NANETTE LAUGHREY, District Judge
Pending before the Court is the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 40]. For the reasons stated below, the Motion will be denied in part and granted in part.
I. Factual Background
Solely for the purpose of the Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion, the Court views the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, accepting as true Plaintiff Mary Meyer's ("Meyer") version of the facts when they are disputed.
Meyer is suing Midland Printing Company ("Midland Printing") seeking damages for sexual harassment allegedly experienced by Meyer during the course of her employment with Midland Printing.
Bobby Smith is currently the President of Midland Printing. Bobby Smith's son, Barry Smith, is currently the Vice President of Midland Printing. Mary Meyer worked at Midland Printing for approximately one year beginning in January 1991. She was rehired on a full time basis in February 2000. While employed at Midland, Meyer's supervisors were Bobby Smith, Barry Smith, and a female, Marcia Simons ("Simons"). Simons is the assistant manager at Midland Printing. Another employee, Tim Thomlinson ("Thomlinson"), was a press operator while Meyer worked at Midland. Meyer and Thomlinson began a romantic relationship in the summer of 2000 and in November 2000 they were sharing a home.
Midland Printing does not have a written sexual harassment policy. An employee could make complaints to Barry Smith, Marcia Simons, Bobby Smith, or Kristin Hess. (Barry Smith Dep. at 52-53; 55; Bobby Smith Dep. at 47.)
A. The "Screwdriver" Comment
At the end of a workday on a Friday afternoon in late October or early November 2000, Bobby Smith asked Thomlinson if a power screwdriver was what his girlfriend used to satisfy herself while he was out deer hunting. Meyer was present when the comment was made, as were two co-workers, John Mullis and Kristin Hess. (Meyer Dep. at 80-81; Ex. 26; Bobby Smith Dep. at 17-18.) The screwdriver comment made by Bobby Smith was a reference of a joke told by a former female employee of Midland Printing. (Bobby Smith Dep. at 8-10.) After Bobby Smith made the screwdriver comment, Meyer said nothing to him. Although Meyer found the comment offensive and believed it to be the worst thing she had experienced at Midland Printing, she did not complain to Bobby Smith, Barry Smith, or Simons about this comment at any time while she worked at Midland Printing. (Meyer Dep. at 82-83, 89-90, 90-91.)
All exhibits are the Defendant's.
At Midland Printing's Christmas party in December 2000, Bobby Smith, who had been sitting with Thomlinson and Meyer for several hours, told them that he was just joking when he made the screwdriver comment. While Bobby Smith considered this an apology, Meyer did not consider this to be an apology and said nothing in response. (Meyer Dep. at 84-87, 88, 91-92; Bobby Smith Dep. at 14.)
B. The Yearbook Picture
In June 2000, Meyer was working on a Saturday while Barry Smith and another co-worker, Rusty Bain ("Bain"), were working on a yearbook job at the press machine. (Meyer Dep. at 92-97.) Barry Smith and Bain began laughing and when Meyer looked over, Barry Smith told her to come here. When Meyer walked over to the press, Barry Smith said, "Look what this school put in their yearbook." Meyer was then shown a picture on a yearbook page on which Barry Smith had drawn male genitalia. (Meyer Dep. at 93-94.) When Meyer was shown the picture, she responded by saying, "Oh, my gosh. They really didn't do that, did they?" Barry Smith then told Meyer he was only joking with her. Meyer did not offer any response other than shaking her head and walking away, and she ignored Barry Smith and Bain after the incident. (Meyer Dep. at 94-95.) The only person Meyer told about the yearbook picture incident was Thomlinson. (Meyer Dep. at 95.)
