MADSEN, C.J.
¶1 — This case began with an automobile accident. The case was referred to mandatory arbitration, and the plaintiff, Lea Hudson, won a monetary award. Respondents (Hapner) requested a trial de novo under the Superior Court Mandatory Arbitration Rules (MAR). Hudson improved her position at trial, receiving a substantially greater award. Hapner successfully appealed, obtaining reversal and instructions for a new trial. Despite appellate success, Hapner moved in the trial court to withdraw his request for trial de novo, end the litigation, and pay the original arbitration award. The trial court denied the motion but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the mandatory arbitration rules provide a unilateral right to withdraw a request for trial de novo. We agree that the rules do provide for unilateral withdrawal but hold that this right must be exercised prior to the start of trial proceedings. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for a new trial.
FACTS
¶2 On April 6, 1998, Hapner rear-ended Hudson in an automobile accident. Hudson filed a lawsuit and requested arbitration under the mandatory arbitration rules. On November 17, 2000, arbitration resulted in an award of $14,537.97 for Hudson. Hapner requested a trial de novo. At the conclusion of trial the jury awarded Hudson a significantly higher amount than the arbitration award: $292,298. Pursuant to MAR 7.3, the court also granted attorney fees, $38,956.25, costs, $1,624.80, and later added $4,935.00 in attorney fees in a supplemental judgment.
Hudson was awarded $10,500.00 in general damages and $4,037.97 in special damages. The award contained no amount for attorney fees or costs.
The jury awarded $26,048 in past economic damages, $140,000 in future economic damages, and $126,250 in past and future noneconomic damages, for a total award of $292,298.
¶3 Hapner appealed, alleging various evidentiary errors related to admissibility of expert witness testimony, portions of Hudson's testimony, and use of a model spine at trial.
¶4 In a separate section of her appellate brief, Hudson requested attorney fees under MAR 7.3. She also requested fees and costs on appeal in the event she prevailed.
¶5 The Court of Appeals ruled that evidence had been improperly excluded and reversed, remanding the matter for a new trial. Hudson v. Hapner, noted at 126 Wn. App. 1057, 2005 WL 834433, at *3, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 610, at *8 ( Hudson I). The court also denied Hudson's attorney fees on appeal, holding that "her claim of reasonable attorney fees at trial must abide the outcome" of the second trial. Id. at *4, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 610, at *15.
¶6 After the Court of Appeals issued its decision, Hapner filed a cost bill requesting $200.00 in statutory attorney fees and $3,473.25 in costs incurred on appeal. Appellants' Cost Bill on Appeal at 1-2 (Apr. 21, 2005) (citing RAP 14.3). Hapner argued he was "the prevailing party on appeal" and that he was entitled to statutory attorney fees and costs pursuant to RAP 14.3.
RAP 14.2 instructs appellate courts to award costs and statutory attorney fees "to the party that substantially prevails on review" or, where neither party substantially prevails, to no one. RAP 18.1(b) also provides that the request for attorney fees must be in separate section of the party's opening brief and "should not be made in the cost bill."
¶7 Hudson objected to the cost bill, arguing (i) "both parties must bear their own costs" because Hapner had only prevailed in part; (ii) awarding costs to Hapner violated the purposes of the mandatory arbitration rules, which contain its own attorney fees provisions; and (iii) in the alternative, an award of attorney fees and costs to Hapner under RAP 14.2 should at least "abide the final determination of this action." Resp't's Objection to Appellants' Cost Bill at 1, 3, 4, 8 (May 2, 2005).
¶8 The Court of Appeals awarded costs and attorney fees to Hapner as the substantially prevailing party.
¶9 Hudson's subsequent motion for reconsideration (reiterating her request for attorney fees) and her petition for review in this court were both denied.
¶10 Following remand, Hapner filed a motion to compel supplemental discovery. Hudson complied, providing additional information about her medical records and billing. Thereafter, Hapner moved to withdraw his request for trial de novo and submitted a draft judgment in which he offered to pay the original arbitration award plus interest, as well as Hudson's attorney fees and costs incurred in proceedings before the superior court. Hudson objected and moved to strike. The trial court denied Hapner's motion, and Hapner appealed.
In the notice of presentment, Hapner offered to pay (1) the original arbitration award plus interest from the date of the filing of request for trial de novo, (2) attorney fees and taxable costs at trial de novo, and (3) attorney fees upon remand to the superior court. The offer excluded attorney fees and costs on first appeal to the Court of Appeals, which Hapner argues Hudson is not entitled to.
¶11 In the second appeal, Hudson requested attorney fees and costs in a separate section of her brief. Specifically, she requested attorney fees and costs "[u]pon prevailing in this appeal and pursuant to MAR 7.3 and RAP 18.1(b)." Resp't's Br. at 25-26.
Hudson requested the Court of Appeals modify its opinions in both Hudson I and Hudson v. Hapner, 146 Wn. App. 280, 187 P.3d 311 (2008), "in order to award Plaintiff her [sic] all of her attorney fees and costs incurred since Defendants filed their Request for Trial de Novo in accordance with MAR 7.3." Resp't's Mot. for Recons. and Mot. to Modify at 1 (July 28, 2008).
¶12 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the mandatory arbitration rules provide a unilateral right to withdraw at any time. The court also denied Hudson's request for attorney fees and costs incurred during this second appeal, since Hudson was not the prevailing party on appeal. Hudson v. Hapner, 146 Wn. App. 280, 187 P.3d 311 (2008) ( Hudson II). Hudson then filed a motion for reconsideration, urging the court to reconsider both of its decisions ( Hudson I and II) pursuant to RAP 2.5(c)(2) and grant her request for attorney fees incurred during both appeals. This motion was denied.
The Court of Appeals also found remedies at law adequate (and equitable remedies unnecessary) because "[h]ere, Hudson's remedy under MAR 7.3 is the original arbitration award, interest, and attorney fees and costs." Hudson II, 146 Wn. App. at 290. Hudson argues this statement is inconsistent with the Court of Appeals' own holdings that denied her attorney fees and costs on both appeals.
¶13 Hudson petitioned this court for review.
ANALYSIS
¶14 On December 7, 2000, Hapner requested a trial de novo. After completing one trial, one appeal, and almost six years of litigation, Hapner sought to unilaterally withdraw his request for a trial de novo. Hudson argues there is no unilateral right to withdraw or, if it exists, it cannot be asserted at this late stage in proceedings. We conclude that Hapner had a unilateral right to withdraw his request. However, we agree with Hudson that his decision came too late.
¶15 RCW 7.06.060(1) and the Mandatory Arbitration Rules do not explicitly create a right to withdraw a request for trial de novo. However, MAR 7.3, the attorney fees provision, mentions voluntary withdrawal of such a request.
The court shall assess costs and reasonable attorney fees against a party who appeals the award and fails to improve the party's position on the trial de novo. The court may assess costs and reasonable attorney fees against
a party who voluntarily withdraws a request for a trial de novo.
MAR 7.3 (emphasis added).
¶16 RCW 7.06.060(1) provides an almost identical statement but adds that fees and costs may be assessed following voluntary withdrawal "if the withdrawal is not requested in conjunction with the acceptance of an offer of compromise."
