MICHAEL, Bankruptcy Judge
Donald E. Armstrong ("Armstrong") appeals from orders of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah (the "bankruptcy court") (1) dismissing an adversary proceeding filed by Armstrong against Debtor Jennifer Gayle Potter ("Potter"), and (2) denying Armstrong's Amended Motion to Recuse (the "Motion to Recuse"). For the reasons set forth below, we dismiss this appeal with respect to the order dismissing the adversary proceeding and affirm the order denying the Motion to Recuse.
I. Background
In early 1999, Armstrong filed suit against Potter in Utah state court (the "State Court"). On June 14, 1999, the State Court entered judgment against Potter and ordered her to pay Armstrong $10,312.92 plus interest, costs and attorney fees. The State Court issued a supplemental judgment September 29, 1999, increasing the amount owed by Potter to $18,123.45, plus interest, costs, and attorney fees. Potter filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on January 31, 2000.
On March 10, 2000, Armstrong filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief. On April 17, 2000, Armstrong filed an adversary proceeding in Potter's bankruptcy case seeking a determination that the debt owed by Potter to Armstrong was nondischargeable pursuant to §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. On June 5, 2000, Armstrong filed the Motion to Recuse.
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to sections of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq. (West 2002).
On July 26, 2000, the bankruptcy court issued its Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Recuse. The bankruptcy court conducted a pretrial conference in the adversary proceeding July 11, 2000. Armstrong appeared pro se, along with counsel for Potter. On July 31, 2000, the bankruptcy court issued a scheduling order (the "Scheduling Order") in the adversary proceeding directing the parties to file a proposed pretrial order by March 6, 2001, and to appear for a final pretrial conference on March 20, 2001. Armstrong and counsel for Potter were served with a copy of the Scheduling Order by first class mail on August 1, 2000.
On September 18, 2000, Kenneth Rushton ("Rushton" or "Trustee") was appointed Chapter 11 trustee in Armstrong's bankruptcy case. On March 20, 2001, the bankruptcy court convened for the final pretrial conference. Neither Rushton nor Armstrong appeared. Potter's counsel also failed to appear. The bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary proceeding by minute entry, noting the parties' failure to appear and their failure to submit a proposed pretrial order as directed in the Scheduling Order.
Sometime after Rushton's appointment, he began negotiating the sale to Armstrong of certain claims that were property of the Armstrong bankruptcy estate. The cause of action against Potter was among the claims discussed during the negotiations. On May 29, 2001, after the bankruptcy court had dismissed the adversary proceeding, an order was entered in Armstrong's bankruptcy case approving the sale of claims.
On March 28, 2001, Armstrong filed a Motion to Reconsider Dismissal of Case (the "Motion to Reconsider"). Rushton filed a response to the Motion to Reconsider on April 12, 2001. On April 16, 2001, Potter filed an objection to the Motion to Reconsider. The bankruptcy court issued a written order dismissing the adversary proceeding on May 3, 2001. Armstrong timely filed a notice of appeal on May 14, 2001. On March 27, 2002, this Court entered an
The tenth day after entry of the order was a Sunday; thus, Armstrong had until Monday, May 14, 2001, to file his notice of appeal. See F.R.Bankr.P. 8002(a) and 9006(a).
Order of Limited Remand directing the bankruptcy court to rule on the Motion to Reconsider and retaining jurisdiction to address this appeal following the bankruptcy court's ruling. On June 5, 2002, the bankruptcy court denied the Motion to Reconsider. The order denying the Motion to Reconsider contained no explanation of the basis for the bankruptcy court's decision. Accordingly, this appeal is now ripe for review.
We note that the filing of the notice of appeal while the Motion to Reconsider was pending before the bankruptcy court does not render this appeal untimely. Bankruptcy Rule 8002 contemplates just such a scenario and provides in relevant part:
A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of the judgment, order, or decree but before disposition of any of the above motions is ineffective to appeal from the judgment, order, or decree or part thereof, specified in the notice of appeal, until the entry of the order disposing of the last such motion outstanding.
F.R.Bankr.P. 8002(b) (emphasis added). The advisory committee notes to the 1994 amendment to the rule state in part:
This rule as amended provides that a notice of appeal filed before the disposition of a specified postjudgment motion will become effective upon disposition of the motion. A notice filed before the filing of one of the specified motions or after the filing of a motion but before disposition of the motion is, in effect, suspended until the motion is disposed of, whereupon, the previously filed notice effectively places jurisdiction in the district court or bankruptcy appellate panel.
