MOSK, J.
INTRODUCTION
The Children's Law Center of Los Angeles (the Center) appeals from an order of the juvenile court disqualifying the Center from representing Charlisse C. (child), a child in a dependency proceeding. The motion to disqualify was filed by child's mother, Shadonna C. (mother), age 19, a former client of the Center. The juvenile court disqualified the Center on the ground that the Center had violated the safeguards against conflicts of interest in concurrent representations approved by the Courts of Appeal in Castro v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1432, 1435-1445 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 154] ( Castro) and Peoplev. Christian (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 986, 991-1002 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 867] ( Christian). This court reverses the disqualification order.
The Center is a publicly funded, nonprofit law office that represents parties in the Los Angeles County Juvenile Dependency Court. The Center is organized into three units, which are intended to function as independent law firms for conflict of interest purposes. The Center's Unit 1 (or its predecessor) represented mother when she was a foster child in the dependency system. From 2002 to 2005, Unit 2 represented child's older sibling, who was adopted by a grandparent. In this case, Unit 3 undertook to represent child when the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a juvenile dependency petition, pursuant to section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, concerning child. An attorney appointed to represent mother in the dependency proceeding asserted a conflict of interest, claiming that Unit 3 should be disqualified from representing child in this proceeding due to alleged breaches in ethical screens established within the Center between Units 1, 2, and 3. The alleged breaches occurred several years ago, and there is no evidence that any such breaches involved information concerning the parties in this case.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
In this case involving successive representations, past breaches in the Center's ethical screens do not require disqualification of child's attorney when mother has failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility that confidential information relating to Unit l's prior representation of mother would be shared with or be readily accessible to child's current attorney in Unit 3. Under these circumstances, knowledge of confidential information about mother need not be imputed to child's attorney.
Contrary to the test employed by the juvenile court, the issue raised by mother's motion to disqualify the Center is not whether the Center's recent administrative reorganization and the other conduct attributed to the Center and its director gave rise to the " appearance" of a conflict of interest. Nor is the issue, as seemingly considered by the juvenile court, whether the Center's reorganization and other conduct, in the abstract, strictly adhered to the specific safeguards approved by the court in Castro, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 1432.
Rather, mother's motion for disqualification raises the issue of whether, in the circumstances of this case, there is a conflict of interest that requires the disqualification of child's attorney. Unlike Castro, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 1432, and Christian, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th 986 — both of which involved the concurrent representation of clients with conflicting interests — this case involves the successive representation of clients with conflicting interests. Thus, whether there is a disqualifying conflict in this case turns on whether it is reasonably likely that confidential information relating to mother's prior representation by the Center's Unit 1 would be shared with or be readily accessible to child's current attorney in the Center's Unit 3. (See Jessen v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 698, 710 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 877] ( Jessen) ["where the former attorney-client relationship is peripheral or attenuated instead of direct, then the presumption [that the attorney acquired confidential client information] will not be applied in the absence of an adequate showing that the attorney was in a position vis-a-vis the client to likely have acquired confidential information material to the current representation"].) The record in this case does not support the juvenile court's conclusion that disqualification is required. Furthermore, because the juvenile court disqualified the Center based entirely on "structural" factors that bear no relation to any particular, identifiable case, affirming the juvenile court's order in this case would, in effect, require the unwarranted disqualification of the Center in virtually every case involving either the concurrent representation of multiple siblings or the successive representation of a parent or sibling and a child.
Courts have noted that "[m]otions to disqualify counsel are especially prone to tactical abuse. . . ." ( City of Santa Barbara v Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 17, 23 [ 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 403] ( City of Santa Barbara); accord, People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1145 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 816, 980 P.2d 371] ( SpeeDee Oil); Faughn v. Perez (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 592, 602 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 692].)
BACKGROUND
The County of Los Angeles created the Center, formerly called Dependency Court Legal Services (DCLS), to provide legal services to parents and children in the dependency court, and specifically to provide representation when legal services are required under section 317. Effective July 1, 2005, such legal services are provided by the Center pursuant to a contract with the Administrative Office of the Courts (the 2005 Agreement).
Prior to July 1, 2005, DCLS operated under an agreement with the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (the 1990 Agreement) that required DCLS to maintain a structure that permitted up to three independent attorneys to be assigned to represent different parties in the same proceeding, without giving rise to a disqualifying conflict of interest. To the extent relevant here, the 1990 Agreement required DCLS to maintain an operating structure as follows: "1. [DCLS] staff attorneys (i.e. those actually providing representation in dependency court proceedings) must be organized into three separate offices of comparable quality. [¶] 2. Each office shall have its own separate administrator. Each office administrator shall be the attorney of record on all cases assigned to his or her office, with the staff attorneys assigned to that office serving as deputies or assistants. Each office administrator shall be responsible for all legal representation provided by the attorneys in his or her office and shall have full case management authority over all cases assigned to that office. [¶] 3. Each office shall maintain separate case files. No staff attorney shall have access to the case files of an office other than the one to which he or she is assigned, and no corporate officer or director shall have access to any case files, [¶] 4. Attorneys may not be transferred between offices, [¶] 5. [DCLS's] corporate officers and directors shall serve in an administrative capacity only and shall not participate in any way in the representation of individuals in dependency court proceedings. They shall not consult with staff attorneys, including office administrators, about individual cases, except to review performance after the matter has been completed, [¶] 6. Staff attorneys (including office administrators) shall not hold any corporate officer or director positions with [DCLS]. [¶] 7. [DCLS's] corporate officers shall promote, discipline, or dismiss a staff attorney only upon the recommendation of that attorney's office administrator. Corporate officers shall be responsible for hiring staff attorneys and for assigning them to offices in such a manner as to maintain the comparable quality of the three offices. [¶] 8. [DCLS's] corporate officers and directors may participate in the training of staff attorneys and office administrators, but such training shall be provided on an equal basis to the attorneys in the three offices, [¶] 9. Each office administrator shall establish and promulgate a procedure to receive and resolve complaints."
