MEYER v. COMMUNITY COLLEGE OF BEAVER COUNTY

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Docket Number

Nos. 20 WAP 2009, 21 WAP 2009.

Advocates

Mark F. Fischer, John P. Liekar, Jr., Pittsburgh, Thomas Simon Anderson, Yukevich Marchetti Liekar Zangrilli, P.C., for David J. Meyer et al. and Timothy L. Barr, et al. Anthony G. Sanchez, Andrews Price, for Community College of Beaver County.

Judges

Justice ORIE MELVIN.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This case involves two companion civil actions brought by two groups of former students of the Community College of Beaver County, who were enrolled in a police training program. The complaints allege that after the College lost its certification under the governing statute, the students completed a substantial portion of the training but the credits they earned may not be recognized elsewhere. The plaintiffs asserted claims based on contract and warranty theories, as well as claims under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL).

Following pleadings and discovery, the College sought partial summary judgment on the UTPCPL claims, arguing that the UTPCPL does not apply to local governmental entities such as community colleges and that such entities are immune from UTPCPL claims under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act). The trial court denied these motions, reasoning that the Tort Claims Act applies only to tort actions and that the College qualifies as a "person" subject to suit under the UTPCPL.

The College obtained interlocutory appeals, and the Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court in divided, en banc opinions. The Commonwealth Court held that governmental immunity extends to all statutory causes of action against local agencies, whether arising in tort or contract, unless one of eight exceptions enumerated in the Tort Claims Act applies. The Commonwealth Court did not address the arguments presented by the parties, including whether the UTPCPL applies to local agencies. Appellants then filed petitions for allowance of appeal, which were granted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether governmental immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act extends to all statutory causes of action against local agencies, regardless of whether they arise in tort or contract.
Whether the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) applies to local governmental entities such as community colleges.
Whether the Tort Claims Act's immunity provisions should be interpreted to bar UTPCPL claims against local agencies unless the claims fall within one of the eight statutory exceptions.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

The Tort Claims Act is focused on tort claims, as reflected in its original title and statutory language concerning "injury to a person or property," and does not extend immunity to contract-based claims.
The Commonwealth Court's broad holding that immunity applies to all statutory causes of action is unprecedented and disruptive, potentially affecting many statutory schemes that provide monetary remedies against governmental entities.
The distinction between tort and contract claims remains crucial to the application of governmental immunity.

