U.S. v. OCAMPO

ve the authority to open it). Because Defendant has not established a legitimate expectation of privacy in the suitcase, the district court did not err in denying his motion to suppress. Accord United States v. Payne, 119 F.3d 637, 641-42 (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court's holding that the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in suitcase he had possessed only briefly before leaving it in a unit of a condominium complex and then retrieving it only to give it to his co-defendant, who then drove away with it); United States v. Skowronski, 827 F.2d 1414, 1417-18 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in cardboard box he had transferred from the cab of his tractor trailer to the trunk of another individual's car).

II. Hearsay Testimony

Defendant also charges as error the district court's failure to admit the proffered testimony of his sister, Hilda Massey, and his daughter, Christina Powers, as to statements allegedly made by Defendant's brother, Ruben Ocampo.[Fn3] Defendant sought to introduce these statements in order to suggest that Ruben, not Defendant, owned the guns police recovered from Defendant's storage unit. According to the proffered testimony, Massey was to testify to statements made by her brother Ruben in the course of a telephone conversation between the two. As she recalls, sometime after Defendant's arrest she spoke with Ruben, who asked Massey about Defendant. Massey replied that "[Defendant's very, very upset with you because [Defendant] said what was found in the storage unit [the firearms] was not [Defendant's], that it was yours," to which Ruben said "yes, it was." Powers was to testify to her recollection of a three-way telephone call between herself, her father the Defendant, and her uncle Ruben, which also took place after Defendant's arrest. Powers remembers that during the call, Defendant had confronted Ruben, saying "[I] asked [you] repeatedly to get the weapons out of [my] storage unit and since [you] didn't, now [I'm] taking the fall for everything," to which Ruben "kept repeating `I'm sorry and I know.'" The district court excluded these statements as hearsay over Defendant's objection that they should be admitted as statements against interest, given that ownership of firearms exposed Ruben, a convicted felon, to criminal liability.

We review a district court's evidentiary rulings, including those involving hearsay, for abuse of discretion. United States v. Wright, 343 F.3d 849, 865 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Trepel v. Roadway Express, Inc., 194 F.3d 708, 716 (6th Cir. 1999)); see also United States v. Noel, 938 F.2d 685, 688 (6th Cir. 1991) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard of review to district court's ruling under hearsay exception for statements against interest). "Under this standard, we will leave rulings about admissibility of evidence undisturbed unless we are `left with the definite and firm conviction that the [district] court . . . committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors or where it improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard.'" United States v. Bartholomew, 310 F.3d 912, 920 (6th Cir. 2002) (alteration and omission in original) (quoting United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 720 (6th Cir. 2002)).

Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) excludes statements against interest from the general prohibition on hearsay evidence. A court considers three factors when determining whether a statement should be admitted under Rule 804(b)(3). United States v. Price, 134 F.3d 340, 347 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Hilliard, 11 F.3d 618, 619 (6th Cir. 1993)). First, the declarant must be unavailable as a witness, which occurs when the declarant:

(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or

(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or

(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or

(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or

(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has been unable to procure the . . . declarant's attendance or testimony[] by process or other reasonable means.

Fed.R.Evid. 804(a). "Second, from the perspective of the average, reasonable person, the statement must have been truly averse to the declarant's penal interest, considering when it was made." United States v. Jones, 124 F.3d 781, 786 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) (defining a statement against interest as "[a] statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true"). Third, "[c]orroborating circumstances must clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." Price, 134 F.3d at 347; see also Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) ("A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.").

The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Massey's and Powers's testimony regarding Ruben's out-of-court statements because Defendant has not established that Ruben was unavailable to testify. Though Massey indicated under oath that at the time of trial Ruben was living in Saginaw, Michigan, well within the court's subpoena jurisdiction, the district judge noted that there was no evidence of any effort on the part of the defense to procure his attendance in court. Defendant's attorney attempted to excuse this failure by explaining that she "assum[ed]" that, if called to testify, Ruben would "take the [F]ifth," based on her experience that she had "never had a witness get on the stand in the face of Miranda warnings and confess to a crime."

