GLENN v. HOLDER

havior." Id. ¶ 57. With respect to one particular incident, it is alleged that the executive director stated: "It is appalling hypocrisy for these forces to pretend that their venomous words and organizing have no connection to the plague of hate violence against gay people, including [this] murder." Id. ¶ 58; see also ¶¶ 62, 66. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs do not allege that they intend to "willfully cause[] bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, a dangerous weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device, attempt[] to cause bodily injury to any person, because of . . . the actual or perceived . . . sexual orientation [or] gender identity . . . of any person." See § 249(a)(2).

Finally, Plaintiffs allege that the Hate Crimes Act is unnecessary because "all crimes of violence against innocent individuals . . . are being severely punished" under existing state law. Compl. ¶ 41. They allege that the Hate Crimes Act "elevates those engaged in sexual deviance and sinful behavior to a special class of persons worthy of special protections and recognition," and is therefore "an unjust and immoral law." Id.

III

Federal court jurisdiction is limited by the Constitution to "cases" and "controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968); Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Columbus, 172 F.3d 411, 415 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 94-95). Standing, "the core component . . . of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III," Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted), is "the threshold question in every federal case," Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). The U.S. Supreme Court has "established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements":

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not "conjectural" or "hypothetical." Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (citations omitted). "A plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating standing and must plead its components with specificity." Coal Operators Assocs., Inc. v. Babbitt, 291 F.3d 912, 916 (6th Cir. 2002).

To assert sufficient injury to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to a criminal statute, a plaintiff must allege "an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by [the] statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder." Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973)). In Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., this requirement was met when the law that the plaintiffs sought to challenge was "aimed directly at plaintiffs, who, if their interpretation of the statute is correct, will have to take significant and costly compliance measures or risk criminal prosecution." 484 U.S. 383, 392 (1988). On the other hand, "persons having no fears of . . . prosecution except those that are imaginary or speculative, are not to be accepted as appropriate plaintiffs." United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. at 298 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971)). For example, in Greater Cincinnati Coalition for the Homeless v. City of Cincinnati, the plaintiff did not have standing to challenge an anti-panhandling ordinance when he had not violated the ordinance in the past and did not allege that he intended to violate its provisions in the future. 56 F.3d 710, 716 (6th Cir. 1995).

In addition to the constitutional requirements, a plaintiff must also satisfy three prudential standing restrictions. See Coal Operators, 291 F.3d at 915-16. First, a plaintiff must "assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim for relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 (citations omitted). Second, a plaintiff's claim must be more than a "generalized grievance" that is pervasively shared by a large class of citizens. Coal Operators, 291 F.3d at 916 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982)). Third, in statutory cases, the plaintiff's claim must fall within the "zone of interests" regulated by the statute in question. Id. "These additional restrictions enforce the principle that, `as a prudential matter, the plaintiff must be a proper proponent, and the action a proper vehicle, to vindicate the rights asserted.'" Coal Operators, 291 F.3d at 916 (quoting Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 926 F.2d 573, 576 (6th Cir. 1991)).

Prudential standing requirements are relaxed for plaintiffs who allege that a statute is overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. Such plaintiffs "are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." Am. Booksellers, 484 U.S. at 392-393 (quotation and citations omitted). See also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) ("[I]t is not necessary that petitioner first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights."); Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 486 ("Because of the sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression, we have not required that all of those subject to overbroad regulation risk prosecution to test their rights."). Nonetheless, even plaintiffs seeking to assert an overbreadth challenge must first allege sufficient facts to establish a claim that they have suffered or are likely to suffer some injury as a result of the challenged statute. See Prime Media, Inc. v. City of Brentwood, 485 F.3d 343, 353-354 (6th Cir. 2007).

The U.S. Attorney General argues that Plaintiffs cannot meet the threshold requirements for standing because they have not alleged that they intend "to engage in a course of conduct . . . proscribed by [the] statute," or that "there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder." United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. at 298. In particular, the Attorney General argues that the Plaintiffs have not alleged that they intend to "willfully cause[] bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, a dangerous weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device, attempt[] to cause bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or perceived . . . sexual orientation . . . of any person." § 249(a)(2). In other words, Plaintiffs have not alleged that they will suffer an injury in fact as a result of the Hate Crimes Act.

