PITTMAN, Judge.
In these appeals, transferred to this court by the Alabama Supreme Court pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code 1975, we consider the correctness of a judgment entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court on a jury verdict in favor of Pratibha Kapoor, the plaintiff in a civil action asserting, among other things, a negligence claim against Howard Gene Daniels stemming from an automobile collision that occurred in November 2004. At the conclusion of the trial in this case, the jury reached a verdict determining that Daniels had negligently injured Kapoor and assessing damages of $54,722, and the trial court entered a judgment on that verdict on December 15, 2008. On January 13, 2009, Kapoor filed a motion seeking the taxation against Daniels of additional litigation costs. On the 42d day after the entry of the judgment at issue (January 26, 2009), while Kapoor's motion was pending, Daniels filed a notice of appeal in compliance with Rule 3(c), Ala. R.App. P.; Daniels thereby ful-filled the jurisdictional requirement of filing a notice of appeal within the time allowed by Rule 4(a), Ala. R.App. P., see Luce v. Huddleston, 628 So.2d 819, 820 (Ala.Civ.App. 1993), and we reject Kapoor's contention that we lack appellate jurisdiction as to his appeal based upon the alleged untimeliness of a second notice of appeal that Daniels filed in May 2009. On June 9, 2009, Kapoor cross-appealed, asserting that an April 13, 2009, order of the trial court quashing her attempt to garnish funds was erroneous.
Although Kapoor's January 2006 complaint had also stated a wantonness claim against Daniels and claims against other defendants, all claims against the other defendants were dismissed on November 5, 2008, and during the trial a judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Rule 50, Ala. R. Civ. P., was entered as to Kapoor's wantonness claim against Daniels.
Each of the issues raised by Daniels in his brief concerns the propriety of various rulings by the trial court concerning admission of evidence at trial. Specifically, Daniels asserts that the trial court erred in (1) allowing into evidence various medical bills and records as to treatment that, Daniels says, Kapoor failed to show as being reasonable, necessary, and causally related to the collision; (2) allowing into evidence testimony of one of Kapoor's treating physicians to the effect that Kapoor will require a particular medical procedure in the future without, Daniels says, adducing evidence of any causal relationship between the collision and the necessity of the procedure; and (3) allowing Kapoor to testify concerning her understanding of a potential subrogation interest of one of her insurers. As we will discuss herein, we agree with the contentions of Daniels as to the third of these issues and that the judgment must be reversed on that basis.
Pursuant to subsection (a) of § 12-21-45, Ala. Code 1975, in civil actions in which damages arising from medical or hospital expenses are claimed and may be awarded, "evidence that the plaintiffs medical or hospital expenses have been or will be paid or reimbursed shall be admissible as competent evidence." Conversely, subsection (c) of § 12-21-45 provides that if a plaintiff can demonstrate that he or she "is obligated to repay the medical or hospital expenses which have been or will be paid or reimbursed," evidence concerning any such reimbursement or payment shall be "admissible." Taken together, these provisions operate to "`alter[] the collateral source rule in civil actions in which a plaintiff seeks damages for any medical or hospital expenses'" by affording defendants "`the option of introducing evidence that a collateral source has paid or will pay or reimburse[] a plaintiff for his medical or hospital expenses'"; in the event that that option is exercised, "`a plaintiff may present evidence as to the cost of obtaining the reimbursement or payment of medical or hospital expenses, including evidence of any right of subrogation claimed by the collateral source.'" Melvin v. Loats, 23 So.3d 666, 669-70 (Ala. Civ.App. 2009) (quoting Senn v. Alabama Gas Corp., 619 So.2d 1320, 1326 (Ala. 1993) (Hornsby, C.J., concurring specially)).
In this case, Daniels exercised his option to prove that a collateral source had substantially satisfied Kapoor's medical-expense obligations: during Daniels's case, his attorney elicited affirmative answers from Kapoor to questions asking whether she had health insurance at the time that the collision occurred and whether, apart from certain out-of-pocket expenses and co-payments, all Kapoor's medical bills had been paid by virtue of that insurance. On her attorney's cross-examination, Kapoor was asked what "her understanding" was of her obligations to her health insurer, "Viva Health," "about repayment for those expenses," but she did not answer that question because Daniels's objection to that question was sustained. Kapoor later responded in the affirmative, without objection, to a question whether she was "familiar with" her obligations to her insurance carrier, after which the following exchange occurred:
"[Counsel for Kapoor]: What are your obligations to your insurance carrier relating to your medical expenses they pay?
"[Counsel for Daniels]: Objection, Your Honor. The document itself is a hearsay document and hasn't been offered into evidence anyway.
"THE COURT: Well, I haven't heard enough of the question, I think, as to — I think you need to be more specific about obligations. Is that what you said?