In order for a declarant to be unavailable due to the assertion of a privilege, Rule 804(a) requires a "ruling of the court" to exempt the declarant from testifying. Fed.R.Evid. 804(a)(1). The proffer here falls far short of this standard. The defense attorney admitted that, despite her assumption, it was "fair to say" that she did not know what Ruben's testimony would be in court, or whether he in fact would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. While, as the district judge recognized, "calling a witness into a courtroom knowing they're going to exercise the [F]ifth [A]mendment is more than a frowned upon procedure," see United States v. Ballard, 280 Fed. Appx. 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished decision) (noting the potential for prejudice to the prosecution "[w]hen a defendant calls a witness to the stand with the understanding that the witness will assert his Fifth Amendment privilege, [because] it becomes impossible to determine whether the privilege is asserted to obfuscate the factfinder or whether it is invoked out of a genuine desire to avoid self-incrimination"), this alone does not excuse Defendant from satisfying his burden of proof as the proponent of this evidence. For example, Defendant's attorney could have avoided the prejudicial effect of having a witness assert his privilege against self-incrimination in front of the jury by questioning Ruben outside of their presence as to whether he wished to assert the privilege. See United States v. Briscoe, 742 F.2d 842, 846 (5th Cir. 1984) (determining that a witness was unavailable for the purposes of Rule 804(b)(3) because he had invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege when called as a witness in a hearing away from the jury). Instead, there is no evidence that Defendant attempted to either locate Ruben or ascertain whether he would invoke the Fifth Amendment if called to the witness stand. These circumstances do not establish that Ruben was unavailable to testify, so the district court did not err in excluding the proffered testimony.⁴

Even if Ruben's statements qualified as statements against interest under Rule 804, their exclusion from evidence would be harmless error, making reversal inappropriate. See United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 851 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[E]ven if the district court erred in sustaining the hearsay objection, we will not reverse if the error was harmless." (citing United States v. Wiedyk, 71 F.3d 602, 607 (6th Cir. 1995))). Defendant does not dispute that the firearms were found in his storage unit, and this fact alone is enough to establish his liability for illegally possessing a firearm. See United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 713 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that "`[p]roof that the person has dominion over the premises where the firearm is located is sufficient to establish constructive possession'" in order to satisfy the possession requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Kincaide, 145 F.3d 771, 782 (6th Cir. 1998))). Whether or not Ruben was the legal owner of the recovered firearms does not negate the conclusion that Defendant possessed them in violation of federal law: in a prosecution for illegal possession of a firearm, "ownership is not necessary to possession, nor are possession and lack of ownership mutually exclusive." United States v. Miller, 227 Fed.Appx. 446, 461 (6th Cir. 2007) (unpublished decision) (concluding that even if the district court erred by refusing to admit a co-defendant's statement that he owned the firearms found in the residence he shared with the defendant, any error was harmless because the defendant was charged with illegally possessing, not owning, the firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and as a convicted felon). The district court did not err by excluding the proffered testimony of Massey and Powers as inadmissible hearsay, and even if it had, any error would be harmless.

III. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

Defendant next appeals the district court's denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal, which challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of his conviction for the cocaine aspect of the drug conspiracy charge and for possession of a firearm by an unlawful user of a controlled substance. We review a district court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Gibson, 896 F.2d 206, 209 (6th Cir. 1990). In reviewing Defendant's claim, "we do not weigh the evidence presented, consider the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the jury." United States v. Abdullah, 162 F.3d 897, 902 (6th Cir. 1998). Instead, "we must determine `whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" United States v. Humphrey, 279 F.3d 372, 378 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). "Circumstantial evidence alone, if `substantial and competent,' may support a verdict and need not `remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.'" United States v. Keeton, 101 F.3d 48, 52 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 1984)).

A. Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute and to Distribute Cocaine

Before turning to the merits of Defendant's sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge on the cocaine conspiracy charge, we must first address the Government's argument that we need not consider this issue. The Government asserts that because Count 1 of the indictment charged Defendant with conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute at least 5 kilograms of a substance containing cocaine and at least 100 kilograms of marijuana, a guilty verdict of conspiracy with respect to either at least 5 kilograms of cocaine or at least 100 kilograms of marijuana will sustain Defendant's conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846. Therefore, the Government alleges, it would be inappropriate to review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's cocaine verdict, as Defendant failed to challenge the marijuana verdict and vacating the cocaine verdict alone would not overturn Defendant's conviction on Count 1. The Government is correct that, if Defendant prevailed on his motion to acquit with respect to the jury's cocaine verdict, the Defendant's conviction for violating § 846 would stand based on the marijuana verdict. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56-57, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) (applying the rule "`[w]hen a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive . . . the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged'" to "multiple-object and multiple-overt-act conspiracies" (quoting Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420, 90 S.Ct. 642, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970))); United States v. Henry, 71 Fed.Appx. 493, 498-500 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished decision) (rejecting the defendant's sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to his conviction under § 846 of conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and crack cocaine, when the defendant challenged only the crack cocaine aspect of the conviction and the jury had been instructed that it must find the defendant guilty of conspiring with respect to both substances in order to convict him on the indictment's single count alleging a violation of § 846). However, in Defendant's case, there is a sentencing disparity between the amount of marijuana and the amount of cocaine charged in Count 1 of the indictment. Cf. Henry, 71 Fed.Appx. at 500 (noting "there is no disparate sentencing issue here"). The district court sentenced Defendant under the statutory sentencing range for a conspiracy involving at least 5 kilograms of cocaine, which was 10 years to life. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). On the other hand, the statutory sentencing range applicable to 100 kilograms or more of marijuana is 5 to 40 years. Id. § 841(b)(1)(B). While Defendant's 360-month sentence does not exceed the 40-year statutory maximum applicable to the marijuana conspiracy, vacating the cocaine verdict would at least shorten Defendant's Guidelines range of 360 months to life, and may have resulted in a lower base offense level under the Guidelines.[Fn5] Therefore, review of Defendant's sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim is appropriate because overturning the cocaine aspect of Defendant's conviction would affect his sentence. Cf. United States v. Dale, 178 F.3d 429, 432-33 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that, when a defendant is convicted of a § 846 conspiracy involving multiple drugs under circumstances when it is unclear for which drug or drugs the jury found the defendant responsible, the defendant must be sentenced according to the lowest statutory-maximum sentence for any of the charged substances).

"In order to show a conspiracy under § 846, the government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, `(1) an agreement to violate drug laws, (2) knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy, and (3) participation in the conspiracy.'" United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408, 420 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Welch, 97 F.3d 142, 148 (6th Cir. 1996)). "[O]nce the existence [of] a conspiracy is shown, the evidence linking an individual defendant to that conspiracy need only be slight." United States v. Caver, 470 F.3d 220, 233 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Henley, 360 F.3d 509, 514 (6th Cir. 2004)). "[A] defendant's knowledge of and participation in a conspiracy may be inferred from his conduct and established by circumstantial evidence." United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 330 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 447 (6th Cir. 2001)).

Defendant argues that the Government's evidence is insufficient because it does not establish directly Defendant's participation in the Kip Perry operation's cocaine conspiracy, but instead requires a factfinder unjustifiably to build inference upon inference to find Defendant guilty. Under the highly deferential standard of review we apply to sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, however, the Government presented enough substantial and competent circumstantial evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict. See United States v. Hines, 398 F.3d 713, 719-20 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that testimony of the defendant's co-conspirators was sufficient evidence of the defendant's conviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, even though no drugs were found in his possession at the time of his arrest).

