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WILD FISH CONSERVANCY, Plaintiff-Appellant, Kenneth L. SALAZAR, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior; United States Fish and Wildlife Service; Rowan W. Gould, in his official capacity as Acting Director of the United States Fish Wildlife Service; Julie Collins, in her official capacity as Complex Manager for the Leaven-worth National Fish Hatchery Complex, Defendants-Appellees.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS RUSSELL, District Judge

This matter is before the Court on a motion to proceed in forma pauperis by Plaintiff Connie Marshall. Ms. Marshall is no stranger to this Court. Over the past seven years, she has filed twenty-eight separate actions in this Court. She has sought and been granted pauper status in the vast majority of these actions. Almost all of the actions involve the same subject matter-Ms. Marshall's belief that she has been targeted, stalked, menaced, threatened, and otherwise harassed by a legion of state and federal officials as part of a vast conspiracy against her. She has previously been warned that continuing to file baseless lawsuits involving the same subject matter in this Court could result in the imposition of sanctions against her, including revocation of the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis in further actions in this Court. See Marshall v. Johnson et al., No. 3:07CV-171H, docket numbers 12 and 13.

Plaintiff was apparently undaunted by this warning. In fact, she has filed seventeen actions since its entry. Upon review of Ms. Marshall's litigation history, this Court finds that Ms. Marshall has abused the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis by repeatedly filing frivolous lawsuits even after having been warned by the Court to refrain from doing so. As such, the Court will deny Ms. Marshall's pending motion to proceed in forma pauperis and will direct her to show cause why an injunction should not be entered barring her from proceeding in forma pauperis in any future actions in this Court.

Congress first enacted an in forma pauperis statute in 1892 "to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324, (1989) (citing Adkins v. E.I. DuPont deNemours Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342-43 (1948)). Proceeding in forma pauperis is a privilege and not a right. Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 603 (6th Cir. 1998); Weaver v. Toombs, 948 F.2d 1004, 1008 (6th Cir. 1991). It is well-established that the federal courts may revoke or deny the privilege of proceeding as a pauper when a litigant abuses the privilege by repeatedly filing frivolous, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits. See In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184-85 (1989) (per curiam); Maxberry v. S.E.C., 879 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).

When a litigant abuses the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis by repeatedly filing frivolous lawsuits, federal courts have the inherent power to impose appropriate sanctions, including restrictions on future access to the judicial system, to deter future frivolous, harassing or duplicative lawsuits. See Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-45 (1991); Filipas v. Lemons, 835 F.2d 1145, 1146 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Iwachiw v. N.Y. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 396 F.3d 525, 528 (2d Cir. 2005); Cauthon v. Rogers, 116 F.3d 1334, 1337 (10th Cir. 1997). While this Court cannot absolutely foreclose an individual from initiating an action or pursuing an appeal in federal court, Ortman v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 807, 811 (6th Cir. 1996), the Court may impose prefiling restrictions on an individual with a history of repetitive or vexatious litigation. Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 269 (6th Cir. 1998); Ortman, 99 F.3d at 811. A district court may properly require prolific litigators to obtain leave of court before accepting any further complaints for filing, see Filipas, 835 F.2d at 1146, and may deny a vexatious litigant permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See, e.g., Reneer v. Sewell, 975 F.2d 258, 260-61 (6th Cir. 1992). The imposition of these prospective orders has been upheld where a litigant has demonstrated a "history of unsubstantial and vexatious litigation [amounting to] an abuse of the permission granted to him to proceed as a pauper in good faith. . . ." Maxberry, 879 F.2d at 224; see also In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180 (1989).

Ms. Marshall has a history of unsubstantial and vexatious litigation in this Court. She has been warned that her repeated filing of such lawsuits could lead to the imposition of sanctions and restrictions. Yet, undaunted she has continued to file repetitive and patently frivolous lawsuits in this Court. In total, over a span of seven years, Ms. Marshall has filed twenty-eight lawsuits in this Court:

(1) Marshall v. Bowles, 3:03CV-70-H, filed 02/04/03, dismissed on 05/08/03 for failure to state a claim; (2) Marshall v. Maze, et al., 3:03CV-369-H, filed 06/20/03, dismissed 10/03/03 for failure to state a claim; (3) Marshall v. Hall-Craig et al., 3:04CV-612-S, filed 10/29/04, dismissed on 05/18/05 for failure to state a claim; (4) Marshall v. Johnson et al., 3:05CV-261-S, filed 05/02/05, dismissed on 05/20/05 as frivolous and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (5) Marshall v. Bowles, 3:05CV-280-S, filed 05/10/05, dismissed on 12/16/05 for failure to state a claim and as frivolous; (6) Marshall v. Ackerman, 3:05CV-458-R, filed 08/12/05, dismissed on 06/09/06 for failure to state a claim; (7) Marshall v. Howard et al., 3:06CV-354-H, filed 07/24/06, dismissed on 03/27/07 for failure to state a claim; (8) Marshall et al. v. Simpson et al., 3:06CV-423-J, filed 08/25/06, dismissed for failure to state a claim on 07/24/07; (9) Marshall v. Yates et al., 3:06CV-611-S, filed 11/30/06, dismissed on 01/29/07 for failure to state a claim; (10) Marshall v. Willner et al., 3:06CV-665-M, filed 12/28/06, dismissed on 09/14/07 for failure to state a claim; (11) Marshall v. Johnson et al., 3:07CV-171-H, filed 03/28/07, dismissed on 04/23/07 for failure to state a claim; (12) Marshall v. Huber et al., 3:09CV-54-S, filed 04/27/09, dismissed on 07/01/09 as frivolous and for failure to state a claim; (13) Marshall v. Bowles et al., 3:09CV-61-C, filed 03/10/09, dismissed on 08/03/09 for failure to state a claim; (14) Marshall v. CBS Personnel et al., 3:09CV-293-H, filed 06/05/09, dismissed on 02/12/10 for failure to state a claim; (15) Marshall v. Huber et al., 3:09CV-308-S, filed 05/26/09, dismissed on 07/01/09 as frivolous; (16) Marshall v. Richardson Properties et al., 3:09CV-379-H, filed 05/27/09, dismissed on 03/08/10 for failure to state a claim; (17) Marshall v. Huber et al., 3:09CV-428-H, filed 06/17/09, dismissed on 07/08/09 for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (18) Marshall v. Global Connections, Inc. et al., 3:09CV-445-C, filed 06/26/09, dismissed on 10/15/09 as frivolous; (19) Marshall v. Staffleri et al., 3:09CV-448-S, filed 06/29/09, dismissed on 08/11/09 as frivolous; (20) Marshall v. Segal et al., 3:09CV-679-S, filed 09/02/09, dismissed on 03/29/10 for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (21) Marshall v. Derouen et al., 3:09CV-680-H, filed 09/02/09, dismissed on 03/22/10 as frivolous; (22) Marshall v. Potter et al., 3:09CV-910-S, filed 11/13/09, dismissed on 03/29/10 as frivolous and for failure to state a claim; (23) Marshall v. Duncan et al., 3:10CV-11-H, filed 01/07/10, dismissed on 04/06/10 for failure to state a claim and as frivolous; (24) Marshall v. Simpson et al., 3:10CV-20-M, filed 01/11/10, dismissed 04/15/10 for failure to state a claim; (25) Marshall v. Stengel et al., 3:10CV-159-S, filed 03/09/10, dismissed 05/12/10 for failure to state a claim and as frivolous; (26) Marshall v. Green, filed 04/06/10, dismissed 05/17/10 for failure to state a claim and as frivolous; (27) Marshall v. Beshear et al., 3:10CV-663-R (present action), filed 10/25/10, still pending; (28) Marshall v. Fries et al., 3:10CV-708-S, filed 11/19/10, still pending.

Ms. Marshall's submission of frivolous and duplicative lawsuits serves no legitimate purpose, places a tremendous burden on this Court's limited resources, and deprives other litigants with meritorious claims of the speedy resolution of their cases. The sheer number of Ms. Marshall's baseless and duplicative complaints evidences her bad faith and amounts to an abuse of the judicial process, including the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis. See Riches v. Garese, Civ. No. 08-086, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47387, 2008 WL 2475733, at *2-3 (E.D. Ky. June 18, 2008) (and cases cited therein). Accordingly, her motion to proceed in forma pauperis (DN 5) is DENIED. Within 30 days of the entry of this Order, Plaintiff shall pay the $350.00 filing fee in full to the Clerk of Court. Plaintiff is WARNED that her failure to do so will result in the dismissal of this action.

Given Ms. Marshall's extremely abusive case filings, the Court concludes that the least severe sanction likely to deter her from filing future vexatious and frivolous lawsuits is to impose a permanent injunction prohibiting her from proceeding in forma pauperis in any future action filed in this Court. This injunctive relief has no punitive aspect and serves a purely deterrent function. The injunction does not close the courthouse to Ms. Marshall but does impose financial consequences designed to compel Ms. Marshall to seriously consider what she is doing before initiating yet another lawsuit. Before entering such an injunction, however, the Court will provide Ms. Marshall with an opportunity to respond. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within 30 days from the entry of this Order, Plaintiff Connie Marshall shall show cause in writing why this Court should not issue an injunction barring her from proceeding in forma pauperis in all future actions in this Court.