C. The Posters
Several sexually explicit posters featuring women were displayed throughout Midland Printing. While none of the posters were in Meyer's work area, they were posted in the press area, a place Meyer frequently entered. Some posters were displayed in the press room, described as "ink posters." (Ex. 9.) Meyer first noticed these posters only after she had worked at Midland Printing on a full-time basis for a month or two. (Meyer Dep. at 119-21.) There is another poster at a work station, the owner of the poster is unclear. (Ex. 10.) Also, Cliff Houston had posters posted in the press room near his work space. (Ex. 11.) Meyer noticed these posters a few months after returning to work at Midland. Houston was fired in April or May 2000, and Thomlinson gathered Houston's belongings from Midland Printing, including these two posters. Thomlinson stored the posters at his home and moved them when he and Meyer moved together. Thomlinson never returned the posters to Houston, instead he kept the posters at their home until Meyer gave them to her attorney for this lawsuit.
At one point, when Tom Ross ("Ross"), the shop foreman for a short time, asked Meyer during lunch if there was anything she would like to change, Meyer responded by saying, "that, you know, the girly pictures, it would be nice if they would be taken down, you know, at least some of them, the worst ones." Meyer made no other complaints to Ross regarding things that she thought created a sexually hostile work environment. (Meyer Dep. at 43, 109, 113, 122-23, 127, 134-35.) A couple of months after this exchange, Ross took down "some of the worst" ink posters and the one poster in Bain's work area. (Houston's posters had already been removed by Thomlinson.) However, in the next day or two, the poster were back up upon Barry Smith's instructions. According to Ross, Barry Smith told him he did not care who the posters offended. (Meyer Dep. at 111, 131-32; Ex. 18.)
D. Co-Worker Finley
Meyer worked in the pre-press room at Midland Printing along with Mike Finley ("Finley"). Meyer asserts that Finley constantly brought up Thomlinson and her relationship with him, that he called her at home and left a message stating that he cared for her, and that Finley told her that he had a "wet dream." (Meyer Dep. at 101-02.)
Finley did not go into specifics about the dream and did not say anything that led Meyer to believe the dream was about her. (Meyer Dep. at 102-03.) Meyer did not report the comment to anyone in management or in a supervisory position. (Meyer Dep. at 102-03, 198-99, 203.) Finley had a drinking problem and at times would show up to work drunk. Finley attempted rehabilitation in the fall of 2000. When he returned, he began drinking again and the relationship between Meyer and Finley deteriorated. Meyer believed the situation with Finley caused her stress, loss of sleep and stomach pain. (Meyer Dep. at 59-63, 206-07.) When Meyer reported to Barry Smith or Simons that Finley was intoxicated, either Barry Smith or Simons would send him home after confirming that he had been drinking or was intoxicated. Meyer believes that "once or twice" Finley was not sent home after she reported her suspicions to Simons or Barry Smith. (Meyer Dep. at 63-65, 198; Barry Smith Dep. at 55-56.)
E. Thomlinson's Termination
Barry Smith fired Thomlinson on January 11, 2001, for derogatory comments Thomlinson had made about Midland Printing. At that time, Thomlinson told Barry Smith that he "had a lot of growing up to do" and that "when he had something legitimate to discipline me with to call me and I would come back." (Thomlinson Dep. at 41-42, 45-46; Meyer Dep. at 12, 13; Ex. 24; Barry Smith Dep. at 60.) F. Meyer's Resignation
Because she "felt like something was going to happen" as a result of Finley's coming to work intoxicated and his leaving the one telephone message for her, Meyer had been thinking about quitting for months and already had taken some of her personal belongings home. (Meyer Dep. at 53, 57-58.) Meyer had told Finley that if Thomlinson was "fired unjustly," Meyer did not feel like she could stay at Midland Printing, and she had told Thomlinson that if he got fired, she was going to quit. In this conversation, Meyer told Thomlinson her biggest apprehension about remaining at work was that the "situation" with Finley was never going to be "rectified." (Meyer Dep. at 175-76; Ex. 26; Thomlinson Dep. at 62-63.)
On January 11, 2001, Meyer decided that today was "probably going to be it, specially that morning." Finley arrived at work drunk that morning, and after being told to go home by management, had gathered up some work to take home. Meyer alleges that on his way out, Finley threw "work" at her and stated that he would not be back until she and Thomlinson were gone. (Meyer Dep. at 53; Ex. 26.)
