BARNETT v. SUPERIOR COURT OF BUTTE COUNTY

OPINION

CHIN, J. —

Petitioner Lee Max Barnett is under a judgment of death. He filed in the superior court a motion for postconviction discovery under Penal Code section 1054.9 (section 1054.9). We granted review to decide important issues regarding that section. We reach the following conclusions:

(1) Because section 1054.9 provides only for specific discovery and not the proverbial "fishing expedition" for anything that might exist, defendants seeking discovery beyond recovering what the prosecution had provided to the defense before trial must show a reasonable basis to believe that specific requested materials actually exist. But they do not additionally have to show that they are material within the meaning of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194] ( Brady) and its progeny.

(2) Section 1054.9 does not govern materials in the possession of out-of-state law enforcement agencies that merely provided the prosecution with information or assistance under the circumstances of this case.

In 1988, in the Butte County Superior Court, petitioner was convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances, as well as other crimes, and was sentenced to death. We affirmed the judgment. ( People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384].) We have subsequently denied two habeas corpus petitions that are irrelevant to the instant matter, one after issuing an order to show cause and an opinion. ( In re Barnett (2003) 31 Cal.4th 466 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 108, 73 P.3d 1106] [concerning pro se habeas corpus petitions filed by capital inmates already represented by counsel].)

We briefly summarized the facts underlying petitioner's conviction in In re Barnett: "It suffices to note that a jury convicted petitioner in 1988 of one count of assault with a firearm, several counts of kidnapping and robbery, and one count of first degree murder. Petitioner committed his crimes upon encountering the victims unexpectedly in 1986 at a remote campsite in a Butte County gold mining area. The evidence at trial included testimony from persons present at the encounter, including petitioner, and from others who had contact with petitioner the summer before the crimes occurred or immediately afterward." ( In re Barnett, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 469.) At the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecution also presented evidence that petitioner had committed numerous other violent crimes and had various prior felony convictions. This criminal behavior and these convictions occurred between 1965 and 1988 in Canada, New York, Florida, Arizona, and Massachusetts, as well as California. ( People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1080-1081.)

In July 2004, petitioner filed a discovery motion in the Butte County Superior Court pursuant to section 1054.9. As the Court of Appeal summarized, "In his discovery motion, Barnett sought various materials, including materials now missing from the numbered discovery provided during trial, materials the prosecution allegedly failed to produce in response to a discovery order during trial, and various other materials." (Much of the following discussion is taken from the Court of Appeal opinion.) Informal communications between the parties resolved some of the discovery issues, but the parties disagreed regarding other requests, and they litigated the matter in superior court. At one point, petitioner filed a brief that identified 60 items or categories of items he was seeking to discover. After further informal discussions, petitioner's counsel informed the court that the prosecution had produced over 300 pages of discovery materials and 64 compact discs of audiotape recordings. But areas of disagreement remained. Ultimately, the superior court issued a ruling, granting some of the disputed discovery requests and denying others.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal. He sought to compel the superior court to grant the discovery requests it had denied. At issue was the superior court's denial, in whole or in part, of 24 different discovery requests. The Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ of mandate and ultimately addressed the 24 discovery requests in dispute in an exhaustive opinion. It granted the petition in part and denied it in part, and we granted review on specified issues. ( Barnett v. Superior Court (Apr. 25, 2007, S150229).)

While the case was pending in this court, the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation filed an amicus curiae brief arguing that section 1054.9 was an invalid amendment of the statutory provisions of Proposition 115, enacted in 1990. In January 2008, we transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal to decide this question in the first instance. The Court of Appeal found that section 1054.9 is valid and otherwise essentially reiterated its first opinion.

In addition to upholding section 1054.9's validity, the Court of Appeal made three holdings now before us on review:

(1) "[A] law enforcement agency that provides a report relating to previous criminal conduct by a defendant charged with a capital offense can be deemed to have been `involved in the investigation or prosecution of the case' against the defendant, such that materials in the possession of that agency are subject to discovery under section 1054.9." Accordingly, it ordered discovery of original notes from 22 out-of-state law enforcement officers who worked for six different out-of-state law enforcement agencies and who, according to petitioner, had been involved in investigating petitioner's prior crimes later used as aggravating evidence at the penalty phase of his trial.

(2) "`[I]n moving for discovery under section 1054.9, the defendant does not have to prove the actual existence (or a good faith belief in the actual existence) of discovery materials in the possession of the prosecution and/or the relevant law enforcement authorities as a prerequisite to obtaining an order for discovery under the statute.'" (Quoting the same panel's earlier opinion in People v. Superior Court (Maury) (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 473, 485 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 670]; see generally id. at pp. 479-485].)

(3) "[W]hen a defendant seeks discovery under section 1054.9 on the theory that he would have been entitled to the requested materials at time of trial under Brady[, supra, 373 U.S. 83], the defendant bears the burden of establishing the materiality of the evidence he seeks."

Both the People and petitioner sought review. In their respective petitions, the People challenged the first two of these holdings and petitioner the third. We granted both petitions and, on our own motion, ordered review of section 1054.9's validity. We have resolved the latter question in another case and found the statute valid. ( People v. Superior Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 564 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 227 P.3d 858].) Accordingly, we will not now consider the statute's validity.

