FARRELL v. WOODHAM, (M.D.Fla. 2002)

JOHN E. STEELE, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Alane Laboda, Craig Ferrante, Keith Kyle, and Henderson, Franklin, Starnes Holt, P.A.'s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #16), filed September 25, 2001. Plaintiff has filed a Memorandum in Support of Complaint and Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #109).

Plaintiff filed a "Florida Agents In Law Enforcement Protect Wealthy Pedophiles RICO Complaint — Petition For Mandamus — Writ of Prohibition" (Doc. #1), which is deemed to be a complaint and is hereinafter referred to as the Complaint. The Complaint contains twelve numbered counts and an unnumbered RICO claim, and alleges violations of plaintiff's civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985, § 1986, various constitutional provisions, federal RICO violations, and two state law claims. Plaintiff alleges that he was framed, arrested, and prosecuted in state court for sexual child abuse of a five year old girl on June 20, 1993, which was actually committed by defendant Carl Woodham, a member of the International Society of Krsna Consciousness (ISKCON). Plaintiff alleges that ISKCON and its members have a long history of child abuse, which has been habitually covered up. Plaintiff alleges that eight of the defendants conspired to tell law enforcement that plaintiff had the sexual incident with the child, not Carl Woodham. On January 3, 1994, a warrant was issued for plaintiff's arrest for the incident. The case was prosecuted in state court, and plaintiff was ultimately acquitted on November 18, 1998. Plaintiff filed civil lawsuits in state court against persons who he alleged conspired to wrongfully prosecute him. Plaintiff asserts that his state civil lawsuits were barred or frustrated due to a criminal conspiracy by bribed state officers to prevent exposure of their crimes in the conspiracy against him. Plaintiff seeks judgment for the original mistake of blaming and prosecuting him for the abuse instead of Carl Woodham, and the subsequent conspiracy to conceal the mistake and wrongful prosecution.

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all factual allegations in the Complaint. Hughes v. United States, 110 F.3d 765, 767 (11th Cir. 1997); Brown v. Crawford County. Ga., 960 F.2d 1002, 1010 (11th Cir. 1992). The Complaint must be viewed and all reasonable inferences must be made in favor of the plaintiff. Sawinski v. Bill Currie Ford, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 1383, 1385 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). A Complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (footnote omitted); Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc). To satisfy the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, a complaint must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992 (2002). However, dismissal is warranted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) if, assuming the truth of the factual allegations of plaintiff's complaint, there is a dispositive legal issue which precludes relief. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989); Brown v. Crawford County, Ga., 960 F.2d at 1009-10.

Defendant Henderson, Franklin, Starnes Holt, P.A. (Henderson Franklin) and defendant attorneys who currently work at Henderson Franklin seek dismissal with prejudice on the grounds that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and that any possible claim is barred by judicial immunity. Henderson Franklin is sued under a theory of respondeat superior for failing to supervise its attorneys, and the attorneys are sued in their individual capacities. (Doc. #1, 11 117-121). These defendants are named only in Counts Ten and Eleven.

All of the factual allegations relating to Henderson Franklin and its attorneys are made with regard to their roles in court during judicial proceedings and actions made in connection with judicial proceedings. Plaintiff alleges that, in one of his post-acquittal state civil cases, defendant Craig Ferrante (Ferrante) argued a motion for summary judgment before Judge Rosman. During the hearing, Ferrante handed Judge Rosman a copy of the child-victim's deposition and pointed to a certain portion to make a point. Judge Rosman allegedly ignored that portion, and pointed to another portion of the deposition. Judge Rosman ultimately ruled that that portion of the deposition was sufficient to establish probable cause to charge plaintiff, and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. This, plaintiff asserts, was the result of a conspiracy between Judge Rosman, Ferrante and Keith Kyle (Kyle). Plaintiff further asserts that Ferrante improperly argued that there were no materially disputed facts when the facts were disputed; and that Ferrante prepared a proposed order which falsely stated that no material facts were in dispute. Defendant Keith Kyle was at the summary judgment hearing and had been at the deposition in question. (Doc. #1, 11. 727-775). Plaintiff filed an appeal of the summary judgment order, and the Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, allegedly in violation of their oaths and to protect the state from liability. (Doc. #1, 11. 776-789). Plaintiff alleges that Henderson Franklin failed to properly supervise the defendant attorneys and is liable under respondeat superior. (Doc. #1, 11. 117-121). The allegations made against Alane Laboda relate to her conduct as an Assistant State Attorney (Doc. #1, Count Seven, p. 40), and have been dismissed based upon prosecutorial immunity in a prior Order.