The Attorney General emphasizes that the Act prohibits only willful, violent conduct — "willfully caus[ing] bodily injury to any person" or attempting to cause such injury "through the use of fire, a firearm, a dangerous weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device." § 249(a)(2); see also § 4710 ("This division applies to violent acts motivated by actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity or disability of a victim."). To establish a "willful" violation of the Act, the prosecution must prove "that the defendant knew both the pertinent fact(s) and understood the illegality of the pertinent charged conduct." United States v. Carney, 387 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Bryan, 524 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1998)). The Attorney General asserts that because Plaintiffs do not allege that they intend to willfully engage in any violent conduct that might subject them to prosecution under the Act, there is no likelihood that they will be subjected to any federal action or otherwise injured by enforcement of the Act.

The Attorney General acknowledges that Plaintiffs allege that the Act authorizes "federal investigative and other federal law enforcement actions against" them because of their opposition to "homosexual activism, the homosexual lifestyle, and the homosexual agenda," Compl. ¶ 48, and that the Act will subject them "to increased government scrutiny, questioning, investigation, [and] surveillance on account of" their opposition, Compl. ¶ 52. The Attorney General insists, however, that there is no basis for these allegations in the language of the Hate Crimes Act itself.

The Attorney General also contends that Plaintiffs' allegations that the Act will subject them to liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2, see Compl. ¶¶ 54-69, are without foundation. Section 2(a) of Title 18 provides that one who "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures" an offense "is punishable as a principal." To establish this offense, the prosecution must prove "that the substantive offense has been committed" and "that the defendant committed overt acts or affirmative conduct to further the offense, and intended to facilitate the commission of the crime." United States v. Dolt, 27 F.3d 235, 238 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The Attorney General asserts that mere speech — without the intent to facilitate the commission of a violent act and the act to provide some active assistance or participation in the offense itself — could not be the basis for a prosecution for aiding and abetting a violation of the Hate Crimes Act.

The Attorney General also addresses Plaintiffs' allegations that their exercise of their First Amendment rights is chilled because they fear they may be investigated in connection with a hate crime, see, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 52, 69. The Attorney General emphasizes that Plaintiffs "must present more than `[a]llegations of a subjective chill.' There must be a `claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.'" Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 816-817 (1975) (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972)); White v. United States, 601 F.3d 545, 554 (6th Cir. 2010).

In Laird, for example, "most if not all of the [plaintiffs]" established that they had "been the subject of Army surveillance reports." Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947, 954 n. 17 (D.C. Cir. 1971). They contended that surveillance of their activities had "chilled" their exercise of First Amendment rights. Laird, 408 U.S. at 13. The U.S. Supreme Court nevertheless found that plaintiffs did not demonstrate "a direct injury as the result of [the government's] action" because their decision to curtail their expressive activity reflected a "subjective `chill'" that did not qualify as a "specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm" caused by the government's surveillance. Id. at 13-14 (citation omitted); see also A.C.L.U. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 661 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[T]o allege a sufficient injury under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must establish that he or she is regulated, constrained, or compelled directly by the government's actions, instead of by his or her own subjective chill."), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1179 (2008).

Similarly, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993), addressed a First Amendment challenge to a state statute that enhanced an offender's sentence if his crime was motivated by bias. The Court rejected the defendant's claim that the statute was "unconstitutionally overbroad because of its `chilling effect' on free speech," finding the claim too speculative to support an overbreadth challenge:

The sort of chill envisioned here is far more attenuated and unlikely than that contemplated in traditional "overbreadth" cases. We must conjure up a vision of a Wisconsin citizen suppressing his unpopular bigoted opinions for fear that if he later commits an offense covered by the statute, these opinions will be offered at trial to establish that he selected his victim on account of the victim's protected status, thus qualifying him for penalty enhancement. . . . This is simply too speculative a hypothesis to support Mitchell's overbreadth claim.

Id. at 488-90.

The Attorney General acknowledges that under the Hate Crimes Act, evidence of speech, expression, or associations could be relevant and admissible in a prosecution against an individual who engaged in the prohibited violent actions to prove that individual's motive. See § 4710(1); Compl. ¶ 51. The Attorney General once again emphasizes, however, that the Act only prohibits violent conduct, not speech, and that Plaintiffs do not allege that they intend to engage in any such violent conduct. Thus, Plaintiffs' belief that they will be subjected to any kind of investigation in the future is simply too "`conjectural' or `hypothetical'" to constitute a claim of actual injury necessary to establish standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citation omitted).

