PARRO, J.Page 2
Lafayette Electrical Marine Supply, Inc. (LEMS) appeals the granting of a summary judgment in favor of Abdon Callais Offshore, LLC (Abdon), which dismissed its petition for a declaratory judgment recognizing its lien or privilege against a dry dock owned by Abdon. Based on our de novo review of the evidence, we affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
During February and March 2009, LEMS provided electrical materials and supplies on open account to Creole Labor Services, LLC (Creole) to be used in the construction of a dry dock structure owned by Abdon. The value of the materials supplied to Creole and incorporated into the dry dock amounted to $9,406.32. Creole did not pay LEMS for these materials and supplies.
In June 2009, LEMS filed suit against Abdon, seeking a declaratory judgment recognizing a lien or privilege against Abdon's dry dock under the provisions of LSA-R.S. 9:4502 and/or LSA-C.C. art. 3237. Abdon filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted. This appeal followed.
LEMS contends the district court erred in considering an affidavit filed in support of Abdon's motion, because that affidavit did not contain an affirmative declaration that the affiant had personal knowledge of the factual statements in the affidavit, nor did it state how the affiant had come by such knowledge. LEMS further claims that the court erred in failing to recognize its lien or privilege under LSA-R.S. 9:4502 and/or LSA-C.C. art. 3237 for furnishing materials and supplies in connection with the construction of Abdon's dry dock.
APPLICABLE LAW
An appellate court reviews a district court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment de novo, using the same criteria that govern the district court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 750. The motion should be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(B); Washauer v. J.C. Penney, Inc., 03-0642 (La.App. 1st Cir. 4/21/04), 879 So.2d 195, 197. If the moving party will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter before the court on the motion, the moving party must point out that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. If the adverse party then fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment must be granted. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2); Fredericks v. Daiquiris Creams of Mandeville, LLC, 04-0567 (La.App. 1st Cir. 3/24/05), 906 So.2d 636, 639, writ denied, 05-1047 (La.6/17/05), 904 So.2d 706.
ANALYSIS
Admissibility of Affidavit
Article 967 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure describes the type of documentation a party may submit in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 99-2181 and 99-2257 (La.2/29/00), 755 So.2d 226, 231. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. LSA-C.C.P. art. 967; Boland v. West Feliciana Parish Police Jury, 03-1297, (La.App. 1st Cir. 6/25/04), 878 So.2d 808, 813, writ denied, 04-2286 (La.11/24/04), 888 So.2d 231.
In support of its motion, Abdon submitted the affidavit of Bill Foret, in which he identifies himself as the President of Abdon and recites certain facts relevant to the motion. At the hearing on the motion, LEMS objected to the admission of this affidavit on the grounds that it did not state that the affiant had personal knowledge of the recited facts, nor did it show how he was competent to testify to those facts. The objection was overruled, and LEMS reurges it in this appeal. Abdon contends the affidavit is admissible, because Foret's position as the President of Abdon establishes his competence to testify to the information provided and demonstrates that he was in a position to have personal knowledge of the facts set out in his affidavit.
A strikingly similar situation was considered by the Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Chavers v. Bright Truck Leasing, 06-1011 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 12/6/06), 945 So.2d 838, 844-45, writ denied, 07-0304 (La.4/5/07), 954 So.2d 141. In that case, the appellant contended that the trial court erred in considering the affidavit of a company's senior vice-president, on the grounds that it was not based on his personal knowledge, as required by LSAC.C.P. art. 967. The court disagreed, stating:
The affidavit of Freeman expressly states that he is the senior vice-president of CitiCapital and that CitiCapital purchased Associates subsequent to the accident at issue. The trial court noted that Freeman's position as senior vice-president demonstrated his competence to testify as to the substance within his affidavit. . . . We agree with the trial court that Freeman, in his capacity as senior vice-president of CitiCapital, had the requisite knowledge to attest to the contents of his affidavit. We, therefore, affirm the ruling of the trial court that the affidavit of Ken Freeman was admissible in support of Associates' motion for summary judgment. (Footnote omitted).