In 2002, the Legislature enacted section 1054.9, providing for post-conviction discovery in certain circumstances. Subdivisions (a) and (b) of that section, the portions relevant here, provide: "(a) Upon the prosecution of a postconviction writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment in a case in which a sentence of death or of life in prison without the possibility of parole has been imposed, and on a showing that good faith efforts to obtain discovery materials from trial counsel were made and were unsuccessful, the court shall, except as provided in subdivision (c) [relating to physical evidence], order that the defendant be provided reasonable access to any of the materials described in subdivision (b).

"(b) For purposes of this section, `discovery materials' means materials in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities to which the same defendant would have been entitled at time of trial."

In In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 536, 85 P.3d 444] ( Steele), we resolved some issues regarding section 1054.9's meaning, but others remain. Here, we must decide (1) what burden, if any, defendants have to show that the requested discovery materials actually exist and are material; and (2) whether section 1054.9 applies to discovery materials that out-of-state law enforcement agencies possess.

A. Whether Defendants Have a Burden to Show Entitlement to Discovery Materials

The legislative history behind section 1054.9 shows that the Legislature's main purpose was to enable defendants efficiently to reconstruct defense attorneys' trial files that might have become lost or destroyed after trial. (See Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 694.) For example, the following discussion appears repeatedly in committee reports and other legislative history materials:

"According to the sponsor, `The problem that occurs all too often is this: a defendant's files are lost or destroyed after trial and habeas counsel is unable to obtain the original documents because the State has no legal obligation to provide them absent a court order. This leads to many delays and causes unnecessary public expenditures as prosecutors and habeas counsel litigate whether the defendant can demonstrate a need to re-access the materials and information originally available to him or her at trial.

"`Currently, as expressed in People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159], habeas corpus counsel is required to establish all of the elements of a claim for habeas corpus relief before the court will entertain a motion to provide such original documents as police reports, ballistic tests and other materials and information. If habeas counsel cannot obtain the documents needed to meet this threshold showing because trial counsel's files have been lost or destroyed, the injustice is clear. The existing remedy, as discussed in Gonzalez, is woefully inadequate in cases where a defendant's file, through no fault of their own, no longer exists. The purpose of this bill is to provide a reasonable avenue for habeas counsel to obtain documents to which trial counsel was already legally entitled.'" (E.g., Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1391 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 10, 2002, p. 3.)

The Legislature's purpose of enabling file reconstruction should not be difficult to implement. Defendants should first seek to obtain their trial files from trial counsel. But if a defendant can show a legitimate reason for believing trial counsel's current files are incomplete (for example, if, as here, not all numbered discovery is available), the defendant should be able to work with the prosecution to obtain copies of any missing discovery materials it had provided to the defense before trial (assuming it still possesses them). (See Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 692 [suggesting informal efforts to resolve discovery matters].) If necessary, the trial court can order the prosecution to provide any materials it still possesses that it had provided at time of trial. As the Court of Appeal noted in a different case, "it is possible that a defendant seeking discovery under section 1054.9 will simply have no idea whether the materials he obtained from trial counsel — assuming he obtained any at all — amount to all of the materials the prosecution turned over during trial." ( People v. Superior Court (Maury), supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 482.) Accordingly, we agree with Maury (and the Court of Appeal here, which followed Maury in this regard) that, when trying to reconstruct files, defendants need not identify all missing discovery materials that the prosecution had previously provided to the defense or show that they are still in the prosecution's possession.

A problem exists, however, because, as we explained in Steele, although "the bill's main focus was to permit reconstruction of lost files the statutory language provides for more than that. ( Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 694.) The statute permits discovery of materials "to which trial counsel was legally entitled," which "is broader than mere file reconstruction." ( Ibid.) Here, petitioner seeks much more than mere file reconstruction. His discovery motion contained a wide range of requests, some reasonably specific, others open ended. At one point in this litigation, for example, he identified 60 different items or categories of items that he sought. Even after the trial court granted many of his requests, petitioner challenged in this writ proceeding the denial or partial denial of 24 others. He sought "any information in the government's hands regarding any of its witnesses' motives to lie or biases for the State or against Mr. Barnett." Thus, in addition to some specific requests, petitioner was on a proverbial fishing expedition for anything that might exist.

In Steele, we stated that "section 1054.9 does provide only limited discovery. It does not allow `free-floating' discovery asking for virtually anything the prosecution possesses." ( Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 695.) In discussing what materials beyond file reconstruction defendants were entitled to obtain, we repeatedly used the word "specific." For example, we said the obtainable discovery "includes specific materials that the defendant can show the prosecution should have provided (but did not provide) at the time of trial because they came within the scope of a discovery order the trial court actually issued at time of trial or a statutory duty to provide discovery." ( Ibid.) We also noted Evidence Code section 664's presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed and said that, before being entitled to discovery under section 1054.9, the defendant must overcome this "presumption as to specific evidence." ( Steele, supra, at p. 694.) As we have explained, the Legislature was primarily concerned with preventing the problems that occur when the trial attorney's files no longer exist through no fault of the defendant. This concern, together with the Legislature's evident intent to make section 1054.9 an efficient method of discovery, causes us to conclude that section 1054.9 requires defendants who seek discovery beyond file reconstruction to show a reasonable basis to believe that other specific materials actually exist. Otherwise, a discovery request can always become, as this one has, a free-floating request for anything the prosecution team may possess.