The Attorney General addresses the fact that Plaintiffs recite alleged statements by third parties, see Compl. ¶¶ 57-67, claims about the enforcement of allegedly similar legislation in other jurisdictions, see Compl. ¶¶ 70-72, and statements by congressional supporters of the Hate Crimes Act, see Compl. ¶¶ 59, 74-75, in support of their contention that they could be investigated or prosecuted for violating the Act based solely on their speech. The Attorney General contends that such allegations are irrelevant because none of the individuals or organizations quoted by Plaintiffs have any responsibility for enforcement of the Act. The Attorney General emphasizes that any allegation that Plaintiffs might be subjected to false prosecution under the Hate Crimes Act solely because of their public views or associations is too speculative to confer standing. White, 601 F.3d at 553-54. The Attorney General asserts that such false prosecution could occur only if a hate crime occurred, if Plaintiffs' speech was somehow associated with such an offense, and if the Act was improperly enforced. Id.

The Attorney General acknowledges that the prudential standing requirement that a plaintiff pursue his own personal interests, and not those of a third party, is relaxed in the First Amendment context. Nonetheless, the Attorney General insists that Plaintiffs seek to assert a classic "generalized grievance" against a federal statute with which they disagree. Plaintiffs complain that the statute is "inherently divisive" and creates "a special, protected class of persons under federal law." Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3. They allege that the Act "seeks to normalize" behavior that they believe to be "contrary to the moral law and harmful to the common good of society." Compl. ¶ 4. The Attorney General emphasizes that if Plaintiffs were allowed to pursue litigation based on "mere disagreement with a federal policy," then the judicial system would be flooded with such "generalized grievances."

In response, Plaintiffs emphasize five main points. First, Plaintiffs suggest that the term "bodily injury," as defined by the Hate Crimes Act, can be interpreted to include a simple headache or stomachache. Plaintiffs emphasize that the definition of "bodily injury" includes "physical pain," "illness," and "any other injury to the body, no matter how temporary." See § 249(c)(1) (citing § 1365(h)(4)). In addition, Plaintiffs contend that the Act does not require a battery or other physical act of violence, because it only requires conduct to "cause" bodily injury. They contend that the Rules of Construction and the violence "requirement" are ineffective because they are not included within the text of the statute. Thus, Plaintiffs conclude that the government can investigate and prosecute a person under the Act even if the person does not commit, or counsel, command, or induce another to commit, a physical act of violence.

Second, Plaintiffs emphasize that they have been accused by "supporters of the Act" of causing "bodily injury" to persons because of their sexual orientation, and intentionally counseling, commanding, and inducing others to cause such "bodily injury." See Compl. ¶¶ 56-67. Plaintiffs allege that such accusations have been made by organizations such as the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force and the Triangle Foundation, which Plaintiffs assert "have influence with this current administration, [and] from powerful and influential government officials." See Compl. ¶¶ 57-67.

Third, Plaintiffs emphasize that nothing "limit[s] the authority of Federal officers, or a Federal grand jury, to investigate possible violations," of the Act, quoting § 249(b)(2). Thus, Plaintiffs contend that law enforcement is specifically authorized to conduct investigations of them, irrespective of any authority to actually prosecute them. Indeed, Plaintiffs allege that supporters of the Act rejected efforts to explicitly exclude expressive conduct such as Plaintiffs, and that the legislative history of the Act demonstrates that the Act was at least in part designed "to protect those potential victims who may be the recipients of hateful words." See Compl. ¶¶ 70-75.

Plaintiffs explain that in Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed the plaintiff churches to pursue an action against the federal government and some of its officers for violating their constitutional rights by conducting covert surveillance on members of their congregations. The court reasoned:

When congregants are chilled from participating in worship activities, when they refuse to attend church services because they fear the government is spying on them and taping their every utterance, all as alleged in the complaint, we think a church suffers organizational injury because its ability to carry out its ministries has been impaired. . . . A judicial determination that the INS surveillance of the churches' religious services violated the First Amendment would reassure members that they could freely participate in the services without having their religious expression being recorded by the government and becoming part of official records.

870 F.2d at 522-23. Like the plaintiff churches in Presbyterian Church, Plaintiffs here assert they have standing to challenge the Hate Crimes Act because they are targets for government scrutiny, questioning, investigation, surveillance, and other adverse law enforcement actions. Moreover, they are seeking judicial reassurance that they can freely participate in their speech and related religious activities without being investigated or prosecuted by the government or becoming part of official records because of their specific beliefs. See Compl. ¶ 53.

Plaintiffs also emphasize that in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1968), the plaintiff had not been charged under the challenged statute, "no record of any prosecutions in Arkansas" under the challenged statute existed, and the statute was no more than a "curiosity." Yet, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had standing to bring the First Amendment challenge. Id. In addition, in Bolton, the Supreme Court found that abortionists had standing to challenge a state's abortion statute even though "the record [did] not disclose that any one of them [had] been prosecuted, or threatened with prosecution." 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973). Finally, the Sixth Circuit has held that where a plaintiff "would be subject to application of the [challenged] statute," that alone is sufficient to provide the "fear of prosecution . . . reasonably founded in fact" to confer standing. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. City of Cincinnati, 822 F.2d 1390, 1395 (6th Cir. 1987).

