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Hugh B. McKEEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, an Agency of the United States Department of Agriculture; Tom Vilsack, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture; Tom Tidwell, in his official capacity as Chief of the Forest Ser

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

JOHN McBRYDE, District Judge

Came on to be considered the motion of movant, Tippany Denae Grooms, under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence. Having reviewed the motion, the government's response, movant's reply, the entire record of this case, and applicable legal authorities, the court concludes that the motion should be denied.

I. Background

On November 20, 2007, movant pleaded guilty to count four of the superseding indictment, bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and 2, and count five, using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) and 2. The court on March 14, 2008, sentenced movant to a term of imprisonment of fifty-one months as to count four, and a term of imprisonment of eighty-four months as to count five, to be served consecutively to each other, followed by a three-year term of supervised release as to each count, to be served concurrently. On February 4, 2009, the Fifth Circuit affirmed movant's conviction and sentence. United States v. Grooms, 2009 WL 260612 (5th Cir. Feb. 4, 2009). Movant timely filed the instant motion.

II. Grounds of the Motion

Movant claims she is entitled to relief on the following grounds: (1) violation of her Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because counsel recommended she plead guilty when he knew or should have known her sentence would be enhanced under § 3C1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines and failed to notify her of the consequences of her plea agreement; (2) counsel's conduct described in ground one rendered her guilty plea unknowing and involuntary; (3) counsel was ineffective for failing to advise her that pleading guilty to the conduct alleged in count five required a mandatory consecutive sentence although she never constructively possessed a firearm; and (4) the court abused its discretion by permitting her to testify at her co-defendant's detention hearing regarding material elements of a crime in which she was a target without appointing her counsel.

As to the factual basis for her first and second grounds, movant contends her attorney advised her to plead guilty and stipulate to conduct that was factually inaccurate. Specifically, movant contends she never admitted to the elements of bank robbery, nor did she admit to the constructive possession, use or carrying of a firearm during a crime of violence. Movant further contends that although she told her attorney prior to signing the factual resume that she did not know her co-defendant had a gun at the time of the robbery and never went to the bank or its property, her attorney advised her to sign the factual resume anyway. Movant contends her counsel also encouraged her to accept the guilty plea so she would escape perjury charges, and claims counsel should have known she would lose acceptance of responsibility points for pleading guilty. The result, movant contends, is an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea.

As to the factual basis for her third ground, movant contends she had no knowledge of the gun used by her co-defendant in the bank robbery, nor did she constructively possess, brandish, or actively employ the firearm at any time.

The factual basis for movant's fourth ground concerns her testimony in support of her co-defendant, Anthony Williams, at his detention hearing. At the time of her testimony on behalf of Williams, movant had not yet been charged with any crime and no proceedings had been initiated against her. Nevertheless, movant contends it was error for the court to allow her to testify without the appointment of counsel, as her testimony was later determined to be perjury and was used to enhance her sentence.

III. Treatment of § 2255

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, movant must show that (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). Both prongs of the Strickland test must be met to demonstrate ineffective assistance. Id. at 687. "A court need not address both components of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if the movant makes an insufficient showing on one." United States v. Stewart, 207 F.3d 750, 751 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). Prejudice in the context of a guilty plea requires movant to show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Judicial scrutiny of this type of claim must be highly deferential, and the movant must overcome a strong presumption that her counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

Movant is entitled to no relief based on the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel because she has failed to meet the standard set forth by Strickland.

IV. None of the Grounds Has Merit A. Grounds One and Two

Movant's first and second grounds essentially contend that her attorney's alleged conduct resulted in a guilty plea that was neither knowing or voluntary. For a guilty plea to be knowing and voluntary, the defendant must have "a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence." United States v. Hernandez, 234 F.3d 252, 255 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, "[t]he defendant need only understand the direct consequences of the plea; he need not be made aware every consequence that, absent a plea of guilty, would not otherwise occur." Id. (internal citations omitted). "The consequences of a guilty plea, with respect to sentencing, mean only that the defendant must know the maximum prison term and fine for the offense charged." Ables v. Scott, 73 F.3d 591, 592 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). The defendant's representations, as well as those of her lawyer and the prosecutor, and any findings by the judge in accepting the plea, "constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of truthfulness, and a defendant bears a heavy burden to show that the plea was involuntary after testifying to its voluntariness in open court. Deville v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 654, 659 (5th Cir. 1994).