First, some of the evidence collected from Defendant suggested that he was involved in cocaine trafficking, even though no physical evidence of cocaine was uncovered in the searches of Defendant's residence and storage unit. Some of the drug records recovered in the search of Defendant's house and storage unit were consistent with cocaine transactions but not marijuana transactions; additionally, in his conversation with Sandoval on February 15, 2006, Defendant claimed to have connections in Peru and Columbia, which are two source areas for cocaine but not for marijuana. Furthermore, a drug expert testified that sophisticated drug dealers often try to separate themselves from their product, and it was not unusual for law enforcement to fail to find any direct evidence of cocaine trafficking in Defendant's home or storage unit. In fact, financial records and two Greyhound bus baggage check tickets recovered from Defendant's residence suggest that Defendant might have paid a courier to transport drugs from California back to Michigan around December 8, 2005, indicating that Defendant did avail himself of a strategy drug dealers often use to avoid being caught traveling with their product.

Second, there was ample evidence that the Kip Perry operation had an agreement to violate drug laws by distributing cocaine as well as marijuana. Substantial distribution quantities of cocaine were found in searches of premises connected with co-conspirators Kip Perry and Phil and Theresa Perry. Third, Defendant undoubtedly had ties to the Kip Perry operation. Many types of evidence linked Defendant to Gianfortuna, including signature packaging material, surveillance, telephone and hotel usage, and documents seized from both Defendant's and Gianfortuna's residences. In turn, Gianfortuna was linked to Kip Perry and his drug operation. Defendant does not dispute that this evidence supports his conviction for his involvement in the Kip Perry operation's conspiracy to distribute marijuana.

Finally, and most importantly, wiretap evidence of conversations involving Kip Perry solidify the conclusion suggested by all the other evidence that Defendant was one of the Kip Perry operation's cocaine suppliers. On December 12, 2005, during a recorded "buy" of cocaine, Kip Perry told a government informant that "Phillip's friend" brings in "10 kilograms and 2,000 pounds at a time," where "10 kilograms" referred to cocaine. A conversation between Gianfortuna and Kip Perry on March 3, 2006 referenced a "traveling guy" who acted as their supplier for both marijuana and cocaine. On both of these occasions, information revealed about "Phillip's friend" and the "traveling guy" was consistent with the paper records of Defendant's travels. A reasonable trier of fact considering all of this evidence could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knew of, intended to join, and participated in the Kip Perry operation's cocaine distribution conspiracy. It was not error for the district court to deny Defendant's motion to acquit on this ground.

B. User of a Controlled Substance in Possession of a Firearm

Defendant's conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) by being an unlawful user of a controlled substance in possession of a firearm is also supported by sufficient evidence. Section 922(g)(3) prohibits a person "who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance" from "possess[ing] in or affecting commerce[] any firearm or ammunition," or from "receiv[ing] any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." Jury instructions adopted by this court clarify that an "unlawful user of a controlled substance" engages in drug use "sufficiently consistent and prolonged as to constitute a pattern of regular and repeated use of a controlled substance." United States v. Burchard, 580 F.3d 341, 352 (6th Cir. 2009). To prove a violation of § 922(g)(3), the Government must establish that a defendant "was engaged in a pattern of regular and repeated use of a controlled substance during a period that reasonably covers the time a firearm was possessed." Id. Defendant claims that the Government did not present sufficient evidence that he was an "unlawful user of a controlled substance," or that any of Defendant's alleged drug use was sufficiently related to his possession of the firearms recovered from his storage unit. These arguments fail.

The Government presented several pieces of evidence indicating that Defendant was engaged in "regular and repeated use of a controlled substance" in the months leading up to the March 16, 2006 discovery of the firearms kept in Defendant's storage unit. In his December 12, 2005 conversation with a government informant, Kip Perry mentioned that he had told Gianfortuna to tell "his friend" to "stop snorting," that is, ingesting cocaine; as discussed above, circumstantial evidence suggest that Gianfortuna's "friend" was Defendant. During the traffic stop of Defendant on February 15, 2006, a state trooper smelled both smoked and unsmoked marijuana in Defendant's vehicle, and found a small amount of marijuana in the vehicle's ashtray. On the same day that law enforcement officers recovered the firearms from Defendant's storage unit, a 1.4 gram quantity of marijuana was found in the refrigerator of Defendant's residence; an expert testified that this small amount of marijuana kept separate from the larger quantity of marijuana packed for distribution indicated personal use. Additionally, the Government showed that quantities of cocaine and marijuana consistent with personal use were seized from Defendant's apartment in Texas in November 2003. In light of this evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could have found that Defendant violated § 922(g)(3) beyond a reasonable doubt.