The 2005 Agreement changed the Center's operating structure insofar as conflicts of interest are concerned. Section B.2 of the 2005 Agreement provides, "[The Center] will ensure that conflicts are declared after appointment only when an actual conflict exists and shall similarly accept new appointments consistent with conflict rules and law. [¶] 1. New Appointments: [¶] [The Center] shall establish procedures to check for conflicts of interest, and shall decline appointment of new clients who present a conflict of interest with their present clients, [¶] 2. Ongoing Clients: [¶] [The Center] shall establish procedures to determine whether actual conflicts of interest arise among current clients, including within sibling groups, and shall advise the Court when such conflicts arise and seek to be relieved of appointment in such cases, when and if required by law."
On July 26, 2006, the DCFS, which is not a party to this appeal, filed a juvenile dependency petition concerning child. The petition alleged that child, born in July 2006, was at substantial risk of being abused or neglected because of the 19-year-old mother's emotional and mental health problems. The petition further alleged that in January 2002, at the age of 14, mother gave birth to child's older sibling, Donna C, who had been adjudicated a court dependent and ultimately adopted by a grandparent. The detention report stated that mother was a former foster youth.
At the detention hearing on July 26, 2006, the juvenile court appointed an attorney not employed by the Center to represent mother. The juvenile court then appointed an attorney from Unit 3 of the Center to represent child. The minute order provided, "CLC 3 Attorney, LINDA JACKSON . . ., appears and is appointed to represent the minor(s)."
On August 18, 2006, mother filed a written motion to disqualify the Center and its Unit 3 as counsel of record for child and alleged, "This motion is based upon the grounds that the [Center] is operated as one law firm and represents clients with adverse interests, in violation of its ethical duties to its clients." Mother alleged that the Center's operating procedures changed under the 2005 Agreement and that certain events had occurred that compromised the independence of the Center's three units. Citing City and County of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 839, 851-853 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 771, 135 P.3d 20] ( Cobra Solutions), mother argued that she was a former client of the Center and that a Center attorney could not ethically take a position adverse to her without breaching its continuing "duty of loyalty" to her.
Mother did not submit her own sworn statement in support of her motion.
With respect to the Center's operating procedures, mother referenced an October 20, 2005 memorandum to the Center's staff from its director, Ms. Miriam Krinsky. The memorandum provided:
"1. [The Center] staff will continue to be assigned by [the Center's] executive leadership to a core unit or such other conflict unit or units as [the Center] may choose to maintain over time (currently denoted as [Unit Nos.] 1, 2, and 3). The conflict unit or units will handle cases with siblings where conflicts of interest are present ('conflict cases') — to be denoted on [the Center's] file and records as conflict cases — as well as any other nonconflict cases that may previously or in the future be assigned to that unit. Attorneys in all [Center] units will continue to pick up new cases in accordance with their assigned pick up days, as determined by [the Center's] supervisors. Any determination that a conflict exists in a given case will be made only after consultation with, and approval by, a supervisor, as set forth in [the Center's] conflict policy, [¶] 2. Each of [the Center's] units will operate pursuant to the procedures set forth herein to ensure that ethical walls for handling conflict cases within [the Center] remain in place and are honored at all times. Any questions or concerns that these procedures do not adequately preserve the separateness of conflict cases or that these procedures are not being complied with shall be directed to [the Center's] Executive Director or the appropriate unit head. [¶] 3. Each [Center] unit shall have a unit head. The conflict unit head(s) shall ensure that conflict case files and all confidential case information relating to conflict cases assigned to a given unit are maintained by that unit, remain separate from the case files and confidential case information of the core firm and any other conflict unit(s), and cannot be accessed by any staff outside the conflict unit. The conflict unit(s) head(s) and any other conflict unit supervisors shall supervise, direct and coordinate the day-to-day representation and case-related decision making in regard to conflict cases and conflict clients assigned to that unit and will be the final decision-maker in regard to those case-specific issues, [¶] 4. Our practice for promoting, terminating or disciplining [the Center] lawyers or staff members is unchanged. The [Center] Executive Director or his or her designee will remain the final decision-maker after considering a recommendation from the unit head or supervisor of that staff member, along with the basis for that recommendation. In evaluating that recommendation, the [Center] Executive Director will not have access to conflict unit case files, or any conflict unit client confidential information, [¶] 5. No attorney shall have access to the case files or confidential client information relating to any clients of other units in conflict with that attorney's clients, [¶] 6. Where no conflict of interest or ethical concerns exist, cases may be reassigned within [the Center], and in particular from the conflict unit(s) to the core firm, [¶] 7. [The Center's] executive leadership shall be responsible for hiring and training staff attorneys and for assigning them, as appropriate and consistent with the Board's restructuring plan, to the core firm or conflict unit(s). All attorneys and staff shall receive training regarding the necessity of maintaining client confidences, [¶] 8. [The Center] will continue to remain counsel for all clients assigned to [the Center]. To ensure that the appropriate staff member receives notices, pleadings, and other information relating to clients, individual attorneys within [the Center] will serve as the responsible attorney — the attorney of record — for cases assigned to that attorney. If those individual attorneys leave [the Center's] employ or change courtrooms or caseloads, a notice will be filed with the court and sent to all critical persons and entities, designating the new responsible attorney of record within [the Center]. As noted above, the conflict unit head(s) will maintain ultimate and final responsibility for the supervision, direction and coordination of case-related decision making in regard to conflict cases and conflict clients assigned to that unit and will be the final decision-maker in regard to those case-specific issues."