"[Counsel for Kapoor]: Yes, sir. I'm asking what is her personal knowledge relating to her obligations relating to repayment of her medical expenses.
"[Counsel for Daniels]: Same objection.
"THE COURT: Repayment of medical expense as to this case?
"[Counsel for Kapoor]: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: You need to be more specific, I think.
"[Counsel for Kapoor]: As to medical expenses —
"[Counsel for Daniels]: Same objection.
"THE COURT: I understand. Overruled.
"[Counsel for Kapoor]: — your insurance carriers paid in this matter, what is your personal knowledge of your obligations towards repayment of those expenses?
"[Counsel for Daniels]: Same objection.
"THE COURT: Overruled. If you know. Go ahead.
"[Kapoor]:
My understanding is that Viva Health, my insurance company, has a lien on any amount that I recover from this lawsuit, and I need to pay it back. And the lien comes from what the insurance company —
"[Counsel for Daniels]: Objection, Your Honor.
"THE COURT: I sustain to that. Next question."
(Emphasis added.)
In Bruno's Supermarkets, Inc. v. Massey, 914 So.2d 862 (Ala.Civ.App. 2005), this court reversed an order granting a new trial and overturning a judgment on a jury verdict in a premises-liability action in which the plaintiff had sought an award of damages arising from her medical expenses; at trial in that case, the plaintiff had been prevented from answering the question whether, if the jury made an award for medical expenses, "`[D]o you know whether you will have to pay Medicare and Blue Cross back?'" 914 So.2d at 864. In concluding that that ruling at trial was correct, and that the new-trial order predicated on potential error in that ruling was itself erroneous, this court, speaking through then Judge (now Justice) Murdock, noted that "[a]t no other time during the trial did [the plaintiff] attempt to present other evidence — through either witnesses or documentation — as to the issue of subrogation" ( 914 So.2d at 865), and we opined that § 12-21-45(c) "does not state that evidence relating to subrogation `shall be admissible' regardless of whether or not it is competent evidence" ( 914 So.2d at 867). In pertinent part, we held:
"In this case, the trial court prohibited [the plaintiff] from testifying as to the truth of the content of a letter allegedly received from Medicare and Blue Cross/Blue Shield stating that Medicare and Blue Cross/Blue Shield intended to enforce a subrogation interest in any recovery
she obtained in court. Any such testimony would have constituted statements `offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted/Rule 801(c), Ala. R. Evid., i.e., that [the plaintiff] was required to repay Medicare and Blue Cross/Blue Shield, even though [her] only knowledge of such an obligation was based on the letter. Thus, as the trial court itself observed in its January 27, 2003, order, the testimony was hearsay and was properly prohibited by the trial court."
Id.
Just as the testimony sought to be elicited in Massey from the plaintiff in that case concerning her "knowledge" of whether she would have to reimburse her collateral payors for their medical-expense payments on her behalf would have been inadmissible hearsay, the testimony given by Kapoor in this case, over Daniels's objection, as to her "understanding" of the existence of a subrogation lien and of a duty to repay her insurer is necessarily hearsay. The testimony was clearly offered for the purpose of proving the truth of the proposition that all or part of any damages assessed by the jury would eventually be paid to an insurer and would not directly benefit Kapoor herself. Although § 12-21-45(c) does afford plaintiffs, such as Kapoor, a conditional right to adduce competent evidence "that a third party has asserted, or has a valid basis for asserting, a reimbursement claim" ( Melvin, 23 So.3d at 670-71), we must disagree with Kapoor's contention that her testimony amounts to "competent evidence" of the existence of such a potential or actual reimbursement claim.
Our reference to "competent evidence" should not be read as excluding the potential possibility that a subrogation interest might be shown, in an appropriate case, by means other than direct evidence, such as via reference to prevailing statutes of which a trial court may properly take judicial notice. See Arthur v. Bolen, 41 So.3d 745, 750 (Ala. 2010).
Based upon the facts of this case, we must conclude that the trial court erred in permitting the jury to consider, in awarding damages, Kapoor's "understanding" that she had a duty to reimburse Viva Health. We thus reverse the judgment entered on the jury verdict in favor of Kapoor and remand the cause for a new trial or for other proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because reversal is necessary based upon this ground, we expressly pretermit consideration of the remaining evidentiary issues raised by Daniels. See North Clarke Water Auth. v. Dockery, 5 So.3d 634, 637 (Ala.Civ.App. 2008). Further, assuming, without deciding, that we would have had appellate jurisdiction to reach the merits of Kapoor's June 9, 2009, cross-appeal from the April 13, 2009, order quashing her attempts to execute on the December 15, 2008, judgment — an order as to which Kapoor has not asserted any error in her brief to this court — we must nonetheless dismiss the cross-appeal as moot because of our reversal of the judgment upon which Kapoor predicated her garnishment efforts. See Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 887 So.2d 222, 229-30 (Ala. 2004).