Appellee (Community College) Arguments

The recodification of the Tort Claims Act into the Judicial Code broadened the immunity provision beyond tort claims, rendering the "tort" label outdated.
Governmental immunity applies to all claims unless specifically waived by statute, and targeted statutory remedies against government entities are exceptions to this general immunity.
The claims against the College fall within the statutory definition of damages caused by injury to person or property.
Recognizing a tort-contract distinction for immunity purposes could encourage litigants to evade immunity by framing claims as contract-based.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Snead v. SPCA of Pa., 604 Pa. 166, 985 A.2d 909 (2009)	Definition of "local agency" under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act and confirmation that immunity applies primarily to tort claims.	Used to establish that the College qualifies as a local agency and that the Tort Claims Act is concerned with tort claims.
Hazleton Area Sch. Dist. v. Bosak, 671 A.2d 277 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1996)	Distinction between tort law focused on injury and contract law focused on bargained-for expectations.	Supported the court's conclusion that governmental immunity under the Tort Claims Act is tied to tort principles and does not extend to contract claims.
Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. The Architectural Studio, 581 Pa. 454, 866 A.2d 270 (2005)	Recognition of limited expansion of tort doctrine to certain economic injuries absent contractual privity.	Referenced to note that blurring of tort and contract lines occurs only in limited, justified circumstances.
Matarazzo v. Millers Mutual Group, Inc., 927 A.2d 689 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2007)	Traditional inquiry whether a claim sounds in tort or contract for applying governmental immunity.	Referenced in the concurring opinion to contrast the Commonwealth Court's abandonment of this approach.
Com. Dept. of Transportation v. Municipal Authority of the Borough of West View, 919 A.2d 343 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2007), aff'd 594 Pa. 409, 936 A.2d 487 (2007)	Contract-based claims are not barred by the Tort Claims Act immunity provisions.	Used to support the distinction between tort and contract claims in immunity analysis.
Johnson v. Hyundai Motor America, 698 A.2d 631 (Pa.Super. 1997)	UTPCPL proscribes a wide range of conduct without differentiating tort-like and contract-like violations.	Cited by the Commonwealth Court majority and discussed in the concurring opinion regarding the nature of UTPCPL claims.
Commonwealth ex rel. Creamer v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974)	UTPCPL is a remedial statute to be liberally construed to protect consumers from unfair practices.	Referenced in concurring opinion to emphasize the broad remedial purpose of the UTPCPL.
Commonwealth v. Peoples Benefit Services, Inc., 923 A.2d 1230 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2007)	UTPCPL's broad scope in prohibiting unfair or deceptive business practices.	Used in concurring opinion to support the liberal construction of the UTPCPL.
Trizechahn Gateway LLC v. Titus, 601 Pa. 637, 976 A.2d 474 (2009)	Litigants can recover counsel fees from an adverse party if there is express statutory authorization.	Referenced in concurring opinion regarding the availability of attorney's fees under the UTPCPL.
Huffman v. Borough of Millvale, 139 Pa.Cmwlth. 349, 591 A.2d 1137 (1991)	Legislature did not intend to include governmental entities within the definition of "persons" subject to UTPCPL liability unless expressly stated.	Referenced in note discussing whether governmental entities are subject to UTPCPL private rights of action.
Leonard v. Masterson, 70 A.D.3d 697, 896 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)	The term "person" generally does not include a governmental entity unless expressly defined to do so.	Used to support the argument that governmental entities may not be included under the UTPCPL's definition of "persons."

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the Commonwealth Court's holding that governmental immunity extends to all statutory causes of action against local agencies, regardless of whether they arise in tort or contract, subject only to the eight exceptions enumerated in the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. The Court found this approach unsustainable, emphasizing that the statutory language conferring immunity and its exceptions pertain specifically to conduct causing "injury to a person or property," reflecting traditional tort law principles.

The Court noted that contract law primarily protects bargained-for expectations, which is distinct from the tort-based focus of the Tort Claims Act. The Court rejected the Commonwealth Court's broad application of immunity to contract claims, reaffirming the historical and legislative intent that immunity applies principally to tort claims.

The Court also addressed the College's argument that the recodification of the statute under the Judicial Code broadened immunity beyond tort claims. The Court disagreed, observing that the immunity provision was always captioned "Governmental immunity generally" and that the recodification did not substantively alter the statute's tort-based focus.

The Court declined to address other challenges raised by the College that were not addressed by the Commonwealth Court, as those exceed the scope of the grant of appeal and remain for the Commonwealth Court's consideration on remand.

Accordingly, the Court held that governmental immunity does not extend to all statutory causes of action, regardless of whether they sound in tort or contract, and vacated the Commonwealth Court's order, remanding for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Holding and Implications

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that governmental immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act does not extend to all statutory causes of action against local agencies, but is limited to tort claims and does not bar contract-based statutory claims such as those under the UTPCPL.

The direct effect of this decision is to vacate the Commonwealth Court's ruling that extended immunity broadly to all statutory claims, and to remand the case for further proceedings consistent with the Court's clarification of the scope of governmental immunity. No new precedent was set beyond reaffirming the tort-based focus of the Tort Claims Act's immunity provisions and rejecting the broad immunity interpretation. The Court also left unresolved the question of whether the UTPCPL applies to local governmental entities, delegating that issue back to the Commonwealth Court for initial determination.

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Da v. d J. MEYER, Dallas Berry, Charles J. Brown, Jeremy Lee Fox, Martin Gorecki, Anthony J. Hollibaugh, Lisa L. Salyers, Rochell Sykes, Joseph W. Vucick, Da

OPINION

Justice SAYLOR.