In concluding that defendants need not make such a showing, the Court of Appeal cited its opinion in an earlier case, which had said that such a requirement "erects a standard that is virtually impossible, if not absolutely impossible, for a defendant to meet." ( People v. Superior Court (Maury), supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 480; see also Curl v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 310, 324 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 320].) Whether this is so depends on the purpose behind section 1054.9. If the statute's purpose is to allow defendants to search for any material that might exist, then of course this requirement would be impossible to meet. But if the statute's purpose is to allow defendants to receive materials they have reason to believe they are missing, then the standard is logical, not impossible. The legislative history shows the statute's purpose is the latter.

Requiring defendants to show they have reason to believe specific materials actually exist does not place an onerous burden on them. Defendants have access to the trial record and to the discovery materials the prosecution provided to the defense before trial. Defendants may obtain those materials either from trial counsel or through file reconstruction. As the Attorney General notes, a person could use these resources "to make the necessary showing. For example, if a witness testifies about a particular report that the petitioner does not possess, the petitioner would have sufficient evidence to justify a request for that report under section 1054.9. It would also be appropriate for a petitioner to seek access to a report he or she does not possess that is cross-referenced in a police report possessed by the petitioner. Similarly, if evidence in the record indicates that a particular witness was interviewed three times and the petitioner has reports documenting only two interviews, that petitioner could make the necessary showing, based on the record, that a third report likely exists."

Petitioner challenges our reliance in Steele on Evidence Code section 664's presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. He argues it is merely an evidentiary presumption for trial purposes. But the United States Supreme Court has cited a similar presumption as a reason to deny discovery regarding speculative misconduct claims. ( Bracy v. Gramley (1997) 520 U.S. 899, 909, [ 138 L.Ed.2d 97, 117 S.Ct. 1793] ["Ordinarily, we presume that public officials have `"properly discharged their official duties."' [Citation.] Were it possible to indulge this presumption here, we might well agree . . . that petitioner's submission and his compensatory-bias theory are too speculative to warrant discovery. But . . . the presumption has been soundly rebutted. . . ."].) Similarly, in a case involving the prosecution's duty to provide exculpatory materials, the high court stated that "[m]ere speculation that some exculpatory material may have been withheld is unlikely to establish good cause for a discovery request on collateral review." ( Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 286 [ 144 L.Ed.2d 286, 119 S.Ct. 1936].) We believe the Legislature intended the courts to interpret section 1054.9 in a similar manner.