When Thomlinson went back to the press room after he had been fired by Barry Smith, he told Meyer that he had been fired and her reply was "something to the effect that she wasn't very happy about it." While Thomlinson told his co-workers good-bye, Meyer quit her job. (Thomlinson Dep. at 48-51.) After Thomlinson was fired, Meyer immediately went up to Barry Smith, gave him her key and told him that she would not be working there anymore. Meyer then told Barry Smith that he could "have Mike [Finley] back" and walked out of the office, got her stuff and left. Meyer and Thomlinson left together. (Meyer Dep. at 51-53, 54; Thomlinson Dep. at 50.) On that day, Simons, who maintained the personnel files at Midland Printing, recorded in Meyer's personnel file that when Meyer handed in her key, she stated, "You get mine, too." (Simons Dep. at 42, 55; Ex. 14.)
On their way home from Midland Printing on January 11, 2001, Thomlinson and Meyer discussed the lack of regard that Midland Printing management had for its employees. As they traveled home, Meyer told Thomlinson why she had quit:
Q: Do you remember anything Mary told you that on the way home or that evening about Midland Printing or about quitting or anything of that nature? A: Well, she told me she had quit because there was no way — she felt there was
no way she could remain there and work and feel safe working there because she knew Mike Finley would be returning.
Q: And you wouldn't be there to protect her?
A: So to speak. And she said without my presence there and stuff she just strictly did not feel safe working in that environment any longer.
(Thomlinson Dep. at 51-52.)
On January 11, 2001, immediately after Thomlinson was fired and Meyer quit her job, Meyer and Thomlinson both filed grievances with the Union related to the end of their employment at Midland Printing. (Meyer Dep. at 20-21, 135-36, 144, 147.) Where instructed on the grievance form to "[s]tate the exact nature of your complaint," Meyer identified two complaints — Mike Finley coming to work drunk and the screwdriver comment. Many current and former employees gave statements in regard to the grievance filed with the Union. On her grievance form, Meyer requested reinstatement and back pay for lost time. Six days after she resigned, on January 17, 2001, Midland Printing offered Meyer her reinstatement and back pay. Midland Printing agreed to Meyer's request to leave the offer open for one week so she could speak with counsel. Meyer never responded to Midland Printing's offer. (Ex. 15; Ex. 28; Meyer Dep. at 225-26; Bobby Smith Dep. at 65-66.)
II. Summary Judgment Standard
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A defendant who moves for summary judgment bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must scrutinize the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and the nonmoving party "must be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences." Mirax Chem. Prods. Corp. v. First Interstate Commercial Corp., 950 F.2d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). The main purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to identify factually unsupported claims. If a plaintiff has the burden of proof at trial on a claim and the defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must identify admissible evidence sufficient to make a submissible case at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). If the plaintiff cannot identify such facts, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 884 (1990) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)).
To establish a genuine issue of fact sufficient to warrant trial, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the nonmoving party bears the burden of setting forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
III. Discussion
A. Hostile Work Environment
In her complaint, Meyer alleges hostile work environment sexual harassment in violation of Title VII and the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"). Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of, among other things, the individual's sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
"Our analysis is the same for both the state and federal claims because decisions under the various federal employment discrimination statutes are applicable and authoritative under the Missouri Human Rights Act as well as federal law." Finley v. Empiregas, Inc. of Potosi, 975 F.2d 467, 473 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Meyer's claim of hostile work environment against the Defendant requires her to prove each of the following elements: (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the existence of a causal nexus between the harassment and her protected group status; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) her employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper action. Palesch v. Missouri Comm'n on Human Rights, 233 F.3d 560, 566 (8th Cir. 2000).
The fifth element applies to allegations of non-supervisory harassment, but not to allegations of supervisory harassment. See Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir. 1999). Thus, to the extent Meyer claims harassment by her supervisors, she need not prove her employer knew or should have known of the harassment.