IV. Brady Claim

Defendant also asserts that the Government violated his due process rights by unlawfully withholding exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). This claim stems from the Government's failure to provide Defendant with information relating to the suspected drug trafficking activities of several individuals associated with Sandoval. This evidence, recounted in the PSR, implicates Sandoval in three incidents involving Hispanic males from whom authorities seized large quantities of cash in circumstances suggesting those individuals were transporting that money to and from Michigan as part of a drug trafficking operation. Defendant argues that this evidence identifies a number of other individuals to whom Kip Perry's and Gianfortuna's comments referencing a "traveling guy" could apply and it therefore should have been available for him to present to the jury to dispute the inference that those comments referred to him.

Normally, "[w]e review de novo the issue of whether evidence withheld by the prosecution constitutes Brady material." United States v. Tarwater, 308 F.3d 494, 515 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 250 (6th Cir. 1991)). However, "[w]here, as in this case, the defense counsel did not make a motion for a mistrial or raise the question of a possible Brady violation to the district court, we review at most for plain error." United States v. Crayton, 357 F.3d 560, 569 (6th Cir. 2004).⁶ To meet this standard, Defendant must show an "error" that was "clear or obvious," "affected [his] substantial rights," and "`seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'" Puckett v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1429, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)).

Under Brady, "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must make a three-part showing "that the Government suppressed evidence, that such evidence was favorable to the defense, and that the suppressed evidence was material." United States v. Graham, 484 F.3d 413, 417 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 601 (6th Cir. 2000)). Evidence is material for the purposes of a Brady claim when "there is a `reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,' the outcome [of the trial] would have been different," where " `reasonable probability' means a probability `sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" United States v. Jones, 399 F.3d 640, 648 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Zuern v. Tate, 336 F.3d 478, 484 (6th Cir. 2003)); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (plurality opinion).

Defendant has not established that evidence of the three cash seizures involving individuals linked with Sandoval is material to his case. Defendant unsuccessfully argued to the jury that the "traveling guy" references did not apply to him, given the inconclusive nature of the "traveling guy" identifier and wiretap evidence indicating that Kip Perry had several suppliers. He now asserts that the new evidence disclosed in the PSR is material to this argument because it identifies other specific individuals to whom "traveling guy" might refer. However, neither the Government nor Defendant has any evidence linking Sandoval to Gianfortuna, Kip Perry, or any other members of the Kip Perry operation other than through Defendant himself, and the conversation between Defendant and Sandoval on February 15, 2006 indicates that they did not have dealings before that date. In contrast, of the three incidents described in the PIR, one occurred in July of 2005 — well in advance of the February 15, 2006 meeting — and the other two occurred in July and August of 2006 — after the March 2006 arrests of the members of the Kip Perry operation. Additionally, the context of Kip Perry's "traveling guy" statement suggests that the individual referenced was a drug supplier, while the individuals detained in these incidents only carried money. More importantly, because no evidence connects Sandoval to Gianfortuna, Defendant cannot explain why Kip Perry would ask Gianfortuna about the whereabouts of Sandoval's contacts; neither can Defendant credibly argue that the Government's stronger evidence of Defendant's involvement in the Kip Perry operation's cocaine distribution scheme — Kip Perry's reference on December 12, 2005 to "Phillip's friend" — could refer to Sandoval's men. In light of these facts, it was not "clear or obvious" that the evidence described in Defendant's PSR created a "reasonable probability" of an acquittal on the cocaine conspiracy charge, so it was not plain error to consider this evidence outside the Government's Brady obligation.

