BONDY v. CITY OF DALLAS, (N.D.Tex. 2002)

A. JOE FISH, Chief Judge

Before the court are the motions of the plaintiffs and of the defendant for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the defendant's motion is granted, and the plaintiffs' motion is denied.

Plaintiffs Gloria Woodard ("Woodard"), Erika Anne Bondy ("Bondy"), and Stacey J. Eubanks ("Eubanks") are current or former employees of the defendant City of Dallas ("City"). Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint ("Complaint") ¶ 4. Specifically, Woodard, Bondy, and Eubanks are current or former event or senior event coordinators at the Dallas Convention Center ("DCC"). Affidavit of Norma Reed ("Reed Affidavit") ¶ 2, located in Appendix of Exhibits to Defendant City of Dallas' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant Appendix"), at 86-93. There is no substantive difference in the duties or responsibilities of an event or senior events coordinator other than the fact that the senior events coordinator is more experienced than the events coordinator. Id. Woodard, Bondy, and Eubanks each earned more than $250 per week while employed by the City. Id.

Event coordinators "advis[e] management on convention related issues, plan events, negotiat[e] event services and logistics with the client, represent the DCC and the City . . ., and promot[e] sales." Id. ¶ 4; see also Id. ¶ 18. The Dallas Convention and Visitors' Bureau disseminates information to callers regarding conventions at the DCC. Id. ¶ 3. Event coordinators do not solicit clients. Id. Rather, event coordinators negotiate services with a client prior to the client's arrival at the DCC and/or during the client's event at the DCC. Id. ¶ 4. Part of servicing a client's needs may include coordination and utilization of various City departments. Id.

Event coordinators must maintain compliance with policies and procedures, such as DCC emergency procedures (e.g., crowd management), and the City's fire, health, and safety codes. Id. ¶¶ 5-6, 17; see also Id. ¶ 22. They must "(1) know or be able to refer to numerous City of Dallas and DCC policies and procedures; (2) be able to apply those policies and procedures to a wide variety of factual situations; (3) negotiate modifications to clients' wishes so they comply with applicable policies and procedures; and (4) enforce restrictions found in the policies and procedures." Id. ¶ 5; see also Id. ¶¶ 16, 18. If a client requests something which is contrary to DCC's applicable policies and procedures, an event coordinator may seek supervisory approval for a waiver or modification of the policy or procedure in question. Id. ¶ 7. If the event coordinator's request is denied, the event coordinator must work with the client to reach a result which complies with the DCC and City guidelines. Id.; see also id. ¶ 16. These negotiations generally are performed without supervisory review. Id. ¶ 7.

Event coordinators are required to participate in weekly staff meetings regarding upcoming events at the DCC. Id. ¶ 4. Possible recommendations by event coordinators to management include: "(1) show assignments; (2) whether a show should be canceled due to non-payment by the client or its failure to produce required pre-show documentation; (3) the waiver or modification of policies and procedures as they apply to particular situations; (4) the waiver of post-event fees for certain clients or in certain situations; (5) general revisions to DCC procedures as they relate to the planning and presentation of events, and (6) staffing requirements for particular events." Id. ¶ 20.

Approximately four to six weeks before an event will occur at the DCC, the client sends an event coordinator a three ring binder which contains all of information pertinent to the DCC event. Id. ¶ 9. The event coordinator analyzes the binder to ensure that the client will comply with all DCC and City policies and procedures. Id. The event coordinator also condenses the client's binder into DCC format. Id. ¶ 10; see also Affidavit of Patsy Brooks ("Brooks Affidavit") ¶ 10, located in Defendant Appendix at 105-08; Affidavit of Gloria Lopez ("Lopez Affidavit") ¶ 10, located in Defendant Appendix at 109-12; Affidavit of George Shaw ("Shaw Affidavit") ¶ 10, located in Defendant Appendix at 113-16; Affidavit of Phillip Holmes ("Holmes Affidavit") ¶ 10, located in Defendant Appendix at 117-20; Affidavit of Sandra Franklin ("Franklin Affidavit") ¶ 10, located in Defendant Appendix at 121-24. The event coordinator distributes her condensed information to management and all trades and craft people who will construct and present the show. Reed Affidavit ¶ 10. In addition to information regarding a construction schedule, the condensed material evaluates work scope requirements, assigns priorities to tasks, and identifies necessary City personnel and outside vendors. Id. ¶ 11; see also Brooks Affidavit ¶ 11; Lopez Affidavit ¶ 11; Shaw Affidavit ¶ 11; Holmes Affidavit ¶ 11; Franklin Affidavit ¶ 11. Persons receiving this information contact the event coordinator with any questions. Reed Affidavit ¶ 11.