Date: December 6, 2010

onclusion that the "current distribution and abundance of the bull trout in the action area" is "not likely to change": (1) the persistence of the Icicle Creek bull trout population since 1940; and (2) the detection of six migratory bull trout upstream of the Hatchery in 2006 and 2007. See id. at 84. Elaborating on the second reason, the 2008 BiOp asserted that the' periodic breeding of migratory and resident bull trout that would "potentially" occur during the term of the action "is likely to contribute to maintaining and improving the viability of this local population and its contribution to the viability of the core area and interim recovery unit populations of the bull trout." Id.

Neither reason adequately explains the contradiction between the Service's findings and its conclusion. First, the fact that the local population has survived since 1940 does not provide any information about how much longer it can hold on. If there are now fewer than twenty spawning individuals and the population continues to decline, then, absent some intervention, the population will eventually reach zero, its long prior existence notwithstanding. Moreover, even before a population is extinguished, it may reach a point at which it is no longer recoverable: "a species can often cling to survival even when recovery is far out of reach." Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 524 F.3d at 931. The Service has not determined when the tipping point precluding recovery of the Icicle Creek bull trout population is likely to be reached, nor, necessarily, whether it will be reached as a result of the 2006-2011 operations and maintenance of the Hatchery.

Second, the discovery of a small number of migratory bull trout upstream of the Hatchery in 2006 and 2007 does not, in light of the 2008 BiOp's other findings, support the Service's conclusion that the 2006-2011 action will not affect bull trout distribution and abundance in Icicle Creek. The Service found that the action was likely to " reduce, and in some years preclude, demographic and genetic contributions by migratory bull trout to the small resident bull trout population." 2008 BiOp at 71 (emphasis added). True, before 2001, there were no migratory bull trout spawning successfully, and under the 2006-2011 operations and maintenance there may — possibly — be a very few, although that is far from certain. But any positive impact from the small number of migratory bull trout upstream can only occur if that impact is not offset by the number of bull trout who are not born or die because the Hatchery impairs upstream migration.

The Service found that between 2001, the first year the Hatchery began adjusting its dams to allow some upstream migration, and 2007, the second year of the action period, there was no net gain: "Not enough migratory bull trout are likely to have passed upstream of the [Hatchery] and successfully spawned between 2001 and 2007, to fully offset the reduced [bull trout] B[irths] and I[mmigration], plus increased D[eaths], caused by [operations and maintenance] at [the Hatchery]." Id. at 49. Moreover, the 2008 BiOp found that stabilizing the local population would require "at least a few pairs of male and female migratory bull trout . . . successfully spawning] in Icicle Creek annually," id., but the action would likely preclude any spawning by migratory bull trout in some years. That is why, presumably, the bottom line of the Service's findings is that as a result of the 2006-2011 action, the local bull trout population will continue to decline. As noted, the Service failed to draw a rational link between that finding and its conclusion that the action would not affect the "current distribution and abundance of the bull trout in the action area."

Nor did the Service articulate a rational connection between its findings and its ultimate conclusion — that the action would not cause jeopardy at the recovery unit scale. The Service has identified the following "survival and recovery needs" for the Columbia River unit: "maintain or expand the current distribution of the bull trout within core areas; maintain stable or increasing trends in bull trout abundance; maintain/restore suitable habitat conditions for all bull trout life history stages and strategies; and conserve genetic diversity and provide opportunities for genetic exchange." Id. at 84. In considering the impact of the action on the Columbia River interim recovery unit, the Service concluded:

[T]he proposed action is likely to contribute to the survival of the bull trout by providing some upstream passage opportunities for migratory bull trout in Icicle Creek, but is not likely to appreciably increase its recovery at the action area, core area, interim recovery unit, and rangewide scales because it will impair upstream passage of migratory bull trout during the optimal period of in-stream flows However, the effect of improved upstream passage conditions caused by the proposed action . . . should improve, albeit in only a small way, the contribution of the Icicle Creek local population to the survival of the bull trout.
For the above reasons, the effects of implementing the proposed [Hatchery] operations from May 2006 through December 2011, are not likely to substantively change the capacity of the Columbia River interim recovery unit to provide both the survival and recovery functions assigned to it. For that reason, the proposed action is not likely to appreciably reduce the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of the bull trout in the wild.
Id. at 86-87. This conclusion simply does not account for the finding that the number of bull trout in Icicle Creek would continue to decrease over the action period. The 2008 BiOp does not explain how a "negative" population trend in Icicle Creek could "improve . . . the contribution of the Icicle Creek bull trout population to the survival of the bull trout." It may be that, as we conjectured in the preceding section, the decrease in the local population over the five-year period under study would not have an "appreciable" negative impact on the interim recovery unit. But how it could have a positive impact remains un-clear.