The Chavers court further observed that the appellant had not put forth any contradictory evidence on the issue before the court. In the case before us, we similarly note that LEMS did not produce any evidence in opposition to the motion that would contradict the statements attested to by Foret. We find no error in the trial court's admission of Foret's affidavit.
Privilege under LSA-R.S. 9:4502
Louisiana Revised Statute 9:4502(A)(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Any person engaged in the making or repairing of movable goods, furniture, upholstery, commodities, equipment, merchandise, machinery, marine vessels, trailers used in transporting marine vessels, equipment or motors used on marine vessels, or movable objects or movable property of any type or description, has a privilege on the thing for the debt due him for materials furnished or labor performed.
Subsections (B) and (C) of the statute establish the remedies for the enforcement of the privilege on the thing for which the materials were furnished in order to obtain payment of the debt due.
There is no dispute in this case that LEMS did not have a contract with Abdon. It merely furnished electrical materials and supplies on open account to Creole, and Creole provided the labor to incorporate those goods into the Abdon dry dock structure. As noted by both parties in briefs, the privilege on movable property described in LSA-R.S. 9:4502 has not generated much jurisprudence. The two cases involving third-party suppliers of goods incorporated into a movable are Graeme Spring Brake Serv., Inc. v. De Felice, 98 So.2d 314 (La.App.Orl. 1957), and Melyn Industries, Inc. v. Sofec, Inc., 392 So.2d 733 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1980).
In Graeme, the plaintiff had furnished materials and labor to a contractor for construction of the defendant's tugboat, and sought recognition of its lien or privilege under LSA-R.S. 9:4502 when it was not paid for its services and materials. The appellate court concluded that the plaintiff was not engaged in the making, or manufacturing, of the tugboat, nor was it engaged in its repair, but had merely furnished, upon the contractor's order, a small portion of the materials used and the incidental labor necessary for the installation of those materials. The court concluded:
It appears perfectly plain to us that plaintiff who was not engaged in "making" or "repairing" the tug but who merely furnished and installed some of the materials used in the work, has no privilege on the vessel for a debt due by the contractor. The statute, unlike those provisions of the law which grant privileges on immovables for labor and materials, does not accord a third person who furnishes labor or materials for the making of movable property a privilege thereon for the amount owed him. If the Legislature ever intended that such person were to be protected by a privilege on the movable, it would have said so.
Graeme, 98 So.2d at 318.
On rehearing, the court remanded the case to the district court for consideration of whether the plaintiff might have a lien or privilege on the vessel under LSA-C.C. art. 3237.
The Melyn case is very similar, in that the plaintiff subcontractor supplied labor, rental equipment, and some materials used by the contractor in the construction of several large structures known as single anchor leg mooring buoys for the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port. Although the principal contractor apparently was paid for the services and supplies it furnished, it did not pay its subcontractor and eventually filed for bankruptcy. Therefore, the plaintiff filed suit against the owner of the mooring buoys to assert its privilege for furnishing materials and labor for their construction. However, the outcome in the Melyn case differed from the Graeme, case, which the Melyn court criticized for construing the statute too narrowly and reading provisions into the statute that the legislature did not intend. The Melyn court concluded that because the plaintiff actually worked on the project to install equipment, the plaintiff had been engaged in the making of the movable property and was entitled to a privilege on the mooring buoys. Melyn, 392 So.2d at 737.
Both of these cases differ from the matter before us, in that LEMS did not provide any labor or installation services for the materials it supplied to Creole for the dry dock. It is, therefore, one step removed from the position of the subcontractors in both the Graeme and Melyn cases, as it was not directly "engaged in the making" of the movable structure. Accordingly, we conclude the district court was legally correct in determining that LEMS did not qualify for a privilege under LSA-R.S. 9:4502.