The record here squarely contradicts movant's claims. At her rearraignment, movant waived the reading of the superseding indictment, but testified that before signing the factual resume and plea agreement she read each one, understood what each document was before she signed it, and discussed the legal significance of them with her attorney. Rearraignment Tr. at 13-15, 29. Movant heard all of the elements of the offenses to which she pleaded guilty read aloud, as well as the stipulated facts, and she admitted that all of the facts were true. Id. at 16, 30-31. Movant testified that she understood that the sentencing guidelines are advisory but knew they would apply to her case. Id. at 7-8. After considering all of the aforementioned testimony, the court expressly found her plea to be knowing and voluntary. Id. at 31-31. Under these facts, it is clear that movant knew the consequences of her plea as contemplated by the Fifth Circuit, and the court cannot now conclude that movant's plea was anything other than knowing and voluntary. United States v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1998).

B. Ground Three

The transcript of movant's rearraignment hearing refutes the third ground of her motion, that she had no knowledge of the gun used by Williams to rob the bank. The following statement was included in the reading of the stipulated facts:

Specifically, [movant] drove Williams to the Wachovia Bank on August 15th, 2007, knowing that Williams intended to rob the bank. [Movant] also knew that Williams intended to use and carry a firearm during the commission of that robbery.

Rearraignment Tr. at 30. Movant testified that all of the stipulated facts were true and correct. For the reasons discussedsupra, movant's after-the-fact assertions cannot overcome her sworn testimony.

To the extent movant contends she cannot be charged under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because she did not brandish or actively employ the firearm, her argument is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent. To sustain a charge under § 942(c)(1) requires a showing that the defendant "act[ed] with the knowledge or specific intent of advancing the `use' of the firearm" and "performed some affirmative act relating to the firearm." United States v. Lopez-Urbina, 434 F.3d 750, 758 (5th Cir. 2005) (brackets and internal quotation mark in original). Movant's admissions at her rearraignment hearing — that she drove Williams to the bank, knowing that he intended to use a firearm to rob that bank — are sufficient to sustain her conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). See United States v. Thompson, 454 F.3d 459, 466 (5th Cir. 2006) (affirming conviction under § 924(c)(1) where defendant drove getaway car and knew firearm was used in bank robbery).

C. Ground Four

Movant contends she was entitled to representation when she testified at Williams's detention hearing, and that the court's failure to appoint counsel rendered that testimony invalid. It is undisputed that movant testified voluntarily at Williams's detention hearing, and that her testimony was given prior to the initiation of any proceedings against her. Movant had no right to counsel during her testimony at Williams's detention hearing, and the court expressly overruled her attorney's objection on this point during sentencing. This claim affords movant no relief.

V. ORDER

Therefore,

The court ORDERS that the motion of Tippany Denae Grooms to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 be, and is hereby, denied.

Pursuant to Rule 22(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts, and 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), for the reasons discussed herein, the court further ORDERS that a certificate of appealability be, and is hereby, denied, as movant has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

inistrative action [would] be assessed against the permit issued from the [Decision Notice]." Id. at 424.

Eventually, McKeen administratively appealed both the Glenwood District Ranger's September 27, 2002 Decision Notice and October 8, 2002 cancellation of 25% of his permitted numbers. However, both the Gila Forest Supervisor, and eventually the Regional Forester in Albuquerque, New Mexico, affirmed each of the District Ranger's actions. After these appeals had run their administrative course, in early 2004, the Glenwood District Ranger proposed a new term grazing permit to McKeen. The proposed permit would have, by its own terms, superseded McKeen's then-existing permit and incorporated sections reflecting both the October 8, 2002 cancellation of McKeen's previously permitted numbers and several aspects of the September 27, 2002 Decision Notice. More specifically, the proposed permit included: (1) a section explaining that "[a]s per [the] NEPA decision signed on September 27, 2002 and [the] Administrative Action dated October 8, 2002, permitted numbers may vary from 0-108 cattle and season of use may vary from 0-12 months," id. at 563; and (2) a section listing six improvements which "w[ould] be in place within the first year of issuance of th[e] permit," id. at 571. McKeen agreed to the terms of the new proposed grazing permit, signing it on February 27, 2004. McKeen noted, however, that he did so "under duress to reduce the stress to [him] and [his] family." Id. at 574.

The Glenwood District Ranger had contemplated proposing this new permit by at least as early as December of 2003. See Aplt. Supp.App. at 1 "This letter will serve as an [AOI] Amendment for the Cedar Breaks Allotment for the period of December 1st through the end of February 2004. Prior to the end of February a long term plan will need to be developed for the coming grazing season.").

