EVELYN KEYES, Justice.
Appellant Charles Blevins appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee, Diane E. Andrews, removing a lien from property Andrews currently owns. In three issues, Blevins argues that the trial court erred: (1) in ordering the removal of the lien; (2) in granting summary judgment in favor of Andrews because she failed to negate at least one element of his counterclaim and because he produced some evidence on his counterclaim; and (3) in granting summary judgment in favor of Andrews because her motion was the subject of proper special exceptions.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On May 17, 2006, Willie Dean Floyd transferred property in Harris County, Texas to Andrews by warranty deed, and Andrews filed the deed with the county property records on July 10, 2006. On July 6, 2006, Blevins filed an affidavit claiming a $14,400 lien against the property. The affidavit claimed that Blevins was owed the money because "in accordance with a contract with Floyd Willie Dean, [he had] furnished labor, services, or materials consisting of . . . moving property from off [sic] bushes, keep up-trash, doing all up-keep, lawn care, keeping people off, set-up, keep it up for over twenty years."
On May 1, 2007, Andrews filed suit to remove the lien on the ground that Blevins' "claim or lien is invalid" because: (1) a copy of the filed affidavit was not provided to Andrews or to Floyd, the previous owner, within five days of its filing with the county clerk, as required by section 53.055(a) of the Texas Property Code; (2) the affidavit asserting the lien was not filed before the 15th day of the fourth calendar month after the day on which the indebtedness accrued, as required by section 53.052(a) of the Property Code; (3) Blevins did not furnish notice of his claim to Andrews, as required by section 53.056 of the Property Code and he did not give Andrews notice of any alleged debt for labor or services; and (4) Blevins failed to provide a statement of each month in which work was done for which payment was requested, as required by section 53.054 of the Property Code.
Blevins filed a general denial asserting that he "provided for the upkeep and maintenance of the property" and "has not received the compensation due him in return for the services he has provided." Blevins' answer further alleged "by way of affirmative and/or verified defenses: estoppel, accord and satisfaction, fraud, adverse possession, and failure of consideration." No further allegations were made regarding his affirmative defenses. He also asserted a counterclaim that Andrews "has defaulted in paying the debt of $14,400" and that he, Blevins, "has performed valuable services in regard to the property at issue" and "believes that he can establish liability for these services by implied contract and that natural justice and equity based on the doctrine of unjust enrichment would require that he be compensated for said services under the doctrine of quantum meruit."
On June 27, 2007, Andrews filed her "summary motion to remove invalid lien." She reasserted the claims she made in her petition under sections 53.055(a), 53.052(a), 53.056, and 53.054 of the Property Code and supported her motion with the warranty deed conveying the property to her and several affidavits. Andrews' affidavit stated that the "property was transferred to her on May 17, 2006, by Willie Dean Floyd," that she "never received from Charles Blevins a copy of the affidavit he filed claiming a lien against the property," and that she "never received from Charles Blevins a notice of claim for any alleged debt for labor or services rendered to me or Willie Dean Floyd for construction or repair of the property." Willie Dean Floyd's affidavit averred that Floyd likewise never received a copy of the affidavit or notice of the claim for alleged debt.
In response to Andrews' motion, Blevins argued that Andrews had not shown that she was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, that her motion did not comply with section 53.160(a) of the Property Code, that Andrews might not have standing to bring her suit because she "has not shown that the Warranty Deed she received from Willie Dean Floyd is valid," and that the trial court should deny Andrews' motion because of Blevins' pending counterclaim. Blevins attached a copy of a special warranty deed dated July 25, 2000 that conveyed property with a different legal description from the property at issue here from "William Floyd, also known as William Floyd, Jr., and Willie Dean Floyd" to "William Floyd and Willie Dean Floyd, Trustees of The William Floyd and Willie Dean Floyd Revocable Living Trust." Aside from providing this deed conveying a different piece of property, Blevins did not make any other argument or present any other evidence in the trial court or on appeal supporting his claim that Andrews' warranty deed was invalid.
On August 1, 2007, the trial court entered an order removing the invalid lien from Andrews' property without stating which of Andrews' grounds it relied upon in issuing its order.
On December 7, 2007, Andrews filed a "motion for no evidence and traditional summary judgment," in which she addressed each of Blevins' affirmative defenses and counterclaims. She argued that Blevins had no evidence supporting any of his affirmative defenses or his counterclaim that she was indebted to him and that any claim he might have was actually against Willie Dean Floyd.