This brings us to a related question. The Court of Appeal held that in order to receive potentially exculpatory materials, petitioner "bears the burden of establishing the materiality of the evidence he seeks." This holding was based on the circumstance that, to establish a violation of the prosecution's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, a defendant challenging a conviction must establish not only that the prosecution withheld the evidence but also that the evidence was material, meaning that it is reasonably probable the result would have been different had the evidence been disclosed. (See Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 697-698 [discussing Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, and its progeny].) Petitioner challenges, and the Attorney General defends, this holding. We agree with petilets in the magazines. No other weapons were found in the Arces' house during the search, which was conducted on May 23, 2007. On cross-examination, Investigator Jurado denied knowing that Thomas was a convicted felon at the time of the search of the Arces' house. Sandra Rangel, a crime scene specialist with the Hidalgo County Sheriff's Office, stated that she was the crime scene specialist who worked on investigating Laura's death. Rangel recalled arriving at the crime scene at 1:45 p.m. on the day the body was discovered. Rangel saw Langston and several investigators at the crime scene that day. She also saw three vehicles parked at the residence that did not belong to the sheriff's office — a gray Chevrolet Impala, a black Chevrolet Tahoe, which belonged to Langston, and a green Chevrolet Silverado Remington Limited Edition pickup truck. Rangel found a small bullet casing — a .22-caliber bullet manufactured by Remington, as evidenced by the "REM" markings on the casing — near the Impala. Rangel also found a white sheet, which appeared to be stained, on the ground on the east side of the mobile home. The sheet was preserved as evidence and sent for testing. Upon further investigation of the property, Rangel found a red gasoline container in the middle of a grassy area near where the body was found. Rangel also recalled seeing a vulture near the body as she approached and that there was wire wrapped loosely around the ankles of the body. Rangel testified that the body was "in the advanced stages of decomposition," but that "the stench was very, very minor due to the open area." Rangel recorded the investigation on a video camera and also took numerous photographs with a digital camera. Many of the photographs and the videotape of the investigation were admitted into evidence. Rangel also took buccal swabs from Langston to conclusively determine whether the discovered body was Laura's. Rangel collected some of the dirt that surrounded the body to test for accelerants, such as gasoline, that might have been used to ignite the body. The dirt samples tested negative for ignitable liquids. Rangel subsequently obtained a warrant to search the inside of the mobile home. Upon entering, Rangel saw, among other things, "a box of Remington .22 long rifle ammunition with live rounds," several empty Remington bullet casings throughout the house, and a "yellow-colored mop container like the janitorials [sic] use with a mop and water inside it." Rangel also saw several blood-stained "throw pillows" on the sofa and Laura's purse and driver's license in the house. Rangel collected the "throw pillows," the mop handle, the mop head, and the empty bullet casings and submitted them to crime labs for further testing. Rangel then conducted several field tests on the floor of the house and discovered several small blood stains on the floor. Rangel later testified that she observed the autopsy conducted on the body and was given several projectiles that were extracted from inside the body. These projectiles were submitted for testing. Based on her investigation, Rangel concluded that Laura had been shot six times in the head and then her body had been burned. On cross-examination, Rangel recalled seeing damage to a fence that surrounded the property. Rangel admitted that she did not find any "drag marks" or blood stains on the side of the property where the white sheet was found or near the location where the body was discovered; however, Rangel noted that, in addition to the blood stains, the white sheet had grass and dirt stains on it. Rangel tested the red gas cans, but no blood or DNA was detected. Rangel acknowledged that no large barrels were found anywhere on the property that could have been used to burn garbage or a human body. Rangel later testified that she did not have the mop bucket tested and that no bullet holes were found in any part of the mobile home. Rangel also admitted that no fingerprints or DNA were found on Laura's purse or on any of the credit cards contained within the purse. Juan Jose Vasquez, an investigator with the Hidalgo County Sheriff's Office, testified that he assisted in the investigation into Laura's death and recalled finding a "small-looking revolver" in a shed on the property. Jennifer Otto, a forensic scientist with the New Mexico Department of Public Safety, Northern Forensic Laboratory, testified that she received bone fragments obtained from the body and a buccal swab from Langston. Based on her analysis, Otto concluded, with 99.99% certainty, that the body discovered was Langston's biological mother, Laura. Crystal Kates Dawn Anderson, a forensic scientist at the Texas Department of Public Safety crime lab located in McAllen, Texas, testified that she tested most of the items that Rangel collected from the crime scene. "Apparent blood" was detected on most of the items, including the head of the mop, three of the empty bullet casings, the "throw pillows," and the white sheet. Anderson also detected blood on the left side and inside the barrel of the Walter .22-caliber pistol and on two large sections of the floor of the mobile home. No blood was detected on the trigger area, the grip area, or the right side of the pistol. Anderson testified that Laura could not be excluded as a source of the stains on the "throw pillows" and that Laura's DNA "was included as 15 of the 16 locations that we looked at." Anderson could not match the DNA found on the floor to any known DNA profile. On cross-examination, Anderson acknowledged that the "apparent blood" found on the left side of the pistol could have been a false positive caused by rust. Anderson admitted that she did not test any hair collected by investigators because investigators did not request that the hair be tested. Norma Jean Farley, M.D., the chief forensic pathologist for both Hidalgo County and Cameron County, noted that she performed the autopsy on Laura's body on May 18, 2007. Dr. Farley recalled that when the body was brought to the morgue, x-rays were conducted. Dr. Farley noted that the body was "mostly skeletonized" with no skin and it was both "charred and decomposing" at the same time. Dr. Farley was unable to determine the exact time of death because the body had been burned and was exposed to the outdoors for what appeared to be a rather long time. Dr. Farley found several lead bullets and bullet fragments in the skull and "tiny lead fragments near some of the