BUTTS v. BYSIEWICZ

-ref107 S. Ct. 533, 93 L. Ed. 2d 499 (1986)." Libertarian Party v. Herrera, 506 F.3d 1303, 1310 (10th Cir. 2007). "The right to associate with the political party of one's choice is an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom. . . . Freedom of association means not only that an individual voter has the right to associate with the political party of her choice . . . but also that a political party has a right to identify the people who constitute the association . . . and to select a standard bearer who best represents the party's ideologies and preferences." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nielsen v. Kezer, 232 Conn. 65, 86-87, 652 A.2d 1013 (1995). "Each provision of [an election] code, whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects — at least to some degree — the individual's right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 [ 103 S. Ct. 1564, 75 L. Ed. 2d 547] (1983)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433, 112 S. Ct. 2059, 119 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1992). Therefore, "[c]ommon sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government must play an active role in structuring elections; as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. It generally is understood that filing deadlines for ballot access "are designed to ensure the integrity of the election process in general." Forcade-Osborn v. Madison County Electoral Board, 334 Ill. App. 3d 756, 760, 778 N.E.2d 768 (2002); accord Gomes v. Rhode Island State Board of Elections, 120 R.I. 951, 956, 393 A.2d 1088 (1978) (deadlines "ensure the orderly functioning of the primary-election timetable so that those responsible will have sufficient time to prepare that ballot properly").

"[W]hen a state ballot access law provision imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the plaintiffs' [f]irst and [f]ourteenth [a]mendment rights, a [s]tate's important regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions. [ Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358, 117 S. Ct. 1364, 137 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1997)]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Swanson v. Worley, 490 F.3d 894, 903 (11th Cir. 2007).

Therefore, to give due weight to the interests of the voters, candidates and political parties, on the one hand, and the legislature, on the other hand, we are guided by the following additional principles. Ambiguities in election laws are construed "to allow the greatest scope for public participation in the electoral process, to allow candidates to get on the ballot, to allow parties to put their candidates on the ballot, and most importantly to allow the voters a choice on Election Day." New Jersey Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 175 N.J. 178, 190, 814 A.2d 1028 (2002). "This principle, however, does not authorize the court to substitute its views for those of the legislature. . . ." Gonzalez v. Surgeon, supra, 284 Conn. 569.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the text of § 9-388. That statute provides in relevant part: "Whenever a convention of a political party is held for the endorsement of candidates for nomination to state or district office, each candidate endorsed at such convention shall file with the Secretary of the State a certificate, signed by him, stating that he was endorsed by such convention. . . . Such certificate . . . shall be received by the Secretary of the State not later than four o'clock p.m. on the fourteenth day after the close of such convention. Such certificate shall either be mailed to the Secretary of the State by certified mail, return receipt requested, or delivered in person, in which case a receipt indicating the date and time of delivery shall be provided by the Secretary of the State to the person making delivery. If a certificate of a party's endorsement for a particular state or district office is not received by the Secretary of the State by such time, such certificate shall be invalid and such party, for purposes of section 9-416 and section 9-416a shall be deemed to have made no endorsement of any candidate for such office. . . ." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 9-388.

We begin with the legislature's direction in § 9-388 that the certificate "shall be received" by the Secretary of the State not later than a specified day and time. "Definitive words, such as must or shall, ordinarily express legislative mandates of nondirectory nature." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wiseman v. Armstrong, 295 Conn. 94, 101, 989 A.2d 1027 (2010). "The test to be applied in determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory is whether the prescribed mode of action is the essence of the thing to be accomplished, or in other words, whether it relates to a matter of substance or a matter of convenience." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 100. As we explain in the following discussion, receipt of the certificate is an essential predicate to a determination as to whether a primary is to be held, as well as an integral component of the effective administration of the election calendar.