The Service might also have found that even if the Icicle Creek bull trout population were extirpated, its loss would not jeopardize the survival or recovery of the Columbia Creek interim recovery unit. But it did not make that finding, and it is far from obvious that the extirpation of the Icicle Creek population would be harmless. The 2008 BiOp reports that bull trout populations in the Columbia River interim recovery unit are generally declining and are strong in only 6 to 24 percent of the occupied range. See id. at 19. The Wenatchee River core area is particularly important to the recovery unit because it is a "relative stronghold" for bull trout in the upper Columbia River area. Id. at 36. Further, the Icicle Creek local population is important to the core area because its location in the lower basin "could insulate this population from disturbances in the upper basin that would affect most of the others." Id. at 50. At oral argument, the Service emphasized the buffer function the Icicle Creek population might play if other local populations in the core area were threatened.

In sum, the Service was "obligated to articulate a rational connection between the facts found and the conclusions made." Pac. Coast Fed., 426 F.3d at 1091 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). It did not do so. Because "an agency's action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself," id., we must reverse and remand on this basis as well.

C.

The 2008 BiOp was also required to consider the effects of activities interrelated with the proposed agency action. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. The Hatchery uses about 100,000 pounds of fish food to feed the salmon it rears each year, resulting in 30,000 pounds of solid wastes. See 2008 BiOp at 80. The Hatchery uses a pollution abatement pond to collect these wastes. Periodically, waste is removed from the pond and spread out on dry ground at the Hatchery.

The Conservancy contends that the Service did not address the effects of cleaning the pollution abatement pond. In particular, the Conservancy is concerned about the effects of runoff from the wastes spread on land at the Hatchery. The 2008 BiOp reports that the fish food used at the Hatchery "is a source of very small amounts of PCBs polychlorinated biphenyls]," although samples collected from the top layer of sediments in the pollution abatement pond "did not have significantly elevated levels of PCBs." Id. at 66. The Conservancy worries that runoff associated with the cleaning of the pollution abatement pond may contain PCBs and pesticides that could adversely affect bull trout.

We agree with the Service that the 2008 BiOp adequately considered the effects of runoff. In the section entitled "Release of Effluent into Icicle Creek," the Service described the operation of the pollution abatement pond and noted that it was last cleaned in 2007. Id. at 80. It concluded that "hatchery effluent release into Icicle Creek is unlikely to cause adverse effects to the bull trout." Mat 81.

Although the Service's discussion of the effects of the pollution abatement pond could have been more detailed, we are satisfied that the agency did not "entirely fail[] to consider an important aspect of the problem," as it did give the matter some consideration. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), abrogated in part on other grounds, Winter v. Nat Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365, 375, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). Moreover, there is no indication that the runoff issue is an important aspect of the jeopardy determination. The Service points to the results of a 2005 study of PCB and pesticide concentrations in Icicle Creek, the pollution abatement pond, and Hatchery salmon, reported in the Biological Assessment for Operation and Maintenance of the Leavenworth National Fish Hatchery. According to the Biological Assessment, "[d]ata show that [the Hatchery] is not adversely impacting the PCB or pesticide concentrations in Icicle Creek below the hatchery and hatchery fish are not accumulating PCB or pesticides to levels of concern." U.S. Fish Wildlife Serv., Biological Assessment for Operation and Maintenance of Leavenworth National Fish Hatchery 61 (2006).

We therefore reject the Conservancy's contention that the 2008 BiOp is invalid because it did not adequately address the effects of the pollution abatement pond.

D.

When the Service concludes that a proposed agency action will not jeopardize the continued existence of the species but is likely to result in incidental takings, it issues an "incidental take statement" with the biological opinion. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(4).16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14. The statement must "specif[y] the impact of such incidental taking on the species," as well as "those reasonable and prudent measures . . . necessary or appropriate to minimize such impact." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4). The statement acts as a safe harbor, exempting the specified amount of incidental taking from the take prohibition of ESA section 9. "If during the course of the action the amount or extent of incidental taking, as specified [in the statement], is exceeded, the Federal agency must reinitiate consultation immediately."

Here, the Service issued an incidental take statement ("Statement") setting the following annual limits on incidental take: (1) one bull trout killed and one harmed by the water intake system; and (2) twenty migratory bull trout injured because their access to historically accessible spawning habitat is impaired, significantly disrupting their breeding behavior. See 2008 BiOp at 92. The Conservancy challenges the adequacy of the Statement on two separate grounds.

1.

First, the Conservancy contends that the Statement does not account for the full extent of incidental take. The Hatchery facilitates an active tribal Chinook salmon fishery at the base of its spillway pool, and the 2008 BiOp estimated that some bull trout would be harvested incidentally by tribal anglers. See 2008 BiOp at 73. Take of bull trout in accordance with state and tribal fishing regulations is exempt from the ESA's take prohibition. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.44(w)(2). Nonetheless, the Conservancy maintains that the Hatchery takes bull trout by closing dam 5 during the bull trout's spring migration, which results in large numbers of bull trout lingering in the spillway pool, where they may fall prey to tribal anglers fishing for Chinook salmon. If this "take" were included in the Statement, then the Hatchery would be required to comply with reasonable and prudent measures to minimize the take. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4).