For the harassment to be hostile work environment, the harassment must have been both objectively and subjectively offensive, so that a reasonable person would consider the conduct hostile or abusive. Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher and Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1158 (8th Cir. 1999)). Conduct is actionable if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (internal quotation omitted). Factors relevant to determining whether conduct rises to the level of sexual harassment in violation of the equal protection clause include: (1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) its severity; (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or merely an offensive utterance; and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. Howard v. Burns Bros., Inc., 149 F.3d 835, 840 (8th Cir. 1998). The standards for judging the hostility of the working environment must be sufficiently demanding to "filter out complaints attacking the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998) (internal quotation omitted). The evidence must establish more than a few isolated incidents, and there must be proof that the alleged harassing conduct "was so intimidating, offensive, or hostile that it `poisoned the work environment.'" Scusa, 181 F.3d at 967 (citing Scott v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 798 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir. 1986)).
1. Actions "Based on Sex"
The Defendant argues that certain complained of actions were not based upon Meyer's sex. For instance, Meyer claims that Finley regularly came to work drunk; however, Meyer does not explain why this conduct created a sexually hostile work environment; i.e., conduct or harassment directed at her because of her sex. See Duggins ex rel. Duggins v. Steak'N Shake, Inc., 3 Fed. Appx. 302, 2001 WL 92166 (6th Cir. Jan. 26, 2001) (drinking by a co-worker does not constitute harassment "based upon plaintiff's sex"). Meyer does not claim she was treated differently than anyone else with regard to Finley's intoxication, nor does she claim management unfairly subjected her to this conduct. Finley was almost always sent home if she reported his condition to Simons or Barry Smith. Meyer also claims that the incident in which Finley allegedly threw a folder at her on her last day of employment supports her claim that she was subjected to a hostile work environment, yet this incident was not reported, and there is no evidence suggesting it occurred because of Meyer's sex. Rather the evidence suggests this was due to a deteriorating relationship caused by Finley's drinking and Meyer's complaints about his drinking. Even if Meyer felt physically threatened by Finley, she never told anyone at Midland Printing about this fear or that it was based on her sex. Finally, Meyer relies upon evidence that Barry Smith talked about his bowel movements on his way to the bathroom in her work area as evidence of sexual harassment. While this comment is crass, it does not appear to be sexual nor directed at Meyer because of her gender. Thus, the Court will not consider Finley's drunkenness or Barry Smith's comments about his bowels as part of the environment alleged to be sexual harassment.
2. Severe and Pervasive
Meyer argues that she endured severe and pervasive harassment that rendered her work environment hostile and abusive under both a subjective and objective standard, thereby altering a term or condition of her employment. Meyer points to the following actions: (1) about every other week for about a year, the Vice President and other male co-workers would tell dirty and off-color jokes in Plaintiff's work area; (2) sexually explicit posters hung in the print area at Midland, an area which Meyer frequented. At one point, after Tom Ross, the shop foreman, removed some of the pictures, Barry Smith rehung the posters. Barry Smith stated at this time that he did not care who the sexually explicit posters offended; (3) Finley, her co-worker, initiated detailed conversations with Meyer focusing on her relationship with her boyfriend. Finley also left a phone message at Meyer's home stating that he cared for her, mentioned his wet dream and discussed Meyer's relationship with Thomlinson; (4) in June 2000, Barry Smith showed Meyer a picture of male genitalia that he had drawn on a yearbook page; and (5) in late October 2000, the President of Midland, Bob Smith made the vulgar comment about the screwdriver. This comment was said in the presence of several Midland employees and Meyer.
Meyer argues that these episodes started at the beginning of her full-time employment with the Defendant and continued throughout her employment. Meyer argues that these actions, both separately and in the aggregate, caused her stress at work, with physical and psychological manifestations.
Given this record, there is a genuine issue of material fact about whether Meyer was subjected to a hostile work environment. Meyer stated multiple times in her deposition that the incidents she endured caused her a great deal of stress at work, resulting in physical manifestations of her stress, as well as psychological problems. Moreover, Meyer need not show that they "cause[d] a tangible psychological injury" to succeed on her claim. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. Even conduct that "does not seriously affect employees' psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees' job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing their careers." Id. The alteration in the terms or conditions of her employment was that Meyer was forced to work in an environment with a co-worker who initiated conversation focused on her boyfriend, wet dreams and his affection for her; a Vice President who was constantly making dirty or off-color jokes in Meyer's presence; sexually explicit posters of scantily clad women in the print area; and an owner and President of the company, Bob Smith, who made a comment about Meyer using a screwdriver while her boyfriend was deer hunting.