APPEAL — REVERSED AND REMANDED.
CROSS-APPEAL — DISMISSED.
THOMPSON, P.J., concurs.
BRYAN, THOMAS, and MOORE, JJ., concur in the result, without writings.
o, who reported that she saw the taller of the three girls (Montanez) shoot Cruz.
2. He failed to investigate Rodriguez, whose testimony at trial could have been impeached because she had a motive to lie, and once stated that Montanez shot both victims.
3. He failed to interview any other witnesses.
4. He failed to present any evidence from a mental health professional that would have supported a defense at trial that Mulero's confession was involuntary.
5. He failed to fully investigate any other potential defenses Mulero may have had before advising her to plead guilty.
6. He failed to consult with any attorneys experienced in death penalty cases or experts while representing Mulero.
See generally Resp.'s Ex. D, Br. and Argument for Pet.-Appellant. The Appellate Court affirmed, finding that Lynch's performance did not prejudice Mulero.
Mulero, 06-1325, slip op. at 8-9.
Mulero filed a PLA with the Illinois Supreme Court on March 28, 2008, asserting the following issues related to ineffective assistance of counsel:
1. Lynch had never litigated a capital case, and failed to properly educate himself as to how to proceed.
2. He did not request a plea negotiation conference.
3. He did not consult with any other attorneys experienced in death penalty cases, or consult with any experts or investigators.
4. He did not investigate or present evidence that Mulero was incompetent to plead guilty.
5. He did not investigate or present evidence that Mulero was actually innocent.
6. He did not investigate or present evidence that her confession was involuntary.
7. He did not investigate Rodriguez, who had a motive to lie and gave conflicting accounts of the murders.
8. He did not interview any witnesses who spoke with Montanez immediately after the murders.
9. He did not interview Serrano.
10. He did not investigate Serrano's vantage point to the murders.
11. He had a conflict of interest, as he was retained by the leader of the Maniac Latin Disciples.
Resp.'s Ex. G, PLA, at 11-15. The Illinois Supreme Court denied Mulero's PLA on May 29, 2008. People v. Mulero, 889 N.E.2d 1120 (Ill. 2008).
2. Proceedings before the District Court
Mulero filed her Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus — Person in State Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 26, 2009. Mulero's sole claim in her Petition is that she received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel from Lynch. Mulero offers the following assertions in support of this claim:
1. Lynch did not properly investigate Mulero's claim of actual innocence. Mulero makes four separate factual allegations in support of this assertion:
A. He failed to investigate Serrano and Rodriguez, two important witnesses whose credibility was weak.
B. He failed to investigate the factual circumstances of the murders.
C. He failed to investigate the circumstances under which she confessed. Had he done so, he may have been able to successfully argue that the confession was coerced.
D. He failed to develop any sort of defense.
2. He did not adequately advise Mulero of the adverse consequences of a blind plea of guilty.
3. He did not consult with any other attorneys, death penalty case experts, or specialists in violation of recognized American Bar Association ("ABA") standards for capital representation.
4. He had a conflict of interest, as he was hired by the leader of the Maniac Latin Disciples.
5. He did not attempt to negotiate a plea bargain before allowing his client to enter a blind plea of guilty to double homicide, a capital offense.
Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, at 8-15.
In addition to her ineffective assistance claim, Mulero makes a claim of actual innocence in her Reply brief. Traverse to Resp's. Answer, at 14-18. In support of this claim, Mulero asserts:
1. Montanez shot both Cruz and Reyes.
2. She had no knowledge that Montanez intended to shoot anyone the evening of May 11-12, 1992.
3. Her confession was coerced and involuntary.
Id.
Respondent filed a Response to Mulero's Petition, along with the State court record, on August 24, 2009. Mulero filed her Reply brief on December 18, 2009. The Petition is fully briefed and before the Court.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Decision
Mulero's Petition is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which sets a high hurdle for habeas relief. This statute states:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent "if the state court either incorrectly laid out governing United States Supreme Court precedent, or, having identified the correct rule of law, decided a case differently than a materially factually indistinguishable Supreme Court case." Sutherland v. Gaetz, 581 F.3d 614, 616 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Calloway v. Montgomery, 512 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2008)). A state court's decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established Supreme Court law when:
a state court identifies the correct governing legal rule but unreasonably applies it to the facts of a case or if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from the Supreme Court's precedent to a new context in which it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context in which it should apply.
Id. (citing
Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 814 (7
th Cir. 2005)). In order for a state court decision to be considered "unreasonable" under this standard it must be more than incorrect, it must lie "well outside the boundaries of permissible differences of opinion."