More than two years later, on March 30, 2006, two employees of the Glenwood District Ranger's office met with McKeen to discuss issues and conditions related to the Cedar Breaks Allotment. On May 22, 2006, the Glenwood District Ranger wrote McKeen a letter memorializing the substance of this meeting and of a previous letter McKeen had sent to the District Ranger. Therein, the Glenwood District Ranger began by explaining that McKeen had raised three issues with the District Ranger: (1) McKeen indicated that he believed that the presence of the "as per [the] NEPA decision . . ." language in the grazing permit which he agreed to in February of 2004 was "unfair," id. at 586; (2) McKeen requested that his permit numbers be reinstated to their pre-October 2002 numbers; and (3) McKeen indicated his belief that the "[r]ange developments specified in the [September 2002 NEPA] decision are not all necessary and various details of the monitoring and rotation plan are not fair to [me]," id. at 587.

Responding to concerns that McKeen had expressed, the District Ranger's letter explained that he: (1) planned to amend McKeen's permit to delete the "as per [the] NEPA decision . . ." language, id. at 586; (2) would not consider reinstating McKeen's permit numbers because McKeen was "not fully compliant with the terms and conditions of [his] permit at th[at] time," id. at 587; and (3) planned to make several modifications to the monitoring and improvements sections of McKeen's permit, which would alleviate certain burdens which had previously been placed on McKeen and/or would extend the deadline for certain improvements to be made.

In response, McKeen sent the Glenwood District Ranger a letter dated October 10, 2006. Therein, McKeen noted that he "appreciate[d] the amendments" to his permit and that in his opinion "[t]he changes . . . are common sense." Id. at 590. McKeen, however, challenged the Glenwood District Ranger's refusal to reinstate his pre-October 2002 numbers, noting that the Glenwood District Ranger's "letter did not specifically state where [McKeen was] in noncompliance." Id. The Glenwood District Ranger responded by sending McKeen a letter dated October 24, 2006. Therein, the Glenwood District Ranger clarified his position regarding reinstatement and referred McKeen to a portion of the May 22, 2006 letter which the District Ranger believed demonstrated where McKeen was in noncompliance.

In response, McKeen sent a letter to the Gila Forest Supervisor, Marcia Andre, "appealing the decisions made in a letter dated 10/24/06 and written by the Glen-wood [District] Ranger. . . ." Id. at 593. Andre replied to McKeen in a letter informing him that the Glenwood District Ranger's "letter of October 24th does not contain an appealable decision." I'd,' at 608. Indeed, as Andre explained:

The decision to reduce the number of livestock you are permitted was made previously and your permit amended. You appealed that decision and the appeal process has been completed. . . . Therefore, [the District Ranger] is reaffirming a prior decision. Under 36 C.F.R. [§ ] 251.83(o), reaffirmation of prior decisions is' not appealable.
Id.

Finally, on May 22, 2007, McKeen filed a Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico naming the-Forest Service, the Secretary of Agriculture, and various Forest Service employees as defendants (collectively "Forest Service"). In the first prayer for relief stated in his complaint, McKeen sought "[a] declaration that the [Forest Service's]" October 8, 2002 and May 22, 2006 decisions to permanently cancel 25 percent of [his] term grazing permit were not supported by the evidence." See id. at 32. In the remaining prayers for relief, McKeen sought declarations that the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously and/or abused its discretion, (1) "by issuing a [Decision Notice] that was not based on data or range science"; (2) "in how" ft implemented its [Decision Notice] and NEPA decision"; and (3) "by using the now scientifically condemned stubble height methodology for managing [his] allotment." Id. at 32-33. Finally, McKeen sought an award of costs arid,; attorneys fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412.

In its Memorandum Opinion and Order, the district court analyzed McKeen's claims under the APA, and ultimately denied each of McKeen's prayers for relief. McKeen then filed this timely appeal in which he presents two issues for our review: First, "[w]hether the [Forest Service] acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, abusing its discretion, when it permanently cancelled 25 percent of [his] grazing permit?" Aplt. Op. Br. at 1. And second, "[w]hether the [Forest Service] acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, abusing its discretion, when it implemented its September 27, 2002 [Decision Notice], [and] when it modified that decision regarding range improvements?" Id.

The district court's opinion and order also granted the Forest Service's motion to dismiss McKeen's claim that the Forest Service's October 8, 2002 permit modification was too severe. See Aplt.App. at 222.