The complained of conduct was frequent — every day Meyer had in her work area inappropriate posters that the President and Vice President knew of and allowed to stay and every few weeks Meyer was subjected to off-color and dirty jokes from the Vice President. While the conduct did not appear to unreasonably interfere with Meyer's work performance, it was severe and frequent. The facts that Meyer adduced would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the conditions of her employment were altered by the harassment. The Court denies the Defendant's request for summary judgment as to this claim.
B. Constructive Discharge
The Defendant argues that Meyer's claim of constructive discharge fails as a matter of law based upon the undisputed facts. Constructive discharge occurs "when an employer deliberately renders the employee's working conditions intolerable and thus forces [her] to quit [her] job." Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981); see also Bergstrom-Ek v. Best Oil Co., 153 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 1998). Generally, to prove a claim for constructive discharge, the plaintiff must show that the employer's actions were intended to force the employee to quit, "meaning that the employee's resignation must be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the employer's discriminatory actions." Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 156 F.3d 884, 890 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Allen v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 81 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 1996)); see also Tidwell v. Meyer's Bakeries, Inc., 93 F.3d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 1996) ("To constitute a constructive discharge, the employer must deliberately create intolerable working conditions with the intention of forcing the employee to quit and the employee must quit."). In addition, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a reasonable person would find the working conditions intolerable. Phillips, 156 F.3d at 890. Whether working conditions are intolerable is judged by an objective standard, not the plaintiff's subjective feelings. Id. Finally, for an action to be reasonable, "an employee has an obligation not to assume the worst and not to jump to conclusions too quickly. An employee who quits without giving [her] employer a reasonable chance to work out a problem has not been constructively discharged." Tidwell, 93 F.3d at 494 (citations omitted).
Meyer asserts that her working conditions in the aggregate were so intolerable that she was forced to quit. (Meyer Dep. at 51, 63, 177.) However, the Court finds that no reasonable jury could conclude that she was constructively discharged based on this record.
First, Meyer continued to work for over two months after she says her working conditions were intolerable. In late October or early November, Bobby Smith made his inappropriate screwdriver comment. (Meyer Dep. at 80-81; Bobby Smith Dep. at 17-18.) This comment was the worst thing she had experienced and was allegedly the last straw. Yet, Meyer continued to work and perform her duties for at least two months. She quit on January 11, 2001. If things were objectively intolerable at that moment as Meyer claims and she had no option other than resigning, she would have quit soon after the incident. However, Meyer says that she had been thinking about quitting for months prior to January 11, 2001. She had already taken home some of her personal belongings. (Meyer Dep. at 53-57.) Meyer had been waiting to quit until she found other work. (Meyer Dep. at 53, 230.) While the Court acknowledges that it may be better to stay in a position while looking for other work, the fact that Meyer remained in her position for months does not suggest that the working conditions were intolerable based upon an objective standard. The work environment had not become poisoned to the extent that Meyer was forced to terminate her employment, since she continued her employment for months after the worst incident. Meyer's dissatisfaction with her work environment is not enough to establish a constructive discharge. Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 935-36 (8th Cir. 2002).
Second, the timing of her departure suggests that she did not quit because of a sexually hostile environment. On January 11, 2001, Barry Smith fired Thomlinson for derogatory comments Thomlinson had made about Midland. (Ex. 13.) After this, Thomlinson went back to the press room and told Meyer that he had been fired. She replied that she was not happy about this. (Thomlinson Dep. at 48.) Meyer immediately went to talk with Barry Smith. She quit her job, giving Barry Smith her key and telling him that she would not be working there anymore. Meyer then told Barry Smith that he could "have Mike [Finely] back" and walked out of the office, got her stuff, and left. Meyer and Thomlinson left together. (Meyer Dep. at 51-54; Thomlinson Dep. at 50.) Simons, who maintained the personnel files at Midland, recorded in Meyer's personnel file that when Meyer handed in her key, she stated, "You get mine, too." (Simons Dep. at 42, 55.) Earlier, Meyer had told Finley that if Thomlinson was "fired unjustly," Meyer did not feel like she could stay at Midland. She had told Thomlinson that if he got fired, she was going to quit. (Meyer Dep. at 175-76; Thomlinson Dep. at 62-63.) Moreover, on the way home on January 11, 2001, with Thomlinson, Meyer did not mention the posters, the jokes, the yearbook picture, or the screwdriver comment. These actions suggest that Meyer was not forced to resign based upon a sexually hostile environment, rather, she resigned because Thomlinson was terminated.