¶17 We interpret the mandatory arbitration rules as if they were drafted by the legislature. Wiley v. Rehak, 143 Wn.2d 339, 343, 20 P.3d 404 (2001). Because we avoid interpreting statutes in ways that render provisions meaningless, Svendsen v. Stock, 143 Wn.2d 546, 555, 23 P.3d 455 (2001), the same principle applies here. The language of MAR 7.3 and RCW 7.06.060(1) contemplates that a party may withdraw a request for trial de novo without the consent of the other party. If this occurs, the court has discretion to assess attorney fees and costs. Hudson's argument, that there is no unilateral right to withdraw, would render the attorney fee provisions meaningless.
¶18 The Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in Thomas-Kerr v. Brown, 114 Wn. App. 554, 559 n. 16, 59 P.3d 120 (2002). In that case the defendant withdrew his request for a trial de novo. The plaintiff argued the case should have proceeded to trial. Here, the Court of Appeals reasoned that MAR 7.3 implies that a party has a right to unilaterally withdraw a request for trial de novo and, since the plaintiff had not requested a trial de novo, she was not entitled to a jury trial.
¶19 Hudson argues that the Court of Appeals was wrong in Thomas-Kerr because once a case is no longer in arbitration, the civil rules apply, not the mandatory arbitration rules. As authority, Hudson cites MAR 1.3(b)(1), which states that until a case is assigned to the arbitrator, the rules of civil procedure apply. But this provision does not preclude the application of MAR 7.3 after an arbitration is concluded.
¶20 The parties agree that the primary goal of mandatory arbitration is to reduce congestion in the courts and delays in hearing cases. Nevers v. Fireside, Inc., 133 Wn.2d 804, 815, 947 P.2d 721 (1997); Haywood v. Aranda, 143 Wn.2d 231, 238, 19 P.3d 406 (2001). We believe that interpreting MAR 7.3 and RCW 7.06.060(1) to permit unilateral withdrawal of a request for trial de novo furthers the intent underlying the rules and the statute. Regardless of the outcome in a particular case, as a general proposition, permitting withdrawals of requests for trial de novo serves the purposes of arbitration because such withdrawals will generally eliminate any further court congestion and delay in many, if not the majority, of these cases. The aim of MAR 7.3 is to "influence [a party's] choices in the hope of reducing court congestion." Du K. Do v. Farmer, 127 Wn. App. 180, 187, 110 P.3d 840 (2005). Our decision lends itself to this purpose, regardless of its impact in this particular case.
¶21 Accordingly, we hold the mandatory arbitration rules create an implied right to unilateral withdrawal.
¶22 Anticipating this holding, Hudson argues that even if the mandatory arbitration rules and chapter 7.06 RCW permit unilateral withdrawal, Hapner's decision comes too late. We agree.
¶23 While we hold there is an implied right to unilaterally withdraw a request for trial de novo based on the language in the attorney fees provisions, neither the mandatory arbitration rules nor the statute implies a time limit for exercising the right. Therefore, we look to the language and purpose of the rules and chapter 7.06 RCW to determine the scope of the right.
¶24 First, the language of MAR 7.3 indicates that the decision to forgo a trial de novo after having exercised the right to pursue it must be made prior to commencement of the trial. The rule refers to withdrawal of "a request for a trial de novo." MAR 7.3 (emphasis added). It does not refer to withdrawal from the trial de novo itself. Once a trial de novo is underway, it is no longer a matter of withdrawing a "request" alone.
¶25 Next, Hudson argues that it is inconsistent with the goal of mandatory arbitration for a party to be able to withdraw a request for trial de novo after the case has been tried before a jury. She argues that this only encourages a party who is unsuccessful in arbitration to seek a trial de novo. We agree.
¶26 Without placing some limit on when a party can withdraw a request for trial de novo, one party is free to drag the case on by conducting discovery to see if his or her position improves or not. If it does not, the party can withdraw the request for a trial de novo, knowing there is only a risk of having to pay additional attorney fees and costs (which are discretionary, not mandatory) and no risk of paying any further damages. Allowing unilateral withdrawal during trial would artificially alter the balance of power between the parties.
¶27 This result would also be contrary to the specific purpose of the discretionary attorney fee and costs provision in MAR 7.3. When this rule was promulgated, its purpose was stated as follows: "The provision in Rule 7.3 concerning costs and attorney's fees upon withdrawal of a request for a trial de novo discourages a party from requesting a trial de novo solely for the purpose of delaying enforcement of the [arbitration] award." MAR 7.3, Judicial Council Comment. Regardless of whether delay is specifically intended, delay is certainly the effect when, as here, the arbitration award remains unpaid and the party against whom the award was entered is permitted to pursue a trial de novo until he decides for strategic or tactical reasons that withdrawal from the trial de novo is the more advantageous course. Moreover, this result is contrary to the purpose of avoiding congestion and delay that we recognized in Nevers because it creates an incentive, rather than a penalty, to request trial de novo after a loss at arbitration proceedings. We recognize that requiring Mr. Hapner to conclude the trial de novo that he requested will add to delay and congestion in this specific case, but overall our decision will serve as a disincentive to requests for a trial de novo for the purpose of delay — whether delay for the sake of delay or delay with the purpose of assessing the strength of the other party's case and making a final decision about trial at some future time based upon what is learned. Such misuse of the mandatory arbitration rules is to be discouraged. By permitting unilateral withdrawal prior to the start of trial de novo only, our interpretation of the mandatory arbitration rules and the statute removes the incentive to gamble on trial de novo and provides no tactical advantage for requesting it. It comports with the language and the purpose of MAR 7.3's discretionary attorney fees provision regarding withdrawal of a request for a trial de novo. Accordingly, we hold the unilateral right to withdrawal must be exercised prior to the start of trial de novo.
MAR 7.3 was adopted in 1980 as part of the original rules on mandatory arbitration. This comment accompanied the rule to explain its purpose when the rule was first proposed. Effective September 21, 1989, this court ordered that all of the Judicial Council Comments be deleted from the mandatory arbitration rules in the official Rules of Court. The only reason provided was that the court had "`determined that the deletion of those comments will aid in the prompt and orderly administration of justice.'" 4A KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: RULES PRACTICE 78 n. 17 (7th ed. 2008). "[T]he comments remain a generally reliable guide to the intent of the drafters." Id.
Attorney Fees and Costs
¶28 Hudson claims attorney fees and costs for all proceedings from the date of Hapner's request for trial de novo through the proceedings pending before this court, pursuant to MAR 7.3. Hapner disputes Hudson's entitlement to fees and costs, except fees and costs incurred in the superior court, which Hapner offered to pay in his notice of presentment.
¶29 Hapner first argues Hudson cannot claim fees and costs incurred in proceedings before the Court of Appeals on the first and second appeal because she did not comply with the pleading requirements of RAP 18.1, which provides:
(a) Generally. If applicable law grants to a party the right to recover reasonable attorney fees or expenses on review before either the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, the party must request the fees or expenses as provided in this rule, unless a statute specifies that the request is to be directed to the trial court.