II Standard of Review

"Because none of the statutory or regulatory provisions in question provide for a private cause of action, the judicial review provisions of the APA govern this suit." Utah Shared Access Alliance v. Carpenter, 463 F.3d 1125, 1134 (10th Cir. 2006). We review the district court's decision in an APA case de novo. See Ctr. For Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509 F.3d 1310, 1320 (10th Cir. 2007).

Pursuant to the APA, we have jurisdiction to review only "final agency actions." See 5 U.S.C. § 704. An agency action is considered "final" only if it marks "the consummation of the agency decision-making process" and legal consequences flow from it. See Tsegay v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1347, 1354 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As is relevant to this case, we will set aside a "final agency action" pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 736(2)(A) only if we conclude that it was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." We consider an agency's action to be arbitrary and capricious:

[I]f the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct., 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). In reviewing agency actions under the "arbitrary or capricious" standard, our duty "is to ascertain whether the agency examined the relevant data and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the decision made." Citizens' Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. Krueger, 513 F.3d 1169, 1176 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1574 (10th Cir. 1994)). "A presumption of validity attaches to the agency action and the burden of proof rests with the appellants who challenge such action." Id. (quoting Colo. Health Care Ass'n v. Colo. Dept of Soc. Serv., 842 F.2d 1158, 1164 (10th Cir. 1988)).

Finally, also relevant to this case is 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) which provides, in relevant part:

Except in cases of willfulness or those in which public health, interest, or safety requires otherwise, the withdrawal, suspension, revocation, or annulment of a license is lawful only if, before the institution of agency proceedings there for, the licensee has been given —
(1) notice by the agency in writing of the facts or conduct which may warrant the action; and
(2) opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance with all lawful requirements.
Did the Forest Service act in an arbitrary and capricious manner and/or abuse its discretion when it permanently reduced McKeen's previously permitted numbers?

Pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 1752(a), the Secretary of Agriculture has the authority "to cancel or suspend a grazing permit or lease [for National Forest System lands] for any violation of a grazing regulation or of any term or condition of such grazing permit or lease." Accord 36 C.F.R. § 222.4(a)(4). Section 558(c) of the APA generally requires, however, that before such a cancellation or suspension may take place, the permittee be given notice of his or her noncompliance and an opportunity to cure. See Anchustegui v. Dep't of Agric, 257 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[Section] 558 applies to a grazing permit."); accord Buckingham v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Agric, 603 F.3d.1073, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 2010); cf. Smithsfork Grazing Ass'n v. Salazar, 564 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2009) ("assuming arguendo that grazing permits are licenses and permittees are licensees under § 558(c)"). Section 558(c) does not, however, "require that a [permittee] be apprised of precisely what action the agency will take because of his conduct." Lawrence v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 759 F.2d 767, 773 n. 13 (9th Cir. 1985). Rather, it "only requires notice by the agency in writing of the facts or conduct which may warrant the action." Id. (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).

A variety of Forest Service Handbook and Manual provisions, as well as Forest Service Regulations also require notice and an opportunity to cure. As the district court rioted, however, "[t]o the extent such regulations or policy statements are enforceable in [the judicial] context, . . . the [Forest Service's] compliance with them parallels the analysis of [the Forest Service's] compliance with 5 U.S.C. § 558(c)." Aplt.App. at 204.

In his complaint, McKeen requested "[a] declaration that the [Forest Service's] October 8, 2002 and May 22, 2006 decisions to permanently cancel 25 percent of [his] term grazing permit were not supported by the evidence." Aplt.App. at 32. In his subsequent briefing to the district court, McKeen alleged that the Forest Service "acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, abusing its discretion, when it did not provide [him] with due process prior to permanently cancelling 25 percent of his grazing permit." Id. at 83. In addressing McKeen's arguments, the district court limited its inquiry to whether the Forest Service complied with § 558(c). Ultimately, the district court concluded that the Forest Service did comply with § 558(c) before cancelling 25 percent of McKeen's previously permitted numbers and that "[t]he [Glenwood] District Ranger's decision not to increase the number of live-stock permitted on the allotment in May 2006 [was] not properly before the Court because. . . . the APA authorizes courts to compel agency action [pursuant to] 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)[] only when an agency has failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take." Id. at 218-19 (quotation, citation and emphasis omitted).

The district court makes no mention of the fact that McKeen did not administratively appeal the District Ranger's failure to reinstate his permit numbers in May of 2006, but instead, administratively appealed the District Ranger's October 2006 refusal to reconsider his May 2006 decision. See Aplt.App. at 593 ("We are appealing the decisions made in a letter dated 10/24/06 and written by [the] Glenwood Ranger. . . .") .