Third, even if her resignation was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of a hostile environment, Meyer did not give the Defendant a reasonable opportunity to fix the situation. Before quitting, Meyer never filed a written complaint with the Defendant or the Union. She never complained to the Union in anyway until after her resignation.
The Defendant had no written sexual harassment policy that gave guidance to Meyer about to whom she could complain; however, she could have complained to Bobby Smith, Barry Smith, Marcia Simons, or Kristin Hess. (Barry Smith Dep. at 52-55; Bobby Smith Dep. at 68-69.) Since the Smiths were part of the alleged sexually hostile environment, complaining to either of them would have been difficult. However, Meyer never complained to Marcia Simons, the assistant manager at Midland. Meyer complained to Simons about Finley being drunk at work and thought Simons took her complaints seriously. When Meyer complained about Finley being drunk at work, Finley was sent home.
The only person Meyer complained to about the sexually hostile environment was Ross, the shop foreman for a short period of time. Ross asked Meyer at lunch if there was anything she would like to change. Meyer responded by saying, "[Y]ou know, the girly pictures, it would be nice if they would be taken down, you know, at least some of them, the worst ones." (Meyer Dep. at 190.) After each of the other incidents, Meyer did not complain to anyone employed by the Defendant, with the exception of her boyfriend, Thomlinson.
In Duncan v. General Motors, 300 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2002), discussing the constructive discharge claim, the employee-plaintiff claimed that she complained "to anyone who would listen to her" about the behavior of her supervisor, Booth. Id. at 932. She reported Booth's alleged harassment to a union official and a United Auto Workers local chairman. Id. On their advice, she then met with the personnel director for General Motors. Id. The personnel director passed on her allegations to the EEO Coordinator, who met with her and asked her to prepare a written statement recounting the alleged incidents with Booth. Id. She agreed. Id. In the meantime, the EEO Coordinator prepared a list of suggested corrective action for General Motors to initiate. Id. at 932-33. But the employee changed her mind and resigned prior to submitting her written allegations and prior to General Motors being able to initiate any of the recommended corrective actions. Id. The jury found in favor of the employee on her constructive discharge claim, and awarded her $300,000 in emotional distress damages. Id. at 930-31. But the Eighth Circuit reversed the verdict because the employee quit without giving General Motors a reasonable chance to work out her problems. Id. at 936. The employee, the Eighth Circuit stated, "could have taken steps short of resignation to improve her working conditions, but she declined to do so." Id. The Eighth Circuit also found that she failed, as a matter of law, to show that a reasonable person would find her working conditions so objectively intolerable and extraordinary that the person would have no choice but to resign. Id.
Here, Meyer failed to complain to the Union and only complained once about one aspect of what she now claims to be a situation so intolerable to cause her constructive discharge. In contrast, Duncan complained to anyone that would listen, including two union officials, the personnel director, and the EEO coordinator, but the Eighth Circuit found that she still had not given the defendant a reasonable opportunity to correct the situation. Having considered the parties' arguments and the record, the Court concludes as a matter of law that Meyer has failed to produce sufficient evidence of constructive discharge in response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Thus, the Court will grant the Defendant's request for summary judgment as to Meyer's constructive discharge claim.
IV. Conclusion Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 40] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. As to Meyer's sexual hostile environment claim, the Court denies the Defendant's motion. As to Meyer's constructive discharge claim, the Court grants the Defendant's motion.