(b) Argument in Brief. The party must devote a section of its opening brief to the request for the fees or expenses. Requests made at the Court of Appeals will be considered as continuing requests at the Supreme Court. The request should not be made in the cost bill. In a motion on the merits pursuant to rule 18.14, the request and supporting argument must be included in the motion or response if the requesting party has not yet filed a brief.
(Boldface omitted.)
¶30 This court has held RAP 18.1(b) requires "[argument and citation to authority" as necessary to inform the court of grounds for an award, not merely "a bald request for attorney fees." Wilson Court Ltd. P'ship v. Tony Maroni's, Inc., 134 Wn.2d 692, 710 n. 4, 952 P.2d 590 (1998).
¶31 Hudson requested attorney fees in a separate section of her brief in both appeals. In each case, she cited MAR 7.3 and relevant case law for authority. Therefore, she met the requirements of RAP 18.1(b).
Hapner does not dispute that Hudson's request for costs and attorney fees incurred in proceedings before this court meets the requirements of RAP 18.1.
¶32 Hapner argues these requests were insufficient because Hudson expressed her requests as contingencies, i.e., she requested fees and costs only in the event she prevailed in the Court of Appeals, which she did not. Hudson's requests for attorney fees in both appeals were contingent. However, RAP 18.1 does not prohibit this court from awarding attorney fees simply because the request is expressed as a contingency. Only a separate section and citation to authority are required. Hudson's requests, despite some imprecise language, are sufficient to preserve her claim to attorney fees for both appeals, as well as before this court.
¶33 Although we conclude that Hudson preserved her right to claim attorney fees and costs under the mandatory arbitration rules, whether she is entitled to those costs and fees must abide the outcome of retrial. As noted, MAR 7.3 provides:
The court shall assess costs and reasonable attorney fees against a party who appeals the award and fails to improve the party's position on the trial de novo. The court may assess costs and reasonable attorney fees against a party who voluntarily withdraws a request for a trial de novo.
¶34 Until the case is concluded there is no way to know whether Hapner will fail to improve his position.
In Tribble v. Allstate Property Casualty Insurance Co., 134 Wn. App. 163, 174-75, 139 P.3d 373 (2006), the Court of Appeals held that a party claiming mandatory fees and costs under MAR 7.3 is entitled to all fees and costs from the entire proceedings (i.e., trial and appeals) after the trial de novo request was made. Tribble, 134 Wn. App. at 174-75. This means that if, after a second trial de novo, Hapner fails to improve his position, Hudson is entitled to fees and costs for both appeals and both trials.
¶35 In addition to requesting attorney fees and costs for all proceedings after Hapner's trial de novo request, Hudson asks this court to reevaluate the Court of Appeals' decision in Hudson I. Hudson contends the "`prevailing party'" is one who prevails "`at the conclusion of the entire case.'" Resp't's Corrected Pet. for Review at 23 (quoting Tribble v. Allstate Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 134 Wn. App. 163, 174, 139 P.3d 373 (2006)). Hudson reasons that Hapner has not yet improved his position at trial de novo, and thus has not "prevailed" so far. She argues Hapner should not have been awarded fees and costs during the first appeal and that this result, as well as the denial of her fees and costs in both Hudson I and II conflicts with Tribble.
¶36 As far as Hudson's arguments related to costs and fees under MAR 7.3, Hudson is correct. However, Hudson confuses a prevailing party award under RAP 14.2 with attorney fees to be awarded at the conclusion of trial de novo under MAR 7.3. RAP 14.2 provides:
A commissioner or clerk of the appellate court will award costs to the party that substantially prevails on review, unless the appellate court directs otherwise in its decision terminating review. If there is no substantially prevailing party on review, the commissioner or clerk will not award costs to any party. An award of costs will specify the party who must pay the award.
¶37 Attorney fees under RAP 14.2 are statutory attorney fees and costs are limited to costs on review. A prevailing party is determined by the outcome of the appeal. In contrast, attorney fees and costs under MAR 7.3 depend on the outcome of a trial de novo and include all "costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred after a request for a trial de novo is filed." MAR 7.3.
¶38 In Hudson I, Hapner substantially prevailed because he succeeded in achieving the relief he requested: reversal of the trial de novo result and remand for retrial. This result does not depend on whether Hapner improves his position in the trial de novo. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded him costs based on RAP 14.2. Of course, if Hapner fails to improve his arbitration position, then the trial court must award Hudson attorney fees and costs from both appeals under the mandatory provisions of MAR 7.3.
CONCLUSION
¶39 We hold that MAR 7.3 and RCW 7.06.060(1) imply a unilateral right to withdraw a request for trial de novo, but withdrawal must be exercised prior to the start of trial. The trial de novo in this case has already occurred and been reversed on appeal. An appellate decision reversing and remanding for a new trial does not restart the clock. Instead, the situation is analogous to a trial that has begun but has not been completed. Hapner may not unilaterally withdraw at this time and must undergo a second trial de novo unless the parties reach a settlement.
C. JOHNSON, ALEXANDER, CHAMBERS, OWENS, and STEPHENS, JJ., concur.
SANDERS, J. (dissenting)
¶40 — RCW 7.06.060(1) and MAR 7.3 recognize a party can withdraw its request for a trial de novo, and nothing in chapter 7.06 RCW or MAR 7 places any limitation on when a party can do so — nor is such a limitation necessary for the provisions to function. This court should hold, as the Court of Appeals held, that Clifford Hapner is entitled to withdraw his trial request. See Hudson v. Hapner, 146 Wn. App. 280, 290, 187 P.3d 311 (2008).
¶41 Instead, the majority creates a limitation on when a party can withdraw its trial request, precluding a party from doing so once the trial has begun. But nothing in chapter 7.06 RCW or MAR 7 alludes to a party losing its right to withdraw its request for a trial. The majority attempts to justify its judicially fabricated cutoff with a balance of policy interests — something the legislature already did when drafting chapter 7.06 RCW. Yet even ignoring the inappropriateness of the majority's replacing the legislature's policy balance with its own, the justifications cited by the majority do not actually support the majority's conclusion. I dissent.
¶42 It is difficult to address the majority's reasoning because, much like Frankenstein's monster, the majority opinion is a sewn-together collection of partial arguments, each pilfered from a different cadaver and none lending any real support to its conclusion.
¶43 The majority reasons that the purpose of mandatory arbitration is to reduce court congestion and delays in hearing cases. Majority at 30 (citing Nevers v. Fireside, Inc., 133 Wn.2d 804, 815, 947 P.2d 721 (1997); Haywood v. Aranda, 143 Wn.2d 231, 238, 19 P.3d 406 (2001)). The majority further instructs:
Without placing some limit on when a party can withdraw a request for trial de novo, one party is free to drag the case on by conducting discovery to see if his or her position improves or not. If it does not, the party can withdraw the request for a trial de novo, knowing there is only a risk of having to pay additional attorney fees and costs (which are discretionary, not mandatory) and no risk of paying any further damages. Allowing unilateral withdrawal during trial would artificially alter the balance of power between the parties.
Majority at 31.