F.R.Bankr.P. 8002 advisory committee notes (emphasis added).
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction to hear timely-filed appeals from "final judgments, order, and decrees" of bankruptcy courts within the Tenth Circuit, unless one of the parties elects to have the district court hear the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c)(1); F.R.Bankr.P. 8001. Neither party elected to have this appeal heard by the United States District Court for the District of Utah; thus they have consented to our review. A decision is considered final if it "`ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.'" Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). An order dismissing an adversary proceeding is a final order. See In re Davis, 177 B.R. 907, 910 (9th Cir. BAP 1995). An order denying a motion to recuse is interlocutory and is not immediately appealable. See Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 350 (10th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (citing Lopez v. Behles (In re American Ready Mix, Inc.), 14 F.3d 1497, 1499 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 818 (1994)). However, once the bankruptcy court ruled on the Motion to Reconsider, the order dismissing the adversary proceeding became a final order, permitting our review of the Order Denying the Motion to Recuse.
III. Discussion A. The Order Dismissing Adversary Proceeding
We find it necessary to first address Armstrong's standing to appeal from the order dismissing the adversary proceeding. Potter contends that Armstrong lacks standing. Armstrong argues Potter has waived the issue by failing to raise it below. This argument lacks merit. Armstrong fails to differentiate between his standing, or lack thereof, in the bankruptcy court and his standing to appeal from adverse decisions of that court. Potter's alleged failure to object to Armstrong's standing before the bankruptcy court is irrelevant to our determination here. Moreover, we are required to address the issue of standing even if the court below did not pass on it, and even if no party has raised the issue. See FW/PBS, Inc., v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31 (1990).
"The federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction, and standing `is perhaps the most important of [the jurisdictional] doctrines.'" Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)). "Standing may be raised at any time in the judicial process," Board of County Commissioners v. W.H.I., Inc., 992 F.2d 1061, 1063 (10th Cir. 1993), and cannot be waived. See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995). Armstrong contends that his status as the debtor out of possession in his bankruptcy case confers upon him standing to appeal from the bankruptcy court's orders. The Bankruptcy Code does not contain a grant or limitation on appellate standing. The Tenth Circuit has adopted the "person aggrieved" standard embodied in § 39(c) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See Holmes v. Silver Wings Aviation, Inc., 881 F.2d 939, 940 (10th Cir. 1989). Under this standard, the right to appeal is limited to those persons "whose rights or interests are directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by the decree or order of the bankruptcy court." Id. (internal quotes omitted). "`Litigants are "persons aggrieved" if the order [appealed from] diminishes their property, increases their burdens, or impairs their rights.'" American Ready Mix, 14 F.3d at 1500 (quoting GMAC v. Dykes (In re Dykes), 10 F.3d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 1993)). The party seeking to exercise jurisdiction in his favor must "`clearly allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute.'" City of Dallas, 493 U.S. at 231 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975)).
There is no dispute that Armstrong no longer had standing to prosecute the adversary proceeding once Rushton was appointed Trustee in Armstrong's bankruptcy case. See Rooney v. Thorson (In re Dawnwood Properties/78), 209 F.3d 114, 116 (2d Cir. 2000) (appointment of Chapter 11 trustee deprives debtor of standing to bring adversary proceeding). The appointment of a trustee does not divest a Chapter 11 debtor of all its rights under the Bankruptcy Code, however. Among the rights retained by a debtor out of possession is the right to file a plan of reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c). During oral argument, Armstrong suggested his status as a debtor with the right to file a Chapter 11 plan vests him with standing to pursue this appeal. Under this theory, the order dismissing the adversary proceeding stripped Armstrong's bankruptcy estate of an asset that could have been used in formulating a plan of reorganization.
This argument might have gained some traction if Armstrong had come forth with any facts tending to indicate that he is an "aggrieved person" as that term has been applied in the Tenth Circuit. There is nothing in the record before us, however, indicating that Armstrong's rights or interests qua Armstrong have suffered an adverse pecuniary effect resulting from the order dismissing the adversary proceeding. Furthermore, even if we were to concede that the bankruptcy court's order did adversely impact Armstrong's pecuniary interests, that impact must be direct before Armstrong can acquire standing to appeal. See Silver Wings Aviation, 881 F.2d at 940. Here, we have only some remote unquantified possibility that the adversary proceeding could result in a possible future benefit to Armstrong. Any injury suffered by Armstrong as a result of the bankruptcy court's order is speculative at best. We will not expand the boundaries of appellate standing through speculation. Armstrong has the burden of establishing that he has standing to appeal the order dismissing the adversary proceeding. See City of Dallas, 493 U.S. at 231. He has failed to meet that burden. This appears to be where the majority and the dissent part company. The statement that "[a]pparently the majority believes that Armstrong has not shown anything more than a speculative injury because he has not shown that his judgment against Potter actually is nondischargeable," see dissent at 6, ignores the above analysis.