On appeal, McKeen re-urges his due process argument, requesting that the cancellation of 25 percent of his grazing permit "be overturned" in light of the fact that "[t]he [Forest Service] acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, abusing its discretion, when it did not provide [him] with due process prior to permanently canceling 25 percent of his grazing permit." Aplt. Op. Br. at 39. McKeen argues that "[w]hat the district court did not acknowledge . . . was that after each of the[] . . . allegations [of non-compliance leading up to the October 2002 permit cancellation], the [Forest Service] found that [he] was in compliance with his permit." Id. at 32. And thus, that "it is incongruent to find that any earlier alleged violations — which were obviously cured, as [he] was later found in compliance — provided notice sufficient to justify a 25% cut of [his] permit." Id. at 33.

As previously noted, however, the Glen-wood District Ranger and McKeen agreed to a new term grazing permit in February of 2004. Thus, the declaratory relief which McKeen seeks relates only to a now superseded permit. Concerned that these circumstances may preclude us from granting McKeen any effective relief, we ordered McKeen to show cause why we should not dismiss this issue as moot. See Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 587 F.3d 1245, 1250 (10th Cir. 2009) ("[W]e offer opinions only when doing so `will have some effect in the real world.'" (quoting 13B Charles Alan Wright. Arthur R. Miller Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533.1, at 751 (3d ed. 2008))).

We consider mootness as a threshold issue because "Article III delimits the jurisdiction of federal courts, allowing us to consider only actual cases or controversies." Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1311 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he crucial question is whether granting a present determination of the issues offered will have some effect in the real world." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "When it becomes impossible for a court to grant effective relief, a live controversy ceases to exist, and the case becomes moot." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

McKeen argues that his request for declaratory relief from the Glenwood District Ranger's cancellation of his previously permitted numbers is not moot because he contends that if we "determine that the October 8, 2002 action was unlawful," we have "accordingly determined that the basis for the 2004 permit is unlawful," and that as a result, the Forest Service "would be required to create a new term permit which, was not based on the unlawful cut in permitted numbers." See Aplt. Resp. to Show Cause at 9-10. We disagree.

Simply put, because McKeen has not administratively appealed the terms of the permit to which he agreed in February of 2004, he is precluded from seeking judicial review of said terms or of the Forest Service's basis for imposing them. See Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 579 F.3d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 2009) rh'g en banc granted on other grounds, 597 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2010) ("Claims not properly raised before an agency are waived. . . ." (quotation and citation omitted)); see also U.S.C. § 6912(e) (requiring administrative exhaustion before a plaintiff may file suit against the Secretary of Agriculture, the Department of Agriculture, or any agency, office, officer, or employee of the Department); cf. 36 C.F.R. § 251.101 ("It is the position of the Department of Agriculture that any filing for Federal judicial review of and relief from [an administrative] decision . . . is premature and inappropriate, unless the appellant has first sought to resolve the dispute by invoking and exhausting the [administrative appeals] procedures. . . .").

McKeen contends that even if we are precluded from setting aside the permit to which he agreed in February of 2004, his claim is nonetheless justiciable because it fits into the mootness exception for issues which are "capable of repetition, yet evading review." This exception preserves the justiciability of an issue where: "(1) the duration of the challenged conduct is too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again." See Disability Law Ctr. v. Millcreek Health Ctr., 428 F.3d 992, 996 (10th Cir. 2005) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). We disagree.

To begin, we disagree with McKeen's suggestion that if his case is moot, the path will be cleared for a District Ranger "to simply issue a new term grazing permit any time actions related to an older permit [are] challenged." See Aplt. Resp. to Show Cause at 12. A District Ranger cannot issue a superseding grazing permit at any time he or she sees fit. Rather, the Forest Service may only propose a superseding permit to an existing permittee and request the permittee's acquiescence. If the permittee is unwilling to acquiesce, the Forest Service must wait and propose a new permit when the existing permit-expires, or must revoke the existing permit in accordance with its statutory and regulatory powers, such as the powers detailed in of 36 C.F.R. § 222.4. Thus, McKeen's ability to seek meaningful judicial review of the cancellation of his previously permitted numbers was not unilaterally foreclosed by the issuance of a new permit in February of 2004. Rather, McKeen acquiesced in the cancellation, even if "under protest."