¶44 So, according to the majority, permitting a party to request a trial de novo, conducting some discovery, getting cold feet, and rescinding that request "is contrary to the purpose of avoiding congestion and delay " Id. at 32. The conclusion that logically follows from that statement is that a party cannot conduct discovery and then rescind his or her request for a trial de novo. Thus, the majority's argument should lead it to hold Hapner cannot rescind his request after he begins to take discovery. Instead the majority concludes a party is permitted to request a trial de novo, fully conduct discovery, and then withdraw the trial request on the eve of trial. Id. at 32. How does that address the majority's concern that courts will be congested and trials delayed if "one party is free to drag the case on by conducting discovery to see if his or her position improves or not"? See id. at 31. The majority's justification does not support its holding.
¶45 Preventing a party from withdrawing a trial request at the commencement of discovery or trial increases court congestion. Once a party requests a trial de novo, court congestion and delays are reduced when the party rescinds its request at any time, whether it does so at the onset of discovery, during discovery, the eve of trial, or during the trial. Even if a party rescinded its request on the morning of the last day of trial, the court would be less congested for not having to conduct trial on that final day. The majority's deadline is inconsistent with reducing court congestion.
To clarify, that is not the case here. Hapner withdraw his trial request prior to the commencement of the trial on remand, and whether a deadline exists to preclude him from doing so is the only issue presently before this court. However, the above example demonstrates the inconsistency in the majority's argument.
¶46 The majority insists that, although precluding withdrawal adds to court congestion in this case, precluding it in future cases "will serve as a disincentive to requests for a trial de novo for the purpose of delay." Id. at 32. Again, the stated justification for the majority's holding does not actually support it. First, the legislative purpose here was never to discourage a party from exercising its trial right if it so desired. RCW 7.06.070 (the mandatory arbitration provisions are not to "be construed to abridge the right to trial by jury"). The majority does not explain why it feels justified to do so here.
¶47 Oddly, the majority cites the judicial council comment to MAR 7.3 (which was deleted by order of this court 20 years ago), which noted permitting a trial court to impose costs and attorney fees on a party that withdrew its trial request would discourage the party from requesting a trial de novo for the purpose of delay. Majority at 31-32. Thus, the rules already contain a mechanism to discourage requesting a trial de novo for inappropriate motive; the majority need not create another one.
¶48 The majority then continues, " Regardless of whether delay is specifically intended, delay is certainly the effect when, as here, the arbitration award remains unpaid and the party against whom the award was entered is permitted to pursue a trial de novo until he decides for strategic or tactical reasons that withdrawal from the trial de novo is the more advantageous course." Id. at 31 (emphasis added). This statement has no connection with the Judicial Council Comment to MAR 7.3. The Judicial Council Comment clarifies the trial court is permitted to impose cost and attorney fees to discourage parties from requesting a trial de novo " for the purpose of delaying enforcement of the award." (Emphasis added.) Of course delay occurs automatically when a party requests a trial, but according to the judicial council comment, MAR 7.3 is intended to discourage such delay when delay is the purpose for requesting the trial, not — as the majority spuriously suggests — when the delay is the unavoidable effect of a good faith pursuit of a party's right to trial. The majority's overextension of the mandatory arbitration provisions place a chilling effect, not intended by the legislature, on a party's decision whether to exercise its right to a trial.
¶49 Second, without explanation or justification, the majority labels as a "misuse of the mandatory arbitration rules" a party requesting a trial and then rescinding that request upon determining its case is weaker than it believed. See id. at 32. But it is not only common in, but also a characteristic of, our trial system that a party can and will attempt to settle a case after learning through discovery that the facts are not as favorable as once believed. A party may similarly rescind its request for a trial after learning through discovery that the facts are not as favorable as believed. The majority speaks of maintaining "the balance of power between the parties," id. at 31, and this is a perfect example. Without mandatory arbitration, a party can conduct discovery and then settle; with mandatory arbitration, the party should still be permitted to conduct discovery before deciding to forgo its right to a trial — doing so is not a "misuse" of the mandatory arbitration rules, id. at 32. Permitting a party to conduct discovery to flesh out its case retains the balance of power that existed prior to mandatory arbitration.
¶50 Instead, the majority condemns a party if it seeks discovery and realizes that its case is weaker than previously believed. See id. at 32. A fundamental purpose of discovery is to require both sides to exchange relevant information, which necessarily will affect each party's view of the strength of its case. Seeking discovery to determine the strength of one's case is no more a "misuse" of the mandatory arbitration rules than it is a "misuse" of the system as a whole — that is to say, it is no misuse at all.
¶51 Third, the majority's claim that preventing withdrawal of a trial request will reduce court congestion is based upon unarticulated speculation. The majority concedes that its conclusion actually adds to court congestion in the case before us but assumes future litigants (in cases for which we know neither the facts nor issues involved) will hereafter behave in a manner that will reduce court congestion. I presume the majority believes its holding will reduce the number of de novo trials by discouraging litigants from exercising their rights to a trial. See id. If that is the case, it was neither the intent of the legislature to circumvent a party's trial rights, as discussed above, see RCW 7.06.070, nor does the majority elaborate why it is confident its holding will have that effect on future litigants.
¶52 And the majority's holding, in practice, will not discourage a party from initially requesting a trial. Nothing about precluding a party from withdrawing the trial request after the trial has begun will discourage the party from requesting a trial de novo to conduct discovery. See id. at 31. Under the majority's holding, parties are not discouraged from requesting a trial to conduct discovery and, according to the majority, "misuse" the process by "assessing the strength of the other party's case." See id. at 32. Under the majority, parties can take full discovery and, on the eve of trial, rescind the trial request. The majority's "solution" is all show and no go.
To the extent the majority is concerned with the "balance of power," see majority at 31, MAR 7.3 permits the trial court to "assess costs and reasonable attorney fees against a party who voluntarily withdraws a request for a trial de novo." A party is not given free rein to explore the trial option at the other party's expense.
¶53 Adrift in a sea of half-developed and mostly irrelevant policy considerations, the majority makes one attempt to anchor its holding to the text of an applicable rule. The majority quotes MAR 7.3:" `The court may assess costs and reasonable attorney fees against a party who voluntarily withdraws a request for a trial de novo.'" Id. at 29 (emphasis omitted). The majority asserts the rule permits withdrawal only of a request for a trial de novo, not withdrawal from the actual trial. "Once a trial de novo is underway, it is no longer a matter of withdrawing a `request' alone." Id. at 31.
¶54 The majority's attempt to anchor its deadline to MAE 7.3 is rife with problems. The request for the de novo trial is the only basis for conducting the trial. Withdrawal of the request entails withdrawal from the trial.
¶55 But frankly, MAR 7.3 has little relevance here because it addresses "costs and attorney fees." The majority's demanding MAR 7.3 provide it a deadline for withdrawal is like ordering a steak at a vegetarian restaurant — it doesn't matter that you want it; it's just not there.
