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AYMAN NABIL GHALY, Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, MIKE JOHANNS, Secretary of Agriculture, Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PATTI SARIS, District Judge I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Arthur Moniz, who suffers from degenerative disc disease, depression, and anxiety, challenges the final decision of the Commissioner denying him Social Security disability and disability insurance benefits. After review of the record, the Court DENIES plaintiff's Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Social Security Administration, but ALLOWS the Motion for Remand because the ALJ failed to give adequate consideration to plaintiff's back pain. The Defendant's Motion for an Order Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner is DENIED .

II. BACKGROUND A. Employment and Medical History

Plaintiff is fifty-one years old and has completed twelve years of school. (Administrative Transcript ("Tr.") 54, 133.) He worked in shipping and receiving, and briefly as a truck driver, but has not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since December 15, 2003. (Tr. 13, 25-26.)

1. Physical Ailments

Plaintiff has had intermittent lower back pain since childhood, the result of a deformed lumbar vertebra. (Tr. 24-25.) X-rays taken in 1999 revealed mild degenerative changes and spondylolysis — degeneration or deficient development of a vertebra — at the L5 level. (Tr. 222.) Dr. Anne Marie Treadup, plaintiff's primary care physician, treated him between 2000 and 2006. (Tr. 289-94, 308-12, 341.) Her records contain few references to lumbar pain (See, e.g., Tr. 308, 310), but do address plaintiff's depression and anxiety. Dr. Treadup prescribed various pain relievers and muscle relaxants for his back over a period of several years, including Flexeril, Percocet, and Skelaxin, as well as Ibuprofin. (Tr. 305, 308.) Her notes for April 16, 2002, and August 8, 2003, also suggest referring plaintiff to an orthopedist, but the record contains no evidence of his seeing one prior to 2006. (Tr. 289.)

Plaintiff sought treatment from Dr. Jeffrey G. Swift, a chiropractor, from 1994 to 2005, with no treatment between 1997 and 2001. (Tr. 156, 223.) In April 2001, Dr. Swift examined plaintiff and his x-rays, diagnosing spondylolysis with mild listhesis and lumbar pain originating from an intervertebral disc. (Tr. 222-23.) At that time, plaintiff reported lower back pain rated eight on a ten point scale, but was unsure if he had a history of spondylolysis. (Tr. 223.) After several days of treatment, Dr. Swift noted that plaintiff's condition was improved, his prognosis was good, and that he could return to work as of April 13, 2001. (Tr. 224.)

Dr. Swift treated plaintiff again on January 21, 2004, diagnosing annular insult — a ring-shaped injury — and discogenic pain with antalgia. (Tr. 228.) At that time, plaintiff characterized his pain as a seven out of ten, which he had experienced over the past several days. (Id.) Dr. Swift noted that plaintiff was "totally disabled from occupational duties" on January 21, 2004 (Tr. 229, 231), but his treatment notes over the next several weeks indicated that plaintiff "[f]eels better," made "marked improvement," and had "no acute pain". (Tr. 232-34, 236-38.) On March 23, 2004, he reported that plaintiff was "able to return to his . . . occupational duties with no restrictions. . . ." (Tr. 239.) Dr. Swift treated plaintiff again between July 26, 2004, and September 2, 2004 (Tr. 241-52), and reported, once again, that he was "able to return to work on [September 19, 2004,] with no restrictions." (Tr. 240.)

On October 16, 2006, Dr. Swift completed a questionnaire in connection with plaintiff's application for disability benefits. (Tr. 253-54.) He identified the underlying diagnosis as spondylolysis with no associated limitations to plaintiff's range of motion, motor, or sensory functions, and no current treatment. (Tr. 253.) However, he did find that Mr. Moniz had low back pain and pain with back flexion. (Id.) On a separate questionnaire addressing pain arising from the spondylolysis, Dr. Swift indicated that plaintiff was limited only in "bend[ing] repetitively at the waist." (Tr. 254.)

On August 11, 2006, plaintiff sought treatment from Dr. David E. Adelberg, an orthopedist. He found that plaintiff's back had limited range of motion and exhibited spasm, list, and tenderness. (Tr. 204.) Although his records indicate that plaintiff was oriented, neurovascularly intact, suffering no acute distress, and walking with a normal gait, Dr. Adelberg's impression was of "a gentleman who is absolutely miserable." (Tr. 204-05.) Mr. Moniz related four decades of back pain: "He essentially has had intermittent back problems where his back would `go out' during which time he is either unable to stand or has to walk around in a crab like fashion, sometimes crawl on the floor and it can take days or months to resolve." (Tr. 382.) He added, "The back is positive for spasm, list and tenderness with extremely painful limited range of motion." (Id.) Dr. Adelberg diagnosed symptomatic spondylolysis and recommended epidural steroid injections as "the next step up the treatment ladder. . . ." (Tr. 383)

Plaintiff ceased seeing his primary care physician, Dr. Treadup, when his health insurance terminated in February 2007 and thereafter saw Dr. Sheldon Davis of the St. Luke's Ambulatory Care Clinic. (Tr. 359; see also Tr. 27-28.) Dr. Davis's notes indicate that one of plaintiff's chief complaints was intermittent lower back pain, which varied in intensity from daily discomfort to acute, severe pain during a flare-up in which he would have to crawl to move about, with minimal response to painkillers. (Tr. 360, 363, 378.) During the course of his treatment, Dr. Davis referred plaintiff to a neurologist and prescribed various pain killers and muscle relaxants, including Flexeril, Vicodin, and Naproxen. (Tr. 200, 360, 363, 371, 409.) Dr. Davis requested an MRI of plaintiff's back on March 1, 2007, which revealed grade 1 anterolisthesis and spondylolysis of plaintiff's L5 vertebra, as well as small diffuse bulges in several of his other intervertebral discs and mild compression of the L3 and L4 nerve roots. (Tr. 357-58.) On December 13, 2007, Dr. Davis noted that plaintiff can stand for no more than an hour at a time and "can do no lifting." (Tr. 378.)

Dr. Davis completed a Physical Capacities Evaluation of plaintiff on April 17, 2007, indicating that he could not sit, stand, or walk for more than an hour in an entire eight-hour workday, could never lift or carry any weight at all, was unable to use his hands for grasping, use of arm controls, or fine manipulation, and could not bend, squat, crawl, climb, or reach. (Tr. 365.) A subsequent evaluation on August 7, 2008, amended those restrictions slightly, recommending that plaintiff could not sit, stand, or walk for more than an hour per day, could lift up to five pounds frequently and carry up to ten pounds occasionally, could not use arm controls, and was totally restricted from activities involving unprotected heights, moving machinery, and driving automobile equipment. (Tr. 384.)

Dr. Davis referred plaintiff to Dr. Matthew Philips, a neurologist, in January 2008. (Tr. 360.) Dr. Philips noted that plaintiff had decreased range of motion in his back, but normal gait and motor functions. (Tr. 381.) His impression was that Moniz had "mechanical back pain due to his degenerative lumbar disc disease as well as his spondylolisthesis." He reviewed plaintiff's MRI and recommended a comprehensive course of non-operative therapy with a physiatrist — a rehabilitation physician. (Tr. 381.)

