SMITH, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶ This is an interlocutory appeal from a Jefferson County Circuit Court order compelling Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States ("Equitable") to provide the plaintiff, Mary T. Irving ("Irving"), with the names and addresses of Mississippi residents who bought a "vanishing premium" policy from Equitable. We conclude that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) preempts the issuance of the circuit court's order. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court.
FACTS
¶ Irving sued Equitable for damages alleging that an Equitable Variable Life Insurance Company ("EVLICO") agent, John Sartin ("Sartin"), made fraudulent representations to her regarding its Champion 2000 Policy when she purchased it in 1995. Specifically, she avers that Sartin told her the premiums would be paid out of earnings of the policy after eight years. The Policy itself does not state this and, in fact, states that premiums on the policy are due each year. The Champion 2000 Policy was a variant of a traditional whole life policy; the Champion 2000 Policy allowed the insured to invest the surplus premiums as she chooses, instead of the insurer directing the investment as in a traditional whole life policy. The Champion 2000 Policy is deemed a security and was sold in accordance with federal security regulations. The source of the dispute in the present case is the ability of the policyholder to use the policy's cash value to make premium payments; Irving alleges Sartin assured her the policy's cash value would be sufficient to pay the insurance premiums after eight years — i.e. "vanish the premiums."
¶ Irving requested that Equitable supply the names and addresses of every policyholder in the state of Mississippi. Irving alleges the list is "reasonably calculated to lead to discoverable material;" the supposed purpose of this list is to help prove Equitable's pattern and practice of defrauding her and others like her by selling "vanishing premium" policies. Special Circuit Judge William F. Coleman ordered Equitable to supply that information. We granted Equitable permission to bring this interlocutory appeal. See M.R.A.P. 5.
¶ The following issues are raised by Equitable:
I. WHETHER THE ORDER VIOLATES A FEDERAL STATUTE PROTECTING PRIVACY RIGHTS OF CUSTOMERS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.
II. WHETHER THE ORDER EXCEEDS THE BOUNDS IMPOSED ON DISCOVERY BY MISSISSIPPI LAW.
III. WHETHER THE ORDER IS DEFECTIVE BECAUSE OF VAGUENESS.
IV. WHETHER, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, A PROTECTIVE ORDER SHOULD BE ISSUED REGARDING THE POLICYHOLDER LIST.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ There is a de novo standard of review for questions of law. Mason v. State , 781 So.2d 99, 100 (Miss. 2000) (citing Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. Fires , 693 So.2d 917, 920 (Miss. 1997)). The trial court has considerable discretion relating to matters of discovery; its order will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of that discretion. Harkins v. Paschall , 348 So.2d 1019, 1022 (Miss. 1977).
ANALYSIS
¶ Equitable argues the order compelling it to reveal the names and addresses of its policyholders was impermissible. It asserts that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq. (the "GLBA") prohibits the order. It also argues that the order is not permitted by Mississippi discovery law and that it is too vague to require compliance. Finally, Equitable argues in the alternative that a protective order should be given to protect the privacy of the policyholders.
I. WHETHER THE ORDER VIOLATES A FEDERAL STATUTE PROTECTING PRIVACY RIGHTS OF CUSTOMERS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.
¶ Given that this is a determination of law, the trial court's decision is reviewed de novo. Equitable argues the GLBA prevents a state court from compelling the release of private information in the case at bar. Subject to certain exceptions, "[A] financial institution may not, directly or through any affiliate, disclose to a nonaffiliated third party any nonpublic personal information[.]" 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a). There are exceptions in the statute, and these exceptions are the heart of the dispute between Equitable and Irving on this issue. The exceptions raised by Irving include:
1) "to protect against or prevent actual or potential fraud"
15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(3)(B).
2) "for resolving customer disputes or inquiries"
15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(3)(C).
3) "persons that are assessing the licensee's compliance with industry standards"
15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(4).
4) "for an investigation on a matter related to public safety"
15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(5).
5) to comply with federal, state or local laws, rules and other applicable legal requirements; to comply with a properly authorized civil, criminal, or regulatory investigation or subpoena or summons by Federal, State, or local authorities; or to respond to judicial process or government regulatory authorities having jurisdiction over the financial institution for examination, compliance, or other purposes as authorized by law.
15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(8).