Mother submitted additional evidence that included the following: In January 2003, Ms. Krinsky requested that an attorney in one of the units "quash" a subpoena for an employee of DCFS; in 2003, Ms. Krinsky asked questions indicating that she "had knowledge" about a case in one of the units; in June 2003, Ms. Krinsky had the Center's computer administrator put her e-mail address on the interoffice e-mail group of each of the three law units, although this practice was discontinued shortly thereafter; in 2003, Ms. Krinsky imposed a policy on all three units that required her approval before a Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 affidavit of prejudice could be used on a "blanket" basis or in a "class of cases" to disqualify a judicial officer, although this procedure was suspended less than a year later; in 2005, when an attorney left the Center, Ms. Krinsky transferred cases among the three units; Ms. Krinsky once asked one of the attorneys in Unit 2 about a case; secretaries transferred among the units; the Center terminated the employment of one of the attorneys in one of the units; and the units shared the same library.
At the disqualification hearing on September 22, 2006, the juvenile court stated: "I get the impression that [the Center] says one thing and does something else, [¶] They have established a structure which they claim they strictly adhere to, but the underlying facts suggest otherwise." The juvenile court concluded that, regardless of the Center's internal operating procedures, the Center's "ethical walls may have been breached" giving the "appearance of conflict." The juvenile court indicated that it would grant an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the matter, but the Center declined the offer and submitted on the tentative ruling. The juvenile court granted the disqualification motion but stayed the order for one week. The Center timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Center Has Standing to Seek Appellate Review of the Disqualification Order.
Mother contends that the Center lacks standing to appeal the disqualification order. Child, now represented on appeal by independent counsel assigned by the California Appellate Project, joins in mother's standing contention. The standing issue arises because neither mother, child, nor the Center's Unit 3, which was the attorney of record in the juvenile court, sought appellate review of the disqualification order. Mother argues that the Center is an umbrella entity that is neither an "aggrieved" party nor the attorney that was actually disqualified.
A party has standing to seek review of a judgment or order by demonstrating that the party is legally aggrieved within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 902. ( Crook v. Contreras (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1201 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 319]; Bratcher v. Buckner (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1184 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 534].) "One is considered, `aggrieved' whose rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment. [Citations.] Appellant's interest "`must be immediate, pecuniary, and substantial and not nominal or a remote consequence of the judgment.'" [Citation.]" ( County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953]; accord, United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell Reed, Inc. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1300, 1304-1305 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 387].) "`[A] party must be "beneficially interested" (Code Civ. Proc, § 1086), i.e., have "some special interest to be served or some particular right to be preserved or protected over and above the interest held in common with the public at large." [Citation.] This standard . . . is equivalent to the federal "injury in fact" test, which requires a party to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it has suffered "an invasion of a legally protected interest that is `(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'" [Citation.]' ( Associated Builders Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 361-362 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 981 P.2d 499].)" ( Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Helliker (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1182 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 191]; see Carsten v. Psychology Examining Com. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 793, 796 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 844, 614 P.2d 276] [to show beneficial interest party must show "some special interest to be served or some particular right to be preserved or protected over and above the interest held in common with the public at large"].) "The purpose of a standing requirement is to ensure that the courts will decide only actual controversies between parties with a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the dispute to press their case with vigor. [Citations.]" ( Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 439 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 574, 777 P.2d 610]; see Holmes v. California Nat. Guard (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 297, 314-315 [ 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 154].)
Since 1990, the Center and its predecessor organization, DCLS, have provided legal representation to children and other litigants in dependency litigation in Los Angeles County. The Center is contractually obligated to the Administrative Office of the Courts to provide conflict-free representation to children in dependency litigation. The Center has a substantially immediate and concrete stake in the present litigation. The Center's interest is not nominal or remote. Further, because of the ongoing contractual obligations owed to the Administrative Office of the Courts, the Center has a sufficient interest to pursue its position. The Center meets the tests for standing to appeal. ( Associated Builders Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com., supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 361-362; Carsten v. Psychology Examining Com., supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 796; County of Alameda v. Carleson, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 737.)
B. The Juvenile Court Erred in Disqualifying the Center.
1. Standard of Review.
"Generally, a trial court's decision on a disqualification motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citations.] If the trial court resolved disputed factual issues, the reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for the trial court's express or implied findings supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] When substantial evidence supports the trial court's factual findings, the appellate court reviews the conclusions based on those findings for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] However, the trial court's discretion is limited by the applicable legal principles. [Citation.] Thus, where there are no material disputed factual issues, the appellate court reviews the trial court's determination as a question of law. [Citation.] In any event, a disqualification motion involves concerns that justify careful review of the trial court's exercise of discretion. [Citation.]" ( SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 1143-1144; see also Cobra Solutions, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 848.)
2. General Principles.
Although this court reviews a juvenile court's ruling on a motion for disqualification for abuse of discretion, that discretion "is limited by the applicable legal principles." ( SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1144.) To understand the bounds of the juvenile court's discretion in this case, it is important to review the relevant general principles.
(a) Conflicts of Interest and Vicarious Disqualification.
Conflicts of interest (conflicts) arise in legal representation when "there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of the client would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's own interests or by the lawyer's duties to another current client, a former client, or a third person." (Rest.3d of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 121 (Restatement); see Flatt v. Superior Court (1994) 9 Cal.4th 275, 282-283 fn. 2 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 885 P.2d 950] ( Flatt).) Conflicts typically implicate two of lawyers' most basic duties to their clients: the duty of undivided loyalty and the duty to protect confidential client information. ( Cobra Solutions, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 846.)