Plaintiff testified that, at Dr. Philips' recommendation, he saw a Dr. Anonte for pool therapy, which was somewhat helpful in addressing his back pain. (Tr. 30.) There is no documentation of that treatment in the record. (Tr. 29.)

Dr. Maria Gorbovitsky, a non-examining physician, completed a Residual Functional Capacity Assessment of plaintiff on December 5, 2006. (Tr. 257-64.) She concluded that he was able to lift or carry up to twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, that he could operate hand controls continuously, and that he could sit, stand, or walk about six hours in an eight-hour workday, but that he must be permitted to change his position periodically to relieve his back pain. (Tr. 258.) She also found occasional postural limitations to plaintiff's ability to climb, crawl, balance, or crouch. (Tr. 259.)

On August 23, 2007, Dr. Peter Horan examined plaintiff to determine his eligibility for disability benefits. (Tr. 369-70.) Dr. Horan's examination indicated that plaintiff "has extreme difficulty in [back] flexion without pain," noting that he could achieve "about 10 degrees flexion" and walked with a limp on the left side. (Tr. 370.) He also determined that plaintiff's grasp and grip were good, and that he had no motor or sensory deficiencies. (Id.) His assessment concluded that plaintiff had "[s]ignificant severe chronic low back syndrome." (Id.)

2. Mental Ailments

Plaintiff has a history of depression and anxiety, stemming substantially from the debilitation caused by his back pain. (Tr. 152.) His primary care physicians, Drs. Treadup and Davis, treated him for these conditions. Dr. Treadup prescribed Lorazepam for his anxiety beginning on February 25, 2002, and gave him samples of Lexapro. (Tr. 305, 325.) Dr. Davis continued prescribing Lorazepam after February 2007. (Tr. 363.)

Plaintiff sought counseling from Ms. Elizabeth Robert, a Licensed Independent Clinical Social Worker ("LICSW"), who treated him from March 20, 2006, through May 24, 2006. (Tr. 219.) In a Psychiatric Disorder Form dated October 12, 2006, Ms. Robert indicated that plaintiff had a generalized anxiety disorder and that, while he was alert and oriented, he was impulsive, angry, tended to isolate himself, and was aggravated and decompensated easily when with others. (Tr. 219-20.) She noted also that plaintiff was not taking any medication and had, to her knowledge, not undergone any psychological testing. (Tr. 220-21.) According to Ms. Robert, plaintiff's prognosis was guarded without medication and treatment, but he discontinued their sessions because of his high insurance deductible and his unwillingness to work on a payment plan. (Tr. 221.)

On April 17, 2008, plaintiff began treatment with Caryn Julien, LICSW, and Dr. Douglas H. Griffiths, a psychiatrist. (Tr. 385-404.) Ms. Julien noted plaintiff's history of self-medication with alcohol and his depressed and irritable mood, but indicated that he denied any suicidal ideation. (Tr. 385-86.) Her records indicate a primary diagnosis of dysthymic disorder, with a secondary diagnosis of social phobia. (Tr. 389). She saw plaintiff regularly through June 26, 2008, and her notes indicate mild improvement in his condition from week to week. (Tr. 391-97.) Dr. Griffiths prescribed Wellbutrin for plaintiff's depression, but appears to have seen him only once, for a psychiatric evaluation on July 21, 2008, and his notes of that examination are illegible. (Tr. 200, 388.)

Both Dr. Griffiths and Ms. Julien completed questionnaires regarding plaintiff's residual functional capacity in August 2008. (Tr. 401-04.) Their nearly identical assessments indicate moderately severe impairment of plaintiff's ability to relate to others, carry out daily activities, and respond appropriately to peers and workplace supervision. (Tr. 401, 403.) They also note moderate to moderately severe limitations of his ability to perform complex, repetitive, and varied tasks. (Tr. 402, 404.)

On January 5, 2007, Dr. Steven J. Hirsch, a psychologist working for Massachusetts Disability Determination Services, conducted a psychodiagnostic interview to evaluate plaintiff's eligibility for disability benefits. (Tr. 265-68.) Dr. Hirsch reported that plaintiff was alert and oriented, with clear speech and functional memory and expressive vocabulary skills. (Tr. 266.) He described plaintiff as "sad" but "not anxious," noting that he exhibited anhedonia — inability to experience positive emotions — tended to isolate himself, and had difficulty coping with daily stressors, though his social judgment and reasoning skills were functional. (Tr. 267.) Dr. Hirsch diagnosed Dysthymic Disorder and Anxiety Disorder and expressed concern about plaintiff's alcohol use. (Tr. 267-68.)

Joan Kellerman, Ph.D., reviewed plaintiff's medical records in connection with his application for disability benefits on January 18, 2007. (Tr. 269-82.) She identified his affective ailment as a dysthymic disorder characterized by anxiety, and made note of his daily alcohol use, but characterized those conditions as non-severe. (Tr. 270, 273, 275, 278, 282.) Dr. Kellerman determined that his condition caused no limitation on plaintiff's daily activities and only mild limitations on social functioning and maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. (Tr. 280.) Her report contains only a few sentences of explanation, in which she noted that plaintiff "does not report any severe [symptoms] or functional intrusion due to his psychological condition" and concluded that Ms. Robert's notes were inconsistent both with Dr. Hirsch's report and with plaintiff's allegations, noting also that Ms. Robert seemed unaware of his alcohol use. (Tr. 282.)

Mark Sokol, Ed.D., examined plaintiff on September 4, 2007, to determine his eligibility for disability benefits. (Tr. 366-68.) Dr. Sokol found plaintiff to be anxious, depressed, and experiencing recurrent suicidal ideation without serious plan or intent. (Tr. 366-67.) He was alert and oriented, his memory skills were intact, and his speech and thought processes were intelligible. (Id.) Dr. Sokol diagnosed a "[m]ajor recurrent depressive disorder without psychotic features, recurrent, moderate[,]" and a generalized anxiety disorder. (Tr. 368.) As to vocational limitations, Dr. Sokol found that plaintiff could follow simple instructions, but that he was moderately impaired in his ability to maintain attention, perform tasks consistently and at a reasonable pace, and cope with others. (Id.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits on August 10, 2006, alleging disability due to an L-5 spinal defect, degeneration of the lumbar disc, anxiety, and depression. (Tr. 133-135, 152.) The Social Security Administration denied his application at the initial review level on January 24, 2007. (Tr. 68-70.) Plaintiff filed a timely request for reconsideration, and the Federal Reviewing Official affirmed denial of the claim. (Tr. 56-59, 72-73.) Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on November 30, 2007. (Tr. 80.)