Pursuant to 36 C.F.R. § 222.3(c)(1)(iii), "[i]n order to update terms and conditions, term permits may [also] be cancelled at the end of the calendar year of the midyear of the decade (1985, 1995, etc.), provided they are reissued to the existing permit holder for a new term of 10 years." This regulation is, however, irrelevant to McKeen's argument.

Moreover, in order for McKeen's alleged injury to be truly "capable of repetition, yet evading review," he must demonstrate a reasonable expectation that the Forest Service will, in the future, take an action which relates to his permit so close in time to the expiration of that permit that he will be precluded from seeking effective judicial review. He has failed to do so. Indeed, in light of the fact that McKeen seems to misunderstand the limitations on a District Ranger's ability to issue a superseding permit, see Aplt. Resp. to Show Cause at 13 ("It is not unreasonable to believe that [the Forest Service] could take action against a term grazing permit and then immediately issue a new term grazing permit which relied upon the administrative action." (emphasis added)),"he has made no credible suggestion that the Forest Service is likely to subject him to similar actions in the future.

In sum, we have no power to set aside the term grazing permit McKeen and the Glenwood District Ranger agreed to in February of 2004 and thus, any declaration regarding the cancellation of McKeen's prior permitted numbers would be of no effect in the real world. Thus, this issue is moot. See Wyoming, 587 F.3d at 1250; see also Wallace v. Bureau of Land Mgmt, 169 Fed.Appx. 521, 523-24 (10th Cir. 2006) (concluding that a plaintiffs challenge to a BLM decision which affected an expired BLM grazing permit was moot). Further, McKeen's claim does not fit into the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's judgment with respect to this issue and remand with instructions to dismiss the issue as moot. See Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 562 F.3d 1240, 1248 (10th Cir. 2009) ("When a case becomes moot on appeal, the ordinary course is to vacate the judgment below and remand with directions to dismiss.").

Because it is moot, we express no opinion as to the merits of McKeen's § 558(c) claim. We note, however, that in Buckingham, the Ninth Circuit rejected a similar claim presented by a Forest Service grazing permittee. There, the permittee "commenced what became a persistent pattern of permit violations," Buckingham, 603 F.3d at 1078, leading the Forest Service to first cancel 25% of his permitted numbers and eventually to permanently cancel his permit all together. In challenging the ultimate cancellation of his permit, the permittee argued, inter alia, "that the Forest Service [had] failed to give him notice and an opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance with his permit, in accordance with the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 558(c)." Id. at 1084-85. More specifically, the permittee alleged that each instance of his non-compliance "renewed the Forest Service's obligations under § 558(c), requiring the Forest Service to give [him] a new opportunity to achieve compliance with those specific violations." Id. at 1086.
In rejecting this claim, the Ninth Circuit noted that if "[the permittee's proposed] approach were adopted, it is difficult to see how the Forest Service, after documenting one permit violation, would ever be able to actually render an adverse decision related to a grazing permit, because each new violation would restart the clock for the permittee to comply." Id. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit explained that pursuant to such an approach, there would be a "bottomless vortex of red tape, consisting of Forest Service issuance of notice of non-compliance, permittee corrective action, Forest Service verification, followed by another violation of the same term or condition by the permittee, and so forth." Id. (quotation, citation, and alteration omitted).

Did the Forest Service act in an arbitrary and capricious manner and/or abuse its discretion in issuing, modifying, and/or implementing its September 27, 2002 Decision Notice?

McKeen presented several arguments to the district court in support of his request that the September 27, 2002 Decision Notice, and/or the Forest Service's modification arid implementation of that Decision Notice, be set aside pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). First, McKeen argued that the Glenwood District Ranger acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting the Decision Notice because he "propose[d] a range analysis scheme which ignores the Congressional mandate [of the Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901- 1908, and the Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq.] to inventory and identify public rangeland conditions and trends." See Aplt.App. at 85. Second, McKeen claimed that the Glenwood District Ranger acted arbitrarily and capriciously because by adopting an unsuitable monitoring methodology and including issues in the Decision Notice that had not been "discussed collaboratively," the Glen-wood District Ranger "failed to insure the professional integrity, including the scientific integrity, of the discussions and analysis," in. contravention of the duties imposed on it by the Data Quality Act and NEPA. See id. at 86-87. Finally, McKeen alleged that the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously and/or abused its discretion in implementing the Decision Notice because it "did not follow the necessary monitoring process to implement [the stubble height methodology adopted in the Decision Notice]" and because it "failed to approve the projects, fund its share of the projects, or provide the materials it agreed to provide" pursuant to the mediation agreement McKeen reached with the Glen-wood District Ranger on July 27, 2001. See id. at 87-88.