¶ The purpose of the GLBA is to protect the privacy of customers of financial institutions. 15 U.S.C. § 6801. Equitable is considered a financial institution under the Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(B). The information sought by Irving is clearly the type the statute seeks to protect. 145 Cong. Rec. H5291, 5312 (July 1, 1999) (customers have a right to refuse to allow the sharing of their addresses and phone numbers). The GLBA, as a federal statute, will preempt any state law which conflicts with it under the Supremacy Clause. Cooper v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 702 So.2d 428, 434 (Miss. 1997). Similarly, a federal law will bar state courts from issuing orders that conflict with the statute. In Union Planters Bank, N.A. v. Gavel , 2003 WL 1193671 (E.D.La. March 12, 2003), the district court issued a permanent injunction enjoining compliance with a subpoena issued by a Louisiana state court. It held "federal law, the GLBA, specifically prohibits Mr. Gavel from disclosing information sought by the subpoena[.]" Id. at 7 (the subpoena sought names, addresses, and telephones numbers of customers of Union Planters who had a loan secured by a mortgage or deed of trust).
¶ The first exception in the GLBA which Irving points to as permitting disclosure of private information is "to protect against or prevent actual or potential fraud[.]" 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(3)(B). The reasoning of the Union Planters court is persuasive; the "exception is intended for situations in which the customer is using the privacy associated with his financial account to perpetrate a fraud." 2003 WL 1193671 at 8. To do otherwise, "would render the protections provided by the GLBA meaningless." Id . The intent of the GLBA is to protect the privacy of customers; they should not be stripped of this protection because their financial institution is involved in litigation unrelated to them.
¶ The next exception Irving suggests is "for resolving customer disputes or inquiries[.]" 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(3)(C). Again, this exception is intended for releasing information about the actual customer involved in the dispute. The GLBA is intended to protect the privacy of customers of financial institutions; to divulge information simply because another customer of the institution requests it would frustrate the purposes of the act.
¶ The next two exceptions invoked by Irving are similarly inapplicable. Obviously, "persons that are assessing the licensee's compliance with industry standards" 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(4), does not apply. This exception is meant to facilitate regulators in investigations of financial institutions. The allegation against Equitable of misconduct does not make Irving a person assessing Equitable's compliance with industry standards. Again, "for an investigation on a matter related to public safety," 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(5), is similarly inapplicable. Allegations of fraud, while serious, have no relation to public safety.
¶ Finally, Irving points to the exemption
to comply with federal, state or local laws, rules and other applicable legal requirements; to comply with a properly authorized civil, criminal, or regulatory investigation or subpoena or summons by Federal, State, or local authorities; or to respond to judicial process or government regulatory authorities having jurisdiction over the financial institution for examination, compliance, or other purposes as authorized by law.
15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(8). This provides an exception to allow governmental authorities with an exception to use when investigating financial institutions. However, to permit a court to order disclosure of private information to a private plaintiff would eviscerate the protections the GLBA establishes. "An exception must be clear from the language of the statute and cannot be created by construction."
Miss. Gaming Comm'n v. Imperial Palace of Miss., Inc .,
751 So.2d 1025, 1028 (Miss. 1999). Another important rule of statutory construction is "legislative intent must be determined from the total language of the act and not from one section thereof considered apart from the remainder."
Lee v. Alexander ,
607 So.2d 30, 36 (Miss. 1992) (quoting
Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist. v. Hinds County ,
445 So.2d 1330, 1334 (Miss. 1984)). Again, to allow a private plaintiff to circumvent the privacy protections placed in the act would negate much of its effectiveness. There is nothing in the statute or in the Congressional record that reflects an intent, through the exceptions to the GLBA, to allow a private plaintiff an easier time in establishing a pattern of behavior by financial institutions or to create a windfall of clients for the plaintiff's counsel. Since the circuit court's order is preempted by the GLBA, the circuit court erred as a matter of law in issuing the order. Given our conclusion on this issue, we need not address the remaining issues raised by Equitable.
CONCLUSION
¶ The intent of the GLBA is to protect the customers of financial institutions from invasions of their privacy. Part of the purpose of this Act was to stop solicitations generated by customer lists, and this would include solicitation by an attorney to be a witness or for any other purpose. Thus, the GLBA preempts the issuance of the circuit court's order. For these reasons, the trial court's order is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ REVERSED AND REMANDED.
COBB AND CARLSON, JJ., CONCUR. PITTMAN, C.J., AND GRAVES, J., CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY. EASLEY, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. McRAE, P.J., WALLER AND DIAZ, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.