A hearing was held before ALJ Martha Bower on August 26, 2008, who heard testimony from plaintiff, Dr. Stephen Kaplan, an independent medical expert, and Mr. Michael Laraia, a vocational expert. (Tr. 21.) Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that he is unable to sleep well at night and that his medications make him drowsy during the day, which interferes with his ability to drive. (Tr. 27, 46.) He spends most of his day in a recliner and experiences constant pain that becomes paralyzing intermittently. (Tr. 30-31, 46-47.) He testified that he can sit or stand for an hour at a time and he experiences muscle spasms in his back if he sits or stands for too long. (Tr. 35, 40-41.) He is only able to lift five pounds. (Tr. 41.) At the time of the hearing, plaintiff testified that he was taking Flexeril, Lorazepam/Ativan, and Welbutrin. (Tr. 27, 31, 32.) Essentially none of the testimony addressed his depression or anxiety.

Dr. Kaplan testified that he could not identify any specific medical disease recorded by plaintiff's physicians over the period from 1996 to 2007, and concluded that the determination of the non-examining physician, Dr. Gorbovitsky, that plaintiff was capable of light exertional level work with postural limitations was reasonable. (Tr. 39-40.) Mr. Laraia testified that a person of plaintiff's age, education, experience, and medical limitations would be unable to continue his past work, but that a number of other suitable jobs existed in the regional economy. (Tr. 43-45.) In response to the ALJ's questioning, Mr. Laraia testified that taking into account "a moderate limitation in social interactions requiring an object oriented task with only occasional work related interactions with [others]" would diminish the number of jobs by at least seventy-five percent. (Tr. 47.) Mr. Laraia also stated that all jobs would be precluded if an individual needed to lie down for an hour a day and that need could not be accommodated by normal work breaks or if an individual had moderately severe limitation in the ability to sustain concentration, persistence, and pace. (Tr. 47-48.)

In an opinion dated September 2, 2008, the ALJ concluded that only plaintiff's degenerative disc disease constitutes a severe impairment and accepted the residual functional capacity suggested by Dr. Gorbovitsky and adopted as reasonable by Dr. Kaplan, disregarding Dr. Davis's more restrictive assessment. (Tr. 15-18.) She found that, while he is unable to perform his past work, his impairment does not prevent him from performing other available work. (Tr. 18-19.) Based on those conclusions, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not disabled and denied his claim for disability benefits. (Tr. 20.) Plaintiff appealed to the Decision Review Board, which affirmed the ALJ's decision on December 3, 2008. (Tr. 1-5.) Having exhausted his administrative remedies, plaintiff filed the present lawsuit.

III. LEGAL STANDARD A. Disability Determination Process

An individual may be entitled to Social Security disability benefits if he is unable to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). An impairment can be disabling only if it "results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

The Commissioner has developed a five-step evaluation process to determine whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (2009); Goodermote v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 690 F.2d 5, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1982). "Step one determines whether the plaintiff is engaged in `substantial gainful activity.' If he is, disability benefits are denied. If not, the decisionmaker proceeds to step two, which determines whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments." Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-41 (1987) (internal citations omitted). To establish a severe impairment, the claimant must "show that he has an `impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits . . . the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.'" Id. at 146 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 404.1521(b)).

If the claimant has a severe impairment, the third step is to determine "whether the impairment is equivalent to one of a number of listed impairments that . . . are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity." Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d)). If so, the claimant is presumed conclusively to be disabled. Id. If not, the fourth step evaluates whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing his past work. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).

If he cannot perform his past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner on the fifth step to prove that the claimant "is able to perform other work in the national economy in view of his age, education, and work experience." Id. at 142, 146 n. 5. During steps one, two, and four, the burden of proof is on the claimant. Id. at 146 n. 5. At the fifth step, the burden is on the Commissioner. Id. at 142. If the Commissioner fails to meet this burden, the claimant is entitled to benefits. Id.

When determining disability, the ALJ may give controlling weight to the opinion of the claimant's treating physician if it is "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2). However, the ALJ can reject a treating physician's opinion when "contradictory medical advisor evidence appears in the record." Keating v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 848 F.2d 271, 276 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Sitar v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1982)).

B. Standard of Review

This Court does not review the Commissioner's disability and disability insurance decisions de novo. Lizotte v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 654 F.2d 127, 128 (1st Cir. 1981). Rather, it "must affirm the [ALJ's] findings if they are supported by substantial evidence." Cashman v. Shalala, 817 F. Supp. 217, 220 (D. Mass. 1993); see also Rodriguez Pagan v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 819 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that the ALJ's determination must be affirmed, "even if the record arguably could justify a different conclusion, so long as it is supported by substantial evidence").

Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla."Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a "reasonable mind, reviewing the evidence in the record as a whole, could accept . . . as adequate to support [the ALJ's] conclusion."Irlanda Ortiz v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Rodriguez v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 647 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir. 1981)). In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, the Court is "to keep in mind that `[i]ssues of credibility and the drawing of permissible inferences from evidentiary facts are the prime responsibility of the [ALJ].'" Rodriguez, 647 F.2d at 222 (quoting Rodriguez v. Celebrezze, 349 F.2d 494, 496 (1st Cir. 1965)). When a conflict exists in the record, the ALJ weighs the evidence and resolve material conflicts in testimony. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 399;Irlanda Ortiz, 955 F.2d at 769. An ALJ's findings of fact, however, are "not conclusive when derived by ignoring evidence, misapplying the law, or judging matters entrusted to experts."Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999).

In addition to considering whether the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider whether the proper legal standard was applied. "Failure of the [ALJ] to apply the correct legal standards as promulgated by the regulations or failure to provide the reviewing court with the sufficient basis to determine that the [ALJ] applied the correct legal standards are grounds for reversal." Weiler v. Shalala, 922 F. Supp. 689, 694 (D. Mass. 1996) (citing Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982)).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's findings are not supported by substantial evidence with regard to (1) his evaluation of residual functional capacity; and (2) his determination that plaintiff's mental impairment is not severe.

A. Physical Impairments

1. Treating Physicians

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to accord proper weight to his treating physicians' opinions. The ALJ found that plaintiff suffered from a severe impairment of degenerative disc disease but concluded that he retained the residual functional capacity to perform a range of light work. Specifically, he claims that the ALJ improperly discredited the opinions of Drs. Treadup, Davis, Adelberg, and Philips in favor of Dr. Kaplan, who never examined him.

The ALJ generally must give controlling weight to a treating physician's opinion, "since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture" of the patient's medical condition. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). However, the ALJ is "not obligated automatically to accept [their] conclusions." Guyton v. Apfel, 20 F. Supp. 2d 156, 167 (D. Mass. 1998). Controlling weight is given only if the "treating source's opinion on the . . . nature and severity of [the patient's] impairment(s) is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). The ultimate determination of disability is left to the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1), 416.927(e)(1).

If the ALJ does not give a treating physician's report controlling weight, she must consider six factors to determine what weight to give it:

1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; 2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; 3) the relevant evidence in support of the medical opinion; 4) the consistency of the medical opinions reflected in the record as a whole; 5) whether the medical provider is a specialist in the area in which he renders his opinions; and 6) other factors which tend to support or contradict the opinion.
Guyton, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 167 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)-(6)). The regulations do "not mandate assignment of some unvarying weight to every report in every case." Id. (citation omitted). However, an ALJ must give "good reasons" for the weight given a physician's opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2).