Privilege under LSA-C.C. art. 3237
LEMS contends this court should recognize its privilege on Abdon's dry dock under the provisions of Louisiana Civil Code article 3237, which states, in pertinent part:
The following debts are privileged on the price of ships and other vessels, in the order in which they are placed:
* * *
8. Sums due to sellers, to those who have furnished materials and to workmen employed in the construction, if the vessel has never made a voyage; and those due to creditors for supplies, labor, repairing, victuals, armament and equipment, previous to the departure of the ship, if she has already made a voyage.
LEMS contends the dry dock structure is a vessel, and it should have a privilege for the sums due for the materials it furnished for its construction. A definition of "vessel" generally recognized in the jurisprudence is found in 1 U.S.C.A. § 3, which states: "[t]he word `vessel' includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water."
The undisputed facts in this case, as established by Foret's affidavit in support of Abdon's motion, are that Abdon contracted with Creole to complete a partially constructed dry dock for it. This dry dock has no motor or other means of propulsion, and can only be moved from one place to another on the surface of the water by being towed or pushed. It was not designed or used for navigation or transportation on water. Rather, after being moved by a tugboat from the Creole facility in Houma, Louisiana, to Abdon's dock in Golden Meadow, Louisiana, it was permanently attached to the Abdon dock. It has not been moved since being moored there. After Abdon established these facts in the evidence supporting its motion, the burden of proof shifted to LEMS to demonstrate that it could satisfy its burden of proof at trial that the dry dock was a vessel, and thus, was subject to the privilege set out in Article 3237. However, LEMS provided no evidence in opposition to the motion that would suggest there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning the nature or use of the dry dock. Therefore, the district court (and this court) had before it all the facts needed to determine, based on the law established in the jurisprudence, whether the dry dock could be considered a vessel. LEMS suggests that because the dry dock was afloat at one point after its completion, it was "capable of being used . . . as a means of transportation on water," and thus was a vessel. We disagree with this contention. After Hurricane Katrina hit Louisiana, many houses, storage sheds, and decks were lifted off their foundations and set adrift in the water; motor vehicles were similarly caught up in the rising water and floated to new locations; even fiberglass bathtubs were pushed or pulled by people to ferry children or personal belongings out of the flooded area. No one would call these items "vessels" in the context of Article 3237, although without a doubt, they all floated temporarily and were moved by wind, water currents, or human energy from one place to another on the surface of the water. As early as 1887, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a floating dry dock that had been moored in the same location for twenty years was not a vessel, but was a "fixed structure" that had been "permanently moored." See Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625, 7 S.Ct. 336, 30 L.Ed. 501 (1887). Simply calling a fixed structure a "vessel" does not raise a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, we conclude, as a matter of law, that the dry dock involved in this case, which was also permanently affixed, was not a vessel, and the privilege described in Article 3237 was not available to LEMS.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm the granting of Abdon's motion for summary judgment and the dismissal of LEMS' request for a declaratory judgment regarding a privilege in its favor over Abdon's dry dock. All costs of this appeal are assessed to LEMS.
AFFIRMED.
KUHN, J., concurs.
no idea what prompted the Officers' decision. Brinson testified that he had done nothing wrong. The Officers, on the other hand, said nothing at all, except that some unspecified "minor traffic violation" took place.