On December 17, 2007, Blevins filed "special exceptions to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment," arguing that Andrews' motion for summary judgment was "vague and ambiguous," that it did not present any grounds or evidence supporting traditional summary judgment, and that the no-evidence portion of the summary judgment motion was improper because it "has attached to it some evidence that purports to support the no evidence motion for summary judgment."
Blevins also provided an affidavit, which stated in relevant part:
2. Since 1986, I have maintained the property the subject of this lawsuit by cutting the grass, picking up the trash, maintaining the lawn and kept people off the property.
3. William Floyd was the owner of the property and on several occasions promised to pay me for my services but did not, until he died.
4. I filed my lien for the amount of work that I had done on this property that he promised to pay me for. I still have not been paid for the work I did on the property hence my counterclaim.
Andrews responded to Blevins' special exceptions on December 28, 2007, arguing that special exceptions were not the proper method to challenge her motion for summary judgment and arguing that her motion and accompanying evidence were proper. The trial court granted summary judgment in Andrews' favor on January 25, 2008, without stating the grounds upon which it relied, and signed the final judgment on May 20, 2008 disposing of Blevins' counterclaims. Blevins appealed.
Andrews did not file an appellee's brief. On September 8, 2009, we notified Andrews that we would set the case for submission without her brief unless she filed the brief or a motion to extend time to file the brief by September 28, 2009. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(g) provides, "In a civil case, the court will accept as true the facts stated unless another party contradicts them. The statement must be supported by record references." TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f). Thus, we accept any statements made by Blevins in his statement of facts as true. See id.
ANALYSIS A. Standard of ReviewWe review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Provident Life Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). When a party moves for both a traditional and a no-evidence summary judgment, we first review the trial court's summary judgment under the no-evidence standard of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i). Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). If the no-evidence summary judgment was properly granted, we do not reach arguments under the traditional motion for summary judgment. Id.
To prevail on a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the movant must establish that there is no evidence to support an essential element of the non-movant's claim. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); see Flameout Design Fabrication, Inc. v. Pennzoil Caspian Corp., 994 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). The burden then shifts to the non-movant to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to the elements specified in the motion. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006). "The trial court must grant the motion unless the nonmovant produces more than a scintilla of evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged elements." Flameout Design Fabrication, 994 S.W.2d at 834.
To prevail on a traditional summary judgment motion, the movant has the burden of proving that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that there are no genuine issues of material fact. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995). When, as here, the trial court's summary judgment order does not state the basis for the trial court's decision, we must uphold the order if any of the theories advanced is meritorious. Knott, 128 S.W.3d at 216.
B. Trial Court's Grant of "Summary Motion to Remove Invalid Lien"
In his first issue, Blevins argues that the trial court erred in granting Andrews' summary judgment motion to remove invalid lien.
Section 53.160 of the Texas Property Code provides:
(a) In a suit brought to foreclose a lien or to declare a claim or lien invalid or unenforceable, a party objecting to the validity or enforceability of the claim or lien may file a motion to remove the claim or lien. The motion must be verified and state the legal and factual basis for objecting to the validity or enforceability of the claim or lien. The motion may be accompanied by supporting affidavits.
(b) The grounds for objecting to the validity or enforceability of the claim or lien for purposes of the motion are limited to the following:
(1) notice of claim was not furnished to the owner or original contractor as required by Section 53.056 . . .;
(2) an affidavit claiming a lien failed to comply with Section 53.054 or was not filed as required by Section 53.052 ;
(3) notice of the filed affidavit was not furnished to the owner or original contractor as required by Section 53.055 . . . .
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.160 (Vernon 2007). Thus, Section 53.160 expressly provides authority for the trial court to hear a summary motion to remove a lien that is based on any one of the grounds set out in subsection (b). See id. Furthermore, if the trial court determines that the movant is entitled to removal of the lien, the trial court has authority to "enter an order removing the lien claimed in the lien affidavit." See id. § 53.160(e).
Here, Andrews argued in her summary motion to remove the invalid lien that a copy of the filed affidavit was not furnished to her, as the owner, or to the previous owner, Willie Dean Floyd, as required by section 53.055, that neither she nor Floyd was notified as required by section 53.056, that Blevins' affidavit was not filed in compliance with section 53.052, and that the affidavit failed to provide all of the information required by section 53.054. In his appellate brief, Blevins addresses Andrews' arguments under sections 53.054 and 53.055 only by arguing (1) that because his Claim of Lien was filed on July 6, 2006, before the warranty deed conveying the property to Andrews was filed on July 10, 2006, Andrews cannot complain of lack of notice because she was not the record owner of the property when the lien was filed and (2) that he substantially complied with section 53.054 of the Texas Property Code. He leaves unchallenged on appeal Andrews' claims that he failed to comply with sections 53.052 and 53.056.
