SLATKY v. HEALTHFIRST, INC. (S.D.N.Y. 2003)

JOHN KOELTL, District Judge

The plaintiff, Bronwyn Slatky, brings this action against her former employer, Healthfirst, Inc. ("Healthfirst"). The plaintiff alleges that the defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. L. § 296, and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107. The defendant now moves for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

The evidence submitted to the Court reflects the following facts as construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Healthfirst is a health maintenance organization ("HMO") based in New York City that provides managed health care to its members, including persons eligible for Medicare. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 1; Compl. ¶ 7.) In about March 2001, Healthfirst was preparing for a site visit by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS"), the federal agency that administers Medicare and certifies HMOs like Healthfirst that administer Medicare benefits. (Pl.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 3; Def.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 2.)

Also in about March 2001, Healthfirst was looking to fill the position of Medicare Manager that was open in its Medical Management Division. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 3.) At that time, Greg Kaladjian, the Chief Operating Officer of Healthfirst, was the executive overseeing the Medical Management Division. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 4.) Maria Oliveri, who was being promoted in March 2001 from Director for Commercial Product to Vice President of Medical Management, and Phyllis Dembo, who was Director of Medical Management and Medicare, both reported to Kaladjian. (Transcript of Deposition of Maria E. Oliveri dated November 25, 2002 ("Oliveri Dep."), at 6-8, 14-15.) Both Oliveri and Dembo proposed to Kaladjian that Amy Ahern, who was twenty-seven years old at the time and had been working for Healthfirst since August 2000, be promoted to fill the vacant Medicare Manager position. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 5; Pl.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 5 Kaladjian rejected that proposal because he thought that Ahern was not seasoned enough and because he wanted someone who had actual experience with Medicare audits. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 6; Pl.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 5.)

The plaintiff was hired as Medicare Manager on March 19, 2001. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 7; Compl. ¶ 9.) She was hired in part because she had experience with a Medicare unit like the one at Healthfirst and also with Medicare site visits. (Pl.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 2.) The plaintiff, who was born on August 17, 1950, was fifty years old when she was hired. (Compl. ¶ 6.) As Medicare Manager, the plaintiff's responsibilities included developing and overseeing education, policies, procedures, workflow and staffing; hiring, training, supervising, and advising the nursing staff assigned to the Medicare division; preparing for the site visit by CMA; and participating in grievance and appeals processes by patients. (Compl. ¶ 10.) The plaintiff supervised a staff of nurses and social workers. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 12; Pl.'s Rule 56.1 So. ¶ 1.) The plaintiff initially reported to Dembo until Dembo left Healthfirst in May 2001, and thereafter the plaintiff reported to Oliveri. (Oliveri Dep. at 23-24; Def.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶¶ 9-10.) Beginning in April 2001, Oliveri in turn reported to Jay Schechtman, Healthfirst's Chief Medical Officer, who had replaced Kaladjian in overseeing the Medical Management Division. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 13.)

At some point toward the end of June 2001, the plaintiff went to Schechtman's office to discuss her concerns regarding Oliveri's plans to move her office closer to the plaintiff's office and to the plaintiff's staff. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶¶ 15-16; Pl.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 9; Transcript of Deposition of Bronwyn Slatky dated December 3, 2002 ("Slatky Dep."), at 43-44.) In the course of that conversation, the plaintiff informed Schechtman that several members of the plaintiff's staff had informed her that they would leave the company if Oliveri moved her office as planned. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 16; Pl.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 9.) The plaintiff told Schechtman that she was worried about losing good members of her staff if Oliveri's office move were to happen. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 17; Slatky Dep. at 43.) On at least one prior occasion (although Schechtman remembers more), the plaintiff expressed concern to Schechtman over problems she had with Oliveri. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 14; Transcript of Deposition of Jay Schechtman dated Nov. 25, 2002 ("Schechtman Dep."), at 13-14; Slatky Dep. at 50-51.)

Schechtman then met with Sharon Sheer, Healthfirst's Vice President of Human Resources, to discuss the conversation he had with the plaintiff regarding Oliveri's office move. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 So. 18; Pl.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 10.) Sheer and Schechtman concluded that the plaintiff's complaints about Oliveri had been insubordinate, and that the complaints warranted termination. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶¶ 20; Pl.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶¶ 11-12; Transcript of Deposition of Sharon Sheer dated Jan. 30, 2003 ("Sheer Dep."), at 20-22.) As Sheer testified: "[Schechtman's] reasons to me sounded, quite frankly, in the interest of wanting a functional department. It was obviously not healthy, and he had now lost confidence in [the plaintiff] as a professional, my interpretation. Because of the visits, to the disparaging remarks, he did not want this kind of dysfunctional relationship within his department. And so I said I saw no reason that if he wanted to move to terminate, I see no problem with that." (Sheer Dep. at 22.)