At issue is the Commonwealth Court's holding that governmental immunity extends to all statutory causes of action, whether arising in tort or contract, subject only to the eight exceptions enumerated in the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.

The two underlying civil cases are companion ones, involving similar claims by two separate groups of former students of Appellee, Community College of Beaver County, who were enrolled in a police training program. According to the averments of the complaints, each group had completed a substantial portion of the training when the College lost its certification under the governing statute. See 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 2161 — 2171. There are some fairly egregious failures on the part of the College alleged, and, apparently, as a result of the decertification, the credits earned by Appellants may not be recognized elsewhere. In the complaints, Appellants advanced contract and warranty theories, as well as claims under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.

Act of Nov. 24, 1976, P.L. 1166, No. 260 (as amended 73 P.S. §§ 201-1 — 201-9.3) (the "UTPCPL").

Following the close of pleadings and discovery, the College sought partial summary judgment on the UTPCPL claims. In relevant part, it argued that the UTPCPL does not apply in the first instance to local governmental entities such as community colleges, and, moreover, local agencies are immune from UTPCPL claims under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, as recodified in the Judicial Code. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541 (providing that "no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency," subject to eight exceptions enumerated in the companion provisions of Section 8542).

It is undisputed that the College is a local agency for purposes of governmental immunity. See generally Snead v. SPCA of Pa., 604 Pa. 166, 172-74, 985 A.2d 909, 913-14 (2009) (discussing the meaning of the term "local agency" in the context of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act).

Act of Nov. 26, 1978, P.L. 1399, No. 330 (codified as amended 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541 — 8542) (hereinafter the "Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act" or the "Tort Claims Act").

Ultimately, the common pleas court denied the motions, on the ground that the statutory prescription for governmental immunity is directed to tort actions; the UTPCPL subsumes causes of action grounded in contract; and the College falls within the broad definition of a "person" subject to suit under the UTPCPL. See 73 P.S. § 201-2 (defining "persons" subject to UTPCPL claims as "natural persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships, incorporated or unincorporated associations, and any other legal entities").

The College obtained certifications to support permissive interlocutory appeals, and the Commonwealth Court accepted the appeals and reversed in divided, en banc opinions. See Meyer v. Cmty. Coll. of Beaver County, 965 A.2d 406 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (en banc); Barr v. Cmty. Coll. of Beaver County, 968 A.2d 235 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2009) (en banc). The majority holdings were based on the notion — not advanced by the litigants — that local agencies are immune from all statutory causes of action, whether arising in contract or tort, as long as they do not implicate any of the eight exceptions to governmental immunity. See Meyer, 965 A.2d at 413 ("[I]mmunity from statutory damages is only waived for negligent acts within the exceptions enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)."); Barr, 968 A.2d at 239 (applying identical reasoning). In light of this perspective concerning broad immunity relative to statutory causes of action, the majority declined to address the arguments that were presented by the litigants, including the College's contention that the UTPCPL does not, on its own terms, apply against local agencies of the Commonwealth. See Meyer, 965 A.2d at 410. Judge Butler dissented in both cases, without opinion.

Appellants filed timely petitions for allowance of appeal, which we allowed to consider the correctness of the approach to governmental immunity crafted by the Commonwealth Court. As our review centers on a question of law, it is plenary.

Presently, Appellants criticize the Commonwealth Court for raising the dispositive issue sua sponte, highlighting that the College previously, consistently had accepted that the Tort Claims Act was concerned with matters arising in tort and not in contract. See, e.g., Brief for College, Meyer v. Cmty. Coll. of Beaver County, 965 A.2d 406 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2009) (No. 11345 of 2002), 2008 WL 6041567, at *12-21 (reflecting the College's framing of its relevant contentions to the Commonwealth Court in terms of the tort/contract distinction applicable in the immunity setting). Appellants rely on the original title of the enactment — the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act — as encapsulating its focus; the statute's foundational concern with "injury to a person or property," as distinguished from disappointed contract-based expectations; and the numerous expressions of Pennsylvania courts reflecting this limited scope. According to Appellants, the Commonwealth Court's holding is ground-breaking and "havoc wreaking," Brief for Appellants at 13, in light of the many statutory schemes providing for monetary redress against governmental entities. See, e.g., 62 Pa.C.S. § 3935 (providing for damages, penalties and attorney's fees in connection with the implementation of the Government Procurement Code). Contrary to the Commonwealth Court's decision, Appellants assert that it matters — and, indeed, remains crucial — to the appropriate application of immunity whether a claim sounds in contract or tort.