We note that it long has been settled in other jurisdictions that statutes employing such language in filing deadlines for ballot access are deemed mandatory, and that, with limited exceptions not implicated in the present case, strict compliance is required such that neither the election official nor the court can excuse a candidate's inadvertent noncompliance. See 26 Am. Jur. 2d 47-78, Elections § 216 (2004); see, e.g., Andrews v. Secretary of State, 235 Md. 106, 109, 200 A.2d 650 (1964); Smith v. Kiffmeyer, 721 N.W.2d 912, 914-15 (Minn. 2006). In the present case, however, we need not determine whether such language alone would compel a similar conclusion. In addition to stating that the certificate "shall" be received by a specified date and time, § 9-388 also attaches negative consequences to noncompliance — the "certificate shall be invalid," and the "party . . . shall be deemed to have made no endorsement. . . ." Such consequences unmistakably evidence a mandatory intent. See Weems v. Citigroup, Inc., 289 Conn. 769, 790-91, 961 A.2d 349 (2008) (citing these factors as indicative of mandatory, not directory, language); Doe v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 240 Conn. 671, 681, 694 A.2d 1218 (1997) (same); State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400,410-11,645 A.2d 965 (1994) (same).

Some jurisdictions have concluded that, in extraordinary circumstances, courts can excuse a failure to comply with mandatory filing deadlines for declarations of candidacy due to (1) an action by the state, particularly election officials, causing the late filing, or (2) the impossibility of compliance. See, e.g., State v. Jeffery, 170 P.3d 226, 235 (Alaska 2007); Bayne v. Glisson, 300 So. 2d 79, 82-83 (Fla. App.), cert denied, 301 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1974); Ryshpan v. Cashman, 132 Vt. 628, 630, 326 A.2d 169 (1974); Donohoe v. Shearer, 53 Wn. 2d 27, 30-31, 330 P.2d 316 (1958); see also In re Holmes, 346 N.J. Super. 372, 376-78, 788 A.2d 291 (App. Div. 2001) (absentee ballots counted despite delivery beyond statutory deadline for those ballots that would have arrived timely but for anthrax contamination causing processing delays at postal facility). No such circumstance is implicated in the present case, and we express no opinion as to whether courts would have authority to extend filing deadlines under such extraordinary circumstances.

It also is evident that, because these consequences ensue if the certificate is not timely "received" by the defendant, compliance is established by delivery to the defendant, not by the candidate's mailing of the certificate prior to the expiration of the deadline. The significance of actual delivery is underscored by the statutory directive to deliver the certificate by one of two specified methods that provide the candidate with proof of the date of receipt — certified mail or personal delivery. By providing two such methods, the legislature has ensured that the candidate not only has a means to ascertain whether he has complied with the deadline — the dated delivery receipt — but also a means to comply until the last day of the deadline — in person delivery. Thus, the legislature clearly has placed the risk of non-delivery on the prospective candidate who chooses to file his or her candidacy documents by other methods.

We are unaware of any jurisdiction that applies the "mailbox rule" in the context of election filing deadlines. Cf. Harris v. Donovan, 269 Minn. 574, 129 N.W.2d 797 (1964) (holding that depositing affidavit of candidacy in mail does not constitute "filing" within meaning of statute); Johnson v. Herseth, 246 N.W.2d 102, 104-107 (S.D. 1976) (statute providing that nomination made by party committee "`shall be filed'" by specified date required delivery to secretary of state's office within time fixed by statute). The mailbox rule, a general principle of contract law, "provides that a properly stamped and addressed letter that is placed into a mailbox or handed over to the United States Postal Service raises a rebuttable presumption that it will be received." Echavarria v. National Grange Mutual Ins. Co., 275 Conn. 408, 418, 880 A.2d 882 (2005).

Accordingly, we reject the plaintiff's suggestion that the court should presume that the certificate was timely delivered because: (1) there is no way to know whether the certificate was lost in the mail or was misplaced by the defendant's office; and (2) the law generally recognizes a rebuttable presumption of delivery in due course when a letter is properly addressed and duly mailed. We note, however, that we do not deem fatal to the plaintiff's claim his failure to use either of the specified methods of delivery, but, rather, his failure to ensure receipt by the filing deadline.