For example, absent both clients' informed written consent (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3-310(A)), a lawyer may not simultaneously represent two clients who have adverse interests. (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3-310(C); see ABA Model Rule of Prof. Conduct, rule 1.7(a) (Model Rules).) This is because the lawyer, in the course of vigorously representing one client, Client A, has the capacity to be disloyal to the other, Client B, by failing to recommend, assert, or vigorously advocate legal, factual, or negotiating positions that are favorable to Client B but harmful to Client A. ( Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 282; see generally Model Rule 1.7 corns. [6]-[8].) The lawyer would also be able to disclose or misuse confidential information relating to Client B to gain an advantage for Client A. ( SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1147; see generally 1 Hazard Hodes, The Law of Lawyering (3d ed. 2007 supp.) Conflicts of Interest, § 10.2, pp. 10-6 to 10-10 (Hazard Hodes).) Situations involving the simultaneous representation of conflicting interests are sometimes referred to as "concurrent" conflicts. (See generally 1 Vapnek et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Professional Responsibility (The Rutter Group 2006) ¶¶ 4:27-4:50, pp. 4-11 to 4-20.1.)
"California has not adopted the ABA Model Rules . . ., although they may serve as guidelines absent on-point California authority or a conflicting state public policy." ( Cobra Solutions, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 852.)
Similarly, a lawyer may not, without informed written consent, represent a new client, Client C, whose interests are adverse to those of a former client, Client D, when the lawyer obtained confidential information from Client D that is "material to the employment" with Client C. (CRPC, rule 3-310(E); see Cobra Solutions, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 846-847; see also Model Rule 1.9(a).) Although a lawyer's duty of loyalty in such circumstances runs only to the new client, Client C, the lawyer's duty to protect Client D's confidential information persists even after their client-lawyer relationship ends. ( SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 1146-1147.) Because the lawyer, who is dutybound vigorously to represent Client C, might be tempted to disclose or misuse the confidential information of Client D, the lawyer is faced with conflicting duties to his present and former clients. ( Cobra Solutions, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 847.) Such circumstances are sometimes referred to as "successive" conflicts. (See generally 1 Vapnek, supra, ¶ 4:160 at pp. 4-58.9 to 4-58.10.)
The ethics rules and judicial decisions that govern conflicts are primarily intended to prevent, rather than to remedy or to punish, breaches of lawyers' duties of loyalty and confidentiality. (See 1 Hazard Hodes, supra, Conflicts of Interest, § 10.4 at pp. 10-12 to 10-13.) "`The [conflict of interest rules are] designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct,' but also to keep honest attorneys from having to choose between conflicting duties, or being tempted to reconcile conflicting interests, rather than fully pursuing their clients' rights." ( SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1147, quoting Anderson v. Eaton (1930) 211 Cal. 113, 116 [ 293 P. 788].)
In the litigation context, in which the adversarial nature of proceedings makes the lawyer's dilemma particularly acute, courts may disqualify a lawyer who is precluded from representing one or more parties to the litigation by a conflict. ( Cobra Solutions, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 846.) Disqualification not only prevents the lawyer from breaching his or her duties, but also protects the judicial process from any taint of unfairness that might arise from the conflict. ( Ibid. [the "`paramount concern [in disqualification proceedings] must be to preserve public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and the integrity of the bar'"]; see 1 Hazard Hodes, supra, Conflicts of Interest, at § 10.2 at pp. 10-7 to 10-8.)
Accordingly, a litigant seeking to disqualify a lawyer does not need to demonstrate an actual breach of duty. A lawyer who represents clients with adverse interests in the same litigation automatically will be disqualified, as will a lawyer who switches sides during pending litigation, because both situations present an unacceptable risk that the lawyer's duties of loyalty and confidentiality will be compromised. ( Cobra Solutions, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 846.) A lawyer who concurrently represents adverse litigants in entirely unrelated matters will also be disqualified, even when there is no possibility that confidential information will be misused, because of the risk that the attorney's duty of undivided loyalty to each client will be compromised. ( Flatt, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 284-287; Truck Ins. Exchange v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1056-1059 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 228].)
In successive-conflict cases, a lawyer will be disqualified if the lawyer's representation of a current client is "substantially related" to the lawyer's representation of a former client. ( Cobra Solutions, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 847; CRPC 3-310(E); see Model Rule 1.9(a).) The party seeking disqualification does not have to establish that the lawyer actually possesses material confidential information. Rather, "if the subject of the prior representation put the attorney in a position in which confidences material to the current representation would normally have been imparted to counsel," the court will conclusively presume that the lawyer possesses such information. ( Cobra Solutions, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 847.) "[T]he rule followed in California is that the attorney's possession of confidential information will be presumed only when "`a substantial relationship has been shown to exist between the former representation and the current representation, and when it appears by virtue of the nature of the former representation or the relationship of the attorney to his former client confidential information material to the current dispute would normally have been imparted to the attorney. . . .'" [Citation.]" ( H. F. Ahmanson Co. v. Salomon Brothers, Inc. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1445, 1454 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 614].)
Accordingly, "whether an attorney should be disqualified in a successive representation case turns on two variables: (1) the relationship between the legal problem involved in the former representation and the legal problem involved in the current representation, and (2) the relationship between the attorney and the former client with respect to the legal problem involved in the former representation." ( Jessen, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 709.) "If the relationship between the attorney and the former client is shown to have been direct — that is, where the lawyer was personally involved in providing legal advice and services to the former client — then it must be presumed that confidential information has passed to the attorney and there cannot be any delving into the specifics of the communications between the attorney and the former client." ( Ibid.) "However, if the court determines the former attorney was not placed in a direct, personal relationship with the former client, the court must assess whether the attorney was positioned during the first representation so as to make it likely the attorney acquired confidential information relevant to the current representation, given the similarities or lack of similarities between the two." ( Id. at p. 711; accord, Adams v. Aerojet-General Corp. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1333 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 116] [inquiry is "whether the attorney was reasonably likely to have obtained confidential information"]; Ochoa v. Fordel, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 898, 907-909 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 277] [same].)