See, e.g., Snead, 604 Pa. at 170 n. 2, 985 A.2d at 911 n. 2 ("The Tort Claims Act prohibits, with certain narrow exceptions, tort claims against local agencies." (emphasis added)); Flood v. Silfies, 933 A.2d 1072, 1076 n. 7 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2007) (indicating that the "overall purpose of the [Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act] is to limit governmental exposure to tort liability for its acts" (emphasis added)).

According to the College, although the legislative conferral of immunity arose under the former Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, upon recodification, it took on the broader title: "Governmental immunity generally." See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541. Thus, the College regards the tort rubric associated with the statute as outdated and as merely reflecting a misnomer. See Brief for Appellee at 6 (contending that the "commonly used `Tort Claims Act' moniker erroneously used by the parties is simply a remnant from prior legislation which has long been repealed"). The College argues that there is no attempt, within the Tort Claims Act, as codified in the Judicial Code, to limit the immunity afforded to tort actions. With regard to the series of statutes referenced by Appellants embodying statutory damages remedies against governmental entities, the College acknowledges that targeted enactments control over the more general provision for governmental immunity. It maintains, nonetheless, that, in the absence of such specific provision for monetary relief against the government, immunity applies. See Brief for Appellee at 7-8 ("To suggest that the legislature enacted laws specific to government entities only to preclude any action against a government entity based on that law pursuant to governmental immunity is absurd."). Addressing the specific language of Sections 8541 and 8542, the College asserts that the claims against it "fall within the legislative definition of `damages on account of any injury to a person or property,"' id. at 8, albeit without further elaboration of this position. Finally, the College envisions that the recognition of a tort-versus-contract distinction, for immunity purposes, will yield efforts on the part of litigants to subvert the statute's purposes via advancement of "pseudo-contract" actions.

Upon our review, we agree with Appellants that the approach taken by the Commonwealth Court is not sustainable. As Appellants ably explain, the language of the statute conferring governmental immunity, and of that implementing the exceptions, pertains to conduct causing "injury to a person or property." 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541, 8542. The Commonwealth Court previously has recognized that these terms reflect the main policy consideration historically underlying tort law, whereas, the central focus of contract law is the protection of bargained-for expectations. See Hazleton Area Sch. Dist. v. Bosak, 671 A.2d 277, 282-483 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1996).

While the historical line of demarcation between tort and contract has been blurred in some specific circumstances, generally this has occurred in a controlled fashion and upon the Court's acceptance of some special justification. For example, the Court has sanctioned a limited expansion of tort doctrine to encompass foreseeable economic injury occasioned by certain categories of persons collaterally concerned with bargained-for expectations. See, e.g., Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. The Architectural Studio, 581 Pa. 454, 479-82, 866 A.2d 270, 285-87 (2005) (recognizing a "narrowly tailored" cause of action for negligent misrepresentation by an architect in the absence of contractual privity).

In line with the extant understanding of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, we believe the Legislature centered the immunity there conferred on "injury to a person or property" as a reflection of traditional tort jurisprudence. Accord supra note 4 (citing cases reflecting the long-prevailing understanding concerning the Tort Claims Act's reach). We also agree with Appellants that nothing about the recodification of the immunity statute within the Judicial Code altered this substantive intent. In response to the College's contention that the title changed, we observe that the central conferral of immunity was captioned "Governmental immunity generally" from its inception. See Act of Nov. 26, 1978, P.L. 1399, No. 330, § 201. Furthermore, we credit Appellants' position that, by suggesting that the Tort Claims Act impairs the enforceability of contractual relationships with the government, the Commonwealth Court's holding may have unintended effects which are best to be avoided.