Plaintiff's arguments that the ALJ disregarded the opinions of Drs. Treadup, Adelberg, and Philips in favor of Dr. Kaplan are unfounded. First, none of those treating physicians offered any opinion as to plaintiff's residual functional capacity. Furthermore, the ALJ based her residual capacity assessment substantially on the findings of Drs. Adelberg and Philips, as well as the agency physician, Dr. Horan, and plaintiff has not explained how their opinions are at odds with Dr. Kaplan's. The specialists' examinations revealed that, while he suffered decreased range of motion, pain, and tenderness due to mechanical back pain, he was neurovascularly intact with normal gait and motor strength. While Dr. Adelberg noted that plaintiff was "absolutely miserable," both he and Dr. Philips saw plaintiff only once and recommended conservative, non-surgical treatments. Dr. Philips also evaluated plaintiff's MRI, which indicates only mild compression of the nerves in his back.

Dr. Treadup's records contain questionnaires from September 28, 2006, assessing plaintiff's disc disease and pain. (Tr. 341-42.) However, those forms are blank, stating only "see attached records." (Id.) Her records devote minimal space to describing the nature or severity of plaintiff's condition, and none to assessing his resulting physical limitations.

Furthermore, the ALJ noted that plaintiff's chiropractor, Dr. Swift, twice returned him to work without restrictions in 2004,after his alleged onset of disability. In 2006, Dr. Swift, who treated plaintiff for years, listed his only limitation as an inability to bend repetitively at the waist. The only physician to offer a contrary opinion was Dr. Davis, whose April 2007 and August 2008 evaluations indicated a far more severe restriction. The ALJ discredited this opinion, noting its inconsistency with the other evidence in the record. While the ALJ did not engage in a methodical consideration of the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d), substantial evidence supports her assessment of Dr. Davis' opinion, and plaintiff has offered nothing to resuscitate it.

2. Subjective Complaints of Pain

Plaintiff refers to his documented history of back pain associated with his lumbar condition, arguing that the ALJ failed to give proper consideration of his subjective complaints. To establish a claim of disability due to pain or other subjective symptoms, a plaintiff must first show that he has a "clinically determinable medical impairment that can reasonably be expected to produce the pain alleged." Avery v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 797 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 1986). If so, the ALJ must then consider the intensity and persistence of the plaintiff's symptoms as well as the functional impact those symptoms may have on his ability to work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(1), 416.929(c)(1); Makuch v. Halter, 170 F. Supp. 2d 117, 126 (D. Mass. 2001). In making this determination, the ALJ must consider all available objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(1), 416.929(c)(1). However, a plaintiff's statements regarding the intensity and persistence of his pain and its impact on his ability to work will not be rejected solely because they are not substantiated by the available objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2), 416.929(c)(2).

The regulations recognize that a person's symptoms may be more severe than the objective medical evidence suggests. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). Therefore, several factors (known as the Avery factors) should be considered when an applicant alleges pain: (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication taken to alleviate the pain or other symptoms; (5) treatment, other than medications, received to relieve pain or other symptoms; (6) measures used by claimant to relieve pain or other symptoms; and (7) any other factors relating to claimant's functional limitations and restrictions due to pain. Avery, 797 F.2d at 28-29; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3).

To complete the analysis, the ALJ often must assess the credibility of a plaintiff's statements about the intensity of her pain and other symptoms, as well as their effect on his functional abilities. SSR 96-7p, Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims, Assessing the Credibility of an Individual's Statements, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,483, 34,484 (July 2, 1996). Although the ALJ's credibility determination generally is entitled to deference, "an ALJ who does not believe a claimant's testimony regarding his pain, `must make specific findings as to the relevant evidence he considered in determining to disbelieve the [claimant].'" Makuch, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (quoting Da Rosa v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 803 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1986) (alterations in original)).

Here, there is no dispute that plaintiff has a severe impairment that can reasonably be expected to produce the pain alleged, yet the ALJ failed to address these Avery factors in explaining her decision to discredit plaintiff's claims as to the intensity of his pain. She did not discuss the impact of the pain on his daily activities, the effect of his medications, or the efficacy of other treatments. In explaining her reasoning, the ALJ discussed only the medical opinions offered by two of plaintiff's doctors, Treadup and Swift. Because Dr. Swift stated he could return to work in 2004 and Dr. Treadup had only a few references to body pain, she found Moniz's "longstanding complaint and the alleged severity" of his limitations not credible. (Tr. 16-17.) However, virtually every doctor (e.g., Swift, Adelberg, Davis, Philips) who treated plaintiff noted his serious chronic back pain which intermittently flared up and caused such intense pain that he had to crawl. Between 2002 and 2007 he was prescribed Percocet, Motrin, Flexeril, Naproxen and Vicodin. Dr. Adelberg, an orthopedist, reported a man who was miserable. Even the non-treating physician, Dr. Horan, and the independent expert, Dr. Kaplan, reported severe chronic back pain. His social workers (Robert and Julien) all commented on his chronic pain.

The Avery factors, moreover, are based explicitly on the presumption that a claimant's symptoms may be more severe than the objective evidence suggests, and the regulations require the ALJ to consider them and not to reject a plaintiff's claims simply because of inconsistency with the objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2)-(3). The ALJ must actually consider the Avery factors in assessing plaintiff's claims of debilitating pain, and not simply recite his testimony before concluding that it is not credible. SSR 96-7p, 61 Fed. Reg. at 34,484. In light of his consistent medical history, the ALJ's discussion of plaintiff's complaints of pain was woefully inadequate. While it may well be that the chronic back pain in 2003 and 2004 was not disabling, it intensified and became more consistent, and warrants proper consideration.

3. Vocational Evidence

Plaintiff suggests that the ALJ's step-five determination is not supported by substantial evidence, pointing to the vocational expert's statement that plaintiff could engage in no available work if he had to rest one hour during the work day and the rest could not be accommodated by an employer. The First Circuit has held that a vocational expert's answers are relevant only if the limitations considered by him are based on medical evidence in the record. Arocho v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 670 F.2d 374, 375 (1st Cir. 1982). Here, plaintiff has offered no evidence in the record, and the Court can find none, suggesting that plaintiff requires a one hour rest during the workday. To the contrary, plaintiff's own testimony was that he must shift his position periodically to relieve pressure on his back. Therefore, the question posed to the vocational expert was irrelevant and the ALJ's failure to adopt it not erroneous.