We conclude that it was reasonable for the Service not to attribute to the Hatchery the take of bull trout by tribal anglers. Tribal fishing rights in Icicle Creek are guaranteed by treaties and other' agreements. See United States v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 606 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 2010). Although the Hatchery's operations likely do increase the numbers of bull trout lingering in the spillway pool, were the Hatchery to change its operations with the result that the spillway pool became less productive as a Chinook salmon fishing area, the Service might very well be obligated to provide alternative locations for the tribal fishery — which might also result in the taking of bull trout. Take of bull trout by tribal anglers is exempt from the ESA wherever it occurs, as long as tribal regulations are followed. Holding the Hatchery responsible for take by tribal anglers would be incongruent with the special rule exempting tribal fishing from the ESA's take prohibition. It was therefore not arbitrary and capricious for the Service to exclude take associated with the tribal fishery from the Statement.

2.

Second, the Conservancy argues that the Statement does not include adequate monitoring requirements. The Statement anticipates that up to twenty migratory bull trout will be injured each year, because Hatchery operations will significantly disrupt their breeding behavior by preventing or delaying their spawning migration. Yet, the Statement does not require the Hatchery to monitor and report the actual number of bull trout so harmed.

"Incidental Take Statements set forth a `trigger' that, when reached, results in an unacceptable level of incidental take, invalidating the safe harbor provision, and requiring the parties to reinitiate consultation." Ariz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. U.S. Fish Wildlife, 273 F.3d 1229, 1249(9th Cir. 2001). Preferably, the trigger is numerical, but the Service may use a surrogate — for example, changes in ecological conditions affecting the species. Id. at 1250. If a surrogate is used, the agency must articulate a rational connection between the surrogate and the taking of the species. Id. at 1250-51. This court has rejected a surrogate trigger so vague that it failed to "provide a clear standard for determining when the authorized level of take has been exceeded," id. at 1251, and a surrogate so broad" "all spotted owls" associated with the project — that it "could not adequately trigger reinitiation of consultation." Or. Natural Res. Council v. Allen, 476 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2007).

The Service contends that the Statement is adequate because it provides a clear numerical cap on take — twenty bull trout prevented from spawning — beyond which consultation must be reinitiated. Unlike the other anticipated takings discussed in the Statement, however, the twenty-bull trout limit is not accompanied by a monitoring and reporting requirement. For example, the Statement requires the Hatchery to monitor and report the number and types of fish caught in the water intake system. See 2008 BiOp at 94-95. The question, then, is whether the consulting agency is responsible only for providing a clear cap, leaving it up to the action agency to monitor take and reinitiate consultation when the trigger is met, or whether the consulting agency must also set out monitoring and reporting requirements.

The ESA's implementing regulations provide that "[i]n order to monitor the impacts of incidental take, the Federal agency or any applicant must report the progress of the action and its impact on the species to the Service as specified in the incidental take statement." 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(3) (emphasis added). The regulation makes clear that the Service is responsible for specifying in the statement how the action agency is to monitor and report the effects of the action on listed species.

Here, the Service has set a clear numerical cap, but a numerical cap is useful only insofar as the action agency is capable of quantifying take to determine when the trigger has been met. See Or. Natural Res. Council, 476 F.3d at 1039 (explaining that the incidental take statement must "set a clear standard for determining when the authorized level of take hats] been exceeded"); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Evans, 279 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1187 (N.D.Cal. 2003), cited with approval in Or. Natural Res. Council, 476 F.3d at 1038 ("It is arbitrary and capricious to set the trigger at one animal unless defendants can adequately detect the taking of a single animal"). Thus, the Service must either specify monitoring and reporting requirements with respect to the twenty-bull trout limit or, if appropriate, select a surrogate trigger that can be monitored. Therefore, we hold that the ITS failed to establish a meaningful trigger for renewed consultation after the take exceeded authorized levels.

E.

Finally, ESA section 7 also imposes on the Hatchery a substantive duty to ensure that its operations are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the bull trout. "Arbitrarily and capriciously relying on a faulty Biological Opinion violates this duty." Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 976 (9th Cir. 2005), rev'd on other grounds, Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 127 S.Ct. 2518, 168 L.Ed.2d 467 (2007). An agency's reliance on a biological opinion based on "admittedly weak" information satisfies its ESA obligations as long as the challenging party can point to no new information undercutting the opinion's conclusions. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dep't of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1990). Where the opinion's flaws are " legal in nature," however, "[discerning them requires no technical or scientific expertise," and the failure to do so may result in "an action based on reasoning `not in accordance with law* and . . . thus arbitrary and capricious." Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 976.