Finally, in addition to defending the Commonwealth Court's holding, the College also seeks to advance the challenges that it actually presented to the intermediate appellate court, but which were not addressed there. Such arguments, however, exceed the scope of our allocatur grant, and it remains the purview of the Commonwealth Court to address them in the first instance.

We hold that governmental immunity does not extend to all statutory causes of action, regardless of whether they sound in tort or contract.

Responding to the concurring opinion, if not otherwise clear from our discussion, the phrase "all statutory causes of action" — as used in our holding above — subsumes private actions authorized by the UTPCPL. Thus, while the concurrence complains that we should address "the Commonwealth Court's determination that a local agency cannot be held liable for damages under the UTPCPL unless the claim falls within one of the eight exceptions to immunity codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)," Concurring Opinion, op. at 547, 2 A.3d at 504, in point of fact, this is precisely what we have done by rejecting that determination.
To the degree private rights of action against the government exist at all under the UTPCPL, we take no issue with the concurrence's main substantive point that Tort Claims Act immunity would be implicated only where the gravamen of a claim sounds in negligence. As previously noted, however, the College has raised and preserved the threshold issue of whether the legislature intended for the government to be subject to private actions under the UTPCPL in the first instance, since governmental entities are not expressly included in the statutory definition of "persons" subject to such liability. See Brief for Appellee at 19-21 (citing 73 P.S. § 201-2(2) (definition of "person"), 201-9.2 (providing for private actions based on prohibited conduct or omissions by "any person")). In support of its position, the College references the reasoning contained in a line of Commonwealth Court opinions holding that the Legislature did not intend to include governmental entities within a listing of persons and entities which might technically encompass them, where it did not include the governmental expressly. See, e.g., Huffman v. Borough of Millvale, 139 Pa.Cmwlth. 349, 352, 591 A.2d 1137, 1139 (1991). The College's position in this regard also finds support in the law of at least some other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Leonard v. Masterson, 70 A.D.3d 697, 896 N.Y.S.2d 358, 359 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) ("It has long been the law . . . that the term `person' generally does not include a governmental entity unless a statutory definition expressly includes that governmental entity within the meaning of the term.") (citations omitted).
If the College is correct on this threshold issue, there is no need for courts to sort through the litany of unlawful practices set forth in the UTPCPL, to determine which may sound in contract and which may sound in negligence, in order to address governmental immunity. Accordingly, before embarking on a course which may never have been envisioned by the General Assembly, we presume that the Commonwealth Court will first apply the more rational approach of determining the legislative intent as to the availability of a private right of action under the UTPCPL against the government in the first instance.
Again, as this issue is outside the scope of our allocatur grant and is one of several which may need to be addressed to achieve a final resolution, our decision is to return the case to the Commonwealth Court to administer its own appellate responsibilities as the court of original jurisdiction.

The order of the Commonwealth Court is vacated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

Chief Justice CASTILLE and Justices EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY join the opinion.

Justice ORIE MELVIN files a concurring opinion.

Justice ORIE MELVIN.

I agree with the Majority that 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541 — 8542 limits governmental immunity "as a reflection of traditional tort jurisprudence" and that the official title of the statute does not prove otherwise. Majority Op. at 545, 2 A.3d at 502-03. Nonetheless, I write separately because I believe we should also address the Commonwealth Court's determination that a local agency cannot be held liable for damages under the UTPCPL unless the claim falls within one of the eight exceptions to immunity codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b). See Meyer v. Cmty. Coll. of Beaver County, 965 A.2d 406, 412 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2009) ( en banc); Barr v. Cmty. Coll. of Beaver County, 968 A.2d 235, 239 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2009) ( en banc). The parties have briefed this issue of first impression, which was decided on the merits in two published opinions by an en banc panel of the Commonwealth Court, and it is clearly encompassed by our grant of review. Therefore, I offer the following observations.