B. Mental Impairments

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that his mental ailments were not severe at step two by giving improper weight to his treating physicians' opinions and relying arbitrarily on the assessment of Dr. Kellerman, a non-examining consultant. In considering whether an impairment is "severe," an ALJ must rate the degree of functional limitation presented by that condition in four areas: (1) daily activities; (2) social functioning; (3) concentration, persistence, or pace; and (4) episodes of decompensation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3). The first three areas are rated on a scale from none, to mild, moderate, marked, moderately severe, and extreme, while episodes of decompensation are rated zero, one or two, three, or four or more. Id. § 404.1520a(c)(4). An impairment generally is not severe if the ALJ rates the first three areas as mild or lower.Id. § 404.1520a(d)(1). The burden of proving a severe impairment rests with the claimant. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146.

Here, the ALJ found that plaintiff's anxiety and depression were not severe, as he suffered no limitation in his activities of daily living, mild limitation in social functioning and concentration, persistence, or pace, and no episodes of decompensation. She agreed with Dr. Kellerman, a non-examining consultant, in this assessment, and dismissed the contrary findings of Dr. Griffiths, Dr. Sokol, and Ms. Julien. She stated that the basis for Dr. Griffiths's opinion was unclear, as "there is no evaluation in the record, with a detailed mental status examination, by Dr. Griffiths." (Tr. 17.) Dr. Griffiths's notes were not legible, and he did not do a psychological evaluation. She noted that Ms. Julien's records were minimally descriptive, suggesting improvement and only mild impairment. Ms. Julien also stated that Ativan and Prozac "helped somewhat." (Tr. 400.) The ALJ gave Dr. Sokol's evaluation little weight because it included tests of concentration on which plaintiff performed well and supported a finding of "at most, mild limitations." (Tr. 18.) The ALJ did not address the opinion of Ms. Robert, a social worker, whose diagnosis was generalized anxiety disorder.

Plaintiff points also to the records of his treatment for anxiety by Dr. Treadup, his primary care physician, who prescribed Lorazepam. He cannot satisfy his burden of showing a severe impairment, however, merely by demonstrating the diagnosis of his condition and a lengthy treatment history, and Dr. Treadup offered no assessment of the functional impact of his condition.Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 1988) ("The mere diagnosis of [an ailment], of course, says nothing about the severity of the condition.").

While her reasoning was terse, the ALJ gave good reasons for the weight assigned to the treating source's opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)-(6). Dr. Griffiths only saw Moniz once, and he gave no evaluation. Ms. Julien, who was a social worker, only saw him for two months and found him improving. While Dr. Kellerman, upon whose report the ALJ relied exclusively, did not examine plaintiff, Dr. Hirsch, a psychologist, did conduct an interview and a detailed evaluation upon which she relied.

In light of Dr. Griffiths's brief therapeutic relationship with the plaintiff, and the fact that Julien and Roberts are social workers, not medical professionals, the ALJ did not err when she relied on a non-examining expert's report alone. See Berrios Lopez v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 951 F.2d 427, 431 (1st Cir. 1991).

ORDER

Defendant's Motion for an Order Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner [Docket No. 17] is DENIED . Plaintiff's Motion to Remand the Case to the Social Security Administration [Docket No. 1] is ALLOWED .

there. At that point, PPQ Officer Paul Gunther got up, stated that the president had ordered Bin Laden's execution, and asked Ghaly: "What are you, a radical Muslim?" ( Id. at 124). Gunther was never reprimanded or punished, which Ghaly attributes to the fact that Gunther is white. ( Id. at 125).

Ghaly claims Congress issued a rule stating that governmental agencies could not hang posters regarding Osama Bin Laden or provoke issues with Middle Eastern employees in general.

Ghaly testified that he continued to have problems with different officers after the comment, especially Gunther and two others, whom he dubbed the "white racist trio." (Id. at 126). Ghaly recalled that the problems escalated to the point where he needed to turn to alternative dispute resolution. According to Ghaly, the officers were counseled over the phone to leave him alone and stop putting posters up. (Id.) At some point, he told a supervisor that he was going to the United States Attorney because the situation was turning into a hate crime. The supervisor then called a meeting and informed all employees that only pictures of family and friends could be displayed at work. Ghaly claims the "trio" was upset that they had to change their behavior due to his complaints. He also alleges he was harassed by the trio and other officers. Examples of this harassment included incidents when an officer, who was not his supervisor, tried to send him home from an overtime shift or when officers monitored him and singled him out for taking coffee breaks, despite the fact that everyone took coffee breaks.

Notwithstanding Ghaly's complaints about working in the cargo area, when the time came for him to bid again, he chose to remain there. He claims that he did so out of spite and "to see if management felt like moving [him] again." (Id. at 107). Management did not move him, and he received an outstanding evaluation for his work at cargo. He remained there until he was transferred to California at his own request. He continued working for APHIS until he quit in 2006, returned to New York, and started a private business.

During his time with APHIS at JFK, Ghaly filed three complaints with the EEOC. The first, filed on January 29, 2000, alleged that he was subjected to discrimination based on national origin (Egypt), race (black) and reprisal (for past EEO activity) when Officer Greenberg questioned him about his improper use of government equipment and made the above-described comment regarding his "brother." Ghaly's second EEOC complaint, filed on January 3, 2001, alleged that he was subjected to discrimination based on national origin and reprisal when the agency placed him on administrative leave in late 2000. The third and last complaint, filed on May 1, 2002, alleged that he was subject to discrimination based on national origin and reprisal when the agency assigned him to a terminal not of his choosing, changed his shift, and placed him under constant supervision. Ghaly did not file an EEOC complaint regarding the Bin Laden posters or the "radical Moslem" comment made by Officer Gunther. (See 56.1, ¶ 45).

Ghaly's three EEOC complaints were consolidated, and the EEOC conducted an investigation into his allegations. At the conclusion of the investigation, Ghaly received a copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge ("AJ"). On November 13, 2003, the AJ issued a notice of intent to issue a decision without a hearing, and, on March 12, 2004, the AJ did just that, finding that there was no discrimination. The AJ concluded that Ghaly failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to his first complaint, noting, inter alia, that Ghaly had been previously warned about his inappropriate behavior and had a history of misusing government equipment and making inflammatory and harassing comments to fellow employees. As to Ghaly's second complaint, the AJ found that the decision to place him on leave was based on allegations of falsification of time and attendance records, and concluded there was no evidence of discrimination. As for the last complaint, the AJ found that Ghaly was the only one out of ten employees who was provided closer supervision after return from administrative leave, but noted that the position description for PPQ technicians required supervision by PPQ officers. Accordingly, he discerned no inference of bias and concluded there was no discrimination.

Ghaly appealed, and the EEOC affirmed the AJ's decision on February 7, 2006. Analyzing the events at issue in Ghaly's first EEOC complaint, the commission held that the incidents, taken together, were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute discriminatory harassment. As to the second complaint, the commission also found that the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to place Ghaly on leave. It also found Ghaly had presented no evidence of pretext. For the third and final complaint, the commission found the agency had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for transferring him to cargo, specifically citing concerns about tardiness and other attendance problems, and also found that Ghaly failed to present evidence that the reason offered was a pretext for discrimination.