Blevins also argues, "A constitutional mechanic's lien can exist even if the lien holder fails to comply with the legislative requirements for statutory liens." However, he did not make any arguments or file any pleadings to this effect in the trial court. Therefore, this argument is waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. In addition, Blevins argues that Andrews "produced no evidence of the chain of title of the property." However, the statute does not require evidence of chain of title. The statute requires only that the required notices go to the "owner or reputed owner." See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.055(a), 53.056(c). Andrews argues that neither she nor Floyd received the required notice. Thus Blevins' argument that Andrews failed to produce evidence of the chain of title to the property is irrelevant.
"[A]n appellant must attack all independent bases or grounds that fully support a complained-of ruling or judgment." Britton v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice, 95 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). If an appellant does not assign any error to an independent ground that, if meritorious, would fully support the complained-of ruling or judgment, we must accept the validity of that unchallenged independent ground and affirm the ruling or judgment. Id. at 680-81 ("This rule is based on the premise that an appellate court normally cannot alter an erroneous judgment in favor of an appellant in a civil case who does not challenge that error on appeal.") (citing Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993)). Because Blevins did not attack two independent grounds that, if meritorious, would fully support the trial court's order removing the invalid lien, we accept the validity of the judgment on the unchallenged independent grounds of his failure to comply with sections 53.052 and 53.056. See id.
We overrule Blevins' first issue.
C. Summary Judgment on Blevins' Counterclaim
In his second and third issues, Blevins argues that the trial court erred in granting Andrews' motion for summary judgment because Andrews failed to negate at least one essential element of his counterclaims and because he produced some evidence on his counterclaims. Also in his third issue, Blevins argues that the trial court erred in granting Andrews' motion for summary judgment, thereby impliedly overruling his special exceptions.
Blevins asserted in his counterclaim that Andrews has "defaulted in paying the debt of $14,400" and that he had "performed valuable services in regard to the property at issue" and believed that he could "establish liability for these services by implied contract and that natural justice and equity based on the doctrine of unjust enrichment would require that he be compensated for said services under the doctrine of quantum meruit." Thus, the existence of an agreement between Andrews and himself for provision of paid services was an essential element of Blevins' counterclaim that Andrews was indebted to him. See Beverick v. Koch Power, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 145, 150 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (holding that plaintiff must establish valid contract existed between himself and defendant to recover on his claim for breach of agreement to pay for services). Furthermore, the provision of services, goods, or materials to Andrews under circumstances that would provide her reasonable notice that Blevins expected to be paid was an essential element of Blevins' quantum meruit counterclaim. See Wohlfahrt v. Holloway, 172 S.W.3d 630, 634 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) ("[T]o prove quantum meruit, a party must show that (1) valuable services were rendered or materials furnished; (2) for the person sought to be charged; (3) which services and materials were accepted by the person sought to be charged and used and enjoyed by him; (4) under such circumstances as reasonably notified the person sought to be charged that the plaintiff in performing such services was expecting to be paid by the person sought to be charged.").
Andrews argued in her motion for summary judgment that Blevins had provided no evidence that she "agreed to pay [him] for anything" or that he "rendered any service to [her] or provided [her] with any goods or materials for which [she] agreed to pay." Blevins failed to present evidence in response to this argument raising a genuine issue of material fact as to any agreement between Andrews and himself or as to any services or materials that he provided to Andrews. See Mack Trucks, Inc., 206 S.W.3d at 582 (holding that once movant establishes that there is no evidence to support an essential element of non-movant's claim, burden then shifts to non-movant to present evidence raising genuine issue of material fact as to challenged element). In fact, Blevins' pleadings and his own affidavit only allege an agreement with and services provided to "Floyd Willie Dean" or "William Floyd," not to Andrews. We conclude that the trial court did not err in granting Andrews' motion for summary judgment on Blevins' counterclaims. See Knott, 128 S.W.3d at 216 (holding that we must affirm summary judgment order if any theory advanced is meritorious); Flameout Design Fabrication, 994 S.W.2d at 834 (holding that trial court must grant summary judgment unless non-movant meets its burden of producing evidence raising genuine issue of material fact on challenged elements).
This holding also disposes of Blevins' argument that the trial court erred in not considering his special exceptions. Blevins argued that the grounds for summary judgment presented by Andrews were unclear. However, as we have already discussed, Andrews' motion clearly argued that Blevins had no evidence of an essential element of his counterclaims, and the trial court's grant of summary judgment was properly supported by that theory.
We overrule Blevins' second and third issues.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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