Hardaway v. Young 302 F.3d 757, 762 (7
th Cir. 2002);
see also Schultz v. Page, 313 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7
th Cir. 2002) ("The state court decision is reasonable if
it is minimally consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case.").
Before reviewing the Illinois courts' decisions, however, this Court must determine whether Mulero fairly presented her federal claims to the state courts. Section 2254(b) provides that "[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted unless . . . the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). In order to satisfy this exhaustion requirement, habeas petitioners must "fairly presen[t] federal claims to state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Johnson v. Pollard, 559 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995)). A federal habeas petitioner must therefore "present his federal claims at each level of the state's established review process." Id. (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006) ("A state prisoner is generally barred from obtaining federal habeas relief unless the prisoner has properly presented his or her claims through one complete round of the State's established appellate review process.")). Thus, a habeas petitioner procedurally defaults any claim not raised at all levels of state court review.
A federal court may excuse a § 2254 petitioner's procedural default only where the "petitioner can show either cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or can demonstrate that failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Smith v. McKee, 598 F.3d 374, 382 (7th Cir. 2010). A "cause" is defined as "an objective factor, external to the defense, that impeded the defendant's efforts to raise the claim in an earlier proceeding." Id. "Prejudice" means "an error which so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process." Id. The "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception requires a showing of actual innocence. Id. at 388-89 (citingSchlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)).
With the above principles in mind, the Court examines Mulero's Petition.
B. Procedural Default
Respondent asserts that some of Mulero's ineffective assistance claims are procedurally barred because she did not present them for each level of review during her state Post-Conviction proceedings. Although Mulero has asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel claim at every step of her state Post-Conviction proceedings, the factual allegations she provided in support of her ineffective assistance claim changed slightly each time she presented that claim to the state courts. Mulero has therefore not raised some of her factual allegations at each step of the state court Post-Conviction process. Respondent correctly asserts that when a specific factual allegation in support of an ineffective assistance claim is not brought before the state courts for one full round of review, it is procedurally barred. Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 934-35 (7th Cir. 2009) ("if a petitioner fails to assert in the state courts a particular factual basis for the claim of ineffective assistance, that particular factual basis may be considered defaulted.") (citing Stevens v. McBride, 489 F.3d 883, 894 (7th Cir. 2007)). The Court must therefore determine which of Mulero's factual allegations in support of her instant claim of ineffective assistance have been presented at each level of her state court Post-Conviction proceedings and which have not. Those that have not been presented for all three levels of state court review are procedurally barred unless Mulero can demonstrate cause for the default, prejudice therefrom, or that she is actually innocent. See Smith, 598 F.3d at 382.
Mulero supports her first assertion, that Lynch did not properly investigate her claim of actual innocence, with four separate factual allegations: that Lynch failed to interview certain witnesses, investigate the facts of the crime, investigate the circumstances of Mulero's confession, or present a defense. After examining Mulero's state court Post-Conviction submissions, the Court finds that she has presented all four of these factual allegations for a full round of review. Mulero's first assertion is therefore not procedurally barred. Next, Mulero asserts that Lynch did not adequately advise her of the adverse consequences of pleading guilty. Mulero raised this issue in her Post-Conviction Petition in the Circuit Court, but did not raise this issue on appeal or in her PLA. This assertion is therefore procedurally barred. Mulero's third assertion is that Lynch failed to consult with other attorneys and experts in order to educate himself in how to properly proceed in a capital case. She presented this claim to each level of state court review during her Post-Conviction proceedings, so it is not barred. Finally, Mulero did not present her fourth or fifth claims, that Lynch had a conflict of interest and failed to attempt a plea negotiation, for review by the Illinois Appellate Court, so these claims are procedurally barred.
Mulero has not provided the Court with good cause for defaulting the second, fourth, and fifth issues she raises in her instant § 2254 Petition. See id. (explaining that in order to demonstrate "cause" for procedurally defaulting an issue, a habeas petitioner must show that some factor external to her claim impeded her ability to present the issue during the earlier proceeding). Nor has she made a showing of actual innocence. See Id. (if a habeas petitioner cannot demonstrate cause for procedurally defaulting an issue and prejudice therefrom, she must demonstrate actual innocence in order to avoid default). The Court therefore cannot excuse her default of these issues, and finds that they are procedurally barred. With an abundance of caution, however, the Court will proceed to examine each of Mulero's claims on their merits.
The Court will examine Mulero's claim of actual innocence in section II. C. 6. of this Opinion.