Here, the Service committed legal error by limiting the scope of the action to five years; failing to articulate a rational connection between its findings in the 2008 BiOp and its no jeopardy conclusion; and issuing an inadequate incidental take statement. The Hatchery's reliance on a legally flawed biological opinion was arbitrary and capricious. The Hatchery therefore violated its substantive duty to ensure that its operations and maintenance did not jeopardize the continued existence of the bull trout.

III.

We conclude that the 2008 BiOp is arbitrary and capricious because the Service limited the analysis to a five-year period, failed to articulate a rational connection between the facts found and the conclusions made, and issued an incidental take statement lacking adequate monitoring and reporting requirements. Additionally, the Hatchery violated its substantive duty to ensure that its operations did not jeopardize the continued existence of the bull trout. We reverse and remand to the district court with directions to grant the Conservancy's motion for summary judgment and to grant injunctive relief until the Service complies with its obligations under the ESA.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

FISHER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

Prompted by this litigation, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has attempted to minimize the effect of the Leavenworth National Fish Hatchery ("the Hatchery") on the small population of bull trout in Icicle Creek. My colleagues in the majority find these efforts insufficient to meet the strictures of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") and place two substantial burdens on the Fish and Wildlife Service ("the Service") that the ESA does not require. First, the majority requires the Service to address operations and maintenance on an unlimited time horizon, despite planned modifications that will further reduce the Hatchery's impact on the bull trout. Second, the majority requires the Service to attribute continuation of a 70-year population decline to planned Hatchery operations, rather than recognizing that trend and the structures that caused it as the environmental baseline. I respectfully dissent from these aspects of the majority's opinion.

I.

The majority first concludes that the Service acted arbitrarily or capriciously by limiting its analysis to the five-year term of the 2006 to 2011 Operations and Maintenance Plan ("the OM Plan"). See Op. at 521-25. As the majority notes, Section 7 of the ESA requires consultation concerning any agency action that may "jeopardize the continued existence of an endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). The ESA defines agency action as "any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency." Id. The applicable regulation further defines "action" as

all activities or programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United States or upon the high seas. Examples include, but are not limited to . . . actions directly or indirectly causing modifications to the land, water, or air.
50 C.F.R. § 402.02.

Here the Service had a reasonable rationale to limit the scope of the agency action considered in the 2008 Biological Opinion to a five-year period: the projected completion of a new water intake system in 2011 that will reduce annual adverse impacts on the bull trout when completed. See U.S. Fish Wildlife Serv., Biological Opinion for the Operation and Maintenance of the Leavenworth National Fish Hatchery Through 2011, at 14-15 (2008) ("2008 BiOp."). As both the 2008 BiOp and the accompanying Incidental Take Statement ("ITS") acknowledge* the current water intake system harms bull trout annually, and the majority recognizes that improving this system will require a new BiOp. See Op. at 519 n. 2. The Service also intends to undertake a broader habitat restoration project at the Hatchery. Although this project cannot begin until adequate funding has been secured and further consultation has occurred, see 2008 BiOp at 15, it demonstrates the significant differences between the environmental impacts during the period covered by the OM Plan and future operations. Perhaps most importantly, allowing the Service in these circumstances to define an action as the multi-year operation of an ongoing program promotes renewed analysis based on a growing foundation of data, analysis and mitigation experiments. The majority's contention that the Service "might as easily have chosen a thirty-year term or a one-year term," Op. at 522, is unfairly dismissive of the agency's reasonable response to the facts on the ground (and in the river).

It seems quite reasonable for the Service to assess the present and future impacts of a fixed period of operations rather than to assess operations on an indefinite time horizon, which would require the demonstrably false assumption that the Service will never meaningfully change Hatchery operations. Cf. Pac Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082, 1088-92 (9th Cir. 2005) (faulting a 10-year BiOp for failing to explain why mitigating action was delayed until year nine, not for being limited to 10 years). The majority's repeated assertion that a BiOp addressing five years of operation and management is not a "`comprehensive biological opinion[] considering all stages of the agency action,'" Op. at 524, 524-25 (quoting Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1454 (9th Cir. 1988)), begs the question and fails to afford the Service appropriate flexibility to define the scope of its action. The majority guarantees that an ongoing program that fails to remedy immediately a slowly declining population will be found to jeopardize the existence of a threatened or endangered species.