¶56 Regardless, the majority abandons its MAR 7.3 argument when it applies, or rather fails to apply, its holding to the facts of this case. Clifford Hapner requested a trial de novo, received one, and lost. Hudson v. Hapner, noted at 126 Wn. App. 1057, 2005 WL 834433, at *1, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 610, at *3. However, the trial court improperly excluded the testimony of Hapner's expert. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. at *5, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 610, at *8. Hapner then withdrew his request for a trial de novo before the start of the trial on remand. The majority offers no explanation or analysis why Hapner's withdrawal here is time barred under its newly established deadline.
¶57 One might presume the majority views the beginning of the first trial, the verdict of which was subsequently reversed, as the cutoff for Hapner's withdrawal regardless of the later reversal. However, that conclusion is inconsistent with the majority's claim that its cutoff is justified by the language of MAR 7.3. Majority at 30. Because the trial on remand was not yet underway, Hapner was only with-drawing his request for a new trial; he was not requesting withdrawal from a trial itself. See id. Either the majority's nuanced reading of MAR 7.3 is correct, and Hapner can withdraw his trial request, or the majority's holding does not permit Hapner to withdraw his request prior to the trial on remand and MAR 7.3 does not support the majority's holding. Logic does not permit the majority to choose both.
¶58 The majority cites concerns over "the balance of power between the parties" to justify creating a deadline. Id. at 31. But the relevant statute and rules already struck the balance between competing policy and party interests. The legislature weighed an individual's right to a trial by jury against concerns over court congestion and delays in civil cases. A citizen's right to a jury trial is fundamental, and the legislature treaded lightly to avoid discouraging a party from exercising its right. A party must file a request for a trial within 20 days after the arbitration decision, RCW 7.06.050, MAR 7.1(a), but that party is then permitted to unilaterally withdraw that request, RCW 7.06.060(1), MAR 7.3. The statute and rules permit a party to err on the side of requesting a trial.
¶59 And permitting a party to withdraw that request reduces court congestion. Here, Hapner's withdrawing his request saves the trial court from conducting an entire trial on remand.
¶60 The legislature was also mindful of the balance between the parties. "The court may assess costs and reasonable attorneys' fees against a party who voluntarily withdraws a request for a trial de novo. . . ." RCW 7.06.060(1); accord MAR 7.3. A party pointlessly pursuing postarbitration litigation pays the costs of that pursuit, risking liability for all court costs and the attorney fees of both parties. Here, Hapner's withdrawal of his request for a trial de novo permits the trial court to award Lea Hudson any costs and fees incurred after the arbitration award was announced — costs and attorney fees for discovery; the original, invalid trial; the subsequent appeal; any additional preparation that occurred for the trial on remand; and this appeal.
I find no error in the majority's resolution of the costs to date — upholding the Court of Appeals award of costs to Hapner for prevailing on appeal but recognizing that Hapner may ultimately be liable for the costs of the appeal as part of the trial court's assessment of costs and attorney fees under MAR 7.3.
¶61 Ultimately, the majority attempts to "fix" something that isn't broken. Reasonable people may argue there is a better way for chapter 7.06 RCW and MAR 7 to address this issue; they may argue the mandatory arbitration provisions should not provide such leeway to a party uncertain of whether he or she wishes to fully exercise his or her right to a jury trial. But there is no legal infirmity with how the provisions are written now, nor is any created because the provisions permit a party to withdraw its request for a trial at any time prior to a final verdict.
¶62 I would apply chapter 7.06 RCW and MAR 7 as written. Hapner was not precluded from seeking to withdraw his trial request. And, even under the majority's holding, Hapner should be permitted to withdraw his request because he made it before the start of the trial on remand.
¶63 I dissent.
FAIRHURST and J.M. JOHNSON, JJ., concur with SANDERS, J.
l intoxication.
Prior to Rossum's trial, de Villers's samples were also sent to two other laboratories for testing: the Alberta Office of the Chief Medical Examiner in Canada and Associated Pathologist Laboratories in Las Vegas, Nevada. As the following chart demonstrates, the concentration levels of fentanyl measured by the different laboratories varied considerably: __________________________________________________________________ Alberta Office Pacific Associated of the Chief Toxicology Pathologist Medical Examiner Laboratories Laboratories __________________________________________________________________ Stomach Contents 201 ng/mL, 286.5 ng/mL, 128 ng/mL 210 ng/mL 329.7 ng/mL __________________________________________________________________ Urine _ 189 ng/mL 236 ng/mL __________________________________________________________________ Blood _ 57.3 ng/mL 32.8 ng/mL __________________________________________________________________ Peripheral Blood _ 11.2 ng/mL _ __________________________________________________________________ Antemortem Blood _ 35.8 ng/mL _ __________________________________________________________________ Right Proximal Forearm _ 21.3 g _ Ulnar Aspect Tissue __________________________________________________________________ Key: "g" is grams; "ng" is nanograms; "mL" is milliliters;" ___ "indicates that there are no results in the record __________________________________________________________________
At Rossum's trial, the prosecution called Dr. Theodore Stanley as an expert witness on the properties and characteristics of fentanyl. Dr. Stanley testified that fentanyl is a potent and generally fast-acting pain reliever. The drug has one serious side effect; it can cause a person to stop breathing. Dr. Stanley testified that fentanyl begins to affect respiration at a concentration level in the blood of 2 ng/mL. At a concentration of 4 ng/mL, about half of "opioid naive" individuals — people without significant experience taking opiates — would be breathing very slowly or not at all. At 57.3 ng/mL, the concentration found in de Villers's blood by Pacific Toxicology, no opioid-naive individual would be conscious or breathing.
No evidence was presented at trial that deVillers was inured to the effects of fentanyl through the regular abuse of opiates. ( See testimony from Rossum that the only drug de Villers used was marijuana).
Dr. Stanley testified that the speed with which fentanyl takes effect depends on the manner in which the drug is administered: the peak effect occurs about sixteen hours after administration of a transdermal patch, twenty to thirty minutes after oral consumption, fifteen to twenty minutes after intramuscular injection, and five minutes after intravenous injection. He explained that fentanyl is not normally administered orally because when the drug is taken in this way, the liver destroys about 65 percent of it, leaving only about 35 percent to enter the bloodstream.
None of the three physicians who testified at Rossum's trial — Dr. Blackbourne, Dr. Stanley, or the defense expert on fentanyl, Dr. Mark Wallace — could provide a definitive opinion as to how the fentanyl was introduced into de Villers's body. Dr. Stanley, however, testified that the differing concentration levels in de Villers's system, along with the evidence indicating that de Villers had been unconscious and breathing shallowly for hours before his death, suggested that fentanyl likely had been administered to de Villers on multiple occasions.
After de Villers's death, the OME audited its impounded drugs and drug standards. It discovered that fifteen fentanyl patches and ten milligrams of fentanyl standard were missing. Rossum had logged in the fentanyl standard and had worked on each of the three cases in which the missing fentanyl patches had been impounded. The OME also determined that quantities of methamphetamine, clonazepam, and oxycontin (a time-released form of oxycodone) were missing.
The OME impounds drugs discovered at the scene of an individual's death and maintains an inventory of "drug standards" — quantities of particular drugs used as reference material during testing procedures.