C. Mulero's Claims under § 2254
As the Court has noted, Mulero's only claim in her § 2254 Petition is that Lynch was constitutionally ineffective. In order to establish this, Mulero must "show that [Lynch's] performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced [her] defense."See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). An attorney's performance is deficient if it falls "below an objective standard of reasonableness." Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Prejudice is established by showing that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Gentry v. Sevier, 597 F.3d 838, 851 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
When a court reviews an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court's review is "highly deferential" to the attorney, "with the underlying assumption that `counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'"United States v. Holman, 314 F.3d 837, 840 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). There is therefore a strong presumption that Lynch performed reasonably. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; see also Cooper v. United States, 378 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2004). To succeed, Mulero must show "errors so serious that [Lynch] was not functioning as `counsel' guaranteed [to her] by the Sixth Amendment. . . ." See Holman, 314 F.3d at 839 (quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687).
1. Failure to Investigate Mulero's Claim of Actual Innocence
Mulero first asserts that Lynch failed to investigate her claim of actual innocence. In support of this assertion, she maintains that Lynch failed to investigate the factual background of the murders, failed to interview Serrano and Rodriguez, failed to investigate the circumstances under which she confessed, and failed to develop a defense. The state court record, however, belies this claim.
Even though Lynch admitted that he did not interview Serrano and Rodriguez, Lynch testified during the hearing on Mulero's motion to withdraw her guilty plea that he was aware that Serrano may have seen Montanez shoot Cruz, and that he was also aware that Rodriguez had told the police that Montanez shot Cruz.Mulero, 06-1325, at 8. Lynch also testified that he discussed this evidence with Mulero. Id. The Illinois Appellate Court found Lynch's testimony credible, id., and Mulero has offered this Court no reason to find otherwise. Lynch admitted that he failed to discover that Rodriguez had a motive to lie about Mulero's involvement in the murders, but the Appellate Court found that if Lynch had this knowledge it would not have changed the outcome of a trial for Mulero, given the overwhelming evidence against her, including her confession, Montanez's confession which implicated Mulero, the videotape of Mulero shouting and flashing gang signs, the forensic evidence, and Rodriguez's testimony. Id. at 8-9. This Court has no reason to question the Illinois Appellate Court's finding. Moreover, Lynch testified credibly that he reviewed all the discovery materials provided by the State, and spoke with Mulero's previous attorney as well as Montanez's and Mendoza's attorneys about the case. Id. at 4. In addition, Mulero's claim that Lynch did not investigate Mulero's confession is simply false. After interviewing Mulero and examining discovery materials, Lynch presented a motion to suppress Mulero's confession in which he argued that Mulero did not understand her Miranda rights and that the police psychologically coerced her into confessing. See Mulero, 680 N.E.2d at 1332. Given this record, the Court determines that Lynch's investigation of the murders and his decision not to present any defenses at a trial met the minimum standard of reasonableness under Strickland. Mulero's first assertion in support of her Petition therefore fails.
2. Failure to Advise Mulero as to the Adverse Consequences of Pleading Guilty
Mulero's second assertion is that Lynch failed to advise her of the adverse consequences of a guilty plea. During the hearing on Mulero's motion to withdraw her plea, however, Lynch testified that he discussed the pros and cons of pleading guilty with Mulero. Mulero, 06-1325, at 3-4. The Circuit Court found Lynch's testimony on that issue credible. Resp.'s Ex. BB, Tr., at H56-58. In addition, the Circuit Court asked Mulero at her plea hearing whether she understood
that by pleading guilty, she would be giving up certain rights, including her right to have a jury decide her guilt or innocence. Resp.'s Ex. V, Tr., at 177-78. Mulero replied that she understood the rights she was giving up. Id. Mulero also stated that she signed a jury waiver after conferring with Lynch, and confirmed that no one was forcing her to plead guilty. Id.; Resp.'s Ex. K, at C-34. There is thus no factual basis to support Mulero's second assertion in support of her Petition, and it therefore fails.
3. Failure to Consult
Next, Mulero contends that Lynch failed to consult with any other attorneys or death penalty case experts, in violation of recognized ABA standards for capital representation. In her Memorandum in support of her § 2254 Petition, Mulero directs the Court's attention to the 2003 ABA standards, but Respondent correctly points out that it is the 1989 ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (the "GUIDELINES") that would have been in effect during the time Lynch represented Mulero. In the following analysis, the Court will therefore refer to the 1989 GUIDELINES.
GUIDELINE § 8.1, "Supporting Services," provides that in order to provide "quality representation" in a death penalty case, defense counsel should have access to: "expert witnesses capable of testifying at trial and at other proceedings, personnel skilled in social work and related disciplines to provide assistance at pretrial release hearings and at sentencings, and trained investigators to interview witnesses and to assemble demonstrative evidence." Although Lynch did present a mental health expert to testify on Mulero's behalf during the hearing on her motion to withdraw her guilty plea, there is no indication in the record that Lynch availed himself of any of the other supporting services recommended by the GUIDELINES at any point during his representation of Mulero. GUIDELINE § 8.1 emphasizes that "[c]ounsel, whether practicing privately or within a defender's office, cannot adequately perform [the tasks necessary in a capital case] without the assistance of investigators and other assistants."