Furthermore, in most cases, if a lawyer is personally disqualified from representing a client in a particular matter, that disqualification extends to all lawyers in the same law firm. ( Cobra Solutions, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 847-848.) This is because "attorneys, working together and practicing law in a professional association, share each other's, and their clients', confidential information." ( SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 1153-1154.) Rather than inquire as to whether confidential information actually was shared, the law imputes knowledge of confidential client information to all lawyers in the firm, thus compelling the disqualification of all lawyers so "tainted." ( Id. at pp. 1153-1155.) This is the doctrine of "vicarious disqualification." (See generally 1 Vapnek, supra, ¶¶ 4:203-4:205.1 at pp. 4-60.13 to 4-61.)
Two aspects of the doctrine of vicarious disqualification deserve particular mention in relation to this case. First, because the doctrine is based on the presumption that lawyers within firms share client confidences, vicarious disqualification in a particular case will extend only to lawyers in the same "law firm" as the lawyer personally disqualified. (See Christian, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1000.) "Law firm" in this context is not limited to traditional private law firms, but may extend to lawyers whose association is such that they "have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve." (Model Rule 1.0(c) com. [2].) This may include "lawyers employed in a legal services organization." (Model Rule 1.0(c); see post at pt. B.2.(b) of Discussion, p. 1570.) "Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms" for purposes of the conflict of interest rules. (Model Rule 1.0 com. [4]; see generally 1 Hazard Hodes, supra, Imputed Disqualification, § 14.5 at pp. 14-12 to 14-14.) In the context of private law firms, there is no definitive authority in California as to whether a so-called "ethical wall" or "ethical screen" — a mechanism that prevents individual lawyers in a firm representing an existing client from intentionally or inadvertently obtaining material confidential information relating to the prior representation of another client — can be used to preclude vicarious disqualification in successive-conflict cases. (See Hitachi, Ltd. v. Tatung Co. (N.D.Cal. 2006) 419 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1161-1164 [reviewing cases]; 1 Vapnek, supra, ¶ 4:204.4 at pp. 4-60.14 to 4-61; St. John, Screened Out: When an Ethical Screen Can Be Used to Avoid Vicarious Disqualification of a Law Firm Remains Unsettled (Feb. 2005) Los Angeles Lawyer 29-30, 32-34.)
Second, in cases of successive conflicts, vicarious disqualification is required only if the lawyers in a firm are still "tainted" by imputed knowledge of a former client's confidential information. If the attorney or attorneys who personally would be disqualified have left the firm, then disqualification of the firm may not be required. "When . . . the [law firm] relationship between the tainted attorneys and nontainted attorneys is in the past, there is no need to `rely on the fiction of imputed knowledge to safeguard client confidentiality' and opportunity exists for a `dispassionate assessment' of whether confidential information was actually exchanged." ( Goldberg v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 752, 765 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 116] ( Goldberg), quoting Adams v. Aerojet-General Corp., supra, 86 Cal.App. at p. 1335.) Model Rule 1.10(b), cited with approval in Goldberg, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pages 765-766, addresses this issue, stating, "`When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer and not currently represented by the firm, unless (1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and (2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has [confidential client information].'" This concept is also contained in the Restatement.
Section 124(1) of the Restatement provides, "[An imputed conflict] does not restrict an affiliated lawyer when the affiliation between the affiliated lawyer and the personally prohibited lawyer that required the imputation has been terminated, and no material confidential information of the client, relevant to the matter, has been communicated by the personally prohibited lawyer to the affiliated lawyer or that lawyer's firm."
(b) Vicarious Disqualification and Legal-services Agencies.
The conflicts-of-interest principles described above largely developed and are typically applied in cases involving private law firms. ( Christian, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 997.) To some extent, cases involving legal-services agencies, including public law offices, present different circumstances that have justified modifying some of those principles. ( Id. at pp. 997-998.)
First, legal services lawyers "do not have a financial interest in the matters on which they work. As a result, they may have less, if any, incentive to breach client confidences." ( City of Santa Barbara, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 24.) They do not have to attract new clients through client referrals or solicitation, nor must they worry about retaining a fee-generating base of recurrent clients. ( Castro, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at 1441.)
Second, disqualification of legal services attorneys "can result in increased public expeditures for legal representation, and `there is the potential for a substantially increased call upon an already severely strained tax base.'" ( In re Lee G. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 17, 28 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 375], quoting People v. Municipal Court (Byars) (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 294, 301 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 491]; accord, Cobra Solutions, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 851.) Disqualification should therefore be avoided if the benefit is "only speculative or minimal." ( In re Lee G., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 28.)
Third, as a general matter, public law offices often develop specific expertise in particular areas of law, and disqualification may deprive the office's clients of the benefits of this acquired and cultivated expertise. ( Cobra Solutions, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 851; City of Santa Barbara, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 24.) Although there is no indication that any party in this case has been deprived of qualified counsel, according to the Center's Web site, "[w]ith a 185 person staff of lawyers, paralegals, and investigators, [the Center] represents more than 80% of the nearly 30,000 children under the jurisdiction of the dependency court." ( About Children's Law Center, http://www.clcla.org/about.htm [as of Apr. 23, 2007].) Disqualification of the Center in a substantial number of cases would have an impact on the availability of qualified, experienced child welfare counsel in Los Angeles County.
Relying largely on these considerations, California courts have permitted the use of ethical screens to avoid vicarious disqualification in successive-conflicts cases involving (1) a former public-sector lawyer moving into a private firm, when the lawyer was not directly involved in the relevant matter ( Chambers v. Superior Court (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 893, 902-903 [ 175 Cal.Rptr. 575]); (2) a former private-sector lawyer moving into a public law office, when the lawyer was directly and personally involved in the relevant matter ( City of Santa Barbara, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 26-27); and (3) a lawyer moving from one legal-services agency to an adverse legal-services agency ( Chadwick v. Superior Court (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 108, 118-119 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 864] [former public defender employed by prosecutor's office].) The use of ethical screens in such circumstances is also permitted by both the Model Rules and the Restatement. (Model Rule 1.11(b), (d); Restatement, § 124(3); cf. Cobra Solutions, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 852-854 [ethical screens insufficient when lawyer, who personally and directly represented adverse client while in private practice, subsequently occupies position as head of office, with power to review, hire and fire lawyers working on case].)