We are not willing to assume that, but for the order dismissing the adversary proceeding, Armstrong would have prosecuted and ultimately prevailed in the adversary proceeding, realized an economic recovery from the same, filed a Chapter 11 plan that included the claim against Potter as an asset, and that the claim's inclusion in the plan would have materially affected the chances that the plan would be confirmed.
Having determined that Armstrong lacks standing, the fact that the reasoning behind the bankruptcy court's decision to deny the Motion for Reconsideration was not disclosed to this Court is immaterial.
In addition, the dissent postulates that:
Armstrong is personally liable for the debts of his estate, and will likely remain so unless a plan of reorganization is filed and confirmed that allows him to receive a discharge. Probably only a plan filed by Armstrong himself would give him a discharge. So Armstrong will more likely than not have to pay his debts except to the extent they are paid from the assets of his bankruptcy estate. One of those assets is his judgment against Potter for over $18,000. The loss of this asset as a sanction for failure to pursue the proceeding, and not because it was found to be dischargeable or because Potter could never pay any of it, surely deprived Armstrong of an asset that might have reduced his obligations to his creditors, no matter what the ultimate outcome of his Chapter 11 case might be.
See dissent at 5-6. We respectfully find this reasoning to be speculation that we decline to engage in.
Important policy considerations support our decision. Limiting appellate standing to those entities that can show a concrete pecuniary injury resulting from an order of the bankruptcy court promotes the expeditious resolution of disputes, hastening both distributions to creditors and the debtor's "fresh start," while preventing bankruptcy litigation from "becom[ing] mired in endless appeals brought by a myriad of parties who are indirectly affected by every bankruptcy court order." Silver Wings Aviation, 881 F.2d at 940 (quoting Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 642 (2d Cir. 1988)). It is not difficult to envision the Pandora's Box that would be opened were we to conclude that alleged injuries as remote as Armstrong's provide a party with standing to appeal. The Code section that empowers Armstrong to file a Chapter 11 plan in this case also confers that right upon all other parties in interest, including "a creditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee." 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c). A rule permitting any party who is entitled to file a plan to appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court that affects them merely tangentially would inject needless delay into the reorganization process.
Even if Armstrong could show that he has suffered a direct, pecuniary injury resulting from the order dismissing the adversary proceeding, he would still lack standing to appeal that order. "`Prerequisites for being a "person aggrieved" are attendance and objection at a bankruptcy court proceeding.'" In re Weston, 18 F.3d 860, 864 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting In re Schultz Mfg. Fabricating Co., 956 F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 1992)). In Weston, the debtor and a group of creditors (the "opposing creditors") opposed the election of a Chapter 7 trustee chosen by a second group of creditors. The creditors supporting the election filed a motion to resolve the dispute. The debtor filed an objection and appeared at a hearing held by the bankruptcy court. The opposing creditors failed to object or appear. The bankruptcy court overruled the debtor's objection and held the election was proper. On appeal, the circuit court held that the opposing creditors' failure to file an objection, appear at the hearing or file a timely joinder of the debtor's appeal deprived them of standing to appeal. See id.
Armstrong failed to appear at the final pretrial conference or to take any steps prior to dismissal to convince the bankruptcy court not to dismiss the adversary proceeding. A debtor is a "party in interest" with a right to be heard. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). Notwithstanding the appointment of the Trustee, Armstrong could have sought to intervene in the adversary proceeding on the ground that the trustee refused to prosecute the claim. He did not do so, and under Weston, has not met the prerequisites for being a "person aggrieved."
Accordingly, we hold that Armstrong lacks standing to appeal from the order dismissing the adversary proceeding. In so holding, we recognize that this result may appear harsh. To be sure, the fact that the adversary proceeding was dismissed because the Trustee neglected to file a pretrial order or to appear at the final pretrial conference is worrisome. We need not engage in speculation as to whether Armstrong has any recourse on that front. It is sufficient for our purposes to note that Armstrong has failed to meet his burden.