A BiOp addressing a fixed term of operations can and must address long-term implications. However, ESA consultation need address only long-term effects of the agency action at issue, rather than additional agency actions that may or may not occur in the future. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (defining "indirect effects" as "those that are caused by the proposed action and are later in time, but are still reasonably certain to occur" (emphasis added)); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Sew., 524 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he proper baseline analysis is . . . what jeopardy might result from the agency's proposed actions in the present and future human and natural contexts." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). The 2008 BiOp expressly considered these "indirect effects." 2008 BiOp at 67. Although the BiOp acknowledged that the proposed action is unlikely "to prevent the number of migratory spawners from being large enough to cause an increasing population trend, or to fully alleviate long-term genetic risks to the population," id. at 85, given that the population has persisted for over 70 years without access to migratory spawners, it was not irrational for the Service to conclude that five additional years of limited access would not "reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery" of the local population, let alone the interim recovery unit. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02; cf. Am. Rivers v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs., 271 F.Supp.2d 230, 254-55 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits because the Army Corps "narrowly focus[ed] its analysis on the impacts of the 2003 high summer flows on . . . this year only, instead of evaluating both the present and future effects of the 2003 low summer flows "(emphasis added)). Future BiOps may find that continued operation of the Hatchery will push the Icicle Creek population to a tipping point, but the 2008 BiOp provides a rational explanation why this particular OM Plan will not appreciably increase the likelihood that such a point will be reached.

Rejecting appellant's challenge to the 2008 BiOp would not, as the majority envisions, authorize death of the bull trout by a thousand cuts. A short-term BiOp is reasonable in this case because the Service plans major improvements in the near term that will significantly alleviate the bull trout take. Should the Service continue to resort to short-term BiOps in the future, however, that approach would be increasingly unlikely to satisfy the ESA, regardless of the justification. Allowing this short-term BiOp would not foreclose future analysis of any period of time in which the agency's action would reduce " appreciably the likelihood" of survival and recovery. Contra Op. 522-23 (emphasis in original). Indeed, a reasonable definition of an appreciable effect surely would include "a likely net decrease of five to ten bull trout over [a] five-year period", id., when the starting population is believed to number fewer than 20 spawning individuals. See 2008 BiOp at 66. There is, however, no support in the record for the notion that such a decline is likely during the period addressed by the 2008 BiOp, let alone that the Service would continue to reach no-jeopardy conclusions if similar, cumulative decreases were to occur a second or third time.

Finally, the majority fears that the Service would permit serial reductions in the Icicle Creek population until its "role in the interim recovery unit [is] so diminished, that its loss could not be said to reduce appreciably the likelihood of survival and recovery of the interim recovery unit." Op. 523 (emphasis in original). But, if the small Icicle Creek population plays a significant role, that importance must be based on genetic and geographic diversity, not the population's contribution to gross numbers. Even if one or more short-term assessments permitted small further reductions in the Icicle Creek population, its genetic and geographic importance to the interim recovery unit would remain unchanged, and the loss of this diversity would have to be taken into account in future jeopardy assessments.

The majority tries to shoehorn this case into the rule we established in Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988). See Op. at 521-22. Conner is not on point. There we held that an incremental approach to a BiOp was not permissible when the scope of the planned agency action — a lease of federal land for oil exploration development and production" included activity beyond the exploration phase reviewed in the BiOp. See id. at 1443-44, 1452. Unlike Conner, the OM Plan does not authorize activity beyond the duration or scope of the BiOp; the purpose of the planned activities is complete at the end of the authorized agency action. Cf. id. at 1453 ("`[P]umping oil' and not `leasing tracts' is the aim of congressional [mineral leasing]." (quoting North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 608(D.C. Cir. 1980) (alterations in original))).

The D.C. Circuit's decision in Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1982), provides a more apt analysis. Cabinet Mountains Wilderness approved a BiOp that addressed only a three-year exploration plan because "[a]pproval was expressly limited to the proposed exploratory drilling activities[and] further activities such as developmental exploration or mineral extraction would require a comprehensive examination of environmental effects." Id. at 681. Although the D.C. Circuit did not place its express imprimatur on the duration of the drilling plan, it rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the BiOp failed to account for cumulative impacts to grizzly habitat and determined that only concurrent "timber sales and roads were relevant in addressing the problem of cumulative impacts." Id. at 683-84. The majority's dismissal of Cabinet Mountains Wilderness in a footnote, see Op. at 522 n. 6, fails to grapple with the decision. I recognize that Cabinet Mountains Wilderness did not expressly hold that an agency may segregate a fixed period of operations in a BiOp, but Conner did not expressly hold that an agency may not do so. Cabinet Mountains Wilderness remains the more analogous authority.

We are faced with a BiOp addressing a distinct five-year plan for operations and management, using existing infrastructure prior to planned improvements. Unlike Conner, the BiOp addresses the approved agency action in its entirety. And like Cabinet Mountains Wilderness, the OM Plan is expressly limited to a limited period and range of activities; any further operation will require renewed environmental review. I therefore part company with my colleagues' conclusion that the decision to address only five years of management activities was arbitrary and capricious.

II.