In resolving immunity challenges under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act ("Tort Claims Act"), the Commonwealth Court usually inquires as to whether the underlying cause of action sounds in tort or in contract. See generally Matarazzo v. Millers Mutual Group, Inc., 927 A.2d 689 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2007) ( en banc) (holding that a municipal authority was entitled to immunity under section 8542 because the plaintiffs' promissory estoppel claim against the authority actually sounded in tort). If the claim is tort-based, it is barred by the immunity provisions of the Tort Claims Act unless it falls within an exception codified at section 8542(b). Id. at 694. If the claim is contract-based, however, it is not precluded by the Act. See, e.g., Com. Dept. of Transportation v. Municipal Authority of the Borough of West View, 919 A.2d 343 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2007), aff'd. 594 Pa. 409, 936 A.2d 487 (2007).

In the instant case, the Commonwealth Court abandoned that approach for various reasons. Among other things, the Commonwealth Court refused to utilize the traditional analysis because the UTPCPL proscribes a wide range of conduct without differentiating between "tort-like" and "contract-like" violations. Meyer, 965 A.2d at 414 (citing Johnson v. Hyundai Motor America, 698 A.2d 631 (Pa.Super. 1997)). The Court also found that consumer protection claims warrant disparate treatment because the UTPCPL enables plaintiffs to recover treble damages and attorneys' fees. Id. Thus, although it conceded that a common law breach of warranty claim might be actionable under the UTPCPL, the Commonwealth Court concluded that a party cannot assert a consumer protection claim against a local agency unless it falls within an exception listed in section 8542(b).

I take issue with the Commonwealth Court's reasoning because it ignores the legislative intent behind the UTPCPL and elevates form over substance. The UTPCPL is a remedial statute that prohibits service providers and other merchants from engaging in unfair business tactics; enacted in an effort to combat fraud, the statute is to be liberally construed to achieve its objective. See Commonwealth ex rel. Creamer v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812, 817 (1974); see also Commonwealth v. Peoples Benefit Services, Inc., 923 A.2d 1230, 1236 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2007) ("the UTPCPL is to be construed liberally to effectuate its objective of protecting consumers of this Commonwealth from fraud and unfair or deceptive business practices."). Consistent with its stated purpose, the law is broad in scope and applies to the "sale or distribution of any services . . . directly or indirectly affecting the people of this Commonwealth." 73 P.S. § 201-2(3). Furthermore, as the Commonwealth Court acknowledged in Meyer, supra at 414, the UTPCPL forbids certain acts that would enable the aggrieved party to sue for breach of contract in appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(v)-(vii) (relating to representations by sellers concerning non-conforming goods or services).

The Commonwealth Court downplayed these considerations and emphasized minor distinctions between the UTPCPL and common law causes of action. In my view, the legislature's failure to classify prohibited acts as contractual or tort-based violations should not prevent an individual from suing a government agency under the UTPCPL when the action relates to a contract dispute. The Commonwealth Court's narrow construction hinders the application of a law that was clearly intended to govern all types of service agreements. Moreover, I am not persuaded that the Tort Claims Act precludes contract-based UTPCPL claims simply because the statute gives courts discretionary authority to award treble damages and attorneys' fees. See 73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a). Appellants are not sure to recover treble damages in this case, and I would not deprive them of the opportunity to seek attorneys' fees under a statute that embodies a legislative effort to place consumers and sellers on equal footing. See Trizechahn Gateway LLC v. Titus, 601 Pa. 637, 976 A.2d 474, 482 (2009) (as a rule, litigants in this Commonwealth can recover counsel fees from an adverse party if there is express statutory authorization).

Appellants invoked the UTPCPL based on allegations that the College breached a contractual obligation to provide a certificate program in police technology that was designed to meet specific instructional requirements for students interested in pursuing a career in law enforcement. I would direct the Commonwealth Court to examine the pleadings on remand to determine whether Appellants' claims satisfy the UTPCPL. If sufficient facts have been pled, the Commonwealth Court should then ascertain whether the claims sound in tort or in contract and dispose of the matter accordingly.