Fourth, Plaintiffs insist that "speech, beliefs, and expressive conduct are necessarily targeted by the Act." Plaintiffs assert that the plain language of § 249(a)(2) "forces" law enforcement officials to treat identical crimes differently depending upon the government official's determination and proof of the political, philosophical, or religious beliefs of the accused offender.

Fifth, Plaintiffs emphasize the severity of the criminal sanctions permitted under the statute. See Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997) ("The severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words [or] ideas."); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002) (noting that "even minor punishments can chill protected speech"). Plaintiffs contend that this case is distinguishable from Laird, 408 U.S. 1, because while Laird involved government surveillance, it did not involve the potential for criminal sanctions.

In reply, the Attorney General distinguishes Presbyterian, Epperson, and Bolton. The Attorney General highlights that in Presbyterian, surveillance of church religious services had actually occurred, thereby justifying the conclusion that the plaintiff churches had standing to bring an action to vindicate their First Amendment rights. However, to the extent that the churches sought prospective relief, the court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the churches had standing because it was unclear whether the churches would be subject to such surveillance in the future. Here, the Attorney General emphasizes that Plaintiffs seek to premise standing solely on speculation that they might involve themselves in conduct subject to the Hate Crimes Act in the future, and be investigated by law enforcement officers for an offense that they do not plan to commit.

As to Epperson, the Attorney General highlights that counsel for the state acknowledged at oral argument that the plaintiff teacher would be at risk for prosecution if she presented the theory of evolution in class as she said she intended to do. Here, the Attorney General denies that Plaintiffs could be prosecuted under the Hate Crimes Act for simply expressing their views against homosexuals and homosexual behavior. With respect to Bolton, the Attorney General emphasizes that while the abortion statute at issue had not yet been enforced, the predecessor statute had been enforced.

The Attorney General's arguments are persuasive. Plaintiffs do not have standing to pursue their claims when they do not allege an "injury in fact," that is both "concrete and particularized," and "actual or imminent." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. In other words, they have not demonstrated that there is an existing "case or controversy" within the meaning of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Most importantly, Plaintiffs do not allege that they intend to "willfully cause" any "bodily injury." This is true even if one accepts Plaintiffs' proposed definition of "bodily injury," to include simple headaches and stomachaches, because Plaintiffs do not allege that they intend to "willfully cause" headaches and stomachaches.

Moreover, that fact, in combination with the Attorney General's denial that the Hate Crimes Act applies to Plaintiffs' conduct (a conclusion that is supported by the text of the statute, the Rules of Construction, and the legislative history), supports the conclusion that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that "there exists a credible threat of prosecution" under the Act. Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298. Plaintiffs' fear of prosecution is speculative; they do not allege that they have violated the Hate Crimes Act in the past, nor that they intend to violate it in the future. See United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. at 298; Greater Cincinnati Coal. for the Homeless, 56 F.3d at 716. Even though Plaintiffs allege that their exercise of their First Amendment rights is chilled, particularly because of the potential for criminal penalties, Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that they are likely to suffer an injury as a result of the Hate Crimes Act. See Laird, 408 U.S. at 13-14; Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 488-90; Prime Media, 485 F.3d at 353-54.

IV

Whether a plaintiff's claims are ripe also affects a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. "Ripeness is a mixture of Article III concerns about actual cases or controversies and prudential concerns about the appropriate time for a court to make a decision." Seiler v. Charter Twp. of Northville, 53 F. Supp. 2d 957, 961 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (quoting Cmty. Treatment Ctrs., Inc. v. City of Westland, 970 F.Supp. 1197, 1209 (E.D. Mich. 1997)). "Ripeness is more than a mere procedural question; it is determinative of jurisdiction. If a claim is unripe, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction and the complaint must be dismissed." Id. (quoting Bigelow v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 970 F.2d 154, 157 (6th Cir. 1992)).

In Norton v. Ashcroft, the court explained, the "[r]ipeness doctrine exists `to ensure that courts decide only existing, substantial controversies, not hypothetical questions or possibilities.'" 298 F.3d 547, 554 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1172 (2003). To determine ripeness, a court "examines (1) the likelihood that the harm alleged will ever come to pass; (2) whether the factual record is sufficiently developed to allow for adjudication; and, (3) hardship to the parties if judicial review is denied." Id. (citing Adult Video Ass'n v. United States, 71 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 1995)). Since this case presents a pre-enforcement challenge, the Attorney General asserts that it is "ripe for review only if the probability of the future event occurring is substantial and of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." Id. (citation and quotation omitted).