In the cases that this Court has examined, and in every case that the Officers cited in support of their position, there is at least some modestly colorable reason why the officers in those cases decided to conduct a traffic stop. That reason either came from the parties' direct testimony, or it came from some other source of evidence. McDonald, 453 F.3d at 961-62 (stop made because officer believed that proceeding on the same street after engaging a turn signal was a violation of Illinois law); U.S. v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 586-87 (7th Cir. 2000) (officer observed plaintiff's cracked windshield, a violation of the Wisconsin Administrative Code); U.S. v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 518 (7th Cir. 1997) (car stopped to ascertain whether subject of a newly-obtained warrant was present in the vehicle); U.S. v. Quinones-Sandoval, 943 F.2d 771, 773 (7th Cir. 1991) (trooper observed plaintiff run over the left and right hand fog lanes of the highway);Wallace v. Ochoa, No. 09 C 4215, 2010 WL 2330367, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 9, 2010) (officer testified that he observed driver's left shoulder and did not see her wearing a safety belt); Schor v. Daley, 563 F. Supp. 2d 893, 899 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (officers observed plaintiff driving while using a mobile phone, against city ordinance). In this case, beyond the Officers' statement that an unspecified "traffic violation" occurred, there is nothing from which a reasonable jury could infer probable cause. As it is, the inference that Brinson committed a traffic violation, whatever that may or may not have been, has no support in the record. Whitwell v. Hoyt, No. 04 C 0981, 2006 WL 469634, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 27, 2006) (denying defendants' motion for summary judgment because defendants could not offer "any individualized, articulable facts . . . that justified [the officer's] decision to stop plaintiff's vehicle"). Accordingly, Brinson's motion for summary judgment on liability is granted as to Count I.
The Officers rely on Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 1246 (7th Cir. 1994), but the case has no comparative value. While Sheik-Abdi discusses generally the concepts underlying probable cause, it considers the validity of a warrantless entry of a home based on exigent circumstances. It did not involve a traffic stop.
The Court recognizes that a colorable reason does not have to appear in the officers' direct testimony, but it must come from some other source of evidence. For example, in Rainey v. Vill. of Lynwood, the officer there could not recall why he pulled over the plaintiff, but the record contained other evidence from which it became clear that the officer told plaintiff that he pulled him over because his rental car was overdue. No. 09 C 1334, 2010 WL 2403035, at *2-*3 (N.D. Ill. June 9, 2010). The record in this case is void of such other, meaningful evidence.
C. PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST, SEARCH AND DETAIN
Despite the Court's finding that the initial traffic stop was unjustified, the Officers discovered an intervening fact — the warrant — that requires the Court to determine whether probable cause existed for Brinson's subsequent arrest. See Rivera v. Burke, No. 06 C 0734, 2008 WL 345612, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2008) ("a lack of probable cause to stop and search does not vitiate the probable cause to arrest, because (among other reasons) the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is not available to assist a § 1983 claimant") (citing Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 1999)). The Court shall address the constitutionality of the search of Brinson's vehicle and his detention incident to the arrest after this initial inquiry.
The Officers contend that probable cause existed for the arrest because the event query produced a valid warrant for an individual that used Brinson's full name as an alias. Brinson argues, however, that based on the significant physical discrepancies between him and the individual listed in the warrant, it was unreasonable for the Officers to arrest him, despite the alias listed in the warrant. The analysis, then, turns on the following question — was it reasonable for the Officers' to believe that the person they arrested, Brinson, was the person listed in the valid warrant, Jerry Talley? To answer this question, the Court turns to the following standards.
An arrest generally is constitutional if the arresting officers: (1) have probable cause to arrest the person sought; and (2) reasonably believe that the person arrested is the person sought. U.S. v. Marshall, 79 F.3d 68, 69 (7th Cir. 1996). While many formulations for probable cause exist, all of them refer to the exercise of judgment, which hinges "on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts."Maxwell v. Indianapolis, 998 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Ill. v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)). Hence, the touchtone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is sufficient probability, not certainty. Hill v. Cal., 401 U.S. 797, 802 (1971).
In the context of a valid warrant, the arrest of a person named in the warrant, even if it turns out to be the wrong person, will not violate the Fourth Amendment unless the arresting officer acted unreasonably. White v. Olig, 56 F.3d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 1995). "When an individual shares the same name as a person named in a warrant, discrepancies between the warrant and the individual's physical appearance, address, and birth date are, generally speaking, insufficient to create a genuine factual dispute about whether arresting officers had probable cause."Wallace, 2010 WL 2330367, at *4 (citing Tibbs v. City of Chi., 469 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 2006)). The Court notes that this last statement does not reflect an unwavering rule, as a proper issue for the jury may exist if there is room for a difference of opinion concerning the facts or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. See Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1985).