In light of our conclusion that compliance with the statutory deadline is mandatory and is established by actual receipt of the certificate, we turn to the question of whether strict compliance is required, as the trial court concluded, or whether § 9-388 either leaves the defendant with discretion to place a candidate's name on the ballot despite noncompliance or allows the court to order her to do so, as the plaintiff contends. That question is resolved by examining the prescribed consequences of noncompliance.

Under § 9-388, if a certificate of a party's endorsement is not received by the prescribed deadline, the "certificate shall be invalid. . . ." The common meaning of the term invalid is to lack legal effect. See Black's Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009) (defining "invalid" as "[n]ot legally binding . . . [w]ithout basis in fact"); Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1993) (defining "invalid" as "being without foundation in fact or truth . . . lacking in effectiveness . . . being without legal force or effect"). Although the plaintiff suggests that this consequence of invalidity is merely directory," [l]inguistically, a statutory provision generally is considered directory if the requirement is stated in affirmative terms unaccompanied by negative words." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weems v. Citigroup, Inc., supra, 289 Conn. 790. The word "invalid" in § 9-388 undoubtedly is a negative word, which, used in connection with "shall be," leads to the inescapable conclusion that this provision is not directory, but mandatory. Therefore, it is clear that the defendant has no discretion to give legal effect to the certificate if it is delivered untimely.

That the delivery of such a certificate has a substantive effect is further evidence that strict compliance with the requirements of § 9-388 is required. It is undisputed that the certificate is the only statutorily authorized means by which the defendant is permitted to recognize a party's endorsement of a candidate as its nominee. The nomination evidenced by the certificate, in turn, is an essential predicate to the defendant's authority to place a candidate's name on the ballot. See General Statutes § 9-379. Thus, in the absence of a valid certificate, the defendant has nothing upon which to act. Cf. Johnson v. Herseth, 246 N.W.2d 102,107 (S.D. 1976) ("[The statute] requires a nomination [to fill a vacancy] made by a party committee to be delivered to the secretary of state's office within the time fixed by that statute. The fact that the secretary of state may have learned from the news media that [the] petitioner had been selected by the Minnehaha County Republican Central Committee to fill the vacancy created by the withdrawal of a successful candidate is irrelevant. There was nothing before the secretary of state to act upon, and [the] petitioner can point to no statutory duty that the secretary of state failed to perform.").

General Statutes § 9-379 provides: "No name of any candidate shall be printed on any official ballot at any election except the name of a candidate nominated by a major or minor party unless a nominating petition for such candidate is approved by the Secretary of the State as provided in sections 9-453a to 9-453p, inclusive."

The other consequence specified under § 9-388 further demonstrates the effect of the invalidity of a certificate that is not received timely. Section 9-388 directs that "[the] party, for purposes of section 9-416 and section 9-416a shall be deemed to have made no endorsement of any candidate for such office." General Statutes §§ 9-416 and 9-416a address the circumstances under which there is to be a party primary, which is determined by reference to whether there is or is not a party endorsed candidate. Pursuant to § 9-416, when no one is contesting the "party-endorsed candidate"; see General Statutes § 9-372 (9); "no primary shall be held by such party for such office and the partyendorsed candidate for such office shall be deemed to have been lawfully chosen as the nominee of such party for such office." General Statutes § 9-416. By operation of the penalties under § 9-388, however, there is no party endorsed candidate when the certificate is filed untimely. Pursuant to § 9-416a, if there is no party endorsed candidate and if a candidacy is properly filed through other statutory mechanisms by no more than one person, "no primary shall be held by such party for such office and the person filing such candidacy shall be deemed to have been lawfully chosen as the nominee of such party for such office." Similarly, by operation of the penalties under § 9-388, the party's endorsement is given no effect for purposes of determining whether to hold a primary. To conclude otherwise would give rise to the possibility that one person could claim to be the lawfully chosen nominee of the party and to be entitled to proceed to the general election in that capacity, whereas another person in the plaintiffs position could claim to be the party endorsed candidate and entitled to a primary contest. The legislature reasonably could not have intended such a result.