Count Ten alleges a conspiracy and fraudulent concealment under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 18 U.S.C. § 242, 2421, 2422 and 2423, and under an unidentified "whistle blower" statute. It alleges that all defendants retaliated against plaintiff for being a whistle blower by telling various law enforcement officers that Carl Woodham was the perpetrator of the child abuse and for exposing the habitual child abuse by ISKCON. It further alleges that all defendants acted in concert to: "fraudulently conceal the extent and nature of their inherent gross incompetence in the investigation and prosecution" of plaintiff in the state criminal case; conspire to suppress and minimize public knowledge of the sexual abuse of Hare Krsna children; to protect Woodham from criminal prosecution; and fraudulently prosecute plaintiff. (Doc. #1, 11. 1359-1400). Count Eleven alleges intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress by all defendants based upon the misconduct of wrongfully prosecuting plaintiff and conspiring to do so. (Doc. #1, 11. 1403-1428).

To the extent that plaintiff is attempting to state a claim under Title 18, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. There is no private cause of action created by any of these federal criminal statutes. Accordingly, Count Ten does not state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted to the extent it relies upon the criminal statutes.

To the extent Count Ten relies upon a "whistle blower" statute, that reliance is misplaced. The only specific federal whistle blower statute, the Whistle blower Protection Act of 1989, does not apply to the facts alleged here.

In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, plaintiff must allege and prove that the conspiracy involved race. This cannot be done in this case.

The elements of a cause of action under § 1985(3) are well established: "(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of denying any person or class of persons equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or the deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States." Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1190 (11th Cir. 2001). The second element requires Plaintiff to show some "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' actions." Childree v. UAP/Ga AG Chem., Inc., 92 F.3d 1140, 1147 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1148 (1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted). No racial discrimination is alleged here. While the full extent of the "perhaps otherwise class-based" discrimination has not been determined, it is clear that it "unquestionably connotes something more than a group of individuals who share a desire to engage in conduct that the § 1985(3) defendant disfavors," Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269 (1993), and does not reach "conspiracies motivated by bias towards others on account of their economic views, status or activities." United Brotherhood of Carpenters Joiners Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 826 (1983). The allegations in the Complaint do not satisfy the § 1985(3) standard.

Finally, all the conduct which forms the basis for Counts Ten and Eleven is subject to judicial immunity. In Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes Mitchell, P.A. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., the Florida Supreme Court examined immunity issues during judicial proceedings, stating:

Traditionally, defamatory statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged, no matter how false or malicious the statements may be, so long as the statements are relevant to the subject of inquiry. Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1992). Consequently, the torts of perjury, libel, slander, defamation, and similar proceedings that are based on statements made in connection with a judicial proceeding are not actionable. Wright v. Yurko, 446 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). The immunity afforded to statements made during the course of a judicial proceeding extends not only to the parties in a proceeding but to judges, witnesses, and counsel as well.

Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes Mitchell, P.A. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 639 So.2d 606, 607-608 (Fla. 1994) (citations omitted). All the conduct alleged occurred during judicial proceedings and defendants are therefore immune. Because the Court finds that plaintiff could not state a cause of action against these defendants, the motion will be granted and defendants will be dismissed with prejudice.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

Alane Laboda, Craig Ferrante, Keith Kyle, and Henderson, Franklin, Starnes Holt, P.A.'s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #16) is GRANTED, and the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to these defendants. The Clerk shall enter Judgment accordingly and terminate any previously scheduled deadlines as they pertain to these defendants.

DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 29th day of May, 2002.