3. The Center Should Not Have Been Disqualified in this Case.
Applying the principles discussed above, the juvenile court applied the wrong legal standard in deciding mother's motion to disqualify. The factors set forth in Castro, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 1432, are not necessarily dispositive in successive-conflict cases when the attorney at issue was not personally and directly involved in representing the prior client. Furthermore, even if the juvenile court did not err in applying Castro, it nevertheless erred in concluding that disqualification was required in this case.
The juvenile court found, "There was no specific — to this case — conflict raised in terms of the divulgence of any confidential or privileged communication." This finding is determinative. California courts do not disqualify lawyers on conflict of interest grounds — particularly lawyers from legal-services agencies — when the lawyer has no actual or imputed conflict of interest. (See Goldberg, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 764-765 [no vicarious disqualification when attorney who worked on matter no longer associated with firm and had not actually shared confidential information]; Hetos Investments, Ltd. v. Kurtin (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 36, 47 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 472] [disqualification appropriate "`only where the appearance of impropriety arises in connection with a tangible dereliction" (italics added)], quoting Gregori v. Bank of America (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 291, 306 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 853].) Contrary to the juvenile court's suggestion, "an appearance of impropriety by itself does not support a lawyer's disqualification." ( DCH Health Services Corp. v. Waite (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 829, 833 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 847].)
The juvenile court expressly stated that the issue before it was "whether or not, inherently or in practice, the [Center] has violated the ethical constraints enunciated in Castro." The juvenile court concluded that it found "a violation in this case of the Castro and Christian safeguards regarding conflict of interest in representing multiple parties in the same action." Unlike both Castro, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 1432, and Christian, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th 986, however, this is not a concurrent-conflict case, in which the Center "represented] multiple parties in the same action." This is a successive-conflict case. As a result, a finding that the Center "violated" the safeguards set forth in Castro does not automatically compel disqualification. Castro, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 1432, was an action for declaratory and injunctive relief, in which the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Center's predecessor, DCLS, from providing representation to multiple parties in dependency proceedings on the ground that such multiple representation created conflicts of interest. ( Id. at pp. 1434-1435.) The plaintiffs argued that DCLS, which was structured into three independent practice groups serviced by a single administrative unit ( id. at p. 1437), was analogous to a private law firm, and should be treated as a single "law firm" for purposes of applying the vicarious disqualification doctrine. ( Id. at pp. 1441-1442.) The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments. DCLS did not represent private, paying clients, so there was no incentive for DCLS to favor any one client over another. ( Id. at p. 1441.) DCLS had only "one source of clients in a single kind of legal proceeding, and does not solicit clients or accept referrals from the public." ( Id. at p. 1442.) In addition, DCLS had been "structured so its attorneys and its separate groups have no contact with one another." ( Ibid.) Each of the three groups at DCLS had a policy in place "to decline representation whenever one of its attorneys had a conflict of interest arising out of pre-DCLS representation of a client." ( Id. at p. 1443.) The Court of Appeal concluded that "the DCLS arrangement" did not "constitute the appearance of, or any actual, ethical impropriety" ( id. at p. 1444), and therefore affirmed the juvenile court's denial of a preliminary injunction. ( Id. at p. 1445; see Cobra Solutions, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 849 ["In both Castro and Christian, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th 986, the separate law units under a single governmental umbrella operated as separate law firms independent of parallel units also sheltered under that umbrella.")
For purposes of this analysis, it may be assumed that a violation of the safeguards approved in Castro, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 1432, would require disqualification of both Center attorneys involved in a concurrent-conflict case, in which, by definition, both attorneys would be personally and directly involved in representing adverse interests. Nothing in Castro, however, states that the safeguards approved in that case represent the absolute minimum required to comply with the ethics rules in concurrent-conflict cases, nor is such a conclusion necessarily warranted, given the development of the law in this area in the more than fifteen years since Castro was decided.
The reference to "appearance" is not a holding and is contrary to later cases. (See DCH Health Services Corp. v. Waite. supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 833.)
Accordingly, although Castro, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 1432, describes safeguards that might immunize the Center from disqualification in all cases of potential concurrent conflict, it says nothing about when disqualification might be required in a particular case, especially a case involving a successive conflict. Indeed, the court in Castro emphasized that "rulings on disqualifications must proceed according to the circumstances of each case, in light of several competing interests" ( id. at p. 1441), and refused to discuss "possible" conflicts of a "hypothetical nature," stating that "[speculative contentions of conflict of interest cannot justify disqualification of counsel." ( Id. at p. 1442.) Castro does not support the conclusion, inherent in the juvenile court's order here, that a technical violation of one or more of the safeguards present in that case requires automatic disqualification in all successive-conflict cases or even in all cases.
This case illustrates why an automatic disqualification rule is unsound: none of "violations" of the "safeguards" referred to in Castro, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 1432, bears any demonstrable relation to the attorneys or the parties involved in this case. Even accepting the juvenile court's conclusion that the "violations" justify treating the Center's three units as a single "law firm" for purposes of disqualification, the record establishes that those "violations" have been, at most, temporary and sporadic. There is no showing that they are ongoing. The juvenile court made no findings with regard to what period of time the violations persisted, or for what particular cases the three units' separate existence must be disregarded. Finding that the Center must be treated as a single unit for all time and for all cases involving successive representation would be unwarranted. Yet, the disqualification in this case, with no evidence to link the "violations" to the particular attorneys or parties involved, implies precisely such a finding.