Supreme Court case law, however, indicates that the GUIDELINES are not "inexorable commands with which all capital defense counsel must fully comply." Bobby v. Hook, 130 S.Ct. 13, 17 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the GUIDELINES are "`only guides' to what reasonableness means, not its definition." Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (providing that the GUIDELINES are a guide to determining whether counsel's performance was objectively reasonable). In evaluating Lynch's performance, the Court therefore may use the GUIDELINES as evidence of what a reasonable attorney in Lynch's situation would have done, but must ultimately measure Lynch's performance against an objective standard of reasonableness. Bobby, 130 S.Ct. at 17.
Lynch's performance, although perhaps less than laudible, met this minimum standard. As to his decision to allow Mulero to plead guilty, the record in this case indicates the following:
1. His client confessed to participating in two intentional homicides, expressed no remorse for her actions during her confession, and, following this confession, displayed gang signs and shouted slogans indicating that she was a "King Killer" for television news cameras.
Mulero,
680 N.E.2d at 1331-34.
2. After interviewing Mulero and examining discovery materials, Lynch filed a motion to suppress Mulero's confession based on four separate grounds, including coercion.
Id. at 1332. The Circuit Court denied the motion.
Id.
3. The State had forensic evidence regarding the shootings and Rodriguez's statement
implicating Mulero.
Id. at 1332.
4. Perhaps most importantly, Mulero informed the Circuit Court at her plea hearing that she had consulted with Lynch regarding the rights she was giving up, and that she had decided to plead guilty. Resp.'s Ex. BB, Tr., at H56-58; Resp.'s Ex. V, Tr., at 177-78. During her testimony at her first sentencing hearing, Mulero confirmed that she was the one who made the decision to plead guilty.
Mulero, 06-1325, at 3.
Given this record, the Court cannot say that Lynch's decision to allow Mulero to plead guilty did not meet an objective standard of reasonableness. See Holman, 314 F.3d at 839 (in order to establish ineffective assistance, a petitioner must show that counsel was not acting as the "`counsel' guaranteed [to him] by the Sixth Amendment."). At the aggravation/mitigation phase of Mulero's sentencing hearing, the record indicates that Lynch presented mitigating evidence from: Cook County Jail employees who testified favorably as to Mulero's general disposition; Mulero's mother, who testified that Mulero loved her children and enjoyed visiting with them; and Mulero herself, who expressed remorse for the murders. Mulero, 680 N.E.2d at 1334-35. Given this record, the Court also cannot say that Lynch's performance at the sentencing phase was not objectively reasonable. See Holman, 314 F.3d at 839.
Moreover, the ultimate decision whether to plead guilty rested with Mulero. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 485 (2000).
The Court acknowledges that Lynch did not consult with any investigators or assistants during his representation of Mulero, and that his failure to do so did not meet the applicable ABA GUIDELINES for defense counsel in capital cases. However, taking the GUIDELINES as mere guides, see Bobby, 130 S.Ct. at 17, the Court determines that Lynch's representation of Mulero as a whole met an objective standard of reasonableness. Mulero's third claim in support of her Petition therefore fails.
4. Conflict of Interest
Mulero's fourth claim is that Lynch had a conflict of interest because he was hired by an individual known as "Boss Maniac," the leader of the Maniac Latin Disciples. Mulero speculates that this individual or others within the Maniac Latin Disciples' leadership structure ordered Cruz and Reyes' murders, and somehow influenced Lynch to persuade Mulero to plead guilty in order to cover up this plot. Mem. in Support of Pet., at 31. Mulero submits no evidence to support this assertion other than an affidavit in which she states that Lynch told her "that he had been hired by a man he referred to as Boss Maniac to defend me." Aff. of Marilyn Mulero, Resp. Ex. S., at 15. Mulero's mere speculation that Lynch had a conflict of interest is not enough to support this claim. Yang v. Pollard, 202 Fed. Appx. 134, 137 (7th Cir. Oct. 27, 2006) ("speculation alone cannot support an ineffective-assistance claim") (citing United States v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 1991)); Simmons v. Gramley, 915 F.2d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1990). Mulero's fourth claim in support of her Petition therefore fails.
5. Failure to Negotiate a Plea
Mulero's fifth claim is that Lynch did not attempt to negotiate a plea bargain before allowing her to enter a blind plea of guilty to the murders. Respondent correctly points out, however, that Lynch testified that the State refused to participate in a pretrial plea conference, Resp.'s Ex. Z, at A-18, and Mulero presents no evidence to the contrary. There is thus no factual basis in the record to support this claim.
