REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA v. KLOBUCHAR, (D.Minn. 2003)

DONOVAN W. FRANK, District Judge

Introduction

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the undersigned United States District Judge on May 2, 2003, pursuant to Defendants' motions to dismiss all counts of Plaintiff's Complaint based upon principles of standing, ripeness, Younger abstention, Pullman abstention, and under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motions are granted.

Background

This case arises out of a constitutional challenge by the Republican Party of Minnesota, Third Congressional District (the "Party") to the enforcement of Minnesota Statute § 211B.06. Specifically, the case stems from the Party's challenge to the criminal prosecution of John Knight, a Party-endorsed candidate for Hennepin County Commissioner, District 6, who was charged under section 211B.06 with making a false campaign statement in fall 2002.

The Party's territory encompasses Hennepin County District Number 6. "Membership" in the Party is defined as "all voters of the Third Congressional District who desire to support the objectives of the Republican Party." (Id. at Art. III.) The objectives of the Party, as stated in the Party's Constitution, are defined as follows:

1. Further the principles of the Republican Party within the Third Congressional District.

2. Manage the affairs of the Party within the District.

3. Expand membership and participation within the Party.

4. To elect Republicans to federal, state and local office.

(See First Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Art. II.) The Party's First Amended Complaint concedes that Minnesota citizens do not register with a party. (First Amended Complaint at 6 12.) In addition, the Party asserts that "[n]either the Party or the Republican Party of Minnesota maintains a membership roll." (Id.) Moreover, the Party's Constitution does not provide for any removal mechanism for members, other than for members of its Executive Committee. (Id. at Art. III, § 6A.)

In June 2002, the Party endorsed John Knight over Linda Koblick and Ed Oliver as the Party's candidate for the non-partisan position of Hennepin County Commissioner, District 6. Despite failing to garner the Party's nomination, Koblick remained in the primary race scheduled for September 10, 2002. According to the Party's Complaint, Koblick's decision to remain in the race against the Party-endorsed candidate "may have affected her qualification as a member under the definition provided in the Party's Constitution." (First Amended Complaint at ¶ 15 (Emphasis supplied).) However, according to Koblick, she was still a Republican, as she had been a long-standing member of the Republican Party of Minnesota and involved in Party leadership for over a decade. (See Aff. of James P. Jacobsen, Ex. B.)

This matter arose specifically when Koblick was made aware of scripted telephone calls that were being made to voters on John Knight's behalf that, according to the Party's Complaint, stated as follows:

Hello. I'm calling to ask you to vote for John Knight on Tuesday, September 10th. John Knight is the Republican endorsed candidate for Hennepin County Commissioner. Remember, John Knight is the only Republican candidate for County Commissioner and he needs your vote on September 10th. Thank you. Good-bye.

(Emphasis supplied.) Koblick took issue with the statement that John Knight was the "only Republican candidate," since she still considered herself a Republican. On September 5, 2002, Koblick sent an email complaint to the Hennepin County Attorney's Office regarding these calls. Koblick's email complaint stated that she was a candidate for the Hennepin County Board, that she was a Republican, and that she had been in party leadership for over a decade. The email also stated that John Knight was aware of her status as a Republican, as she had been chair of the Party when John Knight was elected vice chair. Koblick requested that the Hennepin County Attorney's Office advise her as to what steps could be taken to "ensure this does not continue."

The following day, the Hennepin County Attorney's Office referred the complaint to the Carver County Attorney, Defendant Michael Fahey, due to the close relationship between the Hennepin County Attorney's Office and the Hennepin County Commissioners. This referral was made pursuant to an agreement among several metro area counties whereby another county's attorney would provide independent assistance when a conflict of interest arose. Because Carver County did not have an investigator, however, Fahey requested the services of the Hennepin County Attorney Office's investigator, Michael Atkinson. Atkinson handled the investigation under Fahey's direction and did not consult any member of the Hennepin County Attorney's Office regarding the substance of the investigation.