The dissent takes the position that the filing of the Motion to Reconsider by Armstrong operated as a motion to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), and that it was in effect error for the bankruptcy court to not allow Armstrong to assume prosecution of the claim against Potter. See dissent at 2-4. We are not so persuaded. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held that:
An intervenor under Rule 24(a)(2) must meet the following requirements: (1) submit a timely application to intervene, (2) demonstrate an interest in the property or transaction, (3) show that the intervenor's ability to protect such interest might be impaired, and (4) demonstrate that the interest is not adequately represented by the existing parties.
Vermejo Park Corp. v. Kaiser Coal Corp. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 998 F.2d 783, 790 (10th Cir. 1993). The record does not establish that Armstrong has met any of these requirements.
Armstrong has never filed a motion to intervene. It has long been established that a "`party who ha[s] taken part in the proceedings and ha[s] the right to intervene, but who ha[s] not formally done so, [is] not capable of appealing, as such a party [is] not properly on the record as an intervenor, and not being a party to the record has no standing to appeal.'" In re Central Ice Cream Co., 62 B.R. 357, 360 (N.D.Ill. 1986) (quoting In re South State Bldg. Corp., 140 F.2d 363, 367 (7th Cir. 1943); accord Kowal v. Malkemus (In re Thomson), 965 F.2d 1136, 1142 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[M]ere participation in a hearing . . . [of] an adversary proceeding does not constitute de facto intervention."); Richman v. First Woman's Bank (In re Richman), 104 F.3d 654, 659 (4th Cir. 1997) ("In order to prove that the party sought to intervene in the bankruptcy court, the intervenor must prove some formal attempt to intervene."). The purpose of formally pleading intervention is so that a court can adequately determine whether intervention is proper. See Miami County Nat'l Bank v. Bancroft, 121 F.2d 921, 926 (10th Cir. 1941). Nothing in Armstrong's Motion to Reconsider specifically referenced intervention or Rule 24.
The fact that the Motion to Reconsider was filed by Armstrong pro se causes us no pause in foreclosing the dissent's position that the Motion to Reconsider operated as a motion to intervene. As the United States Supreme Court acknowledged in McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993), it has only required liberal construction of pleadings filed by pro se defendants in criminal matters, and it has "never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel." See also Members v. Paige, 140 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1998) (Easterbrook, J.) ("To put [McNeil] differently, rules apply to uncounseled litigants and must be enforced."). Furthermore, as the Seventh Circuit has recognized, "[t]he Supreme Court insists that federal judges carry out the rules of procedure whether or not those rules strike the judges as optimal." Tuke v. United States, 76 F.3d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.) (citing the relevant Supreme Court cases).
While we are not advocating a mechanical approach to reviewing pro se motions, we do feel it proper to call for restraint in construing such motions. It is one thing for a court to give pro se litigants the benefit of the doubt when they are asking the court for ambiguous requests; it is quite another for the court to convert one request for another. We feel that the dissent is asking for the latter; and this we cannot do. Thus, we decline to construe Armstrong's Motion to Reconsider as an application for intervention under Rule 24. As the Supreme Court stated: "`[I]n the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.'" McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113 (quoting Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980)).
In addition, the Motion to Reconsider was filed after the adversary proceeding was dismissed. However, according to pleadings filed by Rushton and made a part of the record on appeal by Armstrong,
The Trustee never intended to prosecute this lawsuit [against Potter] and never made any representation to Mr. Armstrong that he would do so. The Trustee has consistently stated to Mr. Armstrong that he would take no action against Ms. Potter except to the extent he might sell or abandon any such claim.
Trustee's Response to Motion to Reconsider Dismissal of Case ¶ 4, in Appellant's Appendix at tab 15. If this statement is true, Armstrong had ample notice of the Trustee's position before the adversary proceeding was dismissed. Under this scenario, even if the Motion to Reconsider were construed as a motion to intervene, its timeliness is in question. Thus, standing based on intervention under Rule 24 is untenable in this case.
The dissent also takes the position that Armstrong had standing because the adversary proceeding might have generated funds that could have been used to satisfy creditors in this bankruptcy case. See dissent at 5-6. The flaw in this argument is that, taken to its logical conclusion, it would have the effect of conferring standing on every issue in the case on every party in the case. If a debtor out of possession has standing because a recovery in an adversary proceeding may create "an asset that might have reduced his obligations to his creditors," then the same would hold true for every creditor in the case, as recovery in the adversary may result in additional payments to them. This reasoning has been rejected by one of the foremost bankruptcy treatises:
It might be said that all creditors and the debtor are parties to every order entered in a bankruptcy proceeding. However, that does not help in determining which parties have standing to take an appeal. If such reasoning were employed, the result would be a rule that any party who is involved either directly, indirectly, or tangentially in the bankruptcy proceeding has the power to appeal from almost any order entered by the bankruptcy judge. The search must be for a workable and, one would hope, predictable rule to govern the standing of parties who may take an appeal from an order, judgment or decree of the bankruptcy court.