The plaintiff was terminated from her position on June 29, 2001, slightly more than three months after she was hired. (Compl. ¶ 13; Pl.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 14.) On that day, she was called to a meeting with Sheer and Schechtman. (Slatky Dep. at 53-55.) The plaintiff entered the meeting and asked whether she was going to be fired. (Id. at 54.) Schechtman responded, "yes." (Id.) When told that she was being terminated for insubordination, the plaintiff requested that they all meet with Oliveri to discuss the problem. (Id.) When Schechtman declined, the plaintiff told him that he had no guts. (Id.) The plaintiff testified that she was concerned for the staff and for herself. (Id.) Before leaving Healthfirst, the plaintiff assembled her staff to tell them that she had been terminated because she "went to try to get them help." (Id. at 56-57.)

Upon Oliveri's recommendation, Amy Ahern was subsequently promoted to the position of Medicare Manager. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 29; Pl.'s Rule 56.1 St. ¶ 14.)

The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. Summary judgment may not be granted unless "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994). "The trial court's task at the summary judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there are genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution."Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224. The moving party bears . . . the initial burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion" and identifying the matter that "it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The substantive law governing the case will identify those facts which are material and "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see also Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1223. Summary judgment is improper if there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994). If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The nonmoving party must produce evidence in the record and "may not rely simply on conclusory statements or on contentions that the affidavits supporting the motion are not credible." Ying Jing Can v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1998) (collecting cases).

The defendant seeks summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim that she was allegedly discriminated against on the basis of her age.

The ADEA makes it unlawful for an "employer" "to discharge any individual" who is at least forty years old "because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), 631(a). The plaintiff's claims for discrimination under the ADEA as well as under the New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws are employment discrimination claims that are governed at the summary judgment stage by the burden-shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).See Jetter v. Knothe Corp., 324 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (claims under ADEA analyzed under burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas); Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass'n, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 2926, 1998 WL 193204, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1998) ("This same burden-shifting analysis applies to age and sex discrimination claims brought under the State or City Human Rights Laws."), aff'd, 192 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 1999). Under the McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000);St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981) (citing McDonnell Douglas); Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1335 (2d Cir. 1997). To state a prima facie case of discrimination the plaintiff must allege that she (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was performing her job satisfactorily; (3) was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 507; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37; Ali v. Bank of New York, 934 F. Supp. 87, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). However, the burden of establishing a prima facie case is de minimis. Chambers, 43 F.3d at 37.

When a plaintiff has successfully demonstrated the elements of a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to put forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's challenged action. See Burdine, 450 U.S. 252-53. After the defendant articulates a legitimate reason for the action, the presumption of discrimination raised by the prima facie case drops out, and the plaintiff has the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision and that her membership in a protected class was.Id. at 254-56; Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1136. "The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; see also Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143;Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1336. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has instructed that in determining whether the plaintiff has met this burden, a court is to use a "case by case" approach that evaluates "the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports [or undermines] the employer's case." James v. New York Racing Ass'n, 233 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-49). Although summary judgment must be granted with caution in Title VII actions "where intent is genuinely in issue, . . . summary judgment remains available to reject discrimination claims in cases lacking genuine issues of material fact." Chambers, 43 F.3d at 40.

The parties do not dispute that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of age discrimination. The parties agree that the plaintiff is a member of the protected class because she is over forty years old, that she was qualified for the position of Medicare Manager, that she was fired from that position, and that her termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of age discrimination because she was replaced by a substantially younger co-worker who was outside the protected class. See O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996) (stating that "the fact that a replacement is substantially younger than the plaintiff" is a "reliable indicator of age discrimination"); Carlton v. Mystic Trans., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding inference of discrimination raised by fact that plaintiff's duties were transferred to co-workers who were 18 and 25 years younger than plaintiff, respectively); Zimmerman v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 376, 381 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that inference of discrimination is raised when plaintiff is replaced by someone outside the protected class).

The defendant has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. The defendant has met its burden at this stage of the analysis because it has explained that the plaintiff was fired as a result of the plaintiff's disparaging comments about her supervisor which her employer considered to be insubordinate. See Sklar v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 00 Civ. 2254, 2001 WL 984724, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2001) (concluding that disrespect for supervisors is nondiscriminatory reason for termination of employment), aff'd, 34 Fed. Appx. 403 (2d Cir. 2002). The defendant has thus articulated a clear and specific reason for the plaintiff's termination, which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. See Carlton, 202 F.3d at 136.