Here, the Officers encountered an individual with the same name as an alias listed in a warrant for another individual. Both individuals were African-American males and were roughly the same age. The crucial discrepancy, however, is the substantial physical difference between the two. Brinson was a full eight inches taller than Jerry Talley and weighed over forty pounds more. As the Seventh Circuit observed in Maxwell, "[w]hile weight is a mutable characteristic, the size of the difference here should have given the police officers pause." 998 F.2d at 435 (affirming the denial of summary judgment where the person arrested was six inches taller than the suspect). This case presents more than a trivial difference between a birth date or a name; it presents a significant difference between an unusually large individual and a fairly average one. Officer Syas himself testified that an eight-inch height difference was "significant," despite the recurrence of discrepancies in warrants. See Syas Dep. at 94-95.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that Brinson did not have the same name as the person listed in the warrant, as the Officers suggest. Brinson's name was merely one of Jerry Talley's aliases; it was not the primary name. Not only that, but Brinson testified that after he insisted he was not Jerry Talley, Officer Timothy Gaskin went back to the squad car and, when he returned, suggested to the other Officers that they let Brinson go because they did not have the right person. Brinson, according to his testimony, was rather shocked when Officer Blaydes ignored this suggestion. This testimony, coupled with the significant physical discrepancies, the name of the alias and the Officers' failure to investigate further, is enough to undermine the reasonableness of the Officers' decision to arrest Brinson. This is not to say conclusively that the Officers acted unreasonably. The Court merely finds that Brinson has put forth enough evidence to create a triable issue as to the reasonableness of the Officers' decision to make an arrest. Accordingly, the Court denies the Officers' motion for summary judgment on Count II.
The Officers in passing argue that probable cause existed to arrest Brinson based on his "traffic infractions." But these infractions are entirely unsubstantiated. There is nothing in the record to show that Brinson broke the law, that he was driving with a suspended license or that the Officers believed he was driving with a suspended license. Brinson points out that the event query that indicates a suspended license was printed over two years after Brinson's arrest. The Officers testified that they had never seen the event query. In short, it is irrelevant. The attempt to use this event query as credible evidence of a "traffic infraction" that justified the arrest is nonsensical.
As to the search of Brinson's vehicle, the Officers assert that if they had probable cause to arrest Brinson, then they in turn were permitted to search his vehicle incident to the arrest. Def.'s Resp. at 8-9. They conclude that Brinson was under arrest pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, and thus the search was lawful. But the Officers' logic is not unyielding, because the "search incident to arrest" exception is foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court's holding in Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.ct 1710 (2009). There the Supreme Court limited the exception and held that officers may not conduct "a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle" unless they have reason to believe that the vehicle may contain evidence of the crime for which the arrest occurred. Gant, 129 S.ct at 1714. The Officers in this case have offered no evidence to show that they had reason to believe that Brinson's vehicle contained, or could have contained, evidence relevant to the reason for which they arrested Brinson. Furthermore, the Court explained previously that regardless of whether a valid arrest warrant exists, a question of fact remains as to whether the Officers reasonably believed that they were arresting the right person. Accordingly, summary judgment for the Officers' search of Brinson's vehicle is denied.
Finally, as to Brinson's detention, the analysis is similar to that with respect to the search of Brinson's vehicle. The Officers once again argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because they had probable cause for Brinson's arrest, "and therefore he can be detained." Def.'s Resp. at 9. But whether probable cause existed as to Brinson's arrest is still at issue. Even if the Court examined the search and detention independently from Brinson's arrest, there are no intervening incidents in the record to justify either one. For example, there is nothing to show that the Officers saw contraband in plain view in Brinson's vehicle, or that Brinson failed to provide the Officers with proof of automobile insurance. This, in the very least, would provide an independent justification for the Officers to arrest Brinson. Moreover, there is no evidence that the Officers made any effort to investigate the discrepancies between Brinson and Jerry Talley, even after they arrived at the station. Brinson's lengthy detention (28 hours) merits some explanation. See generally Arlott v. Bradley Ctr., 349 F.3d 517, 523 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that a four-hour post-arrest detention required an explanation). And since a question remains as to whether the arrest was valid, there is no factual basis for summary judgment as to the Officers' subsequent conduct. Accordingly, summary judgment is denied with respect to Brinson's illegal detention claim in Count IV.