10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 8001.05 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 2002); see also Thompson, 965 F.2d at 1141 (same, quoting prior edition of Collier treatise). If the dissent's analysis is sound, then any individual or entity that had guaranteed any of the debtor's obligations would also have standing, because a reduction in the direct indebtedness would have an effect upon their secondary liability. The dissent's compassion for the appellant is admirable. The ultimate result of its reasoning is problematic.
B. The Order Denying Motion to Recuse
Regarding Armstrong's appeal from the order denying the Motion to Recuse, we note that on August 2, 2000, Armstrong filed a Motion to Leave to Appeal Order Denying Motion to Recuse and to Stay Proceedings until Appeal is Determined (the "August 2 Motion"). Apparently, neither the bankruptcy court nor the District Court for the District of Utah has taken action on said motion. For the purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that the August 2 Motion was rendered moot when the bankruptcy court denied the Motion to Reconsider, finalizing the order dismissing the adversary proceeding.
The Notice of Appeal filed by Armstrong does not refer to the bankruptcy court's order denying the Motion to Recuse. Bankruptcy Rule 8001(a) states that the notice of appeal shall "conform substantially to the appropriate Official Form." Official Form 17 requires a description of the judgment, order or decree from which the appeal is taken. However, Bankruptcy Rule 8001(a) further states:
An appellant's failure to take any step other than timely filing a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the district court or bankruptcy appellate panel deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal.
F.R.Bankr.P. 8001(a). Because we perceive of no prejudice to Potter, we decline to dismiss this appeal simply because Armstrong failed to designate the order denying the Motion to Recuse. See generally Bohn v. Park City Group, Inc., 94 F.3d 1457, 1460 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying Fed.R.App.P. 3, from which F.R.Bankr.P. 8001 is derived).
Assuming for the purposes of our decision today that Armstrong has standing to appeal from the order denying the Motion to Recuse, he has failed to establish that he is entitled to relief. Ordinarily, we review the denial of a motion to recuse for abuse of discretion. See American Ready Mix, 14 F.3d at 1500. Armstrong, citing Sac Fox Nation v. Cuomo, 193 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 1999), argues that we should review the bankruptcy court's ruling de novo. Where a judge does not create a record or document her decision not to recuse, an appellate court conducts a de novo review. See id. at 1168 (citing United States v. Greenspan, 26 F.3d 1001, 1007 (10th Cir. 1994)). In the present case we are not convinced that the bankruptcy court failed to create a record. Indeed, the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Recuse indicates that the bankruptcy court conducted a hearing, provided the parties with an opportunity for argument, and "entered findings and conclusions on the record." See Appellant's Appendix at Ex. 1. It occurs to us that the absence of a complete record regarding the order denying the Motion to Recuse can be attributed to the parties' failure to obtain a transcript of the hearing conducted by the bankruptcy court.
In any event, we cannot say that the bankruptcy court improperly denied the Motion to Recuse under either standard of review. Armstrong argues that recusal is mandated here by 28 U.S.C. § 455, which requires federal judges to disqualify themselves in proceedings where their "impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). "The test is whether a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality." Hinman v. Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, factual allegations need not be taken as true, and the judge is not limited to the facts presented by the challenging party. See id.
Armstrong grounds his argument for recusal largely on adverse rulings he has received from the bankruptcy court in several other cases in which Armstrong has been involved. Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a recusal motion. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Moreover,
opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a [recusal] motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.
Id. We find nothing in the record before us that bespeaks of a deep-seated antagonism toward Armstrong that would cause a reasonable person to conclude that the bankruptcy court was unable to render a fair and impartial decision.
The one or two comments from the bench that are contained in the record amount to nothing more than the bankruptcy court's opinions concerning the relative merit of positions advanced by Armstrong, and those opinions appear to derive directly from the judicial proceedings in which they were voiced.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the appeal from the bankruptcy court's order dismissing the adversary proceeding is dismissed. The order of the bankruptcy court denying the Motion to Recuse is affirmed.