The primary issue raised by this motion, therefore, is whether the plaintiff could carry her burden of persuasion, without the benefit of an inference of discrimination, such that a reasonable jury could conclude, based on all of the evidence, that a motivating factor in discharging the plaintiff was age discrimination.

In this case, however, the plaintiff has failed to present evidence that the proffered reason for her termination was not the true reason for her termination. Moreover, she has failed to adduce any evidence to show that the proffered reason for her termination was a pretext for age discrimination. See James, 233 F.3d at 154 ("Thus, once the employer has proffered its nondiscriminatory reason, the employer will be entitled to summary judgment . . . . unless the plaintiff can point to evidence that reasonably supports a finding of prohibited discrimination.")

The plaintiff contends that there is direct evidence of the fact that age discrimination at least partially motivated her termination. The plaintiff argues that Ahern, the younger employee who replaced her, was initially rejected for the position of Medicare Manager because she was insufficiently "seasoned." But this argument actually cuts against the plaintiff's position, because it shows that the plaintiff was hired, irrespective of her age, because of her greater experience. It does not follow at all that when the plaintiff was terminated about three months later her employer no longer appreciated her experience and her age had become a negative factor and that her age was a motivating factor in her termination. There is simply no evidence that the plaintiff's age played a role in her termination.

The plaintiff also contends that the defendant's articulated reason for her discharge is pretextual and that this fact, along with the evidence submitted to make out her prima facie case, should be sufficient to get the case to the jury. However, the plaintiff has not carried her burden of showing that the defendant's reason for her termination was pretextual or that it was a pretext for age discrimination. The plaintiff points to minor discrepancies in the deposition testimony of Healthfirst's employees regarding the plaintiff's allegedly insubordinate conduct and raises questions about whether the plaintiff's conduct was disrespectful enough to warrant termination.

It would be remarkable if two people recalling the same events remembered them in precisely the same way. Both Schechtman and Sheer agreed that the plaintiff was terminated based on her disparaging and insubordinate comments about her supervisor. Even the plaintiff's recitation of her meeting with Sheer and Schechtman supported her contemporaneous awareness that she was being fired because of her conduct toward her supervisor. To the degree that the plaintiff argues that the reason for her termination was not a good reason for her termination, the argument misses the point. The employer could terminate the plaintiff for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all, so long as it was not a discriminatory reason. See Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1341 (1st Cir. 1988) ("ADEA does not stop a company from discharging an employee for any reason (fair or unfair) or for no reason, so long as the decision does not stem from the person's age."); Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984) ("The employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason.");State Div. Of Human Rights v. County of Onondaga Sheriff's Dept., 524 N.E.2d 123, 125 (N.Y. 1988) (finding under Human Rights Law that employee "could lawfully have been discharged for any reason or for no reason, but not for a statutorily impermissible reason"). Moreover, it is not for the Court to second-guess the business judgment for a termination, so long as there is no evidence that the reason for the decision was a pretext for discrimination. See Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Evidence that an employer made a poor business judgment in discharging an employee generally is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact as to the credibility of the employer's reasons. Thus, the reasons tendered need not be well-advised, but merely truthful." (citations omitted)). In this case, no reasonable jury could conclude, based on the evidence submitted by the plaintiff, that the defendant was intentionally discriminating against the plaintiff based on her age when she was terminated. See Schnabel v. Abrahmson, 232 F.3d 83, 88-91 (2d Cir. 2000).

Indeed, the defendant has submitted substantial evidence that the plaintiff was terminated for the reason articulated The deposition testimony of Sheer and Schechtman supports the conclusion that Schechtman decided to terminate the plaintiff because he considered the plaintiff's actions in protesting Oliveri's office move to be insubordinate. Schechtman also recalled that on several occasions the plaintiff had come to him to raise concerns regarding Oliveri, and the plaintiff conceded that she had done so on at least one occasion prior to the office-move incident. The plaintiff actually anticipated that her bad-mouthing of Oliveri was the reason for her discharge. When she was called into the meeting with Sheer and Schechtman, the plaintiff anticipated that she was about to be fired, and she requested that they all meet with Oliveri to straighten out the problem. When this suggestion was rejected, the plaintiff then convened her staff to tell them that she had been fired for trying to "help" them. The plaintiff herself thus accepted the proffered reason for her discharge and had no reason contemporaneously to doubt that it was in fact the actual reason. There is no evidence that Schechtman had any animus toward workers at Healthfirst who were at least forty years of age.

Drawing all inferences in the plaintiff's favor, no reasonable jury could conclude, based on this record as a whole, that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent in terminating the plaintiff's employment.

For these reasons, the plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in her favor. The defendant's motion for summary judgment is therefore granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing the Complaint and closing this case.