching for the door handle. As plaintiff spun around, her backside hit the closed door. (Plf. Dep. at 87-89). Plaintiff did not suffer any bruises or marks as a result of Deputy Robinson's touching of her arm or plaintiff's contact with the door. (Plf. Dep. at 89-90). Plaintiff denies that she was attempting to enter the room with the purpose of taking the cat. Plaintiff asserts that she was returning to the interview room to inform Robinson and Nielsen of her unsuccessful attempt to contact the chairman of the county commission and to help "facilitate" efforts to get the police to take a statement from her mother regarding the cat. (Plf. Dep. at 82-84). Upon being touched, plaintiff began screaming at Deputy Robinson to leave her alone and to get his hands off of her. Plaintiff was waving her arms up in the air. (Loretta Jones Dep. at 9, 10).
Deputy Robinson let go of plaintiff's arm. He opened the door to take a brief look inside the interview room. (Loretta Jones Dep. at 13). Robinson saw plaintiff put her hand inside the doorway and wrap her fingers around the edge of the door. (Robinson Dep. at 25, 44, docket # 23). Defendant Robinson grasped plaintiff's right forearm and pulled plaintiff's hand clear because Robinson did not want the door to close on plaintiff's hand. This physical contact lasted one to two seconds. (Robinson Dep. at 10, 14, 47, 48 docket # 23; Robinson Dep. at 25, docket # 58). Deputy Robinson testified that the only time he touched plaintiff was to remove her hand from the door. (Robinson Dep. at 14, docket # 23; Robinson Dep. at 25, docket # 58), but construing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court assumes two separate touchings. At her deposition, plaintiff acknowledged putting her hand inside the door and that Deputy Robinson removed it without injuring her. (Plf. Dep. at 59). Plaintiff denied that she was attempting to gain entry to the room. Plaintiff testified that after the initial touch by Robinson, she felt faint. She reached out and grabbed onto the edge of the door to regain her balance. (Plf. Dep. at 63, 65). Plaintiff pulled away from Robinson and began screaming for the police. Deputy Robinson stood up against the interview room's door, preventing plaintiff from opening it. (Robinson Dep. at 47, docket # 23).
Big Rapids Public Safety Officer Brian Miller heard a loud disturbance in the lobby area. In the lobby, he saw Deputies Robinson and Nielsen. He also saw plaintiff and Loretta Jones. Deputy Robinson was standing near the door to the interview room. Plaintiff was attempting to gain entry into the interview room. (Miller Aff., ¶¶ 2-8, docket #64). Officer Miller approached plaintiff and her mother. When Officer Miller spoke to plaintiff, plaintiff indicated that she wanted to file assault charges against Deputy Robinson. Officer Miller asked plaintiff to identify where Deputy Robinson had touched her. Plaintiff indicated that it had been on her arm. Officer Miller requested to see her arm. Plaintiff pulled up her sleeve. (Loretta Jones Dep. at 16). Officer Miller advised plaintiff that he could not see any redness or any other indication of the purported assault. (Miller Aff., ¶¶ 9-10).
Plaintiff responded by yelling louder and creating a disturbance in the lobby. Plaintiff went to use the pay phone again, but Officer Miller prevented her from doing so. (Plf. Dep. at 66-67). Officer Miller ordered plaintiff to cease her screaming and to leave the Mecosta County Sheriff's Department immediately. When the screaming continued, Officer Miller advised plaintiff that if she did not discontinue her behavior she would be arrested as a disorderly person. After a few additional verbal outbursts, plaintiff and her mother left the building. (Miller Aff. ¶¶ 9-11; Nielsen Aff., ¶¶ 21-24).
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on July 12, 2000, exactly two years after her encounter with Deputy Robinson.
Discussion 1.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against defendant Robinson for an alleged violation of her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures. Defendant Robinson seeks summary judgment on the basis of, among other things, qualified immunity. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Supreme Court held that "government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 818. The standard to be applied in deciding a claim of qualified immunity is one of objective reasonableness. Id. The question whether qualified immunity attaches to an official's actions is a purely legal issue for the trial court. See Summar v. Bennett, 157 F.3d 1054, 1057 (6th Cir. 1998); Dominque v. Telb, 831 F.2d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1987).
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Saucier v. Katz, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2155-56 (2001), emphasized that the defense of qualified immunity must be considered in proper analytical sequence.
In a suit against an officer for an alleged violation of a constitutional right, the requisites of a qualified immunity defense must be considered in proper sequence. Where the defendant seeks qualified immunity, a ruling on that issue should be made early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive. Qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial or face other burdens of litigation. The privilege is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute liability, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. As a result, we repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation. 121 S.Ct. at 2155-56 (citations omitted). The initial inquiry must be whether the plaintiff has alleged and supported with evidence facts showing that defendant Robinson's conduct violated a constitutional right. 121 S.Ct. at 2156.