On April 18, 2006, Ghaly commenced the instant action by filing a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, naming the USDA, APHIS, and Secretary of Agriculture as defendants, and alleging claims for "(1) discrimination; (2) retaliation; and (3) harassment." (Cunha Decl., Ex. A at 1). On May 30, 2007, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative, transfer it to the Eastern District of New York. On July 28, 2007, the action was transferred to this Court, which directed Ghaly to file an amended complaint because his original complaint consisted of three words and a number of papers relating to his prior EEOC proceedings. Ghaly duly amended his complaint on October 30, 2006 and asserted three causes of action against the USDA and the Secretary of Agriculture: (1) "discrimination via racial remark," referring to the incident with Officer Greenberg; (2) "harassment via ongoing hostile work environment . . . due to the fact that [he] fought for [t]echnician employee rights," which worsened after 9/11 when Gunther allegedly made his "radical Moslem" remark; and (3) retaliation by management by removing him from work for 13 months and transferring him to the cargo worksite with no duties to carry out in the hope that he would quit and walk away. (Cunha Decl., Ex. D).

Defendants answered Ghaly's amended complaint on November 20, 2006. The Court set a discovery schedule, under which discovery was to conclude by February 9, 2007. Defendants sent a number of interrogatories and requests for production of documents to Ghaly on December 28, 2006. Ghaly did not respond to these requests. Defendants, on February 7, 2007, requested that the Court compel Ghaly to respond. On February 13, 2007, Magistrate Judge Lois Bloom gave Ghaly notice that if he failed to respond to defendants' written discovery requests, or if he did not complete his deposition prior to March 9, 2007, she would recommend that the action be dismissed with prejudice. Ghaly filed for a further extension of discovery on March 8, 2007, in response to which Judge Bloom ordered the deadline extended to April 6, 2007, to respond and further ordered that no further extension requests would be entertained. Ghaly's deposition was taken on April 10, 2007. In lieu of responding to defendants' written discovery requests. Ghaly submitted a short statement in which he argued that he was unable to comply because he had been "instructed by the court not to contact management for a written statement." (Docket No. 39). He also asserted that "fellow coworkers . . . could not willingly come forth and provide a statement" owing to a concern that doing so would violate an unspecified written agreement. (Id.) Lastly, he stated that some witnesses would not come forth because they feared retribution, and would not testify without a court order compelling them to do so.

RULE 37 SANCTIONS MOTION

Empowered by Rule 37, district courts have broad discretion in imposing sanctions to compel compliance with discovery orders, including the "extreme sanction of dismissal." See NHL v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S.ct. 2778, 2781 (1976) (per curiam). "[D]ismissal with prejudice is a harsh remedy to be used only in extreme situations . . . and then only when the court finds willfulness, bad faith, or any fault on the part of the [of a party]." See Bobal v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 916 F.2d 759, 764 (2d Cir. 1990). Reasonable minds might, then, disagree as to remedy, but there is no disagreement that "all litigants, including pro ses, have an obligation to comply with court orders." Minotti v. Lensink, 895 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the sanction of dismissal with prejudice may be imposed on a pro se litigant if he was warned that noncompliance with a discovery order could result in dismissal. See Bobal, 916 F.2d at 766.

Within the considered bounds of discretion, the Court does not find that Ghaly's conduct during discovery in this case warrants dismissal of his claims against defendants. Ghaly ultimately heeded Magistrate Judge Bloom's order to appear for his deposition, and although he did not respond to the discovery requests as ordered, he made an effort to explain that he believed himself incapable of responding, thereby evincing a lack of "bad faith." Furthermore, Ghaly's conduct appears not to have amounted to the sort of tactical litigation delays or other misconduct for which the sanction of dismissal has customarily been deemed appropriate.See, e.g., Friends of Animals Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 131 F.3d 332, 333-34 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding dismissal after magistrate judge warned plaintiff on five occasions about the possibility of the drastic sanction of dismissal, and there were 650 entries in the docket relating to discovery disputes and tactical delays of litigation); John B. Hull, Inc. v. Waterbury Petroleum Prods., Inc., 845 F.2d 1172, 1176 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming court's grant of sanctions after plaintiff delayed discovery for three years and was warned twice about the possibility of the sanctions of dismissal of the complaint). Accordingly, the Court declines to impose the harsh sanction of dismissal with prejudice in this case for plaintiff's discovery peccadillos.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT A. Standard of Review

The Court's responsibility in assessing the merits of a summary judgment motion is not to try issues of fact, but rather to "determine whether there are issues of fact to be tried." Sutera v. Schering Corp., 73 F.3d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, see, e.g., Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005), and the Court will resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. See, e.g., Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line. Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2004); Hetchkop v. Woodlawn at Grassmere, Inc., 116 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 1997) ("If, as to the issue on which summary judgment is sought, there is any evidence in the record from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the opposing party, summary judgment is improper.").

If the moving party meets its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a disputed issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The nonmoving party may not rely solely on "conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation" in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998). Rather, the nonmoving party must "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [each] element to that party's case. . . . since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). If the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is "merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.ct. 2505, 2511 (1986) (internal citations omitted).

The Second Circuit has often cautioned that courts should be "chary" in granting summary judgment in employment discrimination cases, where intent of the employer is usually a central factual issue. See Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 71 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins., 92 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1996)); Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997). "[E]mployers are rarely so cooperative as to include a notation in the personnel file that the firing is for a reason expressly forbidden by law." Bickerstaff v. Vassar College, 196 F.3d 435, 448 (2d Cir. 1999). Notwithstanding, it is "beyond cavil that summary judgment may be appropriate even in the fact-intensive context of discrimination cases."Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, 239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir. 2001). "[E]ven in the discrimination context, a plaintiff must provide more than conclusory allegations of discrimination to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Schwapp, 118 F. 3d at 110; see also Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 40 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[S]ummary judgment remains available to reject discrimination claims in cases lacking genuine issues of material fact.").

Finally, when, as here, a party is proceeding pro se, a court must read that party's supporting papers "liberally . . . and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1998);accord Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1995).

B. Plaintiff's Title VII Claims

Title VII provides, in relevant part, that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), or to retaliate against any employee who complains about a Title VII violation. See id. § 2000e-3(a). In a Title VII action, the plaintiff always bears the ultimate burden of proof to show that the employer's motivation was discriminatory or retaliatory. See Norton, 145 F.3d at 118-19.

Plaintiff alleges that defendants engaged in discrimination against him based on his race and national origin, subjected him to a hostile work environment, and retaliated against him because of EEO activity. As a threshold matter, it is black-letter law that the only proper defendant in a Title VII action by an employee or prospective employee of the federal government is the "head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate," not the agency itself or any lower level employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); see also Healy v. United States, 677 F. Supp. 1284, 1287 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). Therefore, the only proper defendant in this case is the Secretary of Agriculture, and plaintiff's claims against the USDA are dismissed with prejudice.