General Statutes § 9-416 provides: "If (1) at a state or district convention no person other than a party-endorsed candidate has received at least fifteen per cent of the votes of the delegates present and voting on any roll-call vote taken on the endorsement or proposed endorsement of a candidate for a state or district office, and (2) within the time specified in section 9400, no candidacy for nomination by a political party to a state or district office has been filed by or on behalf of a person other than a party-endorsed candidate in conformity with the provisions of section 9-400, no primary shall be held by such party for such office and the party-endorsed candidate for such office shall be deemed to have been lawfully chosen as the nominee of such party for such office."

General Statutes § 9-416a provides: "If a party has made no endorsement of a candidate for a particular state or district office, and if within the time specified in section 9-400, a candidacy for such party's nomination to such office is filed in conformity with the provisions of said section by not more than one person, no primary shall be held by such party for such office and the person filing such candidacy shall be deemed to have been lawfully chosen as the nominee of such party for such office."

General Statutes § 9-372 (9) provides in relevant part: "`Party-endorsed candidate' means (A) in the case of a candidate for state or district office, a person endorsed by the convention of a political party as a candidate in a primary to be held by such party. . . ." We note that this definition reflects that the party's nomination entitles the candidate to a place on the primary ballot, not the general election ballot.

There are three ways to obtain a place on the primary ballot as a party's candidate for a state or district office. A person may: (1) receive his party's endorsement at the party convention, thereby becoming the party endorsed candidate; (2) receive at least 15 percent of the votes of the convention delegates voting on the endorsement; or (3) collect a specified number of signatures on a nominating petition. See General Statutes §§ 9-388 and 9-400. Under the first two options, the candidate is required to file a certificate with the Secretary of the State; General Statutes § 9-388; under the third option, the candidate is required to file the petition pages with the town registrar, who in turn forwards the pages to the Secretary of the State. General Statutes § 9-400.

Despite the seemingly irrational conflict that his construction of § 9-388 could create, the plaintiff contends that the legislature intended to provide a means by which the party endorsed candidate's name could appear on the ballot despite the invalidity of the certificate because § 9-388 provides that the party "shall be deemed to have made no endorsement. . . ." (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff contends that the term "deemed" sets forth a mere presumption that the party has not made an endorsement, which can be overcome by competent evidence that the endorsement in fact has been made. He contends that, even if the legislature originally did not intend for the term deemed to set forth such a presumption, its failure to change this language when it amended the statute in 2006 demonstrates its acquiescence to Superior Court case law construing the statute to have such an effect. We disagree.

We note that the plaintiff concedes, properly in our view, that the defendant's office is not an appropriate forum for weighing evidence. He therefore contends that, when an evidentiary hearing is necessary because the certificate is invalid, the legislature intends for the court to undertake such a task. In light of this concession and our preceding statutory analysis, there can be no question that the legislature has left the defendant no discretion to place a candidate's name on the ballot if the deadline under § 9-388 is not met. We therefore turn to the question of whether the legislature nonetheless intended to allow the court, exercising its equitable power, to order the defendant to place a candidate's name on the ballot if there is competent evidence that the party had endorsed the candidate.

The plaintiff states in his brief to this court: "[W]ithout a certificate of endorsement, the defendant has no competent evidence and arguably no ability to establish that an endorsement has been made. Certainly, the legislature would not want to put the [defendant] in the position of having to make an independent investigation each time a political party endorses a candidate for office. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the legislature, by rendering the certificate `invalid,' intended to clarify this purpose and make plain that the defendant cannot recognize a party endorsement in the absence of the customary certificate. The trial court, on the other hand . . . has the means and the expertise necessary to apply its equitable authority to find, in an appropriate case, that a rebuttable presumption has been overcome by other competent evidence." We also note that the plaintiff acknowledged at oral argument before this court that, because certificates to appear on the ballot as a party's nominee must be filed with the defendant for state, municipal and district offices; see General Statutes §§ 9-391 and 9-400; the defendant's office receives scores of such certificates every election cycle.

