STEWART, J.
Beverly Wilhite ("Wilhite") and her insurance carrier, National Automotive Insurance Company ("National"), and Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest, the UM carrier of Thomas and Lila McElroy, appeal the judgment of the trial court dated June 18, 2004, finding Wilhite 100% at fault for the subject accident. For the reasons that follow, we reverse, render, and remand to the trial court for hearings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
This matter arises from an intersectional collision that occurred on July 8, 2002, at the corner of Creswell and Linden Streets in Shreveport. Creswell is a two-lane north/south highway without traffic controls from Ockley up to Kings Highway. Linden is an east/west street with a stop sign at the end of each two block section, including the intersection with Creswell. The speed limit at the location of the collision was 35 miles per hour.
Immediately before the collision, Thomas McElroy was eastbound on Linden Street. He claimed to have come to a complete stop at the stop sign at the corner of Creswell and Linden and to have looked both ways before proceeding. McElroy noted that there were no sight obstructions. However, he made it only half way into the intersection before being struck by Wilhite's vehicle.
Wilhite testified that she entered Creswell at Ockley and was headed toward Kings Highway. She noted that she usually sets her cruise control at 35 miles per hour to avoiding exceeding the speed limit. She first saw the McElroy vehicle as it approached the stop sign at Linden as she was crossing Wilder Place. She observed the passenger looking toward her and then back toward the driver. She assumed the van was going to stop. However, when she noticed that the McElroy vehicle was proceeding across Creswell, it was "too close" to avoid the collision.
Following a trial on the merits, Wilhite was found to be 100% at fault for the accident. This appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
Causation
A trial court's factual findings are accorded great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal absent manifest error. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La. 1989). It is the duty of the trier of fact to weigh credibility and to accept or reject all or part of a witness's testimony. Welch v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 94-2331 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 309; Marshall v. Caddo Parish School Board, 32,373 (La.App. 2d Cir.10/29/99), 743 So.2d 943. Where there is a conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility should not be disturbed on appeal. Rosell, supra. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Stobart v. State, Through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880 (La. 1993).
Negligence is determined in Louisiana under the duty-risk analysis. The determination of liability in a negligence case usually requires proof of five separate elements: (1) proof that the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard (the duty element); (2) proof that the defendant's conduct failed to conform to the appropriate standard (the breach element); (3) proof that the defendant's substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (4) proof that the defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope of liability or scope of protection element); and (5) proof of actual damages (the damages element). Boykin v. Louisiana Transit Co., Inc., 96-1932 (La. 3/4/98), 707 So.2d 1225, 1230, rehearing denied, 4/24/98.
Duty of Motorist at Stop Sign
The duty of a motorist is controlled by a stop sign under La. R.S. 32:123 which states:
A. Preferential right of way at an intersection may be indicated by stop signs or yield signs.
B. Except when directed to proceed by a police officer or traffic-control signal, every driver and operator of a vehicle approaching a stop intersection indicated by a stop sign shall stop before entering the cross walk on the near side at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, then at the
point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering the intersection. After having stopped, the driver shall yield the right of way to all vehicles which have entered the intersection from another highway or which are approaching so closely on said highway as to constitute an immediate hazard.
Louisiana courts have consistently held that a driver confronted by a stop sign at an intersection must bring his vehicle to a stop, apprize the traffic, and make sure that the way is clear before he enters the intersection. "To stop and then proceed in the immediate path of oncoming vehicles constitutes negligence." McCauley v. LaFleur, 213 So.2d 176, 179 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968), and cases cited therein. See also Toston v. Pardon, 03-1747 (La. 4/23/04), 874 So.2d 791. He must also look for and then evaluate oncoming traffic before proceeding. Guillot v. Valley Forge, Ins. Co., 99-1044 (La.App. 3d Cir.12/8/99), 753 So.2d 891, 894. The duty also includes looking a second time before entering. Continental Ins. Co. v. Duthu, 235 So.2d 182 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1970).
In contrast to the above cited duty of the motorist confronted with a stop sign, the duty of the favored motorist is quite minimal as noted in Sanchez Fernandez v. Gen. Motors Corp., 491 So.2d 633 (La. 1986),
A motorist on a right of way street is entitled to assume that motorists on the unfavored street approaching a stop sign will obey the traffic signal and will stop, look, and yield the right of way to traffic proceeding on the favored street. Of course, once a right of way motorist has failed to yield the right of way, a new duty thereafter devolves on the right of way motorist to take reasonable steps to avoid an accident if there is enough time to afford him a reasonable opportunity to do so.
With regard to the favored motorists' duty, the courts have clarified, noting:
Furthermore, it is only in the exceptional case where the right of way motorist could have avoided the accident by the exercise of the very slightest degree of care that he will be considered guilty of negligence.
Modica v. Manchester Ins. Indem. Co., 284 So.2d 791 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1973);
Shelvin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 99-833 (La.App. 3d Cir.11/3/99),
747 So.2d 160;
McCoy v. Chambers, 403 So.2d 838 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1981).
It is well settled that:
A motorist who is confronted with a stop sign at an intersection is required to bring his vehicle to a complete stop before entering the crossing, to appraise traffic in the intersecting street and to make certain that the way is clear for him to make
a safe passage across the intersection before he enters it. When the motorist stops his vehicle before proceeding to cross a right of way street, he has performed only half of the duty which the law imposes upon him. To stop and then proceed in the immediate path of oncoming vehicles constitutes negligence.