In addition, there is no bright-line rule that allowing a client to enter a blind plea necessarily constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Bracy v. United States, No. 07-679, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18459, at *22 (S.D. Ala. March 2, 2010) (citingBraun v. Ward, 190 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 1999)). In fact, such a decision may well represent sound strategy. Id. (citing Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314 n. 14 (11th Cir. 2000));see also Fields v. Gibson, 277 F.3d 1203, 1271 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding counsel's decision to recommend a blind plea objectively reasonable).
The Court acknowledges that entering a blind plea in a capital murder case may provide little benefit for a defendant. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 191 (2004) ("If no written guarantee can be obtained that death . . . will not be imposed following a plea of guilty, counsel should be extremely reluctant to participate in a waiver of the client's trial rights."). However, where there is overwhelming evidence of a defendant's guilt, as there was in this case, counsel's decision to enter a blind plea and focus on saving the client's life at the penalty phase of the proceedings may be a reasonable one. Id. at 191-92 (citing Lyon, Defending the Death Penalty Case: What Makes Death Different?, 42 MERCER L. REV. 695, 708 (1991) ("It is not good to put on a `he didn't do it' defense and a `he is sorry he did it' mitigation. This just does not work."); Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1589-91 (1998) ("interviews of jurors in capital trials indicate that juries approach the sentencing phase `cynically' where counsel's sentencing-phase presentation is logically inconsistent with the guilt-phase defense.")).
Given the extent of the State's evidence in this case, the Court finds that Lynch's decision to allow Mulero to plead guilty and to focus his efforts on the penalty phase was reasonable. The Court also notes that following the Illinois Supreme Court's decision vacating Mulero's death sentence, Mulero received a life sentence. Mulero 99-825, at 1. Lynch's decision thus ultimately did not prejudice Mulero. Mulero's fifth claim in support of her Petition therefore fails.
6. Actual Innocence
In her Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Traverse to Respondent's Answer (Mulero's Reply brief), Mulero asserts that she is actually innocent of the murders. Mulero does not explain whether she is attempting to assert her innocence in an attempt to avoid the procedural default of her other claims, or whether she is making a freestanding claim of innocence.
As the Supreme Court has explained, one way for a habeas petitioner to avoid procedural default is to make a showing of actual innocence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. In order to avoid procedural default by demonstrating actual innocence, the petitioner must show "that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of . . . new evidence." Bell v. Pierson, 267 F.3d 544, 551 (7th Cir. 2001) (quotingSchlup, 513 U.S. at 327). If Mulero is asserting a claim of actual innocence in order to avoid procedural default, she must therefore submit new evidence of her innocence. Id. The Court must then make a factual finding as to whether her new evidence is credible. Id. If the new evidence is not credible, the claims that the Court has found to be defaulted will remain defaulted. Id.
If Mulero is making a freestanding claim of actual innocence,i.e. a claim of innocence unrelated to any attempt to avoid procedural default, she has a steeper mountain to climb. First, it is not certain that freestanding claims of innocence are cognizable in federal habeas corpus petitions. In In re Davis, the Supreme Court remanded a habeas petition to the Southern District of Georgia for a hearing to determine "whether evidence that could not have been obtained at the time of trial clearly establishes petitioner's innocence." 130 S.Ct. 1, 1 (2009). However, Justice Scalia explained in dissent that "we have repeatedly . . . express[ed] considerable doubt that any claim based on alleged `actual innocence' is constitutionally cognizable." Id. at 3 (citing House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1993)). If such a claim is cognizable, as the Davis majority seemed to indicate, the standard for relief is high. Davis, 130 S.Ct. at 2 (explaining that a habeas petitioner presenting "new evidence conclusively and definitely proving, beyond any scintilla of a doubt, that he is an innocent man," would be entitled to relief) (Stevens, J., concurring); Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 (commenting that if freestanding innocence claims were cognizable, the threshold for such claims would be "extraordinarily high.").
Whether Mulero is asserting her innocence in an attempt to avoid procedural default, or is making a freestanding claim of innocence, the Court must first examine the evidence she has presented that might support her claim. This evidence includes:
1. Two affidavits from capital litigation investigators. These affidavits indicate that the investigators interviewed Serrano in July 1997, and that Serrano stated that the "taller of the three women walked behind a male and shot him." Pet.'s Ex. B, ¶ 6; Pet.'s Ex. C, ¶ 6.