The Data Quality Act, see Pub.L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(3), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153 (2000) (codified as a note to 44 U.S.C. § 3516), "orders the Office of Management and. Budget to draft guidelines concerning information quality and specifies what those guidelines should contain." Salt Inst. v. Leavitt, 440 F.3d 156, 159 (4th Cir. 2006).

In addressing McKeen's first two arguments, the district court acknowledged that "the issuance of a decision notice under NEPA constitutes a `final agency action' that is subject to judicial review under the APA," see id. at 211 (citing Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs v. U.S. Fish Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1434 (10th Cir. 1996)), but concluded that its "careful review of the record d[id] not reveal a basis for setting aside the [Glenwood] District Ranger's Decision Notice of September 27, 2002, under the standard articulated in Section 706 of the APA," id. at 216. Specifically, the district court noted that McKeen's objections to the stubble-height methodology were without merit because (1) McKeen relied on "evidence that did not exist and was not before the agency at the time of its decision," id. at 215, (2) there was "substantial evidence [in the administrative record] to support the agency's use of stubble-height measurements as a range-management tool," id. at 216, and (3) "the Decision Notice . . . does not rely on stubble-height measurements alone as a substitute or replacement for other forms of rangeland monitoring," id. (emphasis in original).

The district court did not, however, address McKeen's contention that the Decision Notice contained "issues" that had not been "discussed collaboratively."

The district court also rejected the challenges McKeen raised to the Forest Service's modification and implementation of the Decision Notice. First, the district court noted that "[t]o the extent that [the May 22, 2006] permit modifications were granted at [McKeen's] request, he is not `adversely affected or aggrieved' by them within the meaning of the APA." Id. at 218. The district court then noted that McKeen had failed to identify any other "final agency action" which he opposed and that "the conclusory references to [fencing, monitoring, and range improvement] activities in [McKeen's] opening brief fail [ed] to provide any lawful basis for setting aside the agency's decision-making under the APA." See id. at 221-22.

On appeal, McKeen appears to re-urge each of the arguments rejected by the district court. First, McKeen argues that the September 27, 2002 Decision Notice was arbitrary and capricious because it "was supposed to be a collaborative effort involving the [Forest Service] Interdisciplinary ("ID") Team, the New Mexico Department of Agriculture, Vic Jenkins (a range conservationist/consultant), and Mr. McKeen (hereinafter collectively referred to as `the planning group')," but "there were issues included in the Decision Notice . . . that had not been discussed by the planning group and that were not based on range science and data." Aplt. Op. Br. at 39-40. And second, McKeen summarily alleges that "[i]n implementing the [Decision Notice], and making modifications to it, the [Forest Service] has failed to approve the needed range improvement projects, fund its share of the projects, or provide the materials it agreed to provide, "and that "[t]hese failures are arbitrary and capricious. . . ." Id. at 43-44.

As an initial matter, the Forest Service contends that because McKeen did not raise the failure to consult argument to the district court, he has waived it. McKeen, by contrast, notes that in a November 9, 2002 letter which he sent to the Gila Forest Supervisor, he explained that in his opinion, "[a]ll of the . . . improvements [listed in the Decision Notice] need to be discussed on the ground so that all parties understand where they are to be built, who provides what and what the benefits are," see Aplt.App. at 452, and he claims that the issue was "properly raised at the district court level in the Complaint, as well as in the Plaintiffs Opening Brief to the district court," see Reply Br. at 12 (citation omitted).

The Forest Service argues, in the alternative, that "McKeen is incorrect to suggest . . . that he was not consulted prior to the inclusion of these items in the Decision Notice." Resp. Br. at 44.