The event coordinator must determine that all of the necessary paperwork is in order, and that the client makes the applicable pre-payment before the event's scheduled date at the DCC. Id. ¶ 12. An event coordinator has the discretion to cancel an event due to a client's failure to timely complete paperwork or make a prepayment. Id.

The event coordinator oversees the construction and set up of the event. Id. In this capacity, an event coordinator ensures compliance with DCC and City policies and procedures and satisfaction of the client's requirements. Id. During a show at the DCC, the event coordinator monitors all aspects of the event. Id. ¶ 13. According to Norma Reed, event coordinator supervisor for the DCC, "[n]o two events are exactly alike, nor is any event trouble-free." Id. An event coordinator must resolve a problem "in a matter of moments without immediate supervision or direction." Id.

After a show, an event coordinator must compile worksheet invoices to determine how much a client owes the DCC. Id. ¶ 14. Event coordinators must make a recommendation in the event that a fee is waived due to a problem with the event. Id.

In this case, the plaintiffs seek compensation, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., for overtime hours of work for which the City has allegedly failed to properly compensate them. Complaint ¶¶ 4, 5.

A. Evidentiary Burdens on Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence on file show that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The movant makes such a showing by informing the court of the basis of its motion and by identifying the portions of the record which reveal there are no genuine material fact issues. See Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant makes this showing, the nonmovants must then direct the court's attention to evidence in the record sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 323-24. To carry this burden, the opponents must do more than simply show some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, they must show that the evidence is sufficient to support a resolution of the factual issue in their favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. All of the evidence must be viewed, however, in a light most favorable to the motion's opponents. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)).

The FLSA provides that "no employer shall employ any of his employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed." 29 U.S.C. § 207 (a)(1). Exempt from the FLSA, however, are individuals "employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity." Id. § 213(a)(1). This exemption shall apply to any bona fide administrative employee

(a) [w]hose primary duty consists of either:

(1) The performance of office or nonmanual work directly related to management policies or general business operations of his employer or his employer's customers, . . .; and

(b) Who customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent judgment; and

(c)(1) Who regularly and directly assists a proprietor, or an employee employed in a bona fide executive or administrative capacity . . ., or

(2) Who performs under only general supervision work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training, experience, or knowledge, or

(3) Who executes under only general supervision special assignments and tasks; and

(d) Who does not devote more than 20 percent, or, in the case of an employee of a retail or service establishment who does not devote as much as 40 percent, of his hours worked in the workweek to activities which are not directly and closely related to the performance of the work described in paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section; and

(e)(1) Who is compensated for his services on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than $155 per week . . .

The court must determine whether an employee is exempt from the FLSA's overtime compensation provisions — a determination that is a question of law for the judge, not of fact for the jury. See Lott v. Howard Wilson Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 203 F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 2000). The employer has the burden to prove that an employee is exempt under the FLSA, and that exemption is construed narrowly against the employer. Tyler v. Union Oil Company of California, 304 F.3d 379, 402 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Dalheim v. KDFW-TV, 918 F.2d 1220, 1224 (5th Cir. 1990)); see also Vela v. City of Houston, 276 F.3d 659, 666 (5th Cir. 2001); Samson v. Apollo Resources, Inc., 242 F.3d 629, 636 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___. 122 S.Ct. 63 (2001).

To determine whether an employee falls within an FSLA exemption in the instant case, both sides agree that the court should analyze the plaintiffs' jobs under the "short test." See Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Their Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs' Response") at 3; City's Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Motion") at 2. The "short test" is used for employees earning more than $250 per week. Under the "short test," an administrative employee may be exempt under the FLSA if: "(1) the employee has a salary of more than $250 per week; (2) the employee's primary duty is performing office work or nonmanual work directly related to management policies or general business operations; and (3) the employee exercises discretion and independent judgment." Heidtman v. County of El Paso, 171 F.3d 1038, 1041 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Lott, 203 F.3d at 331.

The City contends that the plaintiffs were exempt employees under the FSLA and thus not entitled to overtime pay. City's Second Amended Answer, Jury Demand and Affirmative Defenses ("Answer") ¶ 4. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, maintain that the City violated the FLSA by failing to provide them with overtime compensation. Complaint ¶ 5. The plaintiffs assert that they were required to account for their time and are required to work overtime. Complaint ¶ 4.

Woodard, Bondy, and Eubanks each received a salary of more than $250 per week; primarily performed nonmanual work directly related to management policies or general business operations, and routinely exercised discretion and independent judgment. Thus, the court concludes that the City has met its burden of showing that the work performed by Woodard, Bondy, and Eubanks as event coordinators is exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. Accordingly, the City is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs's FLSA claim.

For the reasons stated, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.