McCauley v. LaFleur, 213 So.2d 176, 179 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1968) and cases cited therein. We further note that
Ballaron v. Roth, 221 So.2d 297, 300 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1969), explains that:
[T]o merely stop for a stop sign is to perform only a part of the required duty; such action must be followed by a careful observation of traffic conditions and the motorist controlled by the stop sign must yield the right of way to all
vehicles lawfully proceeding on the favored roadway. (Citations omitted.)
Nonetheless, we note that "each intersectional accident is dependent upon and must be decided on its own facts." Crump v. Ritter, 583 So.2d 47, 50 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1991), citing Ball v. Marquette Casualty Co., 176 So.2d 799 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1965), writ denied, 248 La. 417, 179 So.2d 16.
Before entering the intersection, Mr. McElroy had a duty to come to a complete stop, to appraise traffic in the intersecting street, and to make certain the way was clear for passage. Vallery v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 480 So.2d 818 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1985), writ denied, 481 So.2d 1350 (La. 1986).
The findings of the trier of fact are normally accorded much discretion. However, where documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness's story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face, that a reasonable factfinder would not credit the witness's story, the court of appeal may find manifest error even in a finding purportedly based on a credibility determination. Stobart v. State, supra. The trial court concluded that Wilhite was 100% at fault for the accident. We find that no reasonable view of the evidence submitted permits this conclusion. Our review of the evidence in this matter demands a reapportionment of the fault because reasonable men viewing the evidence could not have found the defendants free from fault.
Because we conclude the record establishes fault on the part of the defendants, we must apply the comparative fault factors announced in Watson v. State Farm Fire Cas. Ins. Co., 469 So.2d 967 (La. 1985), to apportion fault. When examining an accident using the Watson factors the court should consider (1) whether the conduct resulted from inadvertence or involved an awareness of the danger; (2) how great a risk was created by the conduct; (3) the significance of what was sought by the conduct; (4) the capacities of the actor, whether superior or inferior; and (5) any extenuating circumstances which might require the actor to proceed in haste, without proper thought.
Application of these factors leads us to apportion a greater percentage of fault to Mr. McElroy. During his testimony, McElroy noted that although he looked both ways before proceeding through the stop sign, he did not see Wilhite's vehicle prior to entering the intersection. However, his own testimony suggests that he did not keep a proper lookout for oncoming traffic. He admitted that he would not have looked as far as the next intersection, where oncoming vehicles would be visible and added that he would not have looked beyond one-half of the block. He also testified that he had not traveled past the middle of the intersection before being struck by the Wilhite vehicle. This clearly shows that the Wilhite vehicle was very close and should have been fully visible at the time McElroy entered the intersection.
"A motorist is held to see that which with due diligence he should have seen." Audubon Ins. Co. v. Knoten, 325 So.2d 624, 625 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1976). McElroy's ability to make proper observation was not limited to one-half of a block. McElroy correctly testified he could have seen a vehicle all the way back to the Wilder Place intersection. Had he looked, he could have easily seen Wilhite's vehicle approaching before he entered the intersection. There is simply nothing in the record to explain why he did not see her at all, as he testified at trial, before he entered the intersection. As such, it was error by the trial court to conclude that McElroy had no fault for causing the accident at issue. Consequently, we reverse the trial court and apportion 80% of the fault to Mr. McElroy for the accident at issue.
Ms. Wilhite's duty, as the driver on the favored thoroughfare, was one of ordinary care toward drivers entering from side streets. Coleman v. Rabon, 561 So.2d 897 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1990). However, a motorist entering a favored street is entitled to assume that vehicles traveling on the favored street will obey the speed limit. Tillman v. Massey, 445 So.2d 749 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1984); Tatum v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 94-157 (La.App. 3d Cir.10/5/94), 643 So.2d 419. Wilhite claims to have set the cruise control at the posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour as she drove down Creswell, only to disengage the cruise control by pressing the brakes when she initially saw the McElroy vehicle. However, she assumed the McElroy vehicle would stop and claimed to have immediately re-engaged the cruise control seconds before impact. Although Mr. McElroy presented no accident reconstruction or other expert testimony, the physical impact suggests that the Wilhite vehicle was traveling faster than 35 miles an hour when she hit the McElroy vehicle, knocking it over in the road.
Based on our analysis of the Watson factors, we conclude that Mr. McElroy was much more at fault than Ms. Wilhite. We find that Ms. Wilhite was not less than 5% at fault but no more than 20% at fault. Accordingly, we allocate Ms. Wilhite's fault to 20%, which is the lowest amount the trial court could have reasonably allocated to Wilhite and fix McElroy's fault at 80%. See Toston v. Pardon, 2003-1747 (La. 4/23/04), 874 So.2d 791.
CONCLUSION
Finding that the trial court committed manifest error in its allocation of fault, we reverse the trial court's finding of 100% fault to Beverly Wilhite, render judgment apportioning 80% fault to Thomas McElroy and 20% to Beverly Wilhite, and remand this matter to the trial court for a determination of damages. Costs assessed to Thomas McElroy and Hartford Insurance Company.
REVERSED, RENDERED AND REMANDED.
CARAWAY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with written reasons.