The Fourth Amendment states that, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. . . ." U.S. Const. am IV. This constitutional right is enforced against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the Supreme Court held that a free citizen's claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure of his or her person, is to be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness test. 490 U.S. at 388. Plaintiff was not arrested. She was not the subject of an investigatory stop. Therefore, the initial issue before this court is whether plaintiff was subjected to a Fourth Amendment "seizure" of her person.
The Supreme Court has held that "a person has been `seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that [s]he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991). Plaintiff made no allegations nor supported with evidence any claim that defendant Robinson prevented her from leaving the station on July 12, 1998. Police actually encouraged plaintiff to leave. Robinson simply precluded plaintiff from entering the police station's interview room within which police had secured a cat that was apparently stolen property. Police had a duty to the cat's owner not to let plaintiff take the cat. Deputy Robinson used minimal force, causing no injury to plaintiff in the process of preventing plaintiff from entering the room. Under these circumstances, plaintiff was never the subject of a "seizure" of her person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Even assuming arguendo that Deputy Robinson's touching of plaintiff could be considered a Fourth Amendment seizure, his actions did not rise to the level of an "unreasonable" seizure. Determining whether the force used by a law enforcement officer to effect a particular seizure is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment requires "a careful balancing of `the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental interests at stake." 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). The "reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. . . . With respect to a claim of excessive use of force, the same standard of reasonableness at the moment applies: `Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers' violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus of the reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." 490 U.S. at 396-97; see Neague v. Cynkar, 258 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2001).
The cat was considered stolen property. It appeared to Deputy Robinson that plaintiff was determined to enter the room, grab the cat and leave with it. Robinson used minimal force. Plaintiff suffered no injuries as a result of the incident. Defendant Robinson is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law because any temporary seizure of plaintiff's person, if there was a seizure at all, was not unreasonable.
Even assuming that plaintiff had supported a viable Fourth Amendment claim, defendant Robinson would be entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials may violate a person's constitutional rights and nevertheless be shielded from a damage award if they could not reasonably be expected to know that the Constitution prohibited their conduct. In determining whether an official is entitled to this immunity, the court must decide whether the official reasonably could have thought that his actions were consistent with the rights that plaintiff claims have been violated. The Sixth Circuit applies a two-part test for determining whether a government official is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity: (1) whether the plaintiff has shown a violation of a constitutionally protected right; and if so, (2) whether the right was clearly established such that a reasonable official would have understood that his behavior violated that right. See Key v. Grayson, 179 F.3d 996 (6th Cir. 1999); Summar v. Bennett, 157 F.3d at 1058. The absence of a violation of a constitutionally protected right was addressed earlier in this opinion. In this section, the pivotal issue is whether the right plaintiff claims was "clearly established" such that a reasonable official in defendant Robinson's position would have understood that his behavior violated that right. The court must focus on whether, at the time defendant acted, the right asserted was "clearly established" by the decisions of the Supreme Court or the Sixth Circuit. See Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1335-36 (6th Cir. 1993); Garvie v. Jackson, 845 F.2d 647, 649 (6th Cir. 1988). In rare instances, it is possible for decisions of other courts to clearly establish the law. Key, 179 F.3d at 1000. "If reasonable officials could disagree on the issue, immunity should be recognized." Id. "For qualified immunity to be surrendered, pre-existing law must dictate, that is truly compel (not just suggest or allow to raise a question about), the conclusion for every-like situated, reasonable government agent that what the defendant is doing violates federal law in the circumstances." Saylor v. Board of Educ., 118 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1997). "The burden of convincing a court that the law was clearly established `rests squarely with the plaintiff.'" Key 179 F.3d at 1000 (quoting Cope v. Heltsley, 128 F.3d 452, 459 (6th Cir. 1977)).
Plaintiff argues that it was clearly established that "an arrest without probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed violated the Fourth Amendment." (Plf. Brief at 20). This argument simply misses the mark. Plaintiff was never arrested on July 12, 1998. Police officers have authority to maintain order inside the police station and prevent individuals from taking property in police possession which the police have reason to believe may have been stolen from its owner. The court is unable to locate any Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit precedent finding a Fourth Amendment violation under remotely analogous facts. The court finds that defendant Robinson is entitled to judgment in his favor on the alternative basis of qualified immunity.
2.
Plaintiff asserts that defendant County of Mecosta should be held vicariously liable for defendant Robinson's actions. A county is liable only for acts done by its agents or employees in furtherance of county policy, custom or practice. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 409 (6th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff has presented no evidence that defendant Robinson's actions were the result of any county policy, custom or practice. Having found no violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights, the court cannot hold the county vicariously liable. See Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., No. 98-3951, ___ F.3d ___, 2001 WL 985116, at * 5 (6th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001) ("Section 1983 actions against institutions are not sustainable where an employee did not commit an underlying violation."). Accordingly, defendant County of Mecosta is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law.
Conclusion
Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted and judgment will enter in their favor.