The majority holds that it is impossible to issue a rational no jeopardy conclusion in light of the Service's finding that "long-term negative [population] trends[within Icicle Creek] are likely to continue." Op. at 526 (quoting 2008 BiOp at 85) (modifications in original). The majority, however, fails to address the appropriate environmental baseline and merely assumes that the long-term trend is attributable to the current action. See Op. at 525-29. The 2008 BiOp includes the Hatchery's historical structures and operations in the environmental baseline, see 2008 BiOp at 66, and Wild Fish Conservancy has abandoned on appeal its argument that this inclusion was improper.

Department of the Interior regulations define the environmental baseline as including

the past and present impacts of all Federal, State, or private actions and other human activities in the action area, the anticipated impacts of all proposed Federal projects in the action area that have already undergone formal or early section 7 consultation, and the impact of State or private actions which are contemporaneous with the consultation in process.
50 C.F.R. § 402.02. Of course planned operation and maintenance of the Hatchery cannot be included in the baseline. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 524 F.3d at 930-31 ("Although we acknowledge that the existence of the dams must be included in the environmental baseline, the operation of the dams is within the federal agencies' discretion. . . ."). The 2008 BiOp correctly determined that the OM Plan will harm the Icicle Creek bull trout population. See, e.g., 2008 BiOp at 85 ("The proposed action is likely to cause impaired passage conditions for the bull trout in Icicle Creek each year. . . ."). The BiOp, however, included the continued presence of Hatchery facilities, including obstructions to bull trout migration put in place during past operations, as components of the environmental baseline. See 2008 BiOp at 32; Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 524 F.3d at 930 ("The current existence of the [federal] dams constitutes an `existing human activity' which is already endangering the fishes' survival and recovery." (quoting Alcoa v. Administrator, Bonnevile Power Admin., 175 F.3d 1156, 1162 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1999))). Similarly, the BiOp included in the baseline a 70-year population decline and the risks that accompany a small remaining population. See BiOp at 66.

With the scope of both the proposed agency action and the environmental baseline in mind, the Service successfully "articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the [no jeopardy] conclusions made." Pac. Coast, 426 F.3d at 1090 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983)). The continuation of long-term negative population trends results from the continuing presence of obstacles to fish passage through Icicle Creek, and the Service's inaction — its failure to remove those obstacles — is not a part of activity whose effects are considered in the BiOp. There is no contradiction between the remaining effects and the Service's conclusion that the present and long-term effects of the OM Plan are not likely to reduce appreciably the bull trout's likelihood of survival and recovery of the interim recovery unit.

Nor was it irrational for the Service to conclude that the OM Plan, in concert with the environmental baseline, was "not likely to change the current distribution and abundance of the bull trout in the action area." 2008 BiOp at 84. By reducing the period in which preexisting obstacles bar passage of bull trout to spawning grounds, the OM Plan reduced the rate of decline, and we have no reason to disbelieve the Service's conclusion that the marginal decline over a five year period" while improvements are made to the in-take system and plans are laid for habitat rehabilitation — would affect distribution and abundance in an ecologically meaningful manner. This does not guarantee that there "won't be fewer fish in 2011 than there were in 2006." Op. at 527. But that claim was never made by the Service and is not necessary to its no-jeopardy conclusion.

The majority also contends that the 2008 BiOp fails to "explain how a `negative' population trend in Icicle Creek could improve . . . the contribution of the Icicle Creek bull trout population to the survival of the bull trout.'" Op. at 528 (quoting 2008 BiOp 86-87). The majority, however, omits a crucial phrase from the quoted text. The BiOp states in full:

However, the effect of improved upstream passage conditions caused by the proposed action, as evidenced by some migratory bull trout observations in spawning habitat within Icicle Creek above the [Hatchery] in 2006 and 2007, when added to the environmental baseline should improve, albeit in only a small way, the contribution of the Icicle Creek local population to the survival of the bull trout.

Slowing a localized decline improves a population's contribution to the broader survival of the species, both by preserving genetic diversity in the short term and widening the time frame in which further improvements can be made to reverse the trend entirely. More importantly, any contradiction in this analysis is irrelevant to the Service's broader conclusion that "the proposed action . . . is not likely to appreciably increase [the Bull Trout's] recovery at the action area, core area, interim recovery unit, and range-wide scales." 2008 BiOp at 86.

* * * * * *

In sum, the Service provided a rational basis for its no jeopardy conclusion. To conclude otherwise requires neglecting the environmental baseline and distrusting agency experts' analysis of the scope and relevance of continued population decline, mitigated by remedial agency action. I therefore disagree with my colleague's conclusion that the Service's analysis in the 2008 BiOp is irrational. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from Parts II.A., II.B., II.E. and III. of the majority opinion, but otherwise concur.

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WILD FISH CONSERVANCY v. SALAZAR
(Dec 7, 2010)