A simple hypothetical demonstrates this proposition. Assume that Law Firm currently represents Client A, whose interests are adverse to former Client Z, but Law Firm is permitted to represent Client A because a different attorney is handling the matter and an effective ethical screen (assuming, for these purposes, that ethical screens can be employed to prevent vicarious disqualification) has been put in place. Assume further that Law Firm represents Client B, whose interests are adverse to former Client Y, but again, Law Firm is permitted to represent Client B because a different attorney is handling the matter and an ethical screen has been put in place.
A material breach of the ethical screen in the case involving Client A and former Client Z would result in disqualifying Law Firm from representing Client A, even absent evidence that confidential information was actually disclosed, because of the risk that Client Z's confidential information might have been disclosed or misused, and because the proceedings with respect to Client A have been tainted by the breach. But, the breach in the case involving Client A and former Client Z would not justify disqualifying Law Firm from representing Client B, because there is no increased risk that Client Y's confidential information has been disclosed or misused, nor have the proceedings with respect to Client B been tainted. Yet, the anomalous result reached by the juvenile court in this case would disqualify Law Firm from representing Client B, on evidence of a relevant conflict of interest and an ethical breach that is much weaker than the assumptions made in the hypothetical.
Indeed, the disqualification in this case is not based on competent, relevant evidence of a disqualifying conflict of interest, but is the result of speculation, imputation, and presumption. The following is the evidence relating to the alleged breaches of the ethical screens in this case, and the effect or relevance of that evidence.
— The record contains no competent evidence that, in fact, the Center's Unit 1 or its predecessor ever represented mother. The juvenile court appears to have accepted the statements of mother's lawyer of such representation, and the Center has never disputed the accuracy of those statements. Assuming that the Center did represent mother, the juvenile court made no findings, and the record does not clearly establish, when mother was a client of the Center's Unit 1 or its predecessor; the most that can be inferred is that the representation began in or around 2001. The record does not indicate which attorney or attorneys represented mother, or whether that attorney is still employed by the Center. There is thus no evidence that any attorney employed by the Center is currently subject to a personal disqualifying conflict, nor is there any evidence that mother's case was so notorious or unique that it remains the subject of clear memory or is still discussed among the Center's staff.
— The present case was commenced in July 2006. There is no evidence that any of the files from mother's case in Unit 1 are accessible to, or have been reviewed or are likely to be inadvertently discovered by, child's attorney in Unit 3. The evidence, in fact, is to the contrary. The head of Unit 1 declared that, currently, the ethical screens between Unit 1 and Unit 3 are "strictly adhere[d] to and enforce[d]," and that he personally "ensure[s] that no attorneys or staff from . . . [Unit] 3 have access to the case files and client confidential information relating to cases assigned to [Unit] 1." The head of Unit 3 declared that Unit 3 "attorneys and staff . . . have no access to the case files and client confidential information relating to cases assigned to [Unit] 1. . . ." Further, none of the purported "violations" of the ethical screens occurred while this case was pending. Child's attorney in Unit 3 thus had neither the opportunity nor the incentive to exploit any purported breach in the ethical screens to learn mother's confidential information, nor is there any evidence that child's attorney did so.
— Unit 2's representation of child's older sibling, beginning in or about 2002, is irrelevant. That representation was adverse to mother — that was the reason that a Unit 2 attorney was appointed to represent the older sibling. There is no presumption or indication that Unit 2 learned mother's confidential information, nor can anything learned by Unit 2 during the course of that representation constitute grounds for disqualification in this case.
— There is evidence that in 2003, Ms. Krinsky, then the Executive Director of the Center, attempted to have a staff attorney in Unit 2 of the Center move to quash a subpoena involving a child who was a party in a federal action. Even if true, it is irrelevant to the disqualification in this case. Ms. Krinsky's action did not reveal or tend to reveal any confidential information, let alone information relating to the representation in the instant case; it is the existence of such a revelation that is the relevant consideration in cases of successive conflicts. Even if this was a concurrent-convict case, which directly implicated the attorney's duty of loyalty, there is no evidence that Ms. Krinsky had the authority to take, actually took, or threatened any punitive action against the staff attorney, or that the professional independence of any attorney in any matter has been compromised.
— There is evidence that Ms. Krinsky imposed a policy on all three offices to require her personal approval before filing blanket or class of cases affidavits of prejudice against judicial officers under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. Again, this is irrelevant. Nothing in Castro, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 1432, prevents an office administrator from setting office policy, particularly when the policy is one that precludes attorney — employees from perpetuating a specific tactical abuse expressly disapproved by the California Supreme Court. ( Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 203 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148].)
— Ms. Krinsky asked case-specific questions of two now former Center attorneys between 2002 and 2004. The declarants failed to identify any specific case. There is no evidence that mother's case was one of the cases about which Ms. Krinsky inquired, nor is there evidence that Ms. Krinsky engaged in any such conduct in the more than two years preceding the filing of this case. Absent evidence that Ms. Krinsky actually shared or misused information that she learned from the staff attorneys, it does not appear that Ms. Krinsky's conduct presents such an intolerable risk of disclosure ( Castro, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 1444) that, in September 2006, the juvenile court was justified in disregarding the separate existence of the three units for all purposes.
— Ms. Krinsky was copied on interoffice e-mails containing confidential information during part of 2003. Again, this practice was discontinued more than three years ago. There is no evidence that this occurred during Unit l's (or its predecessor's) representation of mother, nor is there any evidence that any of mother's confidential information was transmitted to Ms. Krinsky.
— Ms. Krinsky transferred cases between units of the Center in 2005, allegedly in violation of section 317, subdivision (e), and allegedly fired an attorney because the attorney indicated an intent to communicate with the attorney's clients about the transfers. This allegation is irrelevant to whether disqualification is warranted in this successive-conflict case. Even if this were a concurrent-conflict case, there is no evidence that the alleged transfers that might have occurred in 2005 were improper, and the juvenile court made no such finding. There is no evidence that, as the result of any such transfer, the Center, any of its units, or any of its individual attorneys was disqualified, sanctioned, or disciplined, or that the professional independence of any staff attorney was compromised. Nothing in Castro, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d 1432, proscribes the transfer of cases between the Center's distinct, nonconflicted units, any more than the law prevents the transfer of cases between nonconflicted private law firms. Further, the juvenile court made no finding, express or implied, that the attorney's termination was retributive, illegal, or improper, or that her firing was anything more than an isolated event that occurred long before this case commenced.