Fahey presented the results of the investigation to a Hennepin County Grand Jury on January 9, 2003. The Grand Jury issued a four-count indictment against John Knight for violating Minnesota Statute § 211B.06. Section 211B.06 states, in part, as follows:

Subdivision 1. Gross misdemeanor. A person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor who intentionally participates in the preparation, dissemination, or broadcast of paid political advertising or campaign material with respect to the personal or political character or acts of a candidate, or with respect to the effect of a ballot question, that is designed or tends to elect, injure, promote, or defeat a candidate for nomination or election to a public office or to promote or defeat a ballot question, that is false, and that the person knows is false or communicates to others with reckless disregard of whether it is false.

Minn. Stat. § 211B.06, subd. 1 (2002). On February 7, 2003, the indictment was dismissed and substituted with a complaint.

Two separate challenges have been brought regarding this investigation and the gross misdemeanor charges that were brought against John Knight. First, on January 24, 2003, John Knight filed a motion to dismiss the indictment in Hennepin County court, arguing that section 211B.06 is unconstitutional. By an Order and Memorandum dated March 12, 2003, the State of Minnesota District Court, Hennepin County (Dickstein, J.), denied John Knight's motion to dismiss. Second, on January 30, 2003, this federal lawsuit was filed by the Party "on behalf of John Knight and its other members" regarding the facial and as-applied constitutionality of section 211B.06.

Count I of the Party's First Amended Complaint asserts that Hennepin County Attorney Amy Klobuchar and Carver County Attorney Michael Fahey, in their official capacities, have violated the Party's First Amendment "freedom of association rights to determine membership requirements and define what a Republican is" by enforcing section 211B.06. Count II asserts that by prosecuting John Knight for making a false campaign statement, Klobuchar and Fahey are chilling Party members' and candidates' free speech rights to declare "who is and who isn't a Republican." Count III asserts that section 211B.06 is facially unconstitutional. Count IV asserts that statements made by counsel after this case was filed have resulted in "continued intimidation" on the part of the county attorneys that has further chilled Party members' free speech and left them in fear of prosecution.

Defendants Amy Klobuchar and Michael Fahey have brought their motions to dismiss on various grounds: (1) standing; (2) ripeness; (3) Younger abstention; (4) Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (5) Pullman abstention.

Discussion

I. Standing

Defendants have challenged this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), may challenge the plaintiff's complaint either on its face or on the factual truthfulness of its averments. See Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993); Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1990). Here, insofar as Defendants' motions to dismiss challenge the Party's Complaint for lack of standing and ripeness, Klobuchar and Fahey have raised factual challenges to the Party's subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, as to these challenges, the court may consider matters outside the pleadings and the non-moving party does not benefit from the safeguards of Rule 12(b)(6). See Titus, 4 F.3d at 593; Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729, n. 6. "In short, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims. Moreover, the plaintiff will have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist." Osborn, 918 F.2d at 730.

Article III of the Constitution allows for federal courts to "adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies." Nat'l Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Connor, 323 F.3d 684, 689 (8th Cir. 2003), citing Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). Thus, a plaintiff must establish that it has standing in order to sue. To satisfy the Article III standing requirements, a plaintiff must demonstrate: "(1) it has suffered an `injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Friends of the Earth, Inc., v. Laidlaw Environmental Serv. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000), citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). For an association to bring a suit on behalf of its members, additional requirements must be met: "its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Id. at 181, citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).

The Party has brought this action "on behalf of John Knight and its other members" asserting that Fahey's and Klobuchar's criminal prosecution of John Knight "has chilled member-candidates and other members from participating in Party discussions defining membership requirements, what Republicans should be and who is a Republican for the 2004 and 2006 elections." (See First Amended Complaint at ¶ 22.) The Party raises four constitutional challenges to section 211B.06 and its enforcement. First, the Party asserts an as-applied claim that Klobuchar and Fahey are violating the Party's freedom of association rights to determine membership requirements and to define what a Republican is. The Party contends that by prosecuting John Knight under section 211B.06, that Klobuchar and Fahey "and future similar investigations and prosecutions" are chilling Party members from discussing such membership matters. Second, the Party asserts an as-applied claim that by enforcing section 211B.06, Klobuchar and Fahey are violating the Party's free speech rights to declare whether a person is or is not a Republican. Third, the Party claims that Minnesota Statute § 211B.06 is facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits free exchange from candidates regarding their views on Party membership. The Party asserts that section 211B.06 is unconstitutional because it allows for liability based upon an accused's "reckless disregard" of whether a statement is false. Finally, the Party alleges that comments made by Defendants' counsel following the filing of the Party's initial complaint in the matter resulted in a claim for "continued intimidation" because of a chilling effect on Party members' First Amendment rights to discuss membership matters. As such, the Court will construe this previously unrecognized cause of action as another as-applied challenge to section 211B.06.