1. "Discrimination via Racial Remark"

Plaintiff first complains of unlawful discrimination "via racial remark;" namely, the June 6, 1999 comment by supervisor Greenberg that plaintiff should help his "brother," which comment was one of the subjects of plaintiff's first EEOC complaint. Plaintiff interprets this rather ambiguous remark as an allusion to the fact that he and the other employee it addressed are both of dark complexion. Without more, however, "[s]tray racial remarks or slurs are not actionable under Title VII." Badrinauth v. Touro College, No. 97-cv-3554, 1999 WL 1288956, at *4, (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1999). The inquiry does not end there, though, since the Court liberally construes this cause of action as a claim that the allegedly racist remark created or contributed to a "hostile work environment" in violation of Title VII; such a proscribed environment exists where "the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S. Ct 367, 370 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Title VII hostile work environment claims are subject to "demanding standard[s]" in order to avoid construing the statute as a "general civility code." Wilson v. N.Y.P. Holdings, Inc., No. 05-CV-10355, 2009 WL 873206, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009). To make out a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must show both: "(1) that the harassment was `sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment,' and (2) that a specific basis exists for imputing the objectionable conduct to the employer." Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 373 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir. 1997)). To defeat a motion for summary judgment on a Title VII hostile work environment claim, "[a] plaintiff must produce evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that `the work environment both objectively was, and subjectively was perceived by the plaintiff to be, sufficiently hostile to alter the conditions of employment for the worse.'"Divers v. Metro. Jewish Health Sys., No. 06-CV-6704, 2009 WL 103703, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2009) (quoting Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., 445 F.3d 597, 604 (2d Cir. 2006)).

"Courts look at all circumstances to ascertain whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive to support a claim." Leibovitz v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 188 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). "The factors that courts may consider include: frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Id. at 188 (citation omitted). As a general matter, "[f]or racial comments, slurs, and jokes to constitute a hostile work environment, there must be more than a few isolated incidents of racial enmity, meaning that [i]nstead of sporadic racial slurs, there must be a steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments. Thus, whether racial slurs constitute a hostile work environment typically depends upon the quantity, frequency, and severity of those slurs, considered cumulatively in order to obtain a realistic view of the work environment." Schwapp, 118 F.3d at 110-11 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration in original). However, the Second Circuit has also emphasized that "a single act can create a hostile work environment if it in fact work[s] a transformation of the plaintiff's workplace." Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 150 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration in original). "In short, a plaintiff alleging a hostile work environment must demonstrate either that a single incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a series of incidents were sufficiently continuous and concerted to have altered the conditions of [his] working environment." Alfano, 294 F.3d at 374 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

The Court finds that the "go help your brother" comment allegedly made by Greenberg is insufficient alone to support a Title VII hostile work environment claim. Assuming the accuracy of plaintiff's interpretation of the comment as a derogatory reference to the color of his skin, the comment was understandably offensive. But there is no indication that Greenberg's behavior on June 6, 1999 single-handedly effected a negative change, or any change at all, in the conditions of plaintiff's working environment. Plus, alternatively, there is no allegation that plaintiff, at or around the same time, dealt with any other, much less dealt with a steady barrage of, similar comments from Greenberg or anyone else at APHIS. See, e.g.,Hawana v. City of New York, 230 F. Supp. 2d 518, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (single comment to Egyptian plaintiff by supervisor to

the effect that he came from a third world country and therefore did not like women was "woefully insufficient to rise to the level of harassment required to overcome a motion for summary judgment" on plaintiff's hostile work environment claim). Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff has raised a hostile work environment claim based on Greenberg's "brother" comment, that claim is dismissed with prejudice.

2. Post-9/11 Hostile Work Environment

Plaintiff's second cause of action is identified in the complaint as a claim for a hostile work environment arising from plaintiffs vocal efforts to advance "[t]echnician employee rights," and escalating after 9/11 with Officer Gunther's "what are you, a radical Moslem?" remark. Additionally, at his deposition in this action, plaintiff alleged other post-9/11 instances of discriminatory conduct and comments by superiors and colleagues related to plaintiffs Egyptian national origin, as described supra. However, unlike the "brother" comment allegedly made by Officer Greenberg in 1999, plaintiff did not raise these allegations in any of his three EEOC complaints, and he is now time-barred from filing another EEOC charge regarding them. Exhaustion of administrative remedies "is a pre-condition to bringing a Title VII claim in federal court." Chandler v. AMR Am. Eagle Airlines, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1178 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Francis v. City of New York, 235 F.3d 763, 768 (2d Cir. 2000)). "A Title VII plaintiff typically may raise only those claims that are either contained in a prior EEOC charge or are `reasonably related'" to allegations raised therein." Chandler, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1178 (quoting Holtz v. Rockefeller Co., 258 F.3d 82-83 (2d Cir. 2001)).

Under EEOC regulations, a claimant who believes he has been discriminated against must consult a counselor at the agency's EEO office within 45 days of the alleged discriminatory act. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). If the matter is not resolved after a mandatory counseling period, the employee may then file a formal written administrative complaint with the EEOC, within 15 days of the EEO counsel's final interview with the employee. 29 C.F.R § 1614.106(a) and (b). The employee may then file a civil action (i) within 90 days of notice of a final agency decision on his or her EEOC complaint, or (ii) after 180 days from the filing of the EEOC complaint if the agency has not yet rendered a decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.408(a), (b).

The Second Circuit has recognized three situations in which a plaintiff may assert in district court a claim that was not specifically pleaded in an EEOC complaint because it is "reasonably related" to the claims in the EEOC complaint: (1) claims within the scope of the EEOC investigation likely to result from the EEOC complaint; (2) claims of retaliation for filing the EEOC complaint; and (3) further incidents that occur after the filing of the EEOC charge that are carried out in precisely the same manner alleged in the EEOC charge.See Butts v. N.Y. Dep't of Hous. Pres. Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1402-03 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Williams v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 458 F.3d 67, 70 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2006). When determining whether claims are reasonably related, the focus should be "on the factual allegations made in the [EEOC] charge itself, describing the discriminatory conduct about which plaintiff is grieving." Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 632, 637 (9th Cir. 2002)). "[I]t is the substance of the charge and not its label that controls."Deravin, 335 F.3d at 201 (quotingAlonzo v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 25 F. Supp. 2d 455, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)), and both pre-charge and post-charge conduct may be reasonably related. See Francis v. City of New York, 235 F.3d 763, 766 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2000). The central question is whether the charge filed with the EEOC gave the agency "adequate notice to investigate discrimination on both bases." Williams, 458 F.3d at 70.