We begin with the observation that we are unaware of any circumstance under which the legislature has authorized the court to compel a state official to perform an act that the official is barred by statute from doing. The plaintiff was unable to identify any other statutes that permit the court to do so. Indeed, there is authority from other jurisdictions expressly holding to the contrary in this precise context.

As one court noted: "Equity only applies in the absence of a specific statutory mandate. . . . [I]t is not [a court's] place to create an equitable remedy for a hardship created by an unambiguous, validly enacted, legislative decree. . . . This should be particularly true of election law. If this [c]ourt were to erode the statutory requirements of election law through the use of equity, we would create ambiguity and inconsistency in what needs to be a uniform and stable area of law. Once one exception is created, the very foundation of our form of government can be questioned and our citizens may lose faith. . . . Holding otherwise invites the destruction of our citizens' faith in our electoral process." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Martin v. Secretary of State, 280 Mich. App. 417, 437, 760 N.W.2d 726 (2008) (O'Connell, J., dissenting); see Martin v. Secretary of State, 482 Mich. 956, 755 N.W.2d 153 (2008) (Supreme Court adopting reasoning of Judge O'Connell's dissent on appeal).

We further conclude that, although the common meaning of "deem" may be sufficiently broad to encompass the meaning ascribed by the plaintiff, a contextual review of this term undermines the plaintiff's interpretation. We first note that the phrase "shall be deemed" is used in more than 1300 statutes, fifty-seven of which are in the election title of the General Statutes. See General Statutes chs. 141 through 158. A cursory review of these statutes suggests that the legislature generally does not use this term to set forth rebuttable presumptions. Indeed, it is apparent that this term can indicate a conclusive presumption. In the election laws, one statute expressly uses the phrase "shall be deemed" in setting forth "conclusive presumptions." See General Statutes § 9-150a (J).

See Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1993) (defining "deem" as "to sit in judgment upon: decide . . . to come to view, judge or classify after some reflection: hold, think . . . to form or have an opinion: believe"); American Heritage Dictionary (1978) (defining "deem" as "to judge, consider . . . to have an opinion, suppose").

See, e.g., General Statutes § 1-1d ("[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute . . . the terms `minor', `infant' and `infancy' shall be deemed to refer to a person under the age of eighteen years"); General Statutes (Sup. 2010) § 1-lm ("[w]herever in the general statutes or the public acts the term `husband', `wife', `groom', `bride', `widower' or `widow' is used, such term shall be deemed to include one party to a marriage between two persons of the same sex"); General Statutes § 4-176 (i) ("[i]f an agency does not issue a declaratory ruling within one hundred eighty days after the filing of a petition therefor, or within such longer period as may be agreed by the parties, the agency shall be deemed to have decided not to issue such ruling").

See, e.g., General Statutes § 9-8 ("[a]ny person who makes a false statement in any statement required to be signed under the penalties of false statement under this title and, except as otherwise provided by law, any person who signs the name of another to any such statement shall be guilty of false statement, which shall be deemed to have been committed in the town where such statement is filed and shall be subject to the penalties provided for false statement"); General Statutes § 14-227b (a) ("[a]ny person who operates a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given such person's consent to a chemical analysis of such person's blood, breath or urine and, if such person is a minor, such person's parent or parents or guardian shall also be deemed to have given their consent"); General Statutes § 46b-69b (b) ("[a] party shall be deemed to have satisfactorily completed such [parenting education] program upon certification by the service provider of the program").

General Statutes § 9-150a (j) provides: "In the counting of absentee ballots the intent of the voter shall govern, provided the following conclusive presumptions, where applicable, shall prevail in determining such intent:
"(1) If the names of more candidates for an office than the voter is entitled to vote for are checked or validly written in, then the vote cast for that office shall be deemed an invalid overvote.
"(2) If the name of a candidate who has vacated his candidacy is checked such vote shall not be counted.
"(3) On an absentee ballot on which candidates' names are printed, a vote shall be deemed cast only for each candidate whose name is individually checked or validly written in, except as otherwise provided in this subsection. If a party designation is circled, checked, underscored or similarly marked in any manner, or written in, no vote shall be deemed cast or cancelled for any candidate by virtue of such marking or writing." (Emphasis added.)