— There was evidence that legal secretaries would work in the different units. Knowledge of confidential information, however, is not automatically imputed to or from nonlawyer support personnel. Rather, under existing California authority, the party seeking disqualification must demonstrate that the nonlawyer employee actually possesses confidential information that is material to the representation. ( In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 572, 595-596 [ 283 Cal.Rptr. 732]; see generally 1 Vapnek, supra, Imputed Disqualification, ¶¶ 4:221 4:222.10 at pp. 4-71 to 4-73.) California's rule is consistent with the prevailing majority rule in the United States on this point. (1 Hazard Hodes, supra, § 14.11 at pp. 14-34 to 14-35.) There is no evidence in this case of any breach of confidence by a secretary, let alone that a secretary employed by Unit 1 in the relevant timeframe actually gained knowledge of mother's material confidential information, and was subsequently transferred from Unit 1 to Unit 3 and is presently in Unit 3. Instead, the undisputed evidence is that those in the Center's support staff are advised of and expected to abide by the Center's confidentiality policies.
— A memorandum describes the Center's new administrative structure as "unified." This is irrelevant. Both Castro, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at page 1437, and Christian, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at page 1000, approve a "unified" administrative structure. The relevant question is whether the Center's three legal services units operate independently in handling cases. The undisputed evidence is that, currently, they do.
— There is a central library for all three units. This, however, has always been true. There is no indication that such a library compromised confidentiality. It is common for lawyers from different firms and offices to use a common library — public or private.
— With respect to mother's concerns regarding the Center's "anticipate[d]" "transform[ation]" into a "sort of `public interest' advocacy and policy law firm," there is no indication that any advocacy or fund raising has actually interfered with the duties of competent and vigorous representation, loyalty and confidentiality owed to clients of the Center's individual units.
Many public interest law firms engage in advocacy while vigorously representing individual clients. (See, e.g., Federal Defenders of San Diego v. U.S. Sent. Com'n (1988) 680 F.Supp. 26; Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, Major Advocacy Report 2005 [highlighting "the year's efforts to support our assistance to individual clients by working to more broadly challenge conditions of poverty and injustice"].)
Accordingly, the juvenile court erred by applying the incorrect legal standard, and then again when it concluded, under the wrong legal standard, that the evidence warrants disqualification in this case.
The correct legal standard to apply in a successive-conflict case involving the Center is that articulated in Jessen, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pages 709-711. (See Ochoa v. Fordel, Inc., supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 907-909; Adams v. Aerojet-General Corp., supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1337-1341; see also Rhaburn v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1573-1576 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 464].) That standard is this: If the individual lawyer had a direct and personal relationship with the former client, then the lawyer and the lawyer's unit should be disqualified automatically, as a matter of law; when the individual lawyer had no direct and personal relationship with the former client, as in this case, but the party moving for disqualification presents evidence that the Center's ethical screens have been breached, the juvenile court should treat the Center as a single law firm for conflicts purposes only if the moving party's evidence establishes a reasonable possibility that the lawyer has actually obtained, or will inadvertently acquire, material confidential information relating to the former client's representation. The factors the juvenile court should consider include (1) the length of time that has elapsed since the former client was represented by the Center; (2) whether the prior case was particularly notorious or memorable; (3) whether the current attorney was employed by the Center at the time of the prior representation, and whether the attorney responsible for the prior representation is still employed by the Center; and (4) the nature and extent of any breaches in the Center's operating procedures established to ensure that confidential information acquired by one unit is protected from purposeful or inadvertent disclosure to lawyers in the Center's other units. This procedure represents a reasonable and effective accommodation that strikes an appropriate balance between a client's expectation of confidentiality, the integrity of the judicial system, and the public's interest in avoiding costly disqualifications of public lawyers that provide little or no benefit to either the affected clients or the orderly administration of justice.
The appropriate legal standard does not warrant disqualification in this case. The record is unclear, but it appears that several years have passed since mother was represented by Unit 1 or its predecessor. There is no evidence that mother's case was so unusual or notorious that, of the thousands of cases handled by the Center since, confidential information concerning mother's case is remembered or discussed, either by the attorney who worked on it or colleagues from different units. There is no evidence that child's attorney was employed by the Center when mother's case was pending, and no evidence that the attorney who may have represented mother is still employed there. The Center has instituted formal, institutional mechanisms to prevent the dissemination of confidential client information. To the extent the evidence supports the conclusion that some of those mechanisms might have been compromised since mother's case was pending, such breaches were in the past, temporary, and sporadic, and do not give rise to a "reasonable possibility" that child's attorney in this case has acquired or will advertently be exposed to mother's confidential information.
In any litigation, disqualifying a party's attorney "imposes heavy burdens on both the clients and courts: clients are deprived of their chosen counsel, litigation costs inevitably increase and delays inevitably occur." ( City of Santa Barbara, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 23.) Courts must therefore "examine [motions to disqualify] carefully to ensure that literalism does not deny the parties substantial justice." ( SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1144.) These principles apply with particular force in the context of legal-services agencies. "[T]he government inevitably incurs the added cost of retaining private counsel [citation], the delay such substitution entails, and in certain types of litigation [the client] may also lose the specialized expertise of [the agency's] attorneys" ( Cobra Solutions, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 851.) As a result, "woodenly applying [in the legal-services context] the automatic imputation rule that usually governs private law firms would be impractical and against the public interest." (1 Hazard Hodes, supra, Government Lawyers, § 15.3 at p. 15-10.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order of disqualification is reversed.