2. An affidavit from Mulero, which states that Montanez shot both Cruz and Reyes. Pet.'s Ex. E, ¶ 4.
3. Sworn statements from Magnolia Wright and Maria Ramos, inmates at the Dwight Correctional Center, taken in April 1996. Wright and Ramos state that Montanez
admitted to shooting both Cruz and Reyes. Pet.'s Ex. F, at 5-7; Pet.'s Ex. G, at 4.
4. Affidavits from Michael Deppe and Joseph Kirk, Chicago police officers who investigated the murder scene in June 1999. Deppe and Kirk state that it was physically impossible for Serrano to have seen the murders from her apartment. Pet.'s Ex. H., ¶ 3; Pet.'s Ex. I, ¶ 3.
5. A Neuropsychological Evaluation conducted by Dr. Michael M. Gelbort, which concludes that Mulero suffers from "verbal learning and reasoning deficits, and functioning on tests of frontal lobe abilities [presented] in the cognitively impaired or brain damaged range of abilities," and also suffers from "paranoid tendencies, anxiety, dysphoria, and difficulty understanding and planning how to meet her interpersonal needs." Pet.'s Ex. K, at 4.
6. A Psychological Examination by Dr. Michael D. Kovar which explained that although Mulero suffers from certain cognitive deficits, she was competent to waive her
Miranda rights at the time of her confession. Pet's Ex. L, at C-257. Kovar also determined, however, that
Mulero was not competent to make a knowing and intelligent plea of guilty.
Id.
The Court first notes that none of this evidence is, properly speaking, "new." Dr. Kovar testified on Mulero's behalf during her hearing on her motion to withdraw her plea, and his report is dated December 4, 1994. Mulero, 680 N.E.2d at 1344-46; Pet.'s Ex. L, at C-258. Mulero presented the capital litigation investigators' affidavits, Mulero's affidavit, Deppe's affidavit, Kirk's affidavit, and the Dwight inmates' statements to the state courts during Mulero's Post-Conviction proceedings. The origin of Dr. Gelbort's report is unclear, but this report is dated April 4, 1997. More importantly, after examining this evidence, the Court is not convinced that it would have changed the outcome of a trial, had Mulero declined to plead guilty, given the overwhelming evidence amassed by the State. See Bell, 267 F.3d at 551 (explaining that in order to defeat procedural default by establishing actual innocence, a habeas petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have voted to convict in light of the new evidence). This evidence also does not come close to meeting the very high standard required to establish a freestanding claim of actual innocence. See Davis, 130 S.Ct. at 2; Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417. Mulero's claim of actual innocence therefore fails.
D. Evidentiary Hearing
Mulero asserts that the Court should hold an evidentiary hearing on her claims. Mulero is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if "(1) [s]he has alleged facts, which, if proved, would entitle [her] to habeas relief and (2) the state courts for reasons beyond [her] control, never considered [her] claim in a full and fair hearing." Ward v. Jenkins, 613 F.3d 692, 698 (7th Cir. 2010). The Court has carefully considered the merits of all of Mulero's ineffective assistance claims, even those it found procedurally barred, and it found that none of Mulero's allegations entitle her to habeas relief. In addition, the state courts fully considered, and rejected, Mulero's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during Post-Conviction proceedings. As to Mulero's actual innocence claim, the Court determined that it remained unclear whether the "new" evidence presented by Mulero would have led to a not guilty verdict had this case gone to trial. Her allegations in support of actual innocence, even if they were true, thus do not entitle her to habeas relief. See Davis, 130 S.Ct. at 2; Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 (noting the high standard for actual innocence claims). The Court therefore finds that Mulero is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
E. Certificate of Appealability
Mulero does not have the absolute right to appeal the Court's denial of her Petition. She may, however, file an appeal if the Court grants her a Certificate of Appealability ("COA"). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Court, the Court must determine at the time it enters a final order whether it should grant Mulero a COA. If the Court decides to grant a COA, it must identify the specific issue or issues appropriate for appellate review. Rule 11(a).
Mulero is entitled to a COA only "if [she] has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, the Court should grant her a COA if "reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) [Mulero's] petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335 (2003). The Court first finds that the issues which it has determined are procedurally defaulted could not have been resolved in a different manner. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (where it is not debatable that an issue is procedurally barred, the Court should not grant a COA on that issue.). However, the two issues which survived default — the questions of Lynch's effectiveness with respect to his investigation of the murders and his failure to consult with any other investigators or experts in violation of the applicable ABA GUIDELINES — deserve further review by the Appellate Court. The Court therefore issues a COA as to the following two issues:
1. Whether Lynch's limited investigation into the facts of the murders, particularly his admitted failure to interview any witnesses, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
2. Whether Lynch's failure to procure any supporting services, including experts or investigators, in violation of ABA death penalty case GUIDELINES, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mulero's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus — Person in State Custody is denied. The Court issues a Certificate of Appealability on the two issues identified in section II. E. of this Opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.