entrance wounds." In all, Dr. Farley observed six entrance wounds to Laura's head caused by .22 caliber bullets. Based on her examination of the body, including the entrance and exit wounds, Dr. Farley concluded that the cause of death was "a gunshot wound of head and trunk" and that Laura was shot several times on the top of her head. A toxicology exam did not reveal any illicit drugs in Laura's system; it only revealed "Tylenol, acetaminophen, and a little bit of caffeine." Dr. Farley then testified that a gunshot wound to the head would not necessarily cause blood "to be gushing and gushing." However, the amount of blood ejected as a result of such an injury depends on, among other things, the positioning of the body. On cross-examination, Dr. Farley admitted that she was unable to determine exactly how Laura's body was positioned when she was shot. Dr. Farley also admitted that she could not tell how much blood would have gushed from the gunshot wounds because the body was too decomposed, and because she could not determine the positioning of Laura's body when she was shot. Michael Wayne Hughes, Laura's brother, testified that he and Laura were "pretty close" even though they had not spoken for approximately five years. Michael works for a drilling company overseas. Michael recalled that he and Laura had a "falling out" when "[o]ne of her kids was acting up and she didn't want [Michael] disciplining him . . . so [Michael] asked her to leave." After Laura's body was discovered, Michael spoke to Langston, who informed Michael that he had pictures of the body. Langston and Hughes then went over to Michael's house and showed Michael the pictures of Laura's body. While Langston, Hughes, and Michael were viewing the pictures, Michael observed Hughes exhibit a hateful demeanor that Michael had "never seen before." Hughes then exclaimed, "fucking slut," as he was "hitting the picture [of Laura's body] with his finger." Later, Hughes spoke to Michael about the body and repeatedly referred to the charred body as a female, which made Michael believe that Hughes was aware that the body was Laura's. Michael then heard Hughes state that "they couldn't do nothing [sic] to [Hughes] because [Hughes] didn't have a murder weapon." Hughes also stated that "if anyone was caught for it [the murder of Laura], they would be in prison where no retaliation could be done to them." On cross-examination, Michael admitted that Hughes was the child who misbehaved and caused Michael and Laura to have a "falling out." In fact, Michael noted that Hughes "has always had a way of getting attention when you're trying to talk or anything else, he'd create some type of mischief." Michael acknowledged that he had no proof that Hughes was involved in Laura's murder, and he stated that Hughes once asked Michael if he "needed anybody hurt" because Hughes would "cover up for a hit and run." Michael then admitted that he had previously given Laura a revolver for protection. Jeffery Bailey testified that he was an acquaintance of Hughes's and that they used to ride the bus together. Bailey recalled an incident occurring at the end of the 2006-2007 school year, where Hughes brought a gun onto the school bus. Bailey testified that he is familiar with guns and recognized the pistol that Hughes brought on the bus to be a .22-caliber. Hughes allegedly was pointing the gun at others on the school bus and was playing with the gun's magazine. During the investigation of Laura's murder, Bailey was asked to identify from a photo lineup the gun that Hughes brandished on the school bus. Bailey initially identified the wrong gun and was asked by Investigator Tanguma to try again. Bailey subsequently identified the suspected murder weapon from the photo lineup after feeling "pressured" to do so by investigators. Raul Arce testified that he met Hughes through a friend in 2007. Raul recalled Hughes driving a green pickup truck with an after-market stereo system and neon lighting upgrades. Raul then remembered that he and Hughes once went over to Laura's mobile home to get additional paint balls for their paint-ball guns, and that rather than returning with the paint balls from inside the mobile home, Hughes returned with a .22-caliber pistol. Raul testified that he was certain the gun was a .22-caliber because he is familiar with guns. Raul and Hughes then fired several shots with the gun while outside. Raul later testified that he saw Hughes hand the gun to Thomas and that he later saw the gun in Thomas's room underneath his mattress. Raul could not recall if Thomas had ever been to Laura's mobile home. Raul did remember telling Solis that Hughes's gun was under the mattress in Thomas's room. On cross-examination, Raul denied ever seeing Hughes meet with Thomas to buy drugs. Raul could not remember the exact date that Hughes gave Thomas the gun. Raul admitted that Thomas had been to prison "[q]uite a few times." Raul recalled Thomas firing Hughes's gun once at the Arce house and that the boys' mother got upset with Thomas. Raul acknowledged that he had never seen Hughes get aggressive or physically violent with anyone and that Thomas and Laura had met before. Adrian Ramirez, a convicted murderer, testified that he met Hughes while they were both housed in a juvenile detention center in May 2007. Ramirez noted that he and Hughes became friends and that they talked often. Ramirez was aware that Hughes was in the juvenile detention center because he was a suspect in a murder case. When they first met, Hughes denied murdering Laura; however, Hughes later admitted killing her. Hughes also told Ramirez that after he killed Laura, he went to his girlfriend's house with a "whole bunch" of Laura's money. Hughes then told Ramirez that he gave the gun used to shoot Laura to "some guy"; that he cleaned up the mobile home with a mop after he shot Laura; and that his grandmother called repeatedly to ask for Laura, and he told her that Laura "was on vacation somewhere." On cross-examination, Ramirez admitted that he was on drugs when he made his first statement to police; however, he later stated that he was sober when he talked to police about Hughes's statements. Ramirez testified that Hughes never expressed to him that he took Laura's body out of the barrel that was allegedly used. Ramirez then recalled Hughes stating once that he believed Laura was killed by a drug dealer to whom she owed money. Ramirez denied lying about the statements Hughes made about Laura's murder. Max Orlando Cantu, an investigator with Hidalgo County Sheriff's Office, testified that he, along with Investigator Tanguma, interviewed Hughes after Laura's body was discovered. Hughes was calm when confronted by Investigators Tanguma and Cantu. The investigators took Hughes to the juvenile center at the sheriff's office where Hughes gave a written statement regarding his knowledge of the incident. Hughes denied knowing anything about the body and stated that his mother was in California. Hughes admitted to using Laura's checkbooks to pay for food, bills, and other living expenses. He also admitted that he made one large purchase — the stereo system for the green pickup truck. After making his statement the police, Hughes left the sheriff's office with Langston. Investigator Cantu recalled