A. The As-Applied Challenges

The Party asserts that the prosecution of John Knight and "future similar investigations and prosecutions" have chilled the speech of Party members from defining and expressing membership policies and that such prosecution has unconstitutionally interfered with the Party's internal affairs. It is on the basis of this alleged chilling effect that Klobuchar and Fahey assert that the Party has not suffered any cognizable injury to satisfy Article III standing. The Court agrees with Defendants Klobuchar and Fahey that the Party has not asserted an injury-in-fact in order to satisfy the Article III standing requirements. The Party's alleged subjective "chill" does not create a "specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm" as required to confer Article III standing. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972).

A review of the statute is illustrative of the Party's failure to demonstrate an injury-in-fact. Section 211B.06 applies only to "paid political advertising or campaign material." See Minn Stat. § 211B.06, subd. 1. Nothing in the statute is directed toward the internal workings of the Party or its membership discussions. The statute merely prohibits false statements that are made in the fora of paid political advertising or campaign material. While the Party asserts that its injury is the so-called "chilling" effect on its internal discussions about membership and its members' fear of prosecution under the statute, the Party has not set forth any indication as to how a statute that is directed only at "paid political advertising or campaign material" could interfere with the Party's internal discussions about membership. The Party has not established any reasonable fear of prosecution for its internal membership discussions, as the statute plainly does not apply to those issues.

In addition, the facts surrounding the Party's membership definitions further demonstrate that the Party has not established an injury sufficient to confer Article III standing. Despite the Party's contentions in its briefing that the Defendants' prosecution of this matter have interfered with the Party's internal membership and endorsement policies, the Party has pointed to no Party policy that specifically monitors Party membership. The Party does not maintain membership rolls. The Party does not have a procedure in place as to how to excommunicate its so-called "Benedict Arnolds" who have contravened Party objectives. (See Party's Combined Memorandum of Law in Response to Amy Klobuchar's Motion to Dismiss and to Michael Fahey's Motion to Dismiss at 1.) The Party's constitution only provides for a method by which executive committee members may be removed, and there are no allegations that Linda Koblick was a removed executive committee member. In fact, the First Amended Complaint itself does not allege that Linda Koblick was expelled from membership at all, but merely alleges that Koblick's campaign against a Party-endorsed candidate "may have affected" her membership in the Party. A different issue would be before the Court if the Party had expelled Linda Koblick from the Party when she ran for Hennepin County Commissioner against a Party-endorsed candidate. But that did not happen here. In addition, if the Party had better defined its internal membership requirements prior to the enforcement of section 211B.06 against John Knight, the Party may have established a cognizable injury. However, the Party did not. As aptly noted by Defendants, the Party's assertions of an injury confuse the state's regulation of false representations about membership with the regulation of membership itself. There is a difference between criticizing membership decisions and criminalizing lies. See Illinois v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 123 S.Ct. 1829, 1836 (2003) ("the First Amendment does not shield fraud") (internal citations omitted).

Here, the Party has not established a concrete invasion of its rights based upon the enforcement of section 211B.06. The Party has not demonstrated any government entanglement with the Party's membership decisions. The Party has not demonstrated how the implementation of this statute would result in a reasonable threat of prosecution, as the statute plainly does not apply to discussions about such membership issues. Thus, the Party has not established an actual, concrete injury in order to confer standing.