Ghaly's first two EEOC complaints were filed well before the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The initial charge specifically complained that, on one day in 1999, Officer Greenberg had disciplined Ghaly unfairly and had made a discriminatory remark to him pertaining to the color of his skin. The second and third charges complained that specific adverse employment actions were taken against plaintiff on a discriminatory basis: his placement on administrative leave in late 2000, and his transfer from his preferred terminal at JFK to the cargo area in early 2002. The AJ's decision dismissing these charges and the EEOC's affirmance of that decision were both silent about any post-9/11 hostile work environment claim. The Court finds that the allegations underlying Ghaly's post-9/11 hostile work environment claim — inter alia, his allegations regarding Officer Gunther's "radical Moslem" comment and his coworkers' posting and defacing of Osama Bin Laden posters in 2002 and 2003 — were not within the scope of the EEOC's investigations of his administrative complaints. See, e.g., Chandler, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1186 (as more than year had passed between alleged incidents, they were not sufficiently related to support a single hostile work environment claim). Nor was the alleged post-9/11 verbal harassment carried out in precisely the same manner as the discrimination claimed in his EEOC complaints, which implicated different personnel and primarily protested discrete employment actions, as opposed to a cumulatively hostile atmosphere. Finally, Ghaly alleges that he became a lightning rod for hostility after 9/11 because of his Egyptian national origin, particularly so because APHIS management already had it out for him due to his campaign for advancement of the labor rights and interests of PPQ technicians; however, Ghaly provides absolutely no basis for a reasonable inference that the post-9/11 hostile conduct he complains of constituted retaliation for the filing of his prior EEOC discrimination complaints.

As there is no theory by which Ghaly's post-9/11 hostile work environment claim could be deemed "reasonably related" to his prior EEOC complaints, see Butts, 990 F.2d at 1402-03 (2d Cir. 1993), the claim is barred by his failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and consequently, is dismissed with prejudice.

3. Retaliation

Plaintiff's last claim in this case alleges retaliation as a result of his placement on paid, non-duty status for 13 months in 2000 and then, upon his return to work in 2001, his transfer to what he viewed as an undesirable duty post in the cargo area. With respect to such retaliation claims, Title VII provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful . . . for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made unlawful by this subchapter, or because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

Courts evaluate Title VII retaliation claims using theMcDonnell Douglas three-step burden-shifting analysis.See generally McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 (1973). First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case showing: "(1) participation in a protected activity; (2) that the defendant knew of the protected activity; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 282-83 (2d Cir. 2001); see Reed v. A.W. Lawrence Co., Inc., 95 F.3d 1170, 1178 (2d Cir. 1996). In determining whether this initial burden has been satisfied, a district court's role is to determine only whether proffered admissible evidence would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer a retaliatory motive. See Donahue v. Windsor Locks Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 834 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1987). "If a plaintiff sustains the initial burden, a presumption of retaliation arises. In turn, under the second step of the burden-shifting analysis, the onus falls on the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. Finally, as for the third step, once an employer offers such proof, the presumption of retaliation dissipates and the employee must show that retaliation was a substantial reason for the adverse employment action." Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to satisfy the third (adverse employment action) and fourth (causation) prongs of his prima facie retaliation case. "A plaintiff sustains an adverse employment action if he or she endures a `materially adverse change' in the terms and conditions of employment." Galabya v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2000). "Examples of materially adverse changes include termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices unique to a particular situation." Id. (internal quotation marks, citation and alterations omitted). The Court finds that the agency's decision to place Ghaly on paid administrative leave while investigating evidence of his misconduct was not an adverse employment action, as it was consistent with preexisting USDA disciplinary procedures. "[A]n employee does not suffer a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment where the employer merely enforces its preexisting disciplinary policies in a reasonable manner."Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 2006). However, there is at least a genuine question of material fact as to whether the employer's decision to transfer plaintiff to daytime shifts at the cargo unit constituted an adverse employment action, as Ghaly alleges that his job duties were thereby drastically reduced and that he lost his ability to collect nighttime differential pay.See Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 113 (2d Cir. 1999) ("To constitute an adverse employment action, a transfer must be accompanied by a negative change in the terms and conditions of employment.") (citing Dahm v. Flynn, 60 F.3d 253, 257 (7th Cir. 1994) (transfer involving a dramatic downward shift in duties can rise to the level of an adverse employment action); Fyfe v. Curlee, 902 F.2d 401, 405 (5th Cir. 1990) (transfer from productive position to menial make-work one is an adverse employment action)).

Dispositively, however, even assuming arguendo that Ghaly's paid administrative suspension and his subsequent transfer to the cargo area both constituted adverse employment actions, plaintiff has not made out a prima facie case of retaliation because the record contains no evidence at all of a causal connection between his discrimination complaints to EEOC and either of those events, as his complaint alleges. "[C]ausation can be established by showing that the retaliatory action was close in time to the protected activity; that other similarly situated employees were treated differently; or with direct proof of retaliatory animus." Reed, 95 F.3d at 1178 (citing Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990); DeCintio v. Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 821 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1987)).

Timing does not support causation in this case. "The cases that accept mere temporal proximity between an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be very close." Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273, 121 S.ct. 1508, 1511 (2001) (quoting O'Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001)). More specifically, when assessing causal connections based on temporal relationship, "[t]hree months is on the outer edge of what courts in this circuit recognize as sufficiently proximate to admit of an inference of causation."Yarde v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 360 F. Supp. 2d 552, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), and "[s]ix months between protected activity and discharge is well beyond the time frame for inferring retaliatory causation." Id.; see Jimenez v. City of New York, 605 F. Supp. 2d 485, 528 (S.D.N.Y 2009) (noting that, "[i]n general, when more than three months have passed between a protected activity and an alleged retaliatory response, the Second Circuit has deemed the evidence insufficient to raise an issue of fact concerning causation."). Ghaly filed his first EEOC complaint approximately nine months before he was placed on paid administrative leave and filed his next complaint approximately one year before his transfer to the cargo area.

Similarly, there is no evidence of disparate treatment either with respect to Ghaly's placement on leave or the treatment by his employer upon his return. Nine other employees were also suspended with pay in connection with the OIG investigation in which Ghaly was implicated, and Ghaly was the only one who was not subsequently fired or suspended for an additional period without pay. Moreover, as the EEOC noted, Ghaly's boss gave a reasonable explanation for transferring Ghaly to the cargo area, citing concerns about his tardiness and attendance and the need to supervise him more closely. Finally, plaintiff's conclusory assertions aside, there is absolutely no direct evidence of retaliatory intent in the record. Consequently, plaintiff's retaliation claim fails at the first step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.

And, even if Ghaly could make the requisite prima facie showing of retaliation, his claim would still fail. Defendants have articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged employment actions; plaintiff and others were placed on leave after evidence giving rise to suspicion of time and attendance abuses came to light, and upon plaintiffs return to the workplace, his superiors deemed it appropriate to monitor his job performance more closely. It is reasonable for an employer to increase oversight of an employee who has been formally warned to toe the line on punctuality and attendance. Ultimately, plaintiff has not provided any basis for the Court to infer that the employer's reasons for its actions were pretextual, nor has he offered any evidence to show that retaliation was a "substantial reason for the [alleged] adverse employment action[s]."Jute, 420 F.3d at 173. There being no material fact in dispute, summary judgment for the agency defendant is appropriate.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 37 is denied, but defendants' Rule 56 motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs claims is granted. Plaintiffs claims are dismissed in their entirety with prejudice.

The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for defendants and to close this case.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

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GHALY v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
(Sep 16, 2010)