that Hughes did not seem shocked or surprised when told that Laura's body was found on the property where he lived. Investigator Cantu then noted that he was in the back seat of the police car driven by Investigator Tanguma while Investigator Tanguma was speaking to Ramirez, who was sitting in the passenger seat. On cross-examination, Investigator Cantu stated that he heard Ramirez tell Investigator Tanguma that Hughes admitted to killing Laura; however, Investigator Cantu admitted that he did not hear the entire conversation. On re-direct examination, Investigator Cantu testified that after Hughes made his statement, he looked Investigator Cantu in the eye and stated, "Catch me, if you can." Investigator Cantu also recounted that Hughes's demeanor during the interview was very cold and that he "was not [fazed] in any way whatsoever that there was a body found on his premises where his mother had been reported missing." However, neither of these observations were included in Investigator Cantu's report. Solis, a friend of Hughes's, testified that he had been to Laura's mobile home three or four times and, while there, he saw that Laura had a revolver in the house. Solis also testified that Hughes told him that he had a .22 caliber handgun and that he was going to give the gun to Thomas to keep. Hughes did not tell Solis why he was giving Thomas the gun, and Solis stated that he did not see Hughes actually give Thomas the gun. Hughes told Solis that Daniel left the green Chevrolet pickup to him and that Laura was on vacation in California. On cross-examination, Solis noted that Laura did not appear to fear Hughes and that Hughes was always very respectful towards Laura. Solis testified that he never saw the gun Hughes allegedly gave to Thomas and that Hughes did not tell him the brand name of the gun. Investigator Tanguma testified that he has worked as a homicide investigator for the Hidalgo County Sheriff's Office for eight years. He was the lead investigator into Laura's death and was at the crime scene on May 18, 2007. Investigator Tanguma observed the burnt body and did not recall any foul odors when he approached the body. Investigator Tanguma also searched the mobile home and noticed that the home had burglar bars and that the home had "a lot of stuff" inside; however, the home did not appear to be ransacked. He did not observe any blood on the floor or any bullet casings, but he did find out from other investigators that there were several guns at the residence. When Hughes came to the sheriff's office to make his statement, officers confiscated several credit cards and checkbooks that Hughes had on his person. Three of the credit cards reflected that Daniel was the cardholder and the other credit card was in Laura's name. Investigator Tanguma discovered that Laura had three different bank accounts and that Hughes was designated as the beneficiary on each of the accounts. In addition, after April 20, 2007, it was discovered that Hughes made several large purchases, which included the purchase of $800 or $900 worth of paint-ball equipment and the D-Tronics stereo system. Apparently, Laura last wrote a check on April 19, 2007, for the purchase of gasoline, medication, and food. Investigator Tanguma denied ever pressuring Bailey to sign the photo lineup of the guns. On cross-examination, Investigator Tanguma found it odd that Langston took pictures of the body and called several other individuals before calling law enforcement to report the discovery of Laura's body. He also recalled that Langston changed his story twice regarding his discovery of the body. Investigator Tanguma also testified that Laura had made several reports that people were stalking her, stealing from her, and breaking into her house. He also recounted incidents where Laura, while high on cocaine, threw a .22-caliber pistol in a swimming pool and fired a weapon while inside the residence. Investigator Tanguma also noted that, at the time of Laura's death, several financial documents were missing from the trunk of Laura's car and that there was a pending lawsuit between Daniel's family and Laura regarding some investments that Daniel had made prior to his death. Investigator Tanguma later acknowledged that there are no fingerprints, DNA evidence, or blood evidence tying Hughes to the murder of Laura but that he was the most likely suspect in this case because he lived with Laura. No barrels were found on the property. Perla Rincon, Hughes's girlfriend, stated that Hughes would stay with her every weekend and that Hughes told her that Laura was away in California even though he did not say why. Rincon recalled Hughes driving a green Chevrolet pickup and possessing a gun. On cross-examination, Rincon testified that Hughes had a "[p]retty good" relationship with Laura and that she never saw Hughes get angry or act aggressively towards anyone. Rincon denied defense counsel's insinuation that the gun that Hughes showed her was his paint-ball gun. Zepeda testified that he saw Hughes with a P-22 handgun and that Hughes told him that Laura drove to California in a yellow Hummer and left the Impala at the mobile home. Hughes kept the gun in the center console of the pickup truck, and Zepeda remembered Hughes telling him that he gave the gun to Thomas. Hughes told Zepeda that he stood to inherit over a million dollars from his parents. Thomas testified that Hughes drove a green Chevrolet pickup truck with "a lot of accessories" like a "[stereo] system, screens, indoor TV, things like that, that nature." Thomas recalled when he retrieved Hughes's gun. Raul and Hughes were playing with their paint-ball guns, and Thomas went to check out the accessories on the pickup truck. Thomas discovered a gun in the truck, so he took it and placed it underneath the seat of a "junked-out" green car on the Arce property. Hughes never came back to claim the gun. Thomas's sister discovered that Thomas had taken the gun from Hughes's truck, and she panicked when law enforcement arrived to search the Arce house and threw the gun in Thomas's closet. Thomas admitted that he had spent six months in a state jail facility for unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Thomas denied ever dealing drugs to Laura and testified that Laura did not owe him any money. The State subsequently rested its case-in-chief. Hughes moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied. B. Hughes's Evidence Hughes re-called Langston to the witness stand. Langston admitted going into Laura's mobile home and recovering some of her personal property after he discovered the body on the property. Langston described several notes that Laura had written regarding "planning scholarships and college tuition," presumably for Hughes's benefit. Langston admitted that he was aware that Daniel was cremated; that his ashes were missing; and that Laura did not believe that Hughes had anything to do with missing ashes. Langston also described a note written by Laura to Raul Ramirez for the installation of a security door and six security windows with burglar bars at the mobile home. Langston was not aware of anyone trying to get some of the money and investments that Daniel had left behind. Langston also collected a telephone that Laura had used. Contained on