Logically and linguistically, the plaintiff's construction does not pass muster. There is no rational basis to conclude that the certificate is any less competent evidence of the endorsement the day after the statutory deadline expires than the day before it expires. Linguistically, the use of the phrase "shall be deemed to have made no endorsement" in § 9-388 is consistent with the historical fact that the candidate was endorsed at the party's convention. See General Statutes § 9-372 (9) (setting forth statutory definition of party endorsed candidate); see also footnote 13 of this opinion. Application of § 9-388 cannot alter that historical fact; it can, however, change the defendant's ability to recognize, or give legal effect to, that fact. See Black's Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009) (defining "deem" as "[t]o treat [something] as if [1] it were really something else, or [2] it has qualities that it does not have").

To the extent that the plaintiff relies on Superior Court decisions in support of his interpretation, we also are not persuaded. We note that there were only two Superior Court decisions interpreting § 9-388 before the legislature amended the statute in 2006: Ocif v. Tashjian, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. 0053848 (August 8, 1990), and Gasparino v. Bysiewicz, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV044002077S (September 13, 2004). As we previously noted, prior to the 2006 amendment, the statute provided that, in the event that the certificate was not received by the deadline, the party would be deemed to have made no endorsement, but the statute did not specify a method of mailing or provide that the certificate would be invalid. In both Superior Court cases, the trial court had ordered the Secretary of the State to place on the ballot the name of a candidate who had not timely filed a certificate of endorsement when there was clear evidence that the candidate had in fact been endorsed at the party convention and there was no undue burden in administering the election. The court in Ocif construed "shall be deemed" as creating an evidentiary presumption, whereas the court in Gasparino did not cite this language or Ocif and instead more generally concluded that the equities compelled such a result in the absence of clear language precluding such relief. Neither decision is officially published. Accordingly, the doctrine of legislative acquiescence, which rests on a presumption of legislative awareness of court decisions, is inapplicable. See State v. Courchesne, 296 Conn. 622, 717, 998 A.2d 1 (2010).

There is, however, evidence to suggest that the legislature may have been aware of these Superior Court decisions and may have amended the statute in 2006 to make clear its original intent in light of those decisions. The bill proposing, inter alia, the addition of the language invalidating the certificate, Raised Bill No. 69, entitled "An Act Concerning Polling Place Accessibility and Certification of Candidates," ultimately was incorporated by amendment into a larger election reform bill, Substitute House Bill No. 5064, that was enacted as P.A. 06-137. The raised bill, proposed seventeen months after Gasparino was decided, contained the following statement of purpose: "To make certain clarifications to election law procedures." Raised Bill No. 69, February 2006 Sess. Although this statement does not indicate why the committee had deemed clarification necessary, the defendant submitted the following written testimony to the government administration and elections committee considering the raised bill: "This bill reemphasizes the original intent of . . . § 9-388 by stating that failure to comply with certain election related deadlines is a `fatal defect,' whereby any certificate filed after the deadlines shall be invalid. Certain judicial decisions have made it necessary to clarify the necessity of the deadlines in the [Connecticut] election calendar." Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Government Administration and Elections, Pt. 1, 2006 Sess., p. 83. Although the defendant did not identify these decisions by name, Ocif and Gasparino were the only decisions in which the issue of the deadline under § 9-388 had been at issue up to this period in time. We note that, because the defendant's testimony was not given orally, there was no acknowledgment or response by the committee members, and there were no comments regarding the invalidation of certificates during legislative debate on the final amended bill. Nonetheless, "testimony before legislative committees may be considered in determining the particular problem or issue that the legislature sought to address by the legislation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Matey v. Estate of Dember, 256 Conn. 456, 484-85, 774 A.2d 113 (2001).