D. OFFICERS' REMAINING ARGUMENTS
The Officers argue next that they are entitled to summary judgment because not all of them were personally involved in the alleged Constitutional violations. Initially, Brinson agrees that Officers Pet and Patton were not personally involved in the underlying incidents, and thus summary judgment is granted as to those Defendants. See,e.g., Swanigan v. Trotter, 645 F. Supp. 2d 656, 678 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (granting summary judgment in favor of officers that had no personal involvement in the underlying search and seizure). As to Officers Syas and Blaydes, the Court agrees with Brinson that they were personally involved in the underlying arrest, search and detention, and thus summary judgment is denied as to those Officers. A question remains, however, as to the Officers that Brinson encountered at the police station.
As to Officer Alexander, the Officers state that he "worked at the district to prepare and process the necessary documents to ensure Plaintiff's transfer to Cook County jail." Def.'s Resp. at 10. According to Officer Alexander's deposition, he prepared Brinson's Intrastate Hold Affidavit, which sets forth the information in the out-of-county warrant, or in this instance the Illinois State Police warrant. Officer Alexander testified that when he completed the Intrastate Hold Affidavit, he mistakenly failed to enter either Brinson or Jerry Talley's height and weight. He also failed to include either Brinson or Jerry Talley's "IR Number," the internal record number associated with one's fingerprints. Finally, Officer Alexander failed to mark any boxes on the Intrastate Hold Affidavit that indicate the Officers' "means of identification," which could be a comparison of the individuals' descriptions, a fingerprint comparison or an admission by the person in custody. In the end, Officer Alexander included on the Affidavit only those descriptors that Brinson and Jerry Talley had in common — race, eye color, hair color and sex. Based on these omissions, a reasonable juror could infer that Officer Alexander was involved in Brinson's alleged illegal detention. Summary judgment is therefore denied as to Officer Alexander.
Finally, as to Officer Williams, he served as the Watch Commander and approved probable cause to fingerprint and detain Brinson. He also failed to release Brinson after his fingerprints cleared the system. Accordingly, since it is plausible that a comparison between Brinson and Jerry Talley's fingerprints could have proven that the Officers arrested the wrong individual, an inference exists that Brinson's continued detention was unconstitutional because of Officer Williams' conduct. Summary judgment is denied as to Officer Williams.
The Officers, as their final argument, contend that they are entitled to summary judgment because of qualified immunity. The Court disagrees. The Supreme Court has established a two-part test for qualified immunity: "(1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 639 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). Here, because the Court previously found that Brinson has presented evidence of an unconstitutional stop, search, arrest and detention, the focus of our inquiry is on the second prong of the test above, which turns on whether the Officers' conduct was reasonable. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.ct 808, 818 (2009).
The Court has already found that a question exists as to whether the Officers acted unreasonably with respect to the traffic stop, the arrest and detention. And as to the search of Brinson's vehicle, it seems to have happened prior to Brinson's arrest, without any evidence that the search was justified. Moreover, the search occurred at a time after the Officers pulled over Brinson for an unstated "minor traffic violation," and there is no evidence to suggest that the search had anything to do with either that violation or with some other criminal activity. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that the Officers violated Brinson's "clearly established" rights to be free from searches and arrests that are not supported by probable cause. See Hughes v. City of Chi., 673 F. Supp. 2d 641, 647 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (denying summary judgment on similar arguments) (citingU.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982)). The Officers are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff Kendale Brinson's motion for summary judgment is granted. The Officers' motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety as to Officers Pet and Patton. The Officers' motion for summary judgment is denied as to all Counts as to the remaining Officers.
IT IS SO ORDERED.