The Attorney General argues that Plaintiffs' claims are not ripe for review because there is no "likelihood that the harm alleged will ever come to pass," Norton, 298 F.3d at 554, when Plaintiffs have not alleged that they intend to engage in any conduct that might violate the Hate Crimes Act. The Attorney General particularly distinguishes the Hate Crimes Act from the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act ("FACE"), 18 U.S.C. § 248, because FACE prohibits not only violent conduct but also "threat[s] of force" and "physical obstruction." The plaintiffs challenging FACE in Norton, for example, alleged that they had engaged in "protesting, praying and counseling on the sidewalks around" a Planned Parenthood clinic; that federal law enforcement officials had told the plaintiffs they might be arrested if they did not move their protests across the street from the clinic; and that they had limited their protest activities at the clinic because of these threats. Norton v. Reno, No. 4:00-CV-141, 2000 WL 1769580, at *1-2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 24, 2000); see also Am. Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 855 F.Supp. 137, 139 (E.D. Va. 1994) (finding plaintiffs' claims ripe only after they amended their complaint to allege that "their action at times has constituted, and in the future will constitute . . . `a physical obstruction' . . . and that by so doing, they interfere with, and/or intimidate and/or injure abortion seekers and providers"), aff'd, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 809 (1995).

FACE provides criminal penalties for anyone, who "by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services." 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1).

The Attorney General also emphasizes that in this case, no offense has occurred, no offenders have been charged, and thus, there is no factual predicate to determine whether any particular application of the Hate Crimes Act is unconstitutional. The Attorney General highlights that "[r]ipeness separates those matters that are premature because the injury is speculative and may never occur from those that are appropriate for the court's review." Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 280 (6th Cir. 1997). "Ripeness becomes an issue when a case is anchored in future events that may not occur as anticipated, or at all." Id. at 284. Relatedly, the Attorney General asserts that because Plaintiffs have not established any likelihood of harm resulting from enforcement of the Act, they will suffer no hardship if their claims are not reviewed.

In response, Plaintiffs emphasize that there is nothing "hypothetical or speculative" about Plaintiffs' conduct or the manner in which the Act will be enforced. They assert that they have a "well-founded belief that the statute will be enforced (or threatened to be enforced) in ways that deter and inhibit their activities," and that they have a "credible fear of enforcement." Plaintiffs again emphasize that "at every turn during the legislative process, supporters of the Act defeated efforts designed to ensure that it would not — and could not — be enforced as alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint.

Although Plaintiffs do not contend that anyone has threatened them with prosecution, in their sur-reply brief they highlight recent statements by U.S. Attorney Barbara McQuade and Assistant United States Attorneys for the Eastern District of Michigan, to the effect of being "eager" and "excited about" the Hate Crimes Act and generally pursuing enforcement opportunities. Plaintiffs also contend that the Act chills the exercise of their constitutionally protected rights, thereby resulting in irreparable injury, because even a momentary loss of First Amendment rights constitutes irreparable harm, citing Elrod, 427 U.S. at 373. Plaintiffs assert that the case is fit for judicial resolution because no further factual development is required.

Plaintiffs' claims are not ripe for review. Just as Plaintiffs' risk of harm or injury was speculative under the standing analysis, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a sufficient "likelihood that the harm alleged will ever come to pass" with respect to ripeness. Norton, 298 F.3d at 554. Plaintiffs present hypothetical situations in which they believe that they will be prosecuted or subject to investigation under the Hate Crimes Act. They have not demonstrated that such situations are of "substantial and of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." Id. Plaintiffs allege their own personal beliefs and assertions of third party members of the general public to suggest that they would be subject to prosecution and investigation under the Act, rather than any concrete, "reasonably founded in fact," threat of prosecution or investigation. Cf. Planned Parenthood, 822 F.2d at 1395. Finally, the fact that the United States Attorney for this District expressed her administration's intent to vigorously enforce the Hate Crimes Act does not amount to a credible threat of prosecution of the Plaintiffs for their opinions under the factual circumstances alleged.

V

In addition to arguing that Plaintiffs lack standing and that their claims are not ripe for review, the Attorney General argues that it is entitled to dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims because Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when the Hate Crimes Act does not violate the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, the Tenth Amendment, or the Commerce Clause. Plaintiffs do not have standing and their claims are not ripe, therefore, the Attorney General's "failure to state a claim" arguments will not be reached.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Attorney General's motion to dismiss [Dkt. # 9] is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' complaint [Dkt. # 1] is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

Dated: September 7, 2010