Although the plaintiff claims that the defendant's statement has marginal persuasive value, both parties claim that the 2006 amendment supports their relative positions. The plaintiff relies on the fact that the legislature neither changed the "shall be deemed" language in § 9-388 nor added clear language barring party endorsed candidates from being placed on the ballot as indicative of agreement with the Superior Court holdings. The defendant relies on the addition of the language invalidating the certificate as clarifying that the endorsement is invalid if the certificate is delivered untimely. We conclude that the defendant's reading of the 2006 amendment is more persuasive. More importantly, we see no evidence in the legislative history to undermine the construction to which the text itself is most conducive. Indeed, because the court in Gasparino did not rely on the "shall be deemed" language and Ocif, in which the court did so rely, was decided sixteen years earlier, the legislature may not have considered a change to that language necessary. The fact that the legislature did not add language expressly barring the placement of a candidate's name on the ballot simply may reflect that it did not want to foreclose alternative methods of ballot access.

We note that the legislature added the language that the party "shall be deemed to have made no endorsement" in 1981; Public Acts 1981, No. 81-447, § 7; but there is no legislative history addressing that language.

The bill analysis for the sections of Substitute House Bill 5064 that incorporated Raised Bill No. 69 explains: "The bill invalidates a candidate's party endorsement, endorsement to run in a primary, or selection as a delegate to a convention if the certificate of endorsement or selection is not filed with the secretary of state or town clerk, as applicable, by the statutory deadline. Such endorsements or selections are already deemed not to have been made or certified." Office of Legislative Research, Amended Bill Analysis for Substitute House Bill No. 5064. As we previously have recognized, "the summaries prepared by the office of legislative research expressly provide: The following fiscal impact statement and bill analysis are prepared for the benefit of members of the General Assembly, solely for purposes of information, summarization and explanation and do not represent the intent of the General Assembly or either house thereof for any purpose. . . . Although the comments of the office of legislative research are not, in and of themselves, evidence of legislative intent, they properly may bear on the legislature's knowledge of interpretive problems that could arise from a bill. See, e.g., State v. George J., 280 Conn. 551, 575, 910 A.2d 931 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1326, 127 S. Ct. 1919, 167 L. Ed. 2d 573 (2007)." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102, 124 n. 15, 942 A.2d 396 (2008). We note that the analysis of the pertinent language is consistent with our interpretation of the text and offers no support for the plaintiff's contention that the certificate becomes invalid but the endorsement does not.

In sum, it is clear that the legislature has barred the defendant from accepting an untimely filed certificate of endorsement and similarly barred her from giving effect to the endorsement. The distinction drawn by the plaintiff between evidence of the endorsement and the endorsement itself, vis-a-vis the defendant's authority, is a distinction without a difference. The certificate is the endorsement for all intents and purposes. Because the legislature required strict compliance with the deadline of § 9-388, the court cannot invoke its equitable authority to compel the defendant to act in direct contravention to this clear legislative mandate. Therefore, to the extent that the plaintiff relies on election cases holding that substantial compliance may satisfy a mandatory requirement, those cases are inapposite.

There are only two election cases in which this court has stated that a mandatory requirement of an election law could be satisfied by substantial compliance. In Dombkowski v. Messier, 164 Conn. 204, 206-208, 319 A.2d 373 (1972), the court deemed such a result would be proper when, unlike the present case, there was no adverse consequence specifically prescribed for noncompliance with the requirement at issue. In Wrinn v. Dunleavy, 186 Conn. 125, 147-50, 440 A.2d 261 (1982), the court acknowledged the substantial compliance standard, but in effect applied strict compliance by concluding that, because the absentee ballot had not been mailed by any of the enumerated persons authorized by statute to do so, the ballots could not be counted.

We are mindful of the harsh consequence of application of strict compliance in the present case. The plaintiff, an incumbent probate judge, will not have an opportunity to seek election in the new probate district as the Democratic candidate, and it appears that the Republican candidate for probate judge for the thirty-second district will run unopposed in the general election. The effect on the plaintiff, his party and the voters is greater than it needed to be, however, because the plaintiff chose not to utilize other means of obtaining access to the ballot. See footnote 5 of this opinion. The court cannot intervene when the legislature clearly has expressed its intent to require strict compliance with the filing deadline under § 9-388. Any relief must come from the legislature.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.