the phone were voice messages from different collection agencies and from Lewis. All of the voice messages were then played for the jury. Langston testified that he did not think Laura was afraid of Hughes and that Hughes never exhibited aggressive behaviors. On cross-examination, Langston acknowledged that the voice messages were dated from March 14, 2007 to April 8, 2007, and within that time span, Lewis left nine messages. Langston admitted that Laura found Daniel's ashes in her Impala, yet Langston continued to assert that the ashes had been stolen and placed in the trunk of Laura's car. Singer, a nurse at DeTar Hospital in Victoria, Texas, testified that she has known Hughes since he was a baby. Singer also testified that she and Laura were friends and that they last spoke in the middle of April 2007. Singer recalled the last conversation she had with Laura and that Laura told her that: (1) Hughes was not dealing well with Daniel's death; (2) Laura was having problems with a lawsuit pending against some of Daniel's family members; and (3) some papers had been stolen from Laura's mobile home. Singer offered to let Hughes come stay with her during the pendency of the lawsuit. Singer testified that Laura was not afraid of Hughes and that Hughes had never been physically violent with Laura, even though the two had arguments, which included "slamming doors, yelling, typical teenager stuff." Singer remembered that Hughes had stayed with her once before while Laura was in jail for cocaine possession. Singer believed that Laura did not want Hughes at the mobile home around the time Laura went missing, which Singer presumed was why Laura entertained the notion of pulling Hughes out of school and letting him stay at Singer's house. Singer noted that Laura was very upset with members of Daniel's family because they allegedly stole papers from the mobile home and transferred large sums of money out of Daniel's accounts prior to his death. Singer later admitted that Daniel, though allegedly on a morphine drip, consented to the transfer of the funds from his accounts to the accounts of his family members. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Hughes of first-degree murder and sentenced him to forty-five years' imprisonment. See id. Hughes subsequently filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law. See Tex. R. App. P. 21.8(a), (c). On September 11, 2008, Hughes filed a motion for judgment nunc pro tunc to request that the final judgment reflect that he receive "jail credit for the time he was incarcerated in Juvenile Detention awaiting a certification hearing." The trial court granted Hughes's nunc pro tunc motion and also certified Hughes's right to appeal. This appeal followed. II. Standard of Review In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and ask whether "` any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt — not whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)) (emphasis in original). The trier of fact is the sole judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight given to testimony. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; Beckham v. State, 29 S.W.3d 148, 151 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd). We do not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence, and we do not substitute our own judgment for that of the trier of fact. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc); Beckham, 29 S.W.3d at 151. We resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the judgment. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In conducting a factual sufficiency review, a court of appeals reviews the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the evidence is so weak that the jury's verdict seems clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Unless the record clearly reveals that a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact-finder's determination concerning the weight to be given to contradictory testimony. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The State is not required to present direct evidence, such as eyewitness testimony, to establish guilt. See Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). "Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt of the actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49. The law does not require that each fact "point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative effect of all the incriminating facts is sufficient to support the conviction." Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; see Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49. Both legal and factual sufficiency are measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Grotti v. State, 273 S.W.3d 273, 280-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); see Adi v. State, 94 S.W.3d 124, 131 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd). "`Such a charge [is] one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof, or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.'" Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240). Under the Texas Penal Code, a person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1). A person acts intentionally "with respect to . . . a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to . . . cause the result of his conduct." Id. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 2003). A person acts knowingly "with respect to the result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." Id. § 6.03(b). Intent may "be inferred from circumstantial evidence[,] such as acts, words, and the conduct of the appellant." Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 50; see also Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (stating that a fact-finder may infer both knowledge and intent from the defendant's acts, words, or conduct and from the nature of the wounds inflicted on the victim); Ledesma v. State, 677 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (noting that the requisite culpable mental state may also be inferred from the surrounding circumstances). III. Analysis By two issues on appeal, Hughes asserts that the evidence supporting his conviction is legally and factually insufficient. Specifically, Hughes argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient because the record does not demonstrate that Hughes, alone, was responsible for Laura's death and that no direct evidence tied Hughes to the killing. Hughes further argues that the State's entire case against him was "riddled with conjecture, speculation, and insinuation." Hughes also disputes the testimony of Ramirez, suggesting that Ramirez was not a credible witness since he was serving a sentence for murder. Hughes finally contends that the evidence is insufficient because several witnesses testified that Hughes never exhibited any violent or abusive behavior and had a good relationship with Laura. We first note that the court of criminal appeals has held that the State need not present direct evidence to establish guilt; a conviction may be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; see also Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49. As Investigator Tanguma noted, there is no direct evidence tying Hughes to the murder of Laura. Thus, we must look to the "cumulative effect of all the incriminating facts" to determine whether the evidence supporting Hughes's conviction is sufficient. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; see also Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49. In the present case, several witnesses testified that Hughes drove Daniel's green Chevrolet pickup truck often without his parents' consent, and Alan noted that Laura often complained of Hughes taking the truck without permission. Officer Ybarra noted that Hughes created a false driver's license by pasting his picture on Daniel's driver's license and was unable to produce insurance information pertaining to the truck when Hughes was pulled over for disregarding a stop sign. See Hargrove v. State, 211 S.W.3d 379, 387 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. ref'd) (stating that giving law enforcement a false name may indicate a consciousness of guilt). Alan testified that Laura complained that Hughes stole several items from her even though Hagens recalled that Laura bought Hughes "anything he wanted." However, Hagens recalled that Hughes repeatedly asked Laura for a sports car, but Laura refused Hughes's requests because the family's financial situation was "very up in the air." Hughes told several people that Laura had gone to California on vacation, yet several witnesses testified that Laura did not know anyone there. In addition, Hughes initially stated that Laura drove the Impala to California. He later changed his story to state that Laura drove with someone in a yellow Hummer to California even though Alan, Laura's friend who saw her often, denied ever seeing a yellow Hummer at Laura's residence. See King, 29 S.W.3d at 565 (concluding that false statements made by a defendant may be evidence of a "consciousness of guilt"). Several witnesses also testified that Hughes possessed a .22 caliber handgun and eventually gave the handgun to Thomas around the same time law enforcement discovered Laura's body. Furthermore, Dr. Farley noted that Laura was shot six times in the head with a gun that shot .22 caliber bullets. Investigators found several empty .22 caliber bullet casings around the mobile home. Moreover, investigators also found blood stains on the floor of the mobile home, on "throw pillows," and on the white sheet found on the east side of the mobile home. The white sheet also had dirt and grass stains, which suggests that Laura's body may have been dragged along the ground using the sheet. A red gas can was also found on the property near Laura's body. However, none of the items tested contained DNA evidence directly implicating Hughes with the murder of Laura. Yet, investigators recalled seeing a mop and bucket in the mobile home that the State suggested at trial could have been used to clean up the crime scene after the murder. In fact, Ramirez recounted Hughes's confession that he cleaned up the crime scene with the mop. Moreover, several witnesses noted that only Hughes and Laura lived in the mobile home. Additionally, and perhaps most damning, Ramirez testified that he spoke with Hughes often while both were incarcerated in a juvenile facility. While talking to Ramirez, Hughes admitted to shooting Laura in the head while she was asleep and burning her corpse. Hughes also told Ramirez that he had a truck and took some money from Laura to outfit the truck with a new stereo system. Officer Ybarra and several of Hughes's friends corroborated Ramirez's testimony by recounting Hughes's use of Daniel's pickup truck and his purchase of a $3,500 stereo system shortly after Laura's murder. Hughes told Langston and others that he was using Laura's credit cards and checkbooks that were obtained from Laura's purse to pay his expenses. Hagens and Alan both testified that Laura never went anywhere without her purse, and Langston, when he visited the mobile home, noticed that Laura's birth certificate was missing; that Laura had left her driver's license even though Hughes stated she was in California; and that Laura's purse was left in the mobile home. Several witnesses stated that, as a result of his parents' deaths, Hughes stood to inherit a substantial amount of money. While several witnesses testified that Hughes had a good relationship with Laura and always showed her respect, Michael testified that Hughes, when viewing pictures of Laura's body with Michael and Langston, exhibited a hateful demeanor and exclaimed, "fucking slut," while "hitting the picture [of Laura's body] with his finger." Also, Investigator Cantu recalled Hughes stating, "[c]atch me, if you can," when Hughes came to the sheriff's office to make a statement regarding the discovery of Laura's body. With regard to Hughes's contention regarding the credibility of Ramirez's testimony, we note that it was within the province of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded to their testimony. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; King, 29 S.W.3d at 562; Beckham, 29 S.W.3d at 151. We also note that Hughes's reliance on testimony that he was non-violent and had a good relationship with Laura to support his argument that the evidence is insufficient is unfounded because Hagens testified that Laura was afraid that Hughes "was going to hurt her." The resolution of Hagens's testimony about Laura's fear of Hughes with the testimony relied upon by Hughes was also within the province of the jury to resolve. See Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 705. The jury clearly believed that Hughes was violent towards Laura, and we must defer to the jury's resolution of the apparently contradictory testimony. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ("When the record supports conflicting inferences, we must presume that the fact[-]finder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and therefore defer to that determination."); Curry, 30 S.W.3d at 406; see also Jimenez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 493, 505 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd) ("The jury exclusively resolves conflicting testimony in the record."). Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we hold that a rational fact-finder could have concluded that, based on the "cumulative effect of all incriminating facts," Hughes intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Laura. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1); see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 517; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49. As such, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain Hughes's conviction. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; see also Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 517. Reviewing the evidence in a neutral light, we cannot say that the evidence is so weak that the jury's verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Neal, 256 S.W.3d at 275; see also Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence is factually sufficient. See Neal, 256 S.W.3d at 275; see also Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15. We overrule both of Hughes's issues on appeal. IV. Conclusion Having overruled both of Hughes's issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.