Whether or not McKeen adequately pre-served this argument is, however, of little significance because McKeen has never explained, either to the district court or to this court, how his allegation that the "planning committee" was not consulted, if true, provides any grounds to set aside the September 27, 2002 Decision Notice pursuant to § 706(2). McKeen has not, for example, alleged or demonstrated that the Forest Service's failure to consult the "planning committee" was in contravention of NEPA, see Morris v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 598 F.3d 677, 690 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting that an agency's compliance with NEPA is reviewed under § 706(2) of the APA); see also Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 72, 124 S.Ct. 2373, 159 L.Ed.2d 137 (2004) ("Before addressing whether a NEPA-required duty is actionable under the APA, we must decide whether NEPA creates an obligation in the first place."), or in contravention of statutory authority, see 43 U.S.C. § 1752(d) ("If the Secretary concerned elects to develop an allotment management plan for a given area, he shall do so in careful and considered consultation, cooperation and coordination with the lessees, permittees, and landowners involved. . . ."), or regulation, see 36 C.F.R. § 222.2(b) ("Each allotment will be analyzed and with careful and considered consultation and cooperation with the affected permittees, landowners, and grazing advisory boards involved, as well as the State having land within the area covered, and an allotment management plan developed."). Nor has McKeen demonstrated that the failure to consult the "planning committee" somehow led the Forest Service to render an arbitrary and capricious decision in some other manner. Accordingly, we conclude that the Forest Service's alleged failure to consult with the "planning committee" does not provide a basis for setting aside the September 27, 2002 Decision Notice pursuant to § 706(2) of the APA.

Our decision to refrain from deciding whether McKeen. has waived this argument is also influenced by the fact that in its briefing to the district court, the Forest Service did not address McKeen's failure to consult argument and has thus, arguably waived the waiver argument it now presents.

McKeen's next argument is that the Decision Notice is arbitrary and capricious because it contains "issues . . . that were not based on range science and data." See Aplt. Op. Br. at 40. Because McKeen does not elaborate on this contention in his appellate briefing, the Forest Service alleges that this sentence cannot be construed as a re-urging of McKeen's challenge to the adoption of the stubble-height methodology either in the 2002 Decision Notice or in McKeen's 2004 grazing permit and concomitant AOIs. The Forest Service is correct in this regard. Indeed, neither McKeen's Opening Brief, nor his Reply Brief to this court makes any mention of the scientific efficacy of the stubble-height methodology. Accordingly, we conclude that McKeen has waived any appeal of this issue. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Arguments inadequately briefed in the opening brief are waived.").

The next challenge McKeen raises to the September 27, 2002 Decision Notice relates to the May 22, 2006 letter in which the Glenwood District Ranger amended McKeen's 2004 term grazing permit. In addressing these arguments, we note, as an initial matter, that McKeen has never administratively appealed the amendments made by the May 22, 2006 letter. Rather, in an October 10, 2006 letter to the District Ranger, McKeen noted that he "appreciate[d] the amendments" to his permit and that in his opinion "[t]he changes . . . are common sense." Aplt.App. at 590. Accordingly, McKeen has waived any arguments which relate to the modifications to his term grazing permit effected by the May 22, 2006 letter. See 7 U.S.C. § 6912(e); Forest Guardians, 579 F.3d at 1120. Moreover, to the extent that McKeen has preserved an appeal of the amendments made by the May 22, 2006 letter, that appeal is without merit because McKeen never presented his request that the Decision Notice be "remand[ed] . . . to the [Forest Service], with instructions to make any modifications to that [Decision Notice] in an appealable decision document," Aplt. Op. Br. at 45, to the district court, see Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LUC Holding Co., 497 F.3d 1135, 1141 (10th Cir. 2007) ("This Court will not consider a new theory advanced for the first time as an appellate issue, even a theory that is related to one that was presented to the district court."), nor has he challenged the district court's conclusion that he was not "adversely affected or aggrieved" by the permit modifications within the meaning of the APA.

The final series of challenges that McKeen poses to the September 27, 2002 Decision Notice relate to what McKeen describes as its implementation. Specifically, McKeen alleges that "[i]n implementing the [Decision Notice] . . . the [Forest Service] has failed to approve the needed range improvement projects, fund its share of the projects, or provide the materials it agreed to provide" and that "[t]hese failures are arbitrary and capricious." See Aplt. Op. Br. at 43-44. However, rather than identify any discrete action of the Forest Service which he challenges, McKeen continues to make broad, conclusory statements regarding the implementation of the Decision Notice. Even after a careful reading of McKeen's briefing and the record, it is simply impossible to determine precisely what Forest Service actions he believes have aggrieved him in this regard, and forest "monitoring and management practices are reviewable [only] when, and to the extent that, they affect the lawfulness of a particular final agency action." See Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. Alexander, 303 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002).

III

The district court's grant of summary judgment is AFFIRMED with respect to McKeen's requests for relief which relate to the September 27, 2002 Decision Notice. The district court's grant of summary judgment is VACATED with respect to McKeen's request for relief which relates to the cancellation of his previously permitted grazing numbers, and we REMAND to the district court with instructions to DISMISS this claim as moot.

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McKEEN v. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE
(Aug 2, 2010)