B. The Facial Challenge

In addition, to the extent that the Party attacks the facial constitutionality of section 211B.06, the Party's challenge similarly fails for lack of standing. "As a general rule, a federal court should refrain from entertaining a pre-enforcement constitutional challenge to a state criminal statute in the absence of a `reasonable fear of prosecution.'" SOB, Inc. v. County of Benton, 317 F.3d 856, 865 (8th Cir. 2003), quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961). The Party concedes that "the standing issue on the facial challenge boils down to whether the Party has a reasonable fear of prosecution." See Party's Combined Memorandum of Law in Response to Amy Klobuchar's Motion to Dismiss and to Michael Fahey's Motion to Dismiss at 19. Like the Party's assertions regarding its as-applied challenge, the Party contends that its "reasonable fear of prosecution" stems from Party members' fear of being prosecuted for implementing Party membership and endorsement policies. See id. at 20, 21. As noted above, the Court finds that the Party and its members have no reasonable fear of prosecution that precludes them from implementing Party membership and endorsement policies. Section 211B.06 plainly does not restrict the Party's ability to define or determine membership in any way. The Party is free to implement policies regarding its membership. Section 211B.06 merely operates, in a case like this, to restrict the Party and its members from making false statements about Party membership in paid political advertising or campaign materials when no such membership policies are in place. The statute clearly does not criminalize the Party's internal affairs and any asserted fear of prosecution is not credible. Thus, the Party has not established an injury-in-fact by which to confer standing to bring its facial challenge to section 211B.06. Based upon the language of the statute and the failure of the Party to establish an injury-in-fact, the Court concludes that the Party does not have standing to bring its constitutional claims.

II. Younger Abstention

In addition to the Party's lack of standing, the principles enunciated in Younger v. Harris and its progeny counsel that this Court abstain from hearing the Party's claims. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Under the Younger abstention doctrine, a federal court's jurisdiction is "constrained . . . by traditional principles of equity, comity, and federalism." Alleghany Corp. v. McCartney, 896 F.2d 1138, 1142 (8th Cir. 1990), citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). In Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, the Supreme Court set out a three-part inquiry in which a federal court should engage to determine whether it should abstain from hearing federal claims: (1) is there an "ongoing state judicial proceeding"; (2) "do the proceedings implicate important state interests"; and (3) "is there an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges." 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).

This lawsuit is precisely what the abstention principles outlined in Younger and Middlesex were intended to address. First, there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding. John Knight's criminal trial for his alleged violation of Minnesota Statute § 211B.06 is pending in state court. John Knight brought a motion to dismiss his criminal indictment in state court, asserting the unconstitutionality of Minnesota Statute § 211B.06. That motion was denied on March 12, 2003. While this federal lawsuit is being brought by the Party, the Party has asserted that the suit is being brought "on behalf of John Knight" and other Party members. This suit directly raises as-applied claims that are related to the prosecution of John Knight. The Party's First Amended Complaint seeks a permanent injunction against Fahey and Klobuchar from "continuing to investigate and prosecute" Party members. The only Party member who was asserted to have been prosecuted by Fahey and/or Klobuchar is John Knight. Thus, this lawsuit is obviously intertwined with the criminal proceeding pending against John Knight, because it seeks to interfere with the adjudication of his pending state court proceeding. Despite being brought by the Party, rather than directly by John Knight, this suit satisfies the "ongoing state proceeding" prong of Younger abstention. See, e.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1975); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 831 (1974) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Second, the pending state judicial proceeding implicates important state interests in regulating the integrity of its own elections and campaigns. Finally, as demonstrated by John Knight's motion to dismiss his indictment in state court, the state court offers an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges. Minnesota state courts have previously heard constitutional challenges to this statute in its previous, unamended version, and found it unconstitutional. See State v. Jude, 554 N.W.2d 750 (Minn.App. 1996). As aptly noted by Defendants, this history of state court challenges to the constitutionality of the state's prosecution of false campaign speech demonstrates that the State has an adequate procedure by which to review such challenges.

Thus, all of the Younger requirements are met. In the interests of comity to the Minnesota state courts that can deftly handle these constitutional matters, this Court should abstain from hearing the Party's claims.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, and all of the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Doc. Nos. 3 and 4) are GRANTED and Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.