V. Sentencing Determinations

Defendant's final two objections relate to his sentence. First, he challenges the district court's determination of his base offense level. The district court calculated Defendant's controlling base offense level under § 2D1.1 of the Guidelines, which derives the base offense level for various drug crimes from the drug quantities that a defendant is responsible for distributing. Due in large part to Kip Perry's statement on December 12, 2005 that "Phillip's friend" brings in 10 kilograms of cocaine and 2,000 pounds of marijuana at one time, the district court found Defendant responsible for distributing between 10,000 and 30,000 kilograms of marijuana and marijuana equivalent, leading to a total base offense level of 37.

We review a district court's sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). "[A]ppellate review of sentencing decisions is limited to determining whether they are `reasonable.'" Id. at 46, 128 S.Ct. 586. A significant procedural error such as improperly calculating the applicable Guidelines range renders a sentence procedurally unreasonable. Id. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. When reviewing sentencing decisions, we accept a district court's factual determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we review legal conclusions like its interpretations of the Guidelines de novo. United States v. Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792, 795 (6th Cir. 2005).

Defendant charges as error the district court's reliance on Kip Perry's statements to determine the drug quantities involved in his base offense level calculation. He asserts that these are testimonial statements on which he has not had the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, and, as such, their use to determine his sentence violates his rights under the Confrontation Clause as interpreted in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). He argues that the district court could only establish his base offense level using the drug quantities listed in the jury's special verdict finding him guilty with respect to at least 10 kilograms of cocaine and at least 100 kilograms of marijuana, which would equate to a total base offense level of 33. However, it has long been the rule in this circuit that "[s]o long as the evidence in the presentence report bears some minimal indicia of reliability in respect of defendant's right to due process, the district court . . . may . . . consider and rely on hearsay evidence without any confrontation requirement." United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1511 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have held on numerous occasions that this precedent survives Crawford. See, e.g., United States v. Paull, 551 F.3d 516, 527-28 (6th Cir. 2009) (" Crawford dealt only with the content of what the Confrontation Clause requires and not the scope of when it applies. . . . The rule in Crawford thus does not affect the basis for Silverman."); United States v. Katzopoulos, 437 F.3d 569, 576 (6th Cir. 2006) C'[T]here is nothing specific in . . . Crawford that would cause this Court to reverse its long-settled rule of law that [the] Confrontation Clause permits the admission of testimonial hearsay evidence at sentencing proceedings."); see also United States v. Brazil, 395 Fed.Appx. 205, 221-22 (6th Cir. 2010). The district court did not err by using Kip Perry's statements to determine the drug quantities for which Defendant was responsible, and, because Defendant did not challenge as clearly erroneous the court's finding that Defendant distributed between 10,000 and 30,000 kilograms of marijuana and marijuana equivalency, we cannot conclude that the court incorrectly calculated Defendant's Guidelines range. Therefore, Defendant's sentence is reasonable and should be affirmed.

Second, Defendant claims that the district court erred in classifying him as an armed career criminal subject to the sentencing enhancement of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). However, given our decision to affirm the district court's calculation of Defendant's base offense level, we need not decide this issue. Standing alone, Defendant's conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon, with the armed career criminal enhancement, would result in a base offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A), (c)(2). But because Defendant's drug offenses are grouped with the firearm offenses in Counts 5 and 6 for the calculation of his Guidelines range, we take the higher base offense level from these two groups of offenses, see id. § 4B1.4(b)(1); in Defendant's case, this is the base offense level of 37 assigned to the drug offenses. And, Defendant's total of 20 criminal history points, to which he stated no objection below, independently places him in a criminal history category of VI. See id. § 4B1.4(c)(1). Therefore, Defendant's status as an armed career criminal does not affect his sentence, and we decline to review it.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, we AFFIRM Defendant Robert Ocampo's conviction and sentence.