II. Rossum's Trial and Post-Trial Proceedings
Rossum was prosecuted for the murder of de Villers with the special circumstance that the murder was committed by means of poison. Cal.Penal Code §§ 187, 190.2(a)(19). Her jury trial began in October 2002. At trial, the prosecution argued that Rossum poisoned de Villers with fentanyl, possibly after she gave him clonazepam but the clonazepam failed to kill him. The defense conceded that fentanyl caused de Villers's death but contended that de Villers committed suicide because he was despondent over his marital problems.
The jury found Rossum guilty in November 2002, and in December 2002 the court sentenced her to prison for life without the possibility of parole.
On June 13, 2005, the California Court of Appeal affirmed Rossum's conviction on direct review and denied her concurrently filed petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The California Supreme Court summarily denied her petition for review of her direct appeal.
On December 15, 2006, Rossum filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. The petition asserted for the first time the claim at issue in this appeal — that Rossum's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not having de Villers's autopsy samples tested for fentanyl metabolites despite the fact that such tests might have ruled out fentanyl as the cause of de Villers's death and thus disproven the prosecution's theory of the case. Instead, as the petition stated, counsel promptly conceded the prosecution's theory — that fentanyl was the cause of de Villers's death. Rossum supported her petition with a declaration from Dr. Steven H. Richeimer, a medical professor and practitioner with substantial experience in anesthesiology and requested an evidentiary hearing. Dr. Richeimer has overseen the administration of fentanyl on thousands of occasions and is well versed in the drug's characteristics and properties. His declaration explains that fentanyl "is a very rapidly acting drug." As a result, "[i]f very high doses[were] rapidly administered" to de Villers, then he likely would have died "within minutes," "not in a manner consistent with the 6-12 hours of impaired breathing and consciousness described by Dr. Blackbourne." Alternatively, if de Villers absorbed fentanyl "gradually, perhaps through the stomach," then he likely would not have survived "long enough for [his] blood levels to reach the extremely high levels" measured by the toxicology labs.
As we have previously explained:
In California, the state supreme court, intermediate courts of appeal and superior courts all have original habeas corpus jurisdiction. . . . If the court of appeal denies [habeas] relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review, or may instead file an original habeas petition in the supreme court.
Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1079 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003).
Dr. Richeimer's declaration states that contamination of the samples drawn from de Villers's body could explain the seeming "inconsistency between the rapid action of fentanyl, the extraordinarily high concentration levels, and the lengthy period of impaired breathing and reduced consciousness" that de Villers suffered. Indeed, Dr. Richeimer opines:
[Contamination of the specimens would explain the high blood levels better than ingestion or other administration of fentanyl to the decedent. . . . [I]n attempting to determine if the cause of death was from fentanyl, it would be necessary to rule out the possibility that the samples were contaminated.
Richeimer Decl. at 3.
According to Dr. Richeimer, a toxicology lab could conclusively determine whether fentanyl was present in de Villers's body at the time of his death by testing his samples for metabolites of fentanyl. If de Villers's specimens contain metabolites of fentanyl, then fentanyl must have been present in his body at the time the specimens were taken. If no metabolites are present, then the specimens must have been contaminated after his death.
The California Supreme Court summarily denied Rossum's habeas petition in a one-sentence order on August 8, 2007. Two days later, Rossum filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The magistrate judge to whom Rossum's petition was assigned issued a report and recommendation advising that the petition be denied. The district court adopted this recommendation and denied Rossum's petition on April 8, 2009. It concluded that her trial counsel's performance was not deficient, and that even if it was, she did not suffer any prejudice. It also denied Rossum's motion, made under Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, for leave to test de Villers's autopsy specimens for metabolites of fentanyl. Rossum requested a certificate of appealability, which the district court granted on April 24, 2009.
DISCUSSION
I. Governing Legal Standards
We review a district court's denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2006). Any factual findings made by the district court are reviewed for clear error. Id.
Since Rossum filed her federal habeas petition after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), the district court could not grant her habeas relief unless the California Supreme Court's decision denying her state habeas petition "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Reynoso, 462 F.3d at 1109. "When, as in the instant case, `no reasoned state court decision denying a habeas petition exists,' this court must assume that the state court has decided all the issues and `perform an independent review of the record to ascertain whether the state court decision was objectively unreasonable.'" Reynoso, 462 F.3d at 1109 (quoting Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) ("[A] federal habeas court making the `unreasonable application' inquiry [under section 2254(d)(1)] should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.").
The "clearly established federal law" that applies in this case is the frame-work articulated for analyzing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Williams, 529 U.S. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (applying Strickland as the "clearly established federal law" that governed petitioner's ineffective-assistance claim). Under Strickland, Rossum must prove that (1) her counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) she suffered prejudice as a result. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To be deficient, an attorney's conduct must fall below an "objective standard of reasonableness" established by "prevailing professional norms." Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To demonstrate prejudice, Rossum does not need to show that her counsel's deficient performance more likely than not affected the outcome of the case. Instead, she must demonstrate only a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Supreme Court has defined a "reasonable probability" as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. II. The Merits of Rossum's Strickland Claim
A. Deficient Performance
A competent attorney would not have conceded that fentanyl caused de Villers's death without first having his autopsy specimens tested for metabolites of fentanyl; a determination to the contrary, particularly without an evidentiary hearing, would constitute an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, unless counsel could show some strategic reason for his failure to conduct an elementary investigation.
Strickland recognized that an attorney's duty to provide reasonably effective assistance includes the "duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function 4-4.1(a) (3d ed. 1993) ("Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case. . . ."). In Rossum's case, this investigatory duty extended to the cause of de Villers's death. Rossum's attorneys were presented with "tantalizing indications" that de Villers's autopsy specimens might have been contaminated: the medical and toxicological evidence raised serious questions as to whether fentanyl could have caused de Villers's death, an alternative cause of death was readily apparent, and there was a lapse in the chain of custody of de Villers's autopsy specimens. Stankewitz v. Woodford, 365 F.3d 706, 719-20 (9th Cir. 2004).
The medical and toxicological evidence would have prompted a competent attorney to question Dr. Blackbourne's conclusion that de Villers died from an overdose of fentanyl. The fentanyl concentration levels measured by the three toxicology labs were widely disparate, suggesting, at the very least, that something might have been amiss with de Villers's autopsy specimens. The measurements were also extraordinarily high. Dr. Stanley, the prosecution's fentanyl expert, testified that at a concentration of 4 nanograms of fentanyl per milliliter of blood, about fifty percent of people would be breathing very slowly or not at all. The concentration of fentanyl that Pacific Toxicology measured in de Villers's blood was about fourteen times this level. Dr. Stanley also testified that in his decades of experience with anesthesiology, he had never seen fentanyl concentrations as high as those measured in de Villers's stomach. Given fentanyl's potency, a competent attorney would have wondered how the concentration of fentanyl in de Villers's blood, urine, and stomach contents could have reached such an extraordinary level before the drug killed him.
There is some evidence suggesting that fentanyl has a unique property: unlike most drugs, concentrations of fentanyl may increase after death. Dr. Stanley, however, testified that the concentration of fentanyl measured after death would likely be no more than about twenty percent higher than the concentration before death. Thus, even if one takes into account the possibility that the concentration of fentanyl in de Villers's bodily fluids rose slightly after his death, the levels measured by the toxicology labs were still exceptionally high.
Competent counsel would also have questioned how de Villers could have lingered for six to twelve hours before finally succumbing to fentanyl. As Dr. Richeimer's declaration indicates, if Rossum administered a single, large dose of fentanyl to de Villers, then he almost certainly would have died within a matter of minutes, not hours. If, instead, de Villers absorbed fentanyl gradually, his breathing would have stopped, and thus he would have perished long before the concentration of fentanyl in his blood reached the stratospheric levels measured by the toxicology labs. The inconsistency between fentanyl's potency and its relatively rapid onset, on the one hand, and de Villers's prolonged period of unconsciousness and his extraordinarily high toxicology results, on the other, would have prompted a competent attorney to investigate the possibility that de Villers's death was caused by another substance.
Dr. Stanley did testify that de Villers's blood levels potentially could have been obtained through the application of multiple transdermal patches. But his opinion on this issue was very tentative. He admitted that he was "not sure" that such levels could be achieved because he had never placed that many patches on a patient.
Rossum's lawyers would not have had to look far for an alternative explanation of de Villers's death. In addition to fentanyl, toxicologists also found clonazepam and oxycodone in de Villers's autopsy specimens. True, the concentration of clonazepam was in the high therapeutic range, and only a trace amount of oxycodone was found. But Dr. Stanley testified that clonazepam and oxycodone are synergistic, each multiplying the effect of the other when they are taken in combination. Thus, a concentration of clonazepam near the top of the therapeutic range could potentially have turned lethal when its effect was compounded by the presence of oxycodone. In addition, Dr. Stanley conceded that the concentration of clonazepam in de Villers's body might have fallen after his death due to postmortem redistribution. De Villers thus might have had a fatal concentration of clonazepam in his body at the time of his death, even though the postmortem testing of his autopsy specimens produced measurements within the therapeutic range.
The lapse in the chain of custody of de Villers's autopsy samples would also have led a competent attorney to investigate the possibility of contamination. Although concerns about a potential conflict of interest prompted the OME to send de Villers's specimens to an outside laboratory for testing, it nevertheless stored the samples at its lab for a period of thirty-six hours before they were transferred to the sheriffs office. During this time, anyone with a key to the OME had access to the specimens. Indeed, Robertson claimed to have opened at least one of the samples while they were housed at the OME. Since the OME stores fentanyl at its lab, contamination — whether intentional or unintentional — could have occurred.
While the district court concluded that the possibility of intentional contamination was speculative, the record indicates otherwise. Although the potential motivations for such an act are manifold, two are particularly salient. First, the samples could have been contaminated by a coworker upset by the preferential treatment Rossum seemed to receive from Robertson. Second, an OME employee seeking to dethrone Robertson from his position as laboratory manager could have contaminated the specimens to cast suspicion on both him and Rossum.
Robertson appears to have had a special interest and expertise in fentanyl. Russ Lowe testified that he discovered approximately thirty-seven articles on fentanyl while cleaning out Robertson's office after his departure from the OME. If Robertson's interest in fentanyl was widely known, then contaminating de Villers's samples with fentanyl might have seemed like an effective way of implicating Robertson in de Villers's death.
The appellee rejoins that if one of Rossum's coworkers had decided to frame her or Robertson, he would not have used fentanyl to do so because he would have known that toxicology labs rarely test for fentanyl. The record belies this contention. As an initial matter, the appellee's argument does not account for the possibility of unintentional contamination. It also fails to recognize that OME employees could well have known that de Villers's specimens would be sent to an outside lab, and the first lab selected to analyze de Villers's samples, Pacific Toxicology, did test for fentanyl as part of its standard "drugs of abuse" screen. Finally, the argument ignores the manner in which toxicology testing is ordinarily done. Dr. Blackbourne testified that if a toxicology lab's initial testing fails to disclose a cause of death, further tests are often conducted to determine if less common substances are present in the decedent's body. Even if fentanyl were not initially discovered by toxicologists, then, it might have been found in later tests.
The appellee also contends that Rossum has failed to show that her coworkers held sufficient animosity toward her to motivate them to take the drastic step of framing her for murder. Thus, the appellee argues, Rossum's attorneys could reasonably have decided not to waste their time and resources pursuing a theory of intentional contamination. Again, this argument fails to consider the possibility of unintentional contamination. More importantly, however, it ignores the fact that a contamination defense was the best — and perhaps the only viable — defense available to Rossum. Cf. Gomez v. Beto, 462 F.2d 596, 597 (5th Cir. 1972) ("When a defense counsel fails to investigate his client's only possible defense, although requested to do so by him; and fails to subpoena witnesses in support of the defense, it can hardly be said that the defendant has had the effective assistance of counsel"). A competent attorney would have been extremely reluctant to concede that fentanyl caused de Villers's death because the concession would essentially doom the defense's theory that de Villers committed suicide.
While there were significant holes in the prosecution's theory that Rossum murdered de Villers with fentanyl, the defense's suicide-by-fentanyl theory was even more implausible. The medical and toxicological evidence suggested that de Villers could only have died from an overdose of fentanyl if he was administered the drug on multiple occasions throughout the day. If de Villers self-administered a large, single dose of fentanyl, then he would have died too rapidly for the bronchopneumonia to develop in his lungs and for the large quantity of urine to collect in his bladder. But de Villers could not have voluntarily taken multiple doses of fentanyl over the course of the day because in the last hours of his life, he was too comatose even to breathe properly, much less self-administer fentanyl.
A competent attorney would have recognized the defects in a defense based on the theory that de Villers committed suicide by taking fentanyl and thus would have thoroughly investigated the possibility of contamination before conceding that fentanyl caused de Villers's death. Dr. Richeimer's declaration indicates that a toxicology lab could have definitively determined whether de Villers's samples were contaminated by testing them for the presence of metabolites of fentanyl. Although the district court and the appellee note that the absence of fentanyl metabolites would not have exonerated Rossum because she could have killed de Villers with another drug, it seems highly unlikely that a jury would have convicted Rossum if the defense were able to conclusively contradict the prosecution's theory that Rossum murdered de Villers with fentanyl and show that de Villers's autopsy specimens were contaminated, either intentionally or through inadvertence. If, on the other hand, fentanyl metabolites were found, the defense would have suffered no harm. Even if the prosecution were somehow able to discover the test results, but see Cal.Penal Code § 1054.3(a) (West 2002) (requiring the defense to disclose the results of scientific tests to the prosecution only if the defense intends to introduce the results as evidence at trial), the defense would have been left to pursue the very theory that Rossum's attorneys argued at trial — that de Villers committed suicide by taking fentanyl.
Would a competent attorney have realized that de Villers's samples could be tested for contamination by analyzing them for the presence of fentanyl metabolites? The appellee argues not. At oral argument, the appellee directed our attention to the cross-examination of toxicologist Michael Henson. Rossum's attorney asked Henson, "Do you have any way of knowing or testing to determine if any [of de Villers's] samples . . . has been tampered with or spiked by anybody?" Henson answered, "No." ER 305. If a trained toxicologist did not know that contamination could be detected through a test for metabolites, the appellee asks, how could an attorney, untrained in forensic science, be expected to have such knowledge?
We could dismiss this argument, which the appellee raised for the first time at oral argument, as waived. See Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 642 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, we reject it on its merits. We refuse to accord definitive weight to an answer given by a single prosecution witness during cross-examination. In any case, defense attorneys are obligated to pursue lines of investigation that hold out the promise of proving their clients' innocence prior to deciding on a trial strategy. See Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999). According to Dr. Richeimer, many toxicology labs regularly test samples for metabolites. Thus, at least on the record before us, it seems likely that if Rossum's attorneys had conducted an adequate pretrial investigation, they would have discovered that de Villers's specimens could be tested for contamination by analyzing them for the presence of fentanyl metabolites. Indeed, if that were the case, there would have been no need for them to ask the question on which the appellee's argument is founded. They would have known that a test for contamination is available — the test for metabolites discussed in Dr. Richeimer's declaration.
This leaves only the appellee's argument that Rossum's attorneys could reasonably have decided not to pursue a contamination theory so as not to contradict testimony that Rossum provided at trial. However, this could not have been the basis for their decision not to pursue a contamination theory, as they had an obligation to investigate such a theory before the trial, when there was no testimony to contradict. In any event, this argument misconceives the relevance of a single question and answer made during Rossum's cross-examination:
Q. So it is your testimony, then, that Greg de Villers voluntarily took fentanyl, clonazepam, and oxycodone, correct?
A. As far as his death, yes.
Trial Tr. vol. 21, 2569.
Rossum's answer amounted to no more than a restatement of her defense: de Villers committed suicide by voluntarily taking whatever drugs were found in his system. Rossum was not averring that she had firsthand knowledge that de Villers took fentanyl, along with other drugs. In fact, her entire defense was founded on the premise that she did not have such firsthand knowledge because de Villers, not she, administered whatever drugs caused his demise.
Because the medical and toxicological evidence raised serious questions about de Villers's purported cause of death, because an alternative cause of death was readily apparent, and because there was a lapse in the chain of custody of de Villers's specimens, we conclude that a competent attorney would not have pursued a suicide-by-fentanyl theory, with all its defects, without first having de Villers's specimens tested for the presence of fentanyl metabolites. On this record, Strickland's first prong therefore appears to be satisfied.
Pointing to Dr. Richeimer's declaration that many toxicology labs commonly run tests for metabolites, the appellee speculates that de Villers's autopsy specimens may already have been tested for the presence of fentanyl metabolites. If metabolites of fentanyl were found by any of the toxicology labs that analyzed de Villers's specimens, the appellee bore the burden of presenting this information to the district court. It would be highly improper for us to assume, based merely on the appellee's unsupported speculation, that deVillers's specimens were tested for the presence of fentanyl metabolites and that such tests were unfavorable to Rossum.
We do not prohibit the state, however, from calling defense counsel to testify, at the evidentiary hearing, should counsel choose to assert that his failure to conduct a reasonable investigation regarding metabolites was the result of some thus far undisclosed reason, strategic or other.
B. Prejudice
To prevail in her ineffective assistance claim Rossum must also demonstrate that she was prejudiced by her counsel's deficient performance. We are unable to determine from the record before us whether Rossum was prejudiced by her attorneys' deficient investigation, as that conclusion must ultimately rest on whether or not de Villers's autopsy samples prove to contain fentanyl metabolites.
As noted above, the appellee argues that even if de Villers's autopsy specimens do not contain metabolites of fentanyl, such a finding would not exonerate Rossum because she could have murdered de Villers by other means. This argument ignores both the weaknesses of the prosecution's case against Rossum and the impact that evidence of contamination would likely have had on the jury.
The prosecution's case was based entirely on circumstantial evidence. It primarily relied on the inferences that could be drawn from (1) the medical and toxicological evidence; (2) the lack of other plausible suspects; (3) Rossum's apparent motive to kill de Villers to stop him from disclosing her affair and drug use; and (4) her access to the drugs found in his body.
If the defense had tested de Villers's autopsy specimens and found no fentanyl metabolites, it could have definitively refuted the prosecution's theory of the case — that Rossum murdered de Villers with an overdose of fentanyl. And, given the evidence, the prosecution would have had an extremely difficult time convincing the jury that Rossum instead committed the murder with different drugs. At trial, the prosecution downplayed the significance of the oxycodone and clonazepam found in de Villers's specimens, noting that the concentrations of these drugs were not at lethal levels. Furthermore, if jurors learned that de Villers's autopsy samples had been contaminated, either intentionally or by accident, they could well have viewed all of the prosecution's evidence more skeptically.
Thus, whether or not Rossum was prejudiced by her counsel's deficient performance is a question that ultimately turns on whether fentanyl metabolites are present in de Villers's autopsy samples, a question that cannot be answered based upon the current record.
III. Remand for Further Proceedings
We thus remand for the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing. Rossum is not barred from obtaining an evidentiary hearing by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) because she did not "fail[] to develop the factual basis of [her] claim" before the California state courts. Although Rossum requested an evidentiary hearing before the California Supreme Court, the court summarily denied her habeas petition without ordering such a hearing. As we have previously held, a district court evidentiary hearing is not barred if a habeas petitioner made "a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court, [by] at a minimum seek[ing] an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law." West v. Ryan, 608 F.3d 477, 484-85 (9th Cir. 2010).
A habeas petitioner not barred from receiving an evidentiary hearing by section 2254(e)(2) is entitled to such a hearing if she (1) alleges facts that, if proven, would entitle her to relief, and (2) shows that she did not receive a full and fair hearing in state court. Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 873 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 669-70 (9th Cir. 2005). If, as Rossum alleges, de Villers's specimens were contaminated and her attorneys failed to investigate that possibility, she would in all probability be entitled to habeas relief on her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. And as explained above, the California Supreme Court did not afford Rossum a full and fair hearing on this contention since it summarily denied her state habeas petition. As a result, Rossum is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and, in particular, her claim that she was prejudiced by her attorneys' failure to conduct an investigation as to whether fentanyl was the cause of de Villers's death before conceding the critical point to the prosecution.
Under our holding in Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1997), in conducting this evidentiary hearing the district judge is obligated to allow Rossum to test de Villers's specimens for metabolites of fentanyl. The habeas petitioner in Jones was convicted of murdering his wife. Id. at 1004. He contended that his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to order forensic testing that might have proved that the blood found on the clothing he was wearing on the night of the murder came from a cut on his own hand, rather than from his wife as the prosecution contended. Id. at 1006-07. We held that the district court abused its discretion by denying the petitioner's request to test the blood on the clothing to determine whether it was his or his wife's. Id. at 1009. Here, as in Jones, "discovery is essential for [Rossum] to develop fully [her] ineffective assistance of counsel claim" because the testing she seeks "may establish the prejudice required to make out such a claim." Id